有趣的是，有证据表明，目前的记录水平的干粉可能没有它第一次出现的问题。低利率等其他因素也在起作用，促使普通合伙人利用更多杠杆为交易融资，增加贷款使用。这两种做法都有可能提高基金的内部收益率，同时也有助.
2021-04-30
11页
5星级
技术和创新正在改变全球金融格局，为受监管机构和当局带来机遇、风险和挑战。创新的一个重要领域是应用新技术，帮助当局提高监管能力(称为“SupTech”)，并由机构满足监管要求(称为“RegTech”)。SupTech和RegTech提供的机会是由近年来出现的各种因素共同创造的。其中包括数据可用性和粒度的大幅提高，以及云计算和应用程序编程接口(API)等新的基础设施，这些基础设施允许更有效地收集、存储和分析大型数据集。当局和受监管的机构都求助于这些技术，以帮助它们管理2008年金融危机后实施的日益严格的监管要求。SupTech和RegTech工具可能对金融稳定有重要好处。对于当局来说，使用SupTech可以提高监督、监视和分析能力，并生成实时风险指标，以支持前瞻性、基于判断的监督和决策。对于受监管机构而言，使用RegTech可以改善合规结果，增强风险管理能力，并对业务产生新的见解，以改进决策。对于当局和受管制的机构来说，效率和效力的提高，以及由于以前手动过程的自动化而可能提高的质量，都是一个重要的考虑因素。考虑到这些好处，SupTech成为越来越多当局的战略重点也就不足为奇了。根据对金融稳定委员会成员的调查，大多数受访者都制定了高科技、创新或数据战略，自2016年以来，此类战略的使用量大幅增长。主管部门报告的SupTech工具最常见的“用例”是在监管报告和数据管理领域。近年来，SupTech在“不当行为分析”和微观审慎监管方面的使用有所增加，而市场监督方面的使用案例则有所减少。超过一半的受访者表示，他们拥有一个正式的SupTech工具开发或测试平台。
2021-04-29
76页
5星级
批发银行的回报率很高。十年来市场和IBD业务的结构变化导致了更有效的资产负债表使用和波动性捕捉，为在流感大流行中保持弹性的表现奠定了基础。我们认为，在积极的宏观和政策环境下，提高12%以上的回报率是可.
2021-04-23
37页
5星级
Task Force onClimate-relatedFinancial DisclosuresForward-Looking FinancialSector MetricsConsultation湖人EOTCFDOctober 2020URES#page#ContentsA.Background and PurposeB.Scope and ApproachC.Forward-Looking Financial Sector Metrics41.Carbon and Emissions MetricsS2.Other Metrics53.Challenges of Forward-Looking InformationD. Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature Rise1.Overview82. Potential Benefits93.Current Challenges13Appendix 1: Examples of Implied Temperature Rise Disclosure18Appendix 2: Examples of Climate Value-at-Risk Disclosure20Appendix3:Glossary22Appendix 4: ReferencesTask Force Miin the development ofthis consultation#page#A. Background and PurposeIn its 2019 status report,theTask Force onAs anticipated,disclosure practices and theClimate-related Financial Disclosures (Task Forceuse of disclosures by financial marketor TCFD)identified specificareas it intendedparticipantshave continued to evolvesince 2017In the context of a growing frequency of physicato explore to supportimplementation ofitsdisclosure recommendations, issued in Juneclimate-related impacts and the availability2017.One oftheareas wasrelatedtoclarifyingofnewresearch，tools，andresourcesforassessing climate-relatedrisks andelements of the Task Forces supplementalguidance which was issued at the same time asopportunities,there is increasing interest inforward-lookingclimate-related informationfinancial institutionsdisclosure practicestoinform financial decision-making.especially as they relate to metrics and targetsAdditionally,120 countries plus the European一and in consideration of market and industryUnion have announced that they are workingdevelopments，the Task Force determined thattoward achieving netzero greenhouse gas(GHG）insights gained through a public consultationemissions by 2050-an indication of potentialon current options would be useful in bettershifts in business models and capital flows thatunderstanding the evolution of metrics andthe financial sector seeks to understand.targetsreporting byassetowners，assetFromOctober29，2020.toJanuary 27，2021，managers banks，and insurance companies.the Task Force will hold a public consultatiorThe Task Forces supplemental guidance foron decision-usefulforward-looking metricsthe financialsector encouraged asset managersto be disclosed by financialinstitutions.Severaland asset owners to disclose to their clients orconsiderations for such metrics are describedbeneficiaries，respectivelythe metrics they usein Section C. Forward-Looking Financial Sectorto assess climate-related risks and opportunitiesMetrics，as context forthe consultation.as well as other metrics they believe are usefulIn particularametric that hasgainedinterestfor decision-makingin addition，the Task Forcefrom the financialsector since the Task ForceTable of Contentsrecommended asset managers andasset ownersissued its supplemental guidance-referrecdiscloseaspecific carbon footprint metric-thetoas“implied temperaturerise associatedwithAweighted average carbon intensity.Importantly.investments （ITR)-is described at a highBackground and Purposewhen the Task Force issued its supplementallevel in Section D.Metric for ConsiderationImplied Temperature Rise for consideration inguidancein 2017.itwasaware oflimitationsofcarbon footprinting and intensity metricsthe consultation.TheTask Force alsoseeks to8ScopeandApproachandviewed themasafirststepin theunderstand alternative forward-looking metricsdevelopment of metrics for disclosure bythat could be disclosed by financial institutionsfinancial sector companies.in line with the TCFD recommendationsC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsD.Metric for Con#page#The Task FB.Scope and Approachinvestors that disclose forward-lookingdisclosure from several large institutionalclimate-related metrics to better understandinvestors.the Task Force formedaworkingavailable metrics and the potential benefits andchallenges ofdisclosure.Finally.the workinggroup to consider the benefits and challengesof disclosure of implied temperature rise andgroup developedasetofquestionsforpubldother forward-looking climate-related metrics.consultation，to ensure thatabroad range ofThe Task Forcemembers participating in theperspectives inform the Task Forces future work.working group contributed expertise from assetThe Task Force will take consultation responsesmanagement firms，pension funds,banks，andinto consideration to determine whetherfurthercreditrating agencies.TCFDfinancial sector guidance on forward-looking metrics is needed.Workinggroup members spoketoseveralmethodology providers and institutionalBox B1TCFD Public ConsultationTheTask Forces 90-day publicconsultation solicitsinputonforward-ookingclimate-related metricsforthefinancialsectorTheconsultationasks questionsabouttheusefulnessandchallengesofsuchmetricsandwhat may benecessaryto enhance their comparability.transparency,and rigorThe Task Forceencouragesthe publictorespondtothe consultationatfsb-tcfd.org between October 29,2020.andjanuary272021，Table of ContentsA.Background and PurposeB.Scope and ApproachC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsD.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseAppendices44.3851.31#page#C.Forward-Looking Financial Sector MetricsThrough public consultation， the Task Force aimsInvestors and other users of disclosure rely onto better understand the evolution of metricsclimate-related metrics to better understandused and disclosed by companies in the fourriskandevaluate progress toward establishedfinancial groups that wereidentified in its 2017targets and objectives.They may also usesupplemental guidance:asset owners，assetselect metrics for discussion and engagementwith portfolio companies.The absence ofmanagers，banks，andinsurancecompaniesSuch metrics may focus on carbon and otherwidelyavailable，high-qualityhistoricalclimateemissions orother financially relevant factors.related information contributes to the need forFigure C1 provides excerpts ofthe Task Forcesbetterforward-lookingapproaches.In additionguidance for asset owners on metrics used toto private sector innovation for metrics toassess climate-related issues and how theybetter understand climate-related financialconsider forward-looking information on a lower-impacts,there are increasingregulatorycarbon transition.Figure C1Excerpt of TCFD Guidance for Asset OwnersRisk ManagementDisclose how the organization identifiesassesses,and manages climate-relatedrisks.Table of ContentsRecommendedDisclosure b）Describe theSupplemental Guidance for Asset OwnersA.Assetownersshoulddescribehowthey considerthe positioningoftheirtotal portfolioBackground and Purposeorganizationswithrespectto thetransiton toalower-carbon energysupplyproductonanduseprocesses forsoooduaeuuaesuMoassemouuuedxpnupinosLmanagingclimate8related risks.ScopeandApproach1C.Metrics and TargetsForward-LookingDisclosethemetricsandtargetsusedtoassessand managerelevantclimate-relatedrisksFinancial Sector Metricsand opportunities where such information is materialRecommendedD.Disclosure a）Metric for Consideration:DisclosethemetricsImplied Temperature Riselused bytheorganizationtoSupplemental Guidance forAssetOwnersAppendicesassessclimateAsset owners should describe metrics used to assess dimate-related risks andrelated risks andopportunitiesineach fundorinvestmentstrategy.Whererelevantassetownersopportunities in lineShouldalsodescribe howthese metrics have changedovertimewith its strategy andWhereappropriate，assetownersshouldprovidemetrics consideredininvestmentriskmanagementdecisionsandmonitoringprocess.notedby-#page#The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosuresexpectations for firms to demonstrateaforwardwith international climate agreementsandlooking understanding ofcimate-related risk.national policy goals.Forexample，in December2019,120countriesandthe European UnionItis importanttonote thatsimilartotheuse ofannounced that they areworking to achievemultipletraditional financial valuation metricsnet-zero emissions by 2050-an early indicationin mainstream financial decision-making，noof potentialfuture policyand regulatory changessingleclimate-related metric can fully describefor companies in those jurisdictionsthe position ofacompany.product.fund，orEven todays highest-emitting companies couldinvestment strategy in relation to climate.Themetrics explored in the consultation wouldtake actions to significantly alter their futurebeintendedtocomplementnotreplaceemissionstrajectories，andconsequentlytheexisting disclosures in alignment with the TCFDrelevant climate-related risks and opportunitiesrecommendations.The Task Force welcomestheyface.Many investorsand other users ofinput on all forward-looking metricsthat coulddisclosuretherefore seekto betterevaluatehelp to better inform capital allocation decisions.how carbon exposures associatedwith theirinvestments could evolve overtimeAs described in Section D.Metric for1.CARBON AND EMISSIONS METRICSConsideration: Implied Temperature Riseafewlarge financialinstitutions have started toWeightedaveragecarbonintensity andothercalculate and disclose an“implied temperaturecarbon footprinting metrics provide someriseassociated with investments.This is onevisibility into the carbon exposure of certairapproach to considering the position oftheirassetsatafixedpointintime.Althoughstillassets in relation to thetransition to a loweruseful for decision-making， past carboncarbon economy.Other financially focusedexposures provide littleinsight into potentialapproaches mayrelatetopotentialcostsfutureexposure.Thisisparticularlythecaseassociatedwith carbon emissions，such asasagrowing numberof companies areunpriced carbon cost or carbon earnings at risk14announcing planned changes to products，strategies，and future emissions targets in lineTable of ContentsA.“Emissionsareaprime driver ofrising globaltemperaturesBackground and Purposeand.assuch，areakeyfocalpointofpolicy.regulatorymarketand technology responses to limit climate change，As a result8ScopeandApproachorganizations with significantemissions are lkey to be impactedmoresignifcantly by transition riskthan otherorganizations.C.In additioncurrentorfuture constraints on emissions，eitherForward-LookingFinancial Sector Metricsdirecty by emission restrictions or indirectly through carbon budgetsmayimpact organizationsfinancialy”D.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseApppendiices#page#The Task Force on Climate-n50% ofthe carbon footprint for companies inofjurisdictions offer safe-harbor protections formany industries.222 Many forward-lookingforward-looking disclosures made in good faithcarbon and emissions metrics rely on pastusingthe best information reasonablyavailableGHGemissions data to estimatefuturetrendsatthetime.2and,thereforea lack ofhistorical data canComplexity of Calculation.Until otherexacerbate uncertainty in future assumptions.challengesareaddressed there maybealargeConversely when including all scopes of GHGresource burden associatedwith calculatinganddisclosing forward-lookingmetrics，whichcompanies across a portfolio，investors andoften require theassistance ofoneor moreothers must often take precautions to avoidexternal data and methodology providerscould overstate potentialclimate-related risk.2Suitability for Public Disclosure. Financialsector organizationsmay use several forward-Lack of Transparency and Comparability.lookingmetricsinvariousstatesofmaturityMany forward-looking methodologies are newas inputs to capital allocation decisionsandevolving，andthereis littletransparencyHoweverwhile useful internallythosefrom methodology providers on how theymetrics may be considered proprietary oare calculated or compare to each other.may not meet an organizations qualityWhere methodologies are publicly describedstandard for public disclosuredifferences across data providers can stillmake resulting disclosures difficult to compareSimilar challenges arerelevant to forward-forinvestors and others evaluating climatelookingclimateassessmentsoutsideofmetrics，exposure across their holdings.Forforward.However.the disclosures resulting from thoselooking metrics to be more useful in financialassessments can still be useful.Forexample，indecision-making,disclosure must be based onits recommended disclosure Strategy c) the Tasktransparentand comparablemethodologiesForce recommends that organizations describetheresilience oftheir strategy.taking intoReliance on Assumptions and Futureconsideration different climate-related scenariosUncertainty.Calculationsofforward-lookingincluding a 2C or lower scenario.Climate-relatecmetricsarecomplex andrequiremanyTable of Contentsscenario analysis has become more widely usedmethodological choices and assumptions.androbust since the Task Force released itsSome assumptions attempt to compensateA.recommendations in 2017.na2019 TCFD surveyfor existing data gaps,such as past emissionsBackground and Purposeon effective disclosure aligned with the TCFDtrends or comparable and reliable companyrecommendations，aselect group ofexpertspecific targets.Other assumptions rely onusers most often rated disclosure aligned with8StrategycVeryUseful.2ScopeandApproachmodels，the details ofwhich can varywidelyGreateravailabilityofhigh-qualityemissionsparticular uncertainty around future climateC.data，futureclimate-relatedtargets andrelated policy can contributetogreaterForward-Lookingstrategies,and convergence ar#page#The TaskD. Metric for ConsiderationImplied Temperature RiseA newclimate-related metric that severaldegree rating,ITR incorporates current GHGinstitutionalinvestors have begun to use andemissions orother data andassumptions todiscloseis impliedtemperaturerise（ITR）.27estimate expectedfuture emissions associatedmplied temperaturerise metrics aim to providewiththeselectedentities.Then，theestimateaforward-looking view ofcarbon exposure thatistranslated intoa projected increase incan be applied to a wide range of industriesglobal average temperature(in C)abovepreindustrial levels that would occurifallcompanies，andasset panies in corresponding sectors had then its consultation，theTask Force seeks broadsame carbon intensity as the selected asset(s）input onwhetherand how,ITR disclosure wouldbe useful in financial decision-makingIt alscTheITRmetric is expressedinasingletemperatureunit orrange thatis comparableseeks input on which types oforganizationsmight disclose ITR.which types ofinvestmentstowidely understood potentialclimateoutcomes(eg，1.5,2C,3.5).Asan ITR disclosure could address,as well as itslimitations，potentialchallenges，and what mightsummarized in Appendix 1:Examples ofbe needed to improve its usefulness.Implied Temperature Rise Disclosure,a fewlarge asset owners and asset managerscurrently disclose the implied temperaturerise oftheir portfolios.The extent to which ITR1.OVERVIEWisforward-looking dependson whetherthecalculation methodology usesonly historicalAn implied temperature rise metric attempts toemissions data orifitalsotakes projectedestimate a global temperature rise associatedGHGemissions into account.An example ofwith the greenhouse gas emissions ofasingledisclosure on implied temperature rise overTable of Contentsentity（e.g.,acompany）oraselectionofentitiestwoyears is provided in Figure D1.（egthoseinagiveninvestmentportfolio，fundorinvestment strategy）.ExpressedasanumericA.Background and Purpose8Figure D1ScopeandApproachExample of Implied Temperature Rise DisclosureC.Forward-Looking5.0Financial Sector Metrics4.0C4.0gPotential口.3.0C3.0Metric for Consideration:3.02.80Implied Temperature Rise2.0Appendices1.AXADivestedAXAAggregateBenchmarhAXASODebtCoalAssets2019#page#While ITR can be used as an impact metricDisclosure by different types oforganizationsor communication and engagement toolitswithin thefinancialsector may align withdisclosure could also provide insight on climatedifferent user needs as follows:related risks and opportunities associated withDisclosure by AssetOwners.whetherselect assets to better inform capitalallocationasset owners invest directly or through assetdecisions.In alignmentwith the Task Forcesmanagers.theybeartheoutcomesofclimatesupplemental guidance，a fewasset owners thatrelatedtransitionand physicalrisks towhichcurrently consider ITR in investment decisionstheirinvestmentsareexposed.Similarlyassetand monitoringor“the positioning oftheirowners can benefitfromthe potentialreturnstotal portfoliowithrespect to thetransitionon the investment opportunities associatedto a lowercarbon energy supply productionwithalow-carbontransition.Climate-relatedand use.including how they“actively managedisclosure by asset owners allows beneficiariestheir portfolios positioning in relation to thisandotheraudiences toassesstheassettransitionhave begunto disclose ITR.28.29owners investment strategies andapproachesHowever.theITRmetricisnewandstilevolvingtomanaging their portfolios，There are several technical and methodologicalchallenges related to calculating ITR.noITR disclosure could help asset ownersbeneficiaries make a forward-lookingcommonly agreed terminology to refer to themetricand little understanding ofadvancementsassessmentofan assetowner portfoliosthat would be needed to improvethe usefulnessexposuretoclimate-related risks,theirOfITR disclosuresability to capitalize on opportunities in thelow-carbon transition overtime，and overallinvestmentstrategy.Moreoverassetownerssitatthetopoftheinvestment chainand2.POTENTIALBENEFITSthereforetheir disclosure ofITR may encouragebetter forward-looking disclosure across theBasedon inputfrom severalinstitutionalinvestorsinvestment chain，fromotherasset owners，hat use and disclose implied temperaturerise，asasset managers，and underlying companieswell as data and methodology providers,the TaskTable of ContentsAn example ofan assetowners perspectiveForce understands that ITR disclosure has theon its ITR disclosure is described in Figurepotential to be usefulinseveralways.Appendix 1A1-1(p.13）in Appendix 1:Examples oflmpliedA.Examples of Implied Temperature Rise DisclosureTemperature Rise DisclosureBackground and Purposedescribes perspectives on theITRmetric from anasset ownerandtwoinsurance companies thatDisclosure by Asset Managers.Assetdisclose ITR metrics8ScopeandApproachassets withinaportfolio，bearthe potentialProponents ofITR disclosure note that it couldtransition and physicalrisks to which theirrepresenta proxy forclimate-related transitioninvestments are exposed.Similarly.theyrisks or opportunities associatedwith aselectedC.enjoy the potentialreturns on opportunitiesForward-Lookingportfoio，fundorinvestmentstrategy Forassociated with thetransition toa low#page#The Task Force on cimate6Disclosure by Banks and InsuranceSome methodologies use company-specificCompanies. Banks and insurers serve ahistorical emissions datawhile others takeavariety ofbeneficiariesand stakeholders.“top-down” approach to allocate emissionssome ofwhom could use disclosure ofITR asbased onsectoralor geographicaldata.adirectional proxy for exposure to climate-Methodologiesvary in their use ofScope 1related risks.As such，disclosure ofITR byScope2，and/orScope3GHGemissions.Somebanks and insurers could also indicate howuse only Scope 1data，while others use Scopewell positioned theseinstitutionsare tocapture1and2，andyetotherstake Scope 1，2,and3opportunities for thetransition to a low-carbonGHG emissions into account.economy.Users of disclosure must be ableto distinguish among banks and insuranceCertain methodologiestake cumulativecompanies exposures and risk profiles tohistorical GHG emissions into account whilemakeinformed financial decisions.others incorporate point-in-timeassessmentsHowever current disclosures from banksofemissionsintensity.and insurance companies often omit keyparts ofthe business,forexample capital-Some methodologies incorporate companymarket financing for banks and underwritingspecificfutureemissionstargets，whileothersportfolios for insurers.In part this is due totakeatop-down” approachtoestimatefuturea lack of consistent ITR methodologies foremissions based on sectororgeography.0flendingandinsurance portfolios.thosethatincorporateemissionstargetstherearedifferent criteria forthetypesoftargets that can and cannot be used3.CURRENT CHALLENGES-Methodologiesmay incorporate differentclimate-relatedscenariosoremissionsWhileITRmayhave potentialto beanpathways,orevenutilizeinternal proprietaryinformative metric,itscalculation，disclosure，andfutureemissionspathways.use are currently subject to several significantchallenges.Implied temperature rise is a newly-Certain methodologiesmay be better suiteddeveloped metric and therefore methodologiesTable of Contentstoassessing certain asset classes and mayand approaches are still evolving.Furtherworkvary in whethersome asset classesare abletoand input from preparers and users of disclosurebe assessedat all.A.will likely be needed to improveits quality andBackground and Purposeavailability.In addition to challenges generallyDifferent methodologies will lead to differentapplicable to forward-looking metrics describedITRestimates that are not directly comparablein Section C.3. Challenges of Forward-Looking8Variations in methodologies may also lead toInformation，ITR disclosure is currently subjectScopeandApproachunder or overestimates ofimpliedtemperaturetothefollowingrise，andconsequentlyanexaggeratedindication ofclimate-related riskC.Variationin Approaches and Outcomes.Forward-LookingInresponsetorecentinterestin ITR.severalFinancial Sector MetricsInitiative，Arabesque，Carbon Delta，CDPMSCIScience Based Targets Initiativeand Trucost口.-are developingarange ofITR calculationMetric fo#page#The Task Force on cimateancial DisclosureCoverage Limitations.Currently.calculationofITRseems to befeasible onlyforcertaincarbon-intensive sectors(e.g.，utilitiesoiland gas，androadtransport）or specific assetClasses rather than for a fully diversifiedportfolio. For example，ofthe ITR disclosureexamples provided in Table A1-1（p.13)ofAppendix 1: Examples of Implied TemperatureRise Disclosure none specify 100% portfolioCoverage.Moreoversomeavailablemethodologies may only include a limitednumber oftechnologies and indicators, whileother important levers/indicators that areneeded to understand transitionrisks andopportunities in certain sectors may not beincluded.Assessing otherfactors,suchasthe companys business model historicalperformance，and management actions mayalso be relevant but not taken into account intodays methodologiesChallengesare to beexpectedinthedevelopment ofnewforward-looking metrics.The Task Force recognizes that multipleinitiatives，comprisedofinvestorsandothers.areworking to encourage more consistent ITRdisclosureandaddressits challenges.Table of ContentsA.Background and Purpose8ScopeandApproachC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector Metrics口.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseAppendiices#page#The TaskAppendix 1: Examples of ImpliedTemperature Rise DisclosureCertainfnancialinstitutions have begun to discloseimpliedtemperaturerise （TRestimatesover the past two years.including the nine organizations listed in Table A1-1.As shown in thecomparison.the estimates address various portions ofthe organizationsportfolios andwerdevelopedin collaboration with several methodology providersTableA1-1Comparison of Select ITR DisclosuresadMethodologyLocation ofDisclosed ITROrganizationCoverageEmissionsProviderDisclosureAviva2.9C(al）80%ofScope 1onlyCarbon DeltaAviv,AivaCimate-Relatedaggregate（incl.equities，FinancialDisclosurecorporate credit，sovereign2019,Metricsrealestateand Targetsinfrastructure）Summaryp.3Table of ContentsAXA3.2C（equity）95%coverageScope 1 onlyCarbon DeltaAXA,2020Cimate Report.D.19A.2.8C（corporate70%coverageBackground and Purposedebt）82.8C(sovereign 99.79coverageBeyond RatingsScopeandApproachdebtC.Uamx70%ofequityNotspecifiedTrucost2Banque deBanqueForward-LookingFranceportfoliosdeFrance，InvestingFinancial Sector MetricsInitiativeResponsibleInvestmentReport2020，D.D.18Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature Rise2.3-4.3NotspecifedBNP ParibasNotspecifedScience-BasedBNP Paribas，Cardif2CAlignment2019 TCFD（equity）Appendices（lower bound）.Report,p.41Carbon Impact2.2-3.1CNot specifiedNotspecifiedAnalytics（upper（bonds）bound）ContinuedonnextpogTableAZ-#page#The Task Force on Climatancial DisclosuresTable A1-1:ComparisonofSelectITRDisclosures（Continued）MethodologyLocation ofDisclosed ITRCoverageOrganizationEmissionsProviderDisclosureCNP28CCarbone4CNPAssurancesca78%coverageScope12and32018 CSRReportp.41.Scope 1and215nca50%-60%ofGPIF GPIFGovernmentPensionClimate Relatedeach asset classnvestmentFund(GPIF）2019,p.282.1C（equity）Not specifiedIrcantecNot specifiedICare & Consult，Ircantec,ClimateActions and ESGBeyondRatings，Carbone 4Report，p.353C(bonds）Not specifiedNot specifiedLegal& General2.9C（equity）Legal&General，NotspecifiedBaringaca43%coverageTCFD Report2019.p.123.1C(bonds）SCOR3.7-3.8Carbone485%ofportfolioNotspecifiedScor 2018Table of ContentsCimate Reportp.37A.Background and Purpose8ScopeandApproachC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsD.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseAppendices#page#Excerpts from an asset owners disclosure ofITRare provided in Figure A1-1.FigureA1-1Asset Owner Perspective on ITR DisclosureIn2019,theJapaneseGovernment Pension Investment Fund(GPIF）theworldslargest pensionfund，undertookand disclosedthe results ofa climate-related portfoliorisk assessmentTheresultingreportincludes avariety ofdisclosures such as carbon footprint metrics.fossilfuelandstranded asset exposuremetrics，andimplied temperaturerise metricsreferredtoas temperaturetrajectoryin thereport.GPIFworkedwiththedata providerTrucostto provideITRratingsatanaggregatelevelforallassetsundermanagementas wellas forvarious assetclasses andsectors within its portfolio.The disclosure coversaten-yearperiod（2012-2023）toshowcurrentinformationhistoricalchanges，andfutureprojections.Temperature TrajectoryforLatest PortfolioHoldingsForognEquitiosDomesticBondsForcign Bonds18FY18FY18FY18FY18FYXG3CxC2C3CPortfolloapp，2012-202360.000.003Table of Contents40.088.000A.Background and Purpose8ScopeandApproach2012201320142015201620172018F2019FC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector Metricscurrentorfutureconstraints on GHG emissions.The disclosurelpresentedaimsto highlight leaders andlaggards atthe company levelaswell as overall portfolio performance and performance by sectorD.Metric for Consideration:HoweverGPIF also notes that current data gaps limit the usefulness ofITR in decision-making,Alack ofemissions data onsomeasset classesallows GPIF to estimate ITRonlyforabout 50%-60%oftheirassetsImplied Temperature RiseAppendices#page#Excerpts from an insurance companys disclosure of ITR are provided in Figure A1-2.Figure A1-2Insurance Company Perspective on ITR Disclosureratngsince2018 initsannualclimaterelated disclosures.AvivaSreports incudeawiderangeofmetrics forclimateValueatRisk.andweatherrelatedlossesAvivaworkedwith Carbon Delta to deriveits ITRrating forits shareholdersfunds creditequities,and realestate asaweighted average ofindividual issuers warming potential.As shown belowAviva reports its 2019ratingalongsideits2018 rating to showAvivasyearto-yearprogress，Portfolio Warming Potential/MSCICarbn DetaAvivas PortfolioTheanalysis foundthatthential ofourshareholdends equityporlolioWarming Potential2.9Table of ContentsA.Background and Purpose8ScopeandApproachted by organisC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsAvivadescribesitsuseofITRratings asexploratory noting thatAvivais exploringtheusesofanumberD.ofdifferentemerging metrics designedto help analyse thealignment ofinvestment portfolio tothe PariMetric for Consideration:Agreementstargetoflimiting theglobaltemperature risetowell below2.HoweverwefullyanticipateImplied Temperature Risethattheseapproacheswillevolveovertimeandbeimprovedinthelightofnewresearch.dataandemerging best practice.We have fedthisanalysis into investment strategy reviews of our business.AppendicesAvivanotesthatthelevelofcoverageofitsiTRratingcontinuesto evole.Avivadisclosesthat only 80%ofshareholderfunds wereanalyzedwhich nonethelessrepresentsanincreasein coveragefrom 2018duetottheinclusion ofrealestate,sovereign bonds，andgreen assets#page#Excerpts from an insurance companys disclosure of ITR are provided in Figure A1-3.Figure A1-3Insurance Company Perspective on ITR Disclosureinformation onthetemperaturealignmentofisdirectlyownedequityandbond portoliossince2017mpactAnalytics and the Science-Based 2C Alignment.while both methodologies are largely based on theare largely due to how Carbon Impact Analytics method reflects current carbon performance of companieswithout adjusting for potentialorpromised reduction efforts.uoupeduueseogpeeusuedddemuuelssepueuesterminvestmentdecisions.Temperatures of the equity and corporate bond portfolios held by BNP Paribas CardifBond portfolioEquity portfolioScience-BasedCarbon ImpactScience-BasedCarbon ImpactAnalytics2C Alignment2C AlignmentAnalytics2.34.32.23.1Table of ContentsA.SB2A and CIA methods(source:ICare & Consult/ Mirova/ Carbone 4）Background and Purpose8ScopeandApproachC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsD.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseAppendices#page#The TaskAppendix 2: Examples of ClimateValue-at-Risk DisclosureValue-atRisk(VaR）measuresthesizeofthelossmodel the returns to different asset classesin different countries or regions.It is modelaportfolio may experience,withinagiven timehorizonata particular probability.Climate VaRand data-intensiveand itis unclear whetherquantifies the size oflossattributableto climatethe uncertainty inherentin providing thisrelatedfinancialrisks by comparing the value ofhigh levelof detail would provide particularlyassets inaworldwith climate change relativetoaccurate estimates.the same world without climate change.3sAtop-down approach uses a simple macro-Given that Climate VaRisarelativelynewmetriceconomicmodelthat has been integratedtherearefewavailable methodologiesandthosewithemissionsandclimate modules.Asmallthatareavailablearenotyet fully transparentonumber ofintegrated assessment models ofcomparable，Generally.estimatesofclimateVaRcimatechangeexistwhich havebeen builtincould takea bottom-up or top-down approach:ordertoestimatetheeconomic costofclimatechange.Howeverthesecanbe conservativeirA bottom-up approach would be builttheirestimatesasthey canfailto fullyaccountaroundarelatively detailed portfolio analysisforthe fullrange and deep uncertainty ofmodel which takes as its input variousclimate impacts.macroeconomicvariablesand goes on toFigureA2-1Excerpt from an Asset Managers Climate VaR DisclosureTable of ContentsForward looking metrics:Investmentstemperature and Climate Valueet RiskA.Background and Purpose20182019AxA IMEvolution8ScopeandApproach婚价停03TransitioncostVaR（1.5Cscenario）%-5.10.231TransitioncostaR2Cscenario)TransitioncostVaR（3Cscenario）%C.Forward-Looking04CostofcimateVaR(15Cscenario)Financial Sector Metrics心4.7CostofclimateVaR（2Cscenario）18皖ZD.625治TechnologyopportunityVaR(1.5cscenario）%Metric for Consideration:58TechnologyopportunityVaR2Cscenario)Implied Temperature Rise80TechnologyopportunityaR(3Cscenario%Source:AXAIM.CarbonDeltoAppendicesCostofClimateVaR（Transitionrisks PhysicalrisksVaR）representsaportfoliovaluelossofneary7%iftheworldwenttoa1.5cscenario，duetoregulation costsandextremeweatherevents losses.Itisalreadyrepresentingaportfoliovalueloss ofnearly5%ina2cscenarioandof2%inthe Paris Pledgesscenaric（3c）.Intermsofnewopportunities，GreenVaRrepresentsaportfoliovaluegainofnearly3%ina1.5cscenarioandnearly2%ina2cscenario，companiesbeingallthemoreincentivsedtodevelopgreentechnologies.CLD.35#page#The Task Forceon climatAfew financialinstitutions have disclosedinclude examples of climate VaR disclosuresfrom an asset manager and an insuranceinformation on their use of climate VaRand climate VaR estimates related to theircompany.respectivelyportfolios.FigureA2-1(p.16)and FigureA2-2FigureA2-2Excerpt from an Insurance CompanysClimate VaR DisclosureAvivasclimateVaR measureClimate-relatedrisksandopportunitieshavethe potentialtoaffectinsurers balancesheets aswell asthelong-term businessmodel.Traditionalapproaches based largely on backward looking analysis may needtberefinedor enhancedtocapturetheserisks going forward.In orderto addressthis challengeAviva hasdevelopedaClimate VaR measureinconjunctionwith theUNEP Flinvestor pilot projectand Carbon Deltapotentialbusiness impacts offuture dimate-related risks and opportunities to beassessed in each oftheIPCCscenariosandinaggregate(seeAppendix formore detailsofourClimate VaRmethodology)aswellasprovidinganindicationoftheresilienceofourstrategyCalculatedonalike forlike basis theYE18 andYE19 CimateVaRsaresimilarindicating thatAvivas overallexposureto climate-relatedrisks and opportunities remains broadly unchanged.Figure 9 comparesa plausible range of outcomes(5th to 95th percentile） from our Climate VaR analysis forthedifferent scenarios considered.Consistentwith lastyearAvivaismostexposedtothebusiness-as-usual（BAU)4Cscenariowhere physicalriskdominates，negativelyimpactinglongterminvestmentreturnsonTable of Contents1.5Cand 2C scenarios are the only scenarios with potential upside.Physicalrisk impacts are more limitedbutthere isstil downside risk on longterm investment returns fromcarbon intensive sectors (for exampleA.utilities)asa result oftransition policy actions.This is offsetpartially by revenuetechnologies fromBackground and Purposesome sectors (for example automotivesWhenaggregatedtogethertoderermineanSot3/11/2019overall impact ofclimate-relatedrisks and8opportunities acrossallscenarios，theplausibleScopeandApproachrangeis dominated bytheresultsofthe3Cand4Cscenarios，refectingthatneitherexistingnorC.planned policyactionsare sufficiently ambitiousForward-Lookingto meet the1.5CParisAgreementtarget.InFinancial Sector Metricsthe 1.5Cscenariotransition riskis largerthanphysical risk（see figure 10)even aftertakingintoaccount mitigating technology opportunities.nD.the 2Cscenario，transition and physical risksareMetric for Consideration:somewhat balanced，whereasin the3Cand4Implied Temperature Risescenarios physicalriskdominates.Wewill continueto develop andincorporateAppendicesClimateVaRintoouroverallstrategyrisk0/1/201500management andreporting frameworks.Inparticular.wewill furtherrefineandimproveourClimate VaRapproach in the lightofnewresearchand data aswellas emerging bestpracticeincluding using outputfrom the UNEP FlinsuranceTCFD pilot.#page#The Task Appendix 3: GlossaryCLIMATE-RELATED OPPORTUNITY refers toGREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) EMISSIONSSCOPELEVELS38the potential positive impacts related to climatechange on acompany or organization. EffortsScope 1 refers to all direct GHG emissions，to mitigate and adapt to climate change canoroduce opportunities for companies,such asScope2refers to indirect GHG emissionsthrough resource efficiency and cost savings,thefrom consumption of purchased electricityadoption and utilization of low-emission energyheat，orsteam.sources，the development ofnew products andservices，and building resilience along the supply Scope 3 refers to other indirectemissionschain.Climate-relatedopportunitieswillvarynot coveredin Scope2thatoccurin thevaluedepending on the region marketand industrychain ofthe reporting company. including bothin which an organization operates.upstream and downstream emissions.Scope3emissionscould include:the extraction ancCLIMATE-RELATED RISKrefers to theproduction ofpurchased materials and fuelspotential negative impacts of climate changetransport-related activities in vehicles notonacompany ororganization.Physical risksowned or controlled by thereporting entity.emanating from climate change can be eventelectricity-related activities(eg,transmissiondriven（acute)such as increased severityand distribution losses)outsourced activitiesofextremeweatherevents(eg，cyclonesandwaste disposal.3droughts，floods，and fires）.They can also relateto longer-term shifts （chronic） in precipitationIMPLIED TEMPERATURE RISE （ITR） refersand temperature and increased variability into anestimate ofaglobaltemperatureweatherpatterns（e.g.,sea levelrise）.Climaterise associated with the greenhouse gasrelatedriskscan also beassociatedwith theemissions ofa single entity (egacompany）transition toalower-carbon global economy，theoraselectionofentities（e.g.，thoseinagivenmostcommon of which relate to policy and legalTable of Contentsinvestment portfolio，fund，orinvestmentactionstechnology changes，market responsesstrategy）. Expressedas a numeric degreeand reputational considerationsrating，ITRmetrics incorporate current GHGA.emissions or other data andassumptions toBackground and PurposeCLIMATE VALUE-AT-RISK measures the sizeestimateexpected futureemissions associatedofthelossa portfoliomay experience,withinawiththeselectedentityorentities.Thenthegiven time horizon，ataparticular probability8estimateistranslatedintoaprojectedincreaseattributabletoclimate-related financialrisks.ScopeandApproachin globalaverage temperature（in C)abovepreindustriallevels thatwould occurifallGOVERNANCE refers to “the system by whichcompanies in corresponding sectors hadtheC.an organization is directed and controlledSamecarbon intensity as theselectedassetis）Forward-Lookingin theinterests ofshareholders and otherFinancial Sector Metricsstakeholders.“GovernanceinvolvesasetNET-ZERO refers to achieving an equal balanceof relationships between an organizationsbetween GHG emissions produced and GHGmanagementits b#page#SCENARIO ANALYSIS is aprocessforidentifyingSECTORrefers to a segment of companiesand assessing a potential range ofoutcomes ofperforming similar business activities inanfutureevents under conditions ofuncertainty.economy.A sector generally refers to a largeInthecase ofclimate change,for example，segment ofthe economy or grouping of businessscenarios allow an organization to explore andtypes，while “industry” is used to describe moredevelop an understanding of how the physicalspecific groupings of companies within a sectorand transition risks ofclimate change mayperformance over time.STRATEGY refers to an organizations desiredfuturestate，An organizationsstrategyestablishesafoundationagainstwhichitcanmonitorand measure its progress inreachingthat desired state，Strategy formulation generallyinvolves establishingthe purposeand scope ofthe organizations activities and the nature ofits businesses,taking into account the risks andopportunities it faces and the environment inwhichitoperatesTable of ContentsA.Background and Purpose8ScopeandApproachC.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsD.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseAppendices49.9351.54#page#The TaskAppendix 4: ReferencesAviva.Aviva Climate-Related Financial Disclosure2019.2019.https:/ Paper:The2021 Biennial ExploratoryScenarioon theFinancial Risksfrom Climate Change.December 2019.https:/www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/pdfzla=en&hash=73D06B913C73472DODF21F18DB71C2F454148C80.en.pdf.Table of ContentsA.1992.http:/cadbury.qjbs.archios.info/report.Background and PurposeCDP.CDP Ful GHGEmissions Dataset2019Summary.2019,https:/6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc48original/2020_01_06_FulL_GHG_Emissions_Dataset_Summary.pdfScopeandApproachCimate Finance Leadership Initiative，Financingthelow-Carbon Future,2019.https:/assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/55/2019/09/Financing-the-Low-Carbon-Future_CFLl-Full-Report_September-2019.C.pdf.Forward-LookingFinancial Sector MetricsCNP Assurances.2018 CSR Report2018,https:/p.rlen/the-cnpassurancesgroup/newsroom/publications.D.Metric for Consideration:Implied Temperature Risecop25.mma.gob.c/wp-content/uploads/2020704/Alianza-11122019-INGLS.pdf.AppendicesFinancial Assets. NatureClimate Change676-679.2016.https:/larticles/nclimate2972relating to risk management and disclosure. May 2020. https:/www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdficlimate-related_risks/ssm.202005_draft_guide_on_climaterelated_and_environmental_risks.enpdf.2019.https:/www.gpif.go.jp/en/investment/trucost_report_enpdf.#page#Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeGlobal Warming of1.5Summaryfor PoicymakersOctober 2018.https:/www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2018/07/SR15_SPM_versionstand_alone_LR.pdfIrcantec.CimateActons andESGReport2018.https:/www.ircntec.retraites.fr/sites/defaultfles/publiclactionscimat19_en2_0pdf.Jorion， Phillipe.“How Informative Are Valueat-Risk Disclosures TheAccounting Review.O OwnersAlianceUN-Convened NetZero AssetOwnerAliance. 2020.https:/www.unepti.org/net-zero-alliance/Network for Greening the Financial System.NGFS Climate Scenarios for central banks and supervisors.final_version_v6.pdf.NewClimateInstitute，Germanwatch，and2nvestingInitiative，Developing CriteritoAignTable of ContentsA.Season3.pdf.Background and P Report.2018.https:/ ExposeCompanies and Directors to Liability Risk?Commonwealth CimateForward-LookingFinancial Sector Metricsrns-Misplaced-Report-Final-BriefingpdfTask Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures CTCFD).2020 status report. November 2020.D.https:/assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/09/2020-TCFD_Status-Report.pdfMetric for Consideration:Implied Temperature RiseTCFD.ImplementingtheRecommendationsofthe Task ForceonCimate-related Financial Disclosures.June 29，2017.https:/www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINALTCFD-AnnexAppendicesAmended-121517.pdf.World Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable Development The GreenhouseGas Protocol:A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition）.March 2004.https:plepueis-aielodo/81010010jd8u#page#For moreinformation， please visit fsb-tcfd.org0alPE
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欧洲银行业正经历着800年历史上最伟大的转型时期之一。优先通过分支网络交付的银行模式正在消失，取而代之的是数字，因为移动设备控制了我们自己和客户的更多生活。这个新世界的潜力是众所周知的个性化服务、更快的响应速度、即时支付等等，全天候实时提供。尽管存在这一潜力，但客户采用数字技术的速度和金融服务业对COVID-19的响应加速了数字化，这有助于创造一个迅速扩大的欺诈机会，犯罪分子能够利用数字解决方案、银行系统和客户之间的差距。在不断上升的欺诈案件中，由于监管和银行流程难以跟上犯罪创新的增长，洗钱活动迅速增长。2020年前6个月，反洗钱(AML)合规违规罚款超过了2011年全年的罚款总额912020年上半年的罚款比前一年全年高出40%。虽然处罚相对于行业收入而言有时是很小的，但对客户信任和业务中断造成的损害却是相当大的。利用自动化合规流程中的运营效率的机会也被忽略了。
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中央银行和金融监管机构有责任将环境因素纳入其决策。如果不这样做，就会危及他们完成任务的能力，降低我们应对气候和生态崩溃的机会。由于我们全球经济体系对自然的破坏，导致像COVID-19这样的流行病的风险增加，这加强了采取行动的理由。本报告回顾了一个理想的绿色中央银行将采取的四类政策和举措：研究和宣传、货币政策、金融政策和以身作则。基于这一文献回顾、专家咨询以及与央行行长和监管机构的双边互动，我们开发了一个系统，对G20国家的货币和审慎监管机构的绿色政策和举措进行评分和排名。我们的结果显示在下面的“记分卡”中，表明行动与言辞不符，因为绝大多数国家在研究和宣传方面得分满分，而在其他三个类别中表现不佳。虽然一些机构已采取具体行动评估环境风险并鼓励绿色投资，但所有机构都在回避那些抑制或限制资金流向有害环境活动的政策。我们将货币和金融政策与环境目标的一致性确定为向前推进的关键优先事项。实现这一目标的高影响力政策包括将化石燃料排除在资产购买方案和抵押品框架之外，以及调整风险权重等审慎工具，以有效整合高碳贷款的风险。我们正在经历的“大流行时代”是我们全球经济体系对自然无情开发的一个征兆。各国央行并没有以支持向一个更可持续和公正的社会过渡的方式应对当前的危机，而是支持了一个促进气候变化、生态和社会稳定的金融体系破坏，以及更高的流行病风险。
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工作组在2017年发布的建议和补充指南鼓励资产管理人和资产所有者向其客户和受益人披露他们用于评估气候相关风险和机遇的指标，以及他们认为对决策有用的其他指标。披露实践和使用自2017年以来，通过开发新的研究、工具和资源，以及应对日益频繁的自然气候相关影响，金融市场参与者披露的信息数量不断变化。此外，120个国家加上欧盟已宣布，它们正在努力实现2050年温室气体净零排放，这表明金融部门试图了解的商业模式和资本流动的潜在变化。在这方面，与气候有关的金融披露工作队(工作队或TCFD)于2020年10月29日至2021年1月28日进行了一次公众咨询，以收集有关金融公司潜在前瞻性指标的反馈。该工作组就金融机构将披露的决策有用的前瞻性指标征求了意见，要求就近年来引起金融部门兴趣的一组具体指标和更广泛的前瞻性金融指标的有用性提供反馈向技合论坛的支持者、非政府组织的代表和商业协会伙伴发出回应调查的邀请，并通过TCFD的社交媒体页面。截至1月28日，共有209名受访者完成了咨询调查。这些幻灯片总结了咨询调查的主要结果。调查结果侧重于每个问题的相关受访者子集此外，一些公司/组织提交了回复函，在起草补充指南时将予以考虑。
2021-04-20
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气候变化以及与之相关的生物多样性丧失和由此带来的社会挑战正在定义我们时代的危机。 它们的规模要求将全球经济的所有领域作为重点，尤其是金融市场。 利用数据和技术的力量，瑞士绿色数字金融解决方案加速了全球金融市场向可持续发展的过渡，从而为将全球变暖限制在1.5摄氏度，扭转了生物多样性的丧失以及应对与之相关的社会挑战做出了巨大贡献。解决气候变化和生物多样性丧失给世界各地的公司带来了重大机遇。 这样做是可取的，因为它可以争夺最高荣誉，从而增强对这些全球危机的反应。瑞士绿色数字金融解决方案使全球公司能够抓住这些机会，不断提高竞争力，并带来整体经济增长。 来自实体经济的全球金融机构和公司与瑞士绿色金融科技公司合作，成为技术和金融解决方案的重要合作伙伴。 全面拥抱绿色数字金融，并与瑞士绿色金融科技紧密合作，使瑞士金融机构成为可持续金融的全球领导者，充分利用其作为拥有2.4万亿美元客户资产的最重要的跨境财富管理中心的地位 。瑞士绿色数字金融生态系统具有创建和扩展绿色金融科技的理想框架条件。 例如，可以方便地访问最高质量的可持续发展数据，专用的加速器，获得经验丰富的风险投资基金，世界一流的研究，促进创新和数据安全的监管环境，以及所有利益相关者(尤其是现有金融机构)之间的紧密合作，以实现 共同的可持续金融雄心。 瑞士拥有众多绿色金融科技公司，它们成功地扩大规模，成为了全球技术领导者，为企业客户提供解决方案以及直接面向消费者的服务。它们还可以推动整个瑞士金融业的创新和数字化。
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本执行摘要概述了苏格兰政府2021-22年至2025-26年基础设施投资计划(IIP)草案咨询响应中产生的主要主题。2018年，首席部长宣布了一项国家基础设施任务，以增加苏格兰的年度基础设施投资，使其在下届议会结束前达到具有国际竞争力的水平。为了支持国家基础设施任务的执行，苏格兰部长们为苏格兰成立了一个独立的基础设施委员会。此后，苏格兰基础设施委员会发布了两份报告：苏格兰蓝图(2020年1月)和第二阶段交付结果报告(2020年7月)。苏格兰政府目前正在考虑第二阶段报告的调查结果，并将在适当时候公布正式答复。苏格兰部长们同意第一阶段报告中的建议，IIP草案显示了这些建议将如何在苏格兰实施。在这样做的过程中，IIP草案试图为我们未来的基础设施制定一个明确的愿景支持和实现包容性的净零排放经济。IIP草案阐述了苏格兰政府对苏格兰基础设施的长期愿景，展示了它将如何选择正确的未来投资，并制定了一个五年的进一步改善计划。就IIP草案进行的磋商并没有试图重复苏格兰基础设施委员会(Infrastructure Commission for Scotland)先前进行的接触过程。相反，它就苏格兰政府计划如何执行委员会建议的具体领域征求广泛的意见和反馈，以确保采取正确的最终办法。共收到147份咨询回复，其中包括大量与A96行动小组有关的运动回复(约占所有回复的三分之一)。撇开这一局限性不谈，这次协商会吸引了广泛的基础设施主题领域的响应，包括：建筑和建成环境、自然环境和气候变化、旅行和运输、地方政府、能源、电信、水和废物、商业和企业、卫生、教育和公共服务。苏格兰政府将利用此次磋商的结果在2021年初敲定IIP，并在此后公布。
2021-04-20
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由于COVID-19大流行，从2020年初开始，美国和世界各地的日常生活发生了巨大变化。随着人们越来越多地避开人群，尽可能呆在家里以减少暴露的风险，许多工人，尤其是那些提供现场服务的行业的工人，失去了.
2021-04-19
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2008-09年金融危机爆发后，银行监管框架在全球和地方层面都进行了全面改革。在全球层面，巴塞尔银行监管委员会(BCBS)2制定了流动性管理的新原则，并提高了资本金要求在地方层面，许多国家的监管机构显著改变了对流动性和资本必要水平的计算方法:例如，在美国，美联储(fed)出台了全面资本分析与审查(CCAR)机制，这是一项年度压力测试和资本规划活动;在欧盟，欧洲的中心欧洲央行(ECB)制定了监管审查和评估程序(SREP)，这是一个每两年一次的程序，用于评估银行的风险状况，并就资本和流动性做出监管决定，其依据是欧洲银行管理局每两年一次的压力测试;在英国，审慎监管局提出了一种基于压力测试的新方法，以告知资本金要求这些措施和其他措施使得银行在过去几年积累了大量的资本和流动性缓冲。2020年3月中旬至4月中旬，新冠肺炎引发的首次金融市场冲击，为这些变化提供了首次重大考验。总体而言，尽管受到了央行干预和规模空前的财政计划的支持，但银行相对较好地度过了这段波动期在随后的第二波和第三波感染期间，2020年10月和2021年1月又发生了市场动荡，但这种动荡不如第一波感染期间明显。经过成功的试验，2020年11月底和12月，明显有效的疫苗到达，减少了对大流行持续时间的不确定性，至少在部分发达国家是这样。尽管如此，大流行病的宏观经济影响及其对银行资产负债表的影响将继续传导到金融市场和银行系统，这可能导致进一步的动荡。
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The Potential for Scaling Climate Finance in ChinaFebruary 2021Copyright 2020 Climate Policy Initiative www.climatepolicyinitiative.orgAll rights reserved. CPI welcomes the use of its material for noncommercial purposes, such as policy discussions or educational activities, under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. For commercial use, please contact adminsfcpiglobal.org.AUTHORSJune ChoiWeiting LiUnder the guidance of:Tom HellerACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors of this report would like to acknowledge the financial support received from the Hewlett Foundation which made this work possible. We would also like to acknowledge the generous support from CPI colleagues Bella Tonkonogy, Donovan Escalante, Rob Macquarie, Chavi Meattle, Barbara Buchner, Rob Kahn, Elysha Davila, Julia Janicki, Josh Wheeling, Alice Moi, as well as Jie Pan for translation. We are also grateful for the following individuals who contributed their perspectives through interviews and consultations during the research process (in alphabetical order). Kevin Ao, Melissa Brown, Andrew Chang, Peiyuan Guo, Bondy Lau, Thomas Lapham, Mathias Lund Larsen, Robert Liu, Yujun Liu, Wen Ma, John Maclean, Alfonso Pating, Alex Shoer, Bob Tansey, Marilyn Waite, Phylicia Wu, Wenhong Xie, Hongfu Zhang, Ruoyao Zhang. Front cover photo by Flickr user jose|huerta.ABOUT CPICPI is an analysis and advisory organization with deep expertise in finance and policy. Our mission is to help governments, businesses, and financial institutions drive economic growth while addressing climate change. CPI has six offices around the world in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and the United States.iiiThe Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaSECTORClimate financeREGIONChinaKEYWORDSClimate finance, China, Green financial reform RELATED CPI WORKSGreen Banking in China: Emerging Trends Green Bonds in China: the State and Effectiveness of the MarketGlobal Landscape of Climate Finance 2019The Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance 2020 CONTACTJune Choi june.choicpiglobal.orgMEDIA CONTACTRob Kahn rob.kahncpiglobal.org1The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaFOREWORDWithin a short span of five years, China has achieved remarkable progress in building a green financial system. This was initiated by the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the State Councils issuance of the Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Progress in September 2015, and the Guidelines for Establishing a Green Financial System jointly issued by the Peoples Bank of China and six ministries and commissions in August 2016. Under Chinas leadership as the G20 chair in 2016, green finance was included as a topic in the G20 communiqu for the first time. As a result of these strong beginnings, a diverse range of financial products and supporting policies have been launched, and Chinas green credit and green bond market have become the largest in the world today. In the context of taking Chinas green financial reform to the next stage, we are pleased to present this report, which for the first time offers detailed insights into Chinas green and climate financing trends across sectors and financing actors. It also outlines the key challenges and opportunities for achieving the primary objective of green financial reform: mobilizing and incentivizing more social, increasingly private, capital into green industries, while effectively controlling investments in polluting projects. Innovations in financial institutions and markets to develop new instruments and services will contribute substantially to realizing this goal. At a time when the COVID-19 pandemic has dampened global economic prospects in the near-term, China has continued to reaffirm its climate commitments. In a recent address to the UN General Assembly, President Xi Jinping announced that China will aim to achieve peak CO2 emissions before 2030, and carbon neutrality before 2060. The Guidance on Promoting Investment and Financing to Address Climate Change issued in October reiterates the role of investment and finance in implementing Chinas Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and low-carbon development. Mobilizing resources, especially through the rapidly diversifying financial channels that aggregate private capital, will be essential in meeting the goals of national economic and environmental transition. It is our hope that this report offers usable guidance for expanding these efforts.2021 is a critical year for climate action. It marks the beginning of a new decade for accelerating the transition to a sustainable future, while ensuring a sustainable recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. China will announce its 14th Five Year Plan and host the COP 15 to the Convention on Biological Diversity, as the international community works towards strengthening collective climate action building up to COP 26. We look forward to an ambitious start to the next decade of climate action, marked by enhanced cooperation and strong leadership. Tom Heller Chairman of the Board and Senior Strategic Advisor, Climate Policy InitiativeMa JunPresident of Beijing Institute of Finance and Sustainability2The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaEXECUTIVE SUMMARY Chinas climate action in the coming decade will play a decisive role in whether the world can limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. As the worlds largest source of CO2 emissions, China accounts for nearly a third of the global total.1 Based on its current trajectory, Chinas emissions are expected to increase further by 7%-15% by 2030 above 2015 levels, which would more than offset the global decreasing trend.2 To ensure that China meets its own goals for advancing an ecological society, as well as its stated commitments to the Paris Agreement, climate and green finance needs to mobilize at an unprecedented scale. This report provides an overview of the potential for climate finance, green finance and innovative finance to accelerate Chinas decarbonization and support its transition to a green economy. As one of the first countries to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown and start on a path towards recovery, coupled with the 14th Five-Year Plan to be released in March 2021, China faces a historic opportunity to outline a path for sustainable growth that also highlights the role of innovative green and climate finance. The report addresses the following specific questions: Who are the key actors involved in Chinas green/climate finance landscape? What is the policy and regulatory framework enabling and/or hindering green/climate finance in China? How could the policy framework be improved? What are the common financial instruments and sectors of green/climate investment? How might these be leveraged to scale up green/climate investments? What are some of the key barriers to innovative green/climate finance? How could these barriers be addressed?KEY FINDINGS Chinas green financial reform made great progress during the 13th Five-Year Plan. Key factors such as high-level political support, central bank leadership, green taxonomies, and substantial incentives, all contributed to this success. Green credit and green bonds emerged as particular success stories, mobilizing RMB trillions for green projects in the past five years. Overall green finance in China was an annual average of RMB 2.1 trillion (USD 320 billion) during 2017/2018. It will need to scale up by at least four times to meet estimated green investment needs. As much as USD 1.4 trillion in annual investment is needed over the next decade to meet the climate targets and environmental protection standards that China established in 2015.3 Investment needs might be even higher, considering Chinas emission targets are based on carbon intensity and not on absolute reductions. 1 Chinas CO2 emissions was 9.5 GT CO2 in 2018. IEA (2019) 2 Climate Action Tracker (2020)3 CCICED (2015)3The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaFig ES1. Chinas green finance, from financing source to sector allocation The public sector plays an outsized role. Public sources accounted for at least 51% of total green finance, with nearly 95% of that amount attributable to Central State Owned Enterprises (CSOEs), policy banks and other major state-owned banks (Figure 3). Green PPP projects provided a fifth of climate finance, but it remains largely subsidized by government budgets and has few incentives for private actors to participate. The private sectors contribution to climate finance was concentrated in the solar sector. There is tremendous potential for climate finance to grow. The current green penetration in Chinas financial system is around 4%. As Chinas capital market continues to evolve and actors become familiar with green financial instruments, uptake in the market will grow. China has been increasing financial support for SMEs, new sources of concessional capital are in development, and there is growing interest in exploring innovative structures. Mobile payment and online banking systems offer new financing channels for retail consumers and investors. Finally, there are growing opportunities for foreign private capital to collaborate with domestic actors through funds and joint ventures. Public FundsJoint OwnershipPrivate FundsUnknownCSOE (Top 5 Power& State Utilities) $19Other CSOEs $14Other Public $9Green PPP $60Private $53EV Sales $20Unknown $5Adaptation $10AFOLU $12Biofuel/Biomass $2EcologicalConstruction andEnvironmentalProtection $47Pollution Control $9Transportation$82Solar $61Water and Wastewater management $20Wind $44Other RE $21Policy Banks $92ResourceConservation $21State-ownedcommercial banks $39Joint-stockcommercial banks $174The Potential for Scaling Climate in China China faces several key barriers for scaling up private climate finance. While the top-down approach to implementing green finance reform has led to the mobilization of large pools of green capital, access remains concentrated among public actors. Private capital will be essential for meeting investment targets, but private actors are not benefiting from the increasing pools of available green capital. It remains unclear how private actors can access the funds. For private companies and investors interested in climate impact, there are high search costs and their access to formal financing channels and investment pipelines are limited. There are important opportunities for greening Chinas outbound finance. Chinas outbound investment reached over USD 2 trillion from 2013-2019, of which USD 739 billion, or 37%, went to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries. Energy-related investments to BRI countries over the same period was around USD 292 billion, half of which went to fossil fuels. Initiatives are underway to embed green standards in BRI investments. While such initiatives are promising, green requirements must be ambitious, clearly articulated, and adopted in project screening and investment decision making processes.Figure ES2. Comparison of the green share in financial assetsBank loans outstandingBond marketStock marketInsurance024681012141618202224265% greenGreen portionNon-green portion(trillion USD)1% green1% green7% green$23.8 trillion$13 trillion$9.4 trillion$2.6 trillion5The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaRECOMMENDATIONS Scaling climate finance in China will require clear policy signals and incentives, utilization of all financial tools in the system, participation from a diverse base of financing actors, and a robust framework for accountability. Specific recommendations include: 1. Continue raising the ambition of high-level targets and green standards. Targets in national policy documents like five-year plans provide important signals for economic actors across the country. The updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the 14th Five-Year Plan, which will be released in 2021, are key opportunities to raise climate ambitions and demonstrate Chinas continued leadership in the field. Raising standards in Chinas existing green taxonomies and articulating clear thresholds for exclusion can improve the quality of green assets and projects that receive financing. As one of the first countries to enter the COVID-19 pandemic recovery phase, China faces a historic opportunity to reiterate climate ambitions and mainstream green considerations in its recovery efforts.2. Incentivize experimentation with innovative financing structures. Regulatory authorities can encourage experimentation by rewarding innovation efforts through inclusion in performance evaluation schemes and other monetary benefits. Funds from the National Green Development Fund and the Clean Development Mechanism Fund could be deployed to provide grants and guarantees to fund early-stage projects, feasibility studies, and results-based projects. Insurance schemes could be used to insure performance risks undertaken by private investors in impact-oriented climate projects.3. Build and increase visibility on the pipeline of green projects for private actors. There is little transparency in the investment decision-making processes in large banks and green funds established by the government. This disincentivizes actors without connections to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or local governments. Matchmaking platforms, such as Bank of Huzhous Green Credit Management Platform and the Huzhou municipal governments Green Finance One-stop Service Platform, can reduce search costs and increase efficiency by linking interested investors with qualified green projects and investment products. The recently issued “Guidance on Investment and Financing to address climate change” encourages the development of various mechanisms to attract private capital, which should aim to widely promote collaboration opportunities and lessons learned.4. Track and monitor finance flows for ultimate allocation and impact. Without robust tracking and impact reporting standards, it will be difficult to ensure that climate finance flows are being effectively allocated to projects that can generate the most impact. Currently, green finance policies only suggest some key 6The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinametrics that actors can report at the aggregate level, using their own methodologies. Ensuring that reported climate impacts are ex-post, and pro-rated to an actors share of contributions to a project could be one way to improve impact tracking and avoid double counting. The China Securities Regulatory Commissions forthcoming mandatory environmental information disclosure for listed companies is an opportunity to strengthen tracking and monitoring of progress. The measure will ask companies to report on their climate finance and are currently taking suggestions on which metrics to include. 5. Introduce mandatory exclusion lists and negative incentives for high-emission sectors. Green financial reform is not only about increasing the green, but also about decreasing support for high-emission sectors. So far, Chinas green financial reform has not made a significant impact on its high-emissions portfolios. The Ministry of Ecology and Environments list of polluting industries that require pollution liability insurance is a practice that could be further expanded and applied in other areas. The recently proposed “Climate Investment and Finance Standard System” is an opportunity to establish concrete criteria for screening climate investments and encourage robust monitoring of ex-post performance.7The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaCONTENTSForeword 1Executive summary 2Key findings 2Recommendations 5Introduction 81. Policy framework for green financial reform 101.1 Progress to date 122. Domestic green and climate finance landscape 152.1 Defining public vs private actors 152.2 Investment trends 162.2.1 Sources and sector allocation 172.2.2 Mitigation vs adaptation 192.2.3 Regional distribution 202.3 Instrument analysis 223. Scaling up climate finance 243.1 Potential to scale up 243.2 Barriers to scaling up 263.3 Case studies: innovative climate finance 283.3.1 Green fintech 283.3.2 Matchmaking platforms 293.3.3 Green insurance 304. Opportunities for greening Chinas outbound finance 315. Conclusions and recommendations 345.1 Recommendations 356. References 388The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaINTRODUCTIONChinas climate action in the coming decade will play a decisive role in whether the world can meet the ambitious Paris Agreement target of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Chinas emissions increased by 2.3% and 2.6% in 2018 and 2019, enough to offset the global decreasing trend,4 and is expected to further increase by 7%-15% by 2030 above 2015 levels.5 Already, Chinas recovery from COVID-19 has led to a rapid rebound in emissions.6 To reverse Chinas increasing emissions trend and ensure that China can meet its own goals for advancing an ecological society, as well as its stated commitments to the Paris Agreement, climate and green finance needs to mobilize at an unprecedented scale. Recognizing the challenge at hand, China has undertaken significant steps for green financial reform. Led by the central banks initiative, China introduced green finance as a major topic for the 2016 G20 summit and endorsed a nation-wide blueprint for establishing a green financial system in 2016. So far, Chinas green financial reform has led to more than RMB 10.6 trillion (USD 1.5 trillion) in outstanding green loans, RMB 977 billion (USD 140 billion) in green bonds, hundreds of established green funds, opportunities for green stock indices and insurance.7 In total, an average USD 202 billion was deployed annually in climate-related investments and an additional USD 118 billion in other environmental sectors during the period 2017-2018. However, current levels of finance remain far below what is necessary. As much as RMB 95.45 trillion (USD 14 trillion) over the next decade, or USD 1.4 trillion annually, will be needed to meet Chinas climate targets and environmental protection standards established in 2015.8 This means that investment will need to increase by more than four times the current levels. The estimated investment needs could be much higher, considering that Chinas climate targets are not based on absolute emissions reduction, but on carbon intensity, which still allows room for China to continue increasing its emissions. Despite private capital mobilization being one of Chinas major goals with green financial reform, evidence presented in this report suggests that the private sector has played a limited role to date. Chinas green financial reform has major implications at the global level. For instance, Chinas “Big Four” state-owned banks are also the worlds four largest banks, representing combined assets of USD 14.8 trillion, greater than the combined assets of the 11 largest banks in the US.9 These “Big Four” banks contributed USD 240 billion to the fossil fuel industry in the past four years.10 44% of this amount, or USD 106 billion, went towards the coal sector, making Chinas Big Four the worlds largest financiers of coal.11 Furthermore, Chinas outbound finance has increased significantly in the past decade, with USD 196 billion in energy-related 4RAN (2020)5Climate Action Tracker (2020)6CarbonBrief (2020)7This report uses the IMFs annual official exchange rates for currency conversion unless provided in USD by the original data source. All estimates provided in parentheses have been rounded.8CCICED (2015)9S&P (2020)10RAN (2020)11ibid9The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinainvestments in Belt and Road Initiative countries over the past four years.12 Half of this amount, or around USD 98 billion, went to fossil fuel projects.13So far, however, green financial reform has not impacted Chinas support for fossil fuels in a significant way. Green definitions in China have been contested for their inclusion of clean coal and other efficiency-related improvements for fossil fuels.14 On the other hand, exclusionary lists for fossil fuels have not been developed and Chinas key financial institutions have not made any public commitments to reduce investments in fossil fuels. Ensuring that progress is made on both climate-friendly and climate-harmful investments will be a key step forward for Chinas climate action in the coming years. Section One of this report provides context on the drivers of Chinas green financial reform and progress to date. Section Two provides an overview of Chinas domestic climate finance landscape from 2017-2018. Section Three describes the barriers and opportunities for scaling up innovative climate finance. Section Four provides a brief overview of Chinas outbound finance and the potential for greening outbound flows. The report concludes with recommendations for improving quality and scaling up innovative climate finance.12Calculations based on AEI and BU-GEGI data13ibid14EIB and GFC (2017)10The Potential for Scaling Climate in China1. POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR GREEN FINANCIAL REFORMChinas green financial reform benefits from top-down design and policy framework, with buy-in at the highest levels of the government. Green finance is considered the main channel for mobilizing the necessary resources to achieve the national goal of constructing an “ecological civilization,” a concept first introduced in 2007 and now officially included in the Partys Constitution since 2018. The idea to “build a green financial system” was first mentioned in the State Councils “Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Civilization” in 2015, the first-time green finance was mentioned in a national top-level policy document. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) extensively cites the importance of an ecological civilization alongside the need for a green financial system, demonstrating the states increasing prioritization of environmental standards alongside economic development. Most recently in October 2020, high-level policy guidance for promoting climate investment and finance was jointly issued by five government and regulatory bodies,15 the first time “climate” finance and NDC targets were explicitly mentioned as the policy objective (Box 1).Chinas central bank, the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC), led the formulation of specific green finance policies. In 2014, the PBoC and UNEP Inquiry jointly convened the Green Finance Task Force and put forward 14 recommendations for establishing a green finance system, which were presented at the G20 summit in 2016 under Chinas presidency. The recommendations were officially endorsed the same year by seven leading ministries and regulatory bodies16 in the “Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System,” which currently serves as the national blueprint covering all aspects of the financial sector. The PBoC continues to oversee green finance development through the Green Finance Committee. Figure 1. Policy highlights in Chinas green financial reform15Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Peoples Bank of China (PBOC), China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)16Peoples Bank of China, the Ministry of Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, and China Insurance Regulatory Commission2015201620172018201920202021Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological CivilizationGreen Finance Pilot Zones establishedImplementation Plan for Green BankEvaluation (Trial)Plan for the Development of the National Standardization System Construction in the Financial Industry (2016-2020)13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020)Constitution amendment to include thegoal of “Ecological civilization”Guiding Opinions on Building a ModernEnvironmental Governance SystemGuidelines for the Conduct of Assessmentand Certification of Green Bonds (Interim)Notice on Establishing a Special StatisticalSystem for Green LoansGreen Finance Study Group presents 14 recommendations at the G20 SummitGuidelines for Establishing the GreenFinancial SystemGreen Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue14th Five Year Plan (Forthcoming)Guidance Catalogue for Green Industry(NDRC)11The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaA key objective of Chinas green financial reform is to mobilize private capital. The PBoC/UNEP report in 2015 estimated that 85% of green investment needs during the 13th Five-Year Plan period would need to come from the private sector.17 This understanding is embedded in the PBoCs definition of green finance as “a series of policy and institutional arrangements to attract private capital investments into green industries such as environmental protection, energy conservation and clean energy through financial services including lending, private equity funds, bonds, shares and insurance.”18 Given that Chinas green transition is much less reliant on bottom-up action from the private sector compared to the US and Europe, policy and institutional arrangements have an important role to play. There are limitations to this top-down approach in mobilizing private capital, which are further discussed in Section 3.2.Despite its limitations, Chinas top-down approach has generated significant momentum. Some key factors contributing to Chinas success so far include: Policy-signaling through high-level policy documents: Five-year plans form the basis of Chinas economic development strategy, providing clear policy signals in the form of medium-term goals and priorities, including climate and energy targets (Box 2). These targets are frequently referenced by regulatory authorities and local governments to launch new policies in their respective jurisdictions. The inclusion of building a green financial system in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), and the seven ministries joint issuance of the “Guiding Opinions Establishing the Financial System” was an important signal for policymakers and financial actors to adopt measures for increasing green finance.19 Green standardization and taxonomies: One of the most important steps for driving investment into green sectors is to establish harmonized standards and taxonomies for determining what counts as green. China has established three green taxonomies to date, for green loans, green bonds, and green industry. Increasing harmonization is underway through initiatives such as the Green Bonds Standards Committee. The new draft plan for green bonds eligible projects released in May 2020 excludes key fossil fuel-related activities, which would be a major step forward for raising green standards in China. Furthermore, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) green industry catalogue released in March 2019 will serve as a basis for aligning green definitions both within and beyond the financial system. Establishing innovative pilot zones: China has historically relied on pilot cities and provinces to demonstrate how they can contribute to national goals in their respective contexts. Lessons learned from pilot initiatives are widely communicated to serve as examples for replication elsewhere. In 2017, the State Council approved nine cities in five provinces to establish pilot zones for green finance innovation.20 The pilot cities focus on five major tasks, including designing local policies, setting up finance units or branches, developing environmental rights trading, innovating products and services, and establishing market mechanism and infrastructure. 17PBoC and UNEP Inquiry (2015)18UNEP Inquiry (2016) 19PBoC (2016)20 Huzhou and Quzhou in Zhejiang province; Ganjiang in Jiangxi province, Guangzhou in Guangdong province, Guian in Guizhou province, Hami, Changji, and Kelamayi in Xinjiang province; in December 2019, Lanzhou in Gansu province was added as the ninth pilot city.12The Potential for Scaling Climate in China Monetary and performance incentives: Green finance policies are supported by concrete monetary and performance incentives. For instance, local provinces offer grants to reduce issuance costs and certification fees, subsidies to reduce debt interest, and tax benefits. Banks are rewarded for their performance on green credit through higher scores in the PBoCs Macroprudential Assessment (MPA), which can lead to monetary benefits such as more flexible capital adequacy requirements. Banks also benefit from increased access to the PBoCs Short-term Standing and Medium-term Lending Facilities, in which green loans and bonds are accepted as collateral. Within banks, managers and local branches are evaluated on their green performance as well. 1.1 PROGRESS TO DATEThis section revisits the initial fourteen recommendations made by the Green Finance Study Group in 2016 to highlight progress to date. The recommendations are grouped into four areas: 1) Specialized Investment Institutions, 2) Fiscal and Financial Support, 3) Financial Infrastructure, and 4) Legal Infrastructure. A summary is provided in Table 1. Box 2. Chinas climate targetsCarbon neutrality by 2060Paris Agreement (By 2030) Peak CO2 emissions by 2030 Carbon intensity: 65% decrease from 2005 levels Non-fossil fuel share: increase to 25th Five-Year Plan Targets (By 2020) Carbon intensity: -18% from 2015 levels Energy consumption intensity: -15% from 2015 levels Coal cap: less than 1100 GW Share of coal in primary energy consumption: 15%Box 1. “Green Finance” vs “Climate Finance” The term “green finance” in Chinas context covers a much broader range of activities than is typically covered under the term “climate finance,” a term used more frequently outside of developing countries to refer specifically to activities that combat climate change. The International Development Finance Club (IDFC) also employs the broader definition of green finance to track financing efforts among member institutions. As mentioned above, Chinas national goal of building an ecological civilization means that combating climate change is only one of several objectives of green finance, which also include combating air pollution, ecological restoration, water conservation, waste management, and reducing excess industry capacity, among many others.1 In some cases, green finance also includes clean coal utilization and other efficiency-related improvements for fossil fuel projects. This broader definition imposes challenges for measuring the mitigation impact of Chinas green investments. This report uses the term climate finance to encompass all green financing activities in China, with the exclusion of projects involving fossil fuel efficiency improvements, large hydropower, manufacturing, and waste incineration. Recently however, policy guidance in China has used the term “climate” finance to refer specifically to financing needs for addressing climate change for the first time, acknowledging it as an important part of green finance.2 1. See also IIGF (2018). China Green Finance Development Report (In Mandarin)2. Guidance on promoting investment and financing to address climate change 13The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaTable 1. Summary of progress on Green Finance Study Group recommendationsRECOMMENDATIONPROGRESS TO DATESpecialized Investment InstitutionsGreen BanksFirst green banks established (e.g. Maanshan Rural Commercial Bank)Increasing adoption of green banking practices and governance systemsGreen Funds and PPP780 green funds established to date21Green PPP project investment total around USD 300 billion (active since 2014)Greening Development BanksSupport for Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks (AIIB) sustainable energy and cities strategy22Support for greening investments through multilateral financial institutions such as AIIB, BRICS Development Bank, and the Silk Road FundFiscal and Financial Policy SupportGreen Loans and DiscountsRMB 10.6 trillion (USD 1.5 trillion) in green loans by end of 2019, doubling since 201323Green loan statistics system established (2018)Discounted loans accessible through the PBoCs green re-lending facility, short-term and medium-term facilitiesGreen BondsGreen bonds eligible project catalogue published by the PBoCTotal RMB 977 billion (USD 140 billion) outstanding, representing Year-on-Year average growth of 30% (active since 2016)24The worlds largest source of labelled green bonds in 2019Green IPO16 clean energy company IPOs between 2016 and Q2 201925Streamlining IPO processes for green companies under discussion (CSRC)Financial Infrastructure Carbon MarketsSeven provincial pilots in place, national ETS postponed to 2021Green RatingsGreen bond verification and rating systems developedGreen Stock Indices23 ESG/Green indices, 22 green passive index funds (RMB 7.39 billion), 25 green open index funds (RMB 25.28 billion) developed26Environmental Cost AnalysisStress-test methodologies and analyses shared through a knowledge platformGreen Investor NetworkGreen Finance Committee, more than 240 members consisting of financial institutions, green companies, and research organizationsGreening BRI Coalition, Green Investment Principles21 Tsinghua (2020)22 AIIB (2017); AIIB (2018) 23 Tsinghua (2020)24 CBI (2020)25 Xinhua Finance (2019)26 IIGF (2018)14The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaLegal Infrastructure Green InsuranceRMB 882 billion (USD 130 billion) in green investment, representing 5% of total insurance funds balance (as of September 2019) Remote Damage Assessment and Claim Settlement Platform Green buildings insurance scheme (PICC)Lender LiabilityIncreasing number of climate stress-tests undertaken by banksCompulsory DisclosureMandatory ESG and increasing disclosure requirements (CBIRC)While there has been considerable progress across all four areas, green credit and green bonds have emerged as particular success stories. Green credit represents one of the earliest intervention points of Chinas green finance policy, dating back to 1995 when the PBoC first issued guidance on integrating environmental factors in lending decisions. In 2012 and 2013, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued further guidance on increasing green credit and established a green credit statistics system to track environmental impact and financial performance. By the end of 2019, outstanding green loans from 21 major banks were RMB 10.6 trillion (USD 1.5 trillion), more than double the amount from end of 2013. The environmental impact achieved by the green loans include CO2 reduction of 518 million tons and energy consumption reduction equivalent to 247 million tons of standard coal.27 Furthermore, green loans delivered better financial performance with an average non-performing ratio of 0.48%, 1.81 percentage points lower than that of corporate loans.28 These datapoints make a strong case for reducing the risk weighting of green assets, which is already being piloted in some banks. Despite the relatively late start in 2016, Chinas green bond market is now the worlds largest source of labeled green bonds with RMB 977 billion (USD 140 billion) outstanding at the end of 2019, averaging 30% annual growth.29 Transport and energy were the two largest sectors supported by the green bonds use of proceeds, and the total market has achieved an annual CO2 reduction of at least 52.6 million tons.30 Supporting market infrastructure has also significantly evolved, with increasing business volumes flowing to domestic third party verifiers and rating agencies. 27 Ibid.28 Tsinghua (2020)29 CBI (2020)30 Escalante et al. (2020)15The Potential for Scaling Climate in China2. DOMESTIC GREEN AND CLIMATE FINANCE LANDSCAPEThis section gives an overview of Chinas domestic green and climate finance landscape from 2017-2018. It presents new research that builds on CPIs Global Landscape of Climate Finance methodology,31 a new method for classifying financing entities, and integration of additional data sources. Annual domestic green finance averaged RMB 2.25 trillion (USD 320 billion), making China one of the largest contributors of green finance globally. This section investigates specific investment trends during 2017-2018, as well as barriers to and the potential for scaling up. 2.1 DEFINING PUBLIC VS PRIVATE ACTORSClassifying Chinese entities as public or private is challenging due to complex shareholding structures and the states control over economic actors through its large state-owned enterprises and banks. Despite ongoing efforts to shift towards a market-driven economy, the financial sector still has a strong tendency to favor state-owned businesses and those with political connections.32 Even private companies are not exempt from state control, due to their dependence on state-owned banks. This became clear during the widespread selloff of foreign assets by large Chinese conglomerates in 2017 prompted by state directives to rein in capital outflows.33In this report, “public actors” are defined as actors and subsidiaries with direct identifiable links to the State Council, including the State-owned Assets supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), Ministry of Finance, three policy banks, Big Four state-owned commercial banks, and the sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation (CIC) (Figure 2). The wholly-owned subsidiary and investment arm of CIC, China Huijin Investment Co., makes equity investments in key state-owned financial institutions on behalf of the State Council and holds controlling shares in the Big Four banks. Despite their status as listed commercial entities, the strategic direction and overall operations of the Big Four commercial banks are overseen by the Ministry of Finance and Huijin, which is why they are tracked as public entities in this report.Joint stock commercial banks have mixed ownership, but the top shareholders are usually state-related entities such as the Peoples Insurance Company of China (PICC) and the provincial finance department (e.g. Industrial Bank) or local investment groups (e.g. Huaxia Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank). Some joint stock commercial banks are subsidiaries of CSOEs (e.g. CITIC, China Merchants) or majority owned by Huijin (e.g. China Everbright, Hengfeng Bank). Because the banks providing green credit in this report are majority state-owned, they are also tracked as public entities.31CBI GLCF Methodology (2019)32China US Focus (2012); Elliot & Yan, The Chinese Financial System33SCMP (2019); Nikkei Asia (2019)16The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaAll other actors whose ownership was unclear or did not indicate any direct links to governmental bodies listed above were tracked as private actors. These included project developers, corporate groups, holding companies, private equity providers, and other institutional investors. A detailed methodology is available in the Annex.Figure 2. Map of relevant public actors in the green finance landscapeState CouncilMinistry of FinanceState-owned Assets Supervision andAdministration Commission (SASAC)Top 5 Power Companies(China Energy, Datang, Huadian,Huaneng, SPIC)Policy BanksExport-Import Bank of ChinaChina Development BankState-owned Commercial BanksChina Construction BankIndustrial Commercial Bank of China2 National Utilities(State Grid, China Southern Power Grid)Provincial SOEsEnergy GroupsLocal Government Financing VehiclesAgricultural Development Bank of ChinaAgricultural Bank of ChinaBank of ChinaAsset Management CorporationsChina Great WallChina HuarongDirection of SupervisionChina Investment CorporationChina OrientChina CindaInsurance CompaniesChina Life InsurancePICCChina Taiping InsuranceChina ReinsuranceOther Central SOEsChina National Tobacco CorporationChina Railway CorporationChina Post GroupChina Arts and EntertainmentJoint Stock Commercial BanksEverbrightShanghai PudongJianyinChina Intl Capital Corporation (CICC)Merchants BankBank of CommunicationsIndustrial BankCITIC Industrial BankGuangdong Development BankChina MinshengHengfeng BankShenzhen BankCentral Huijin Investment Co.2.2 INVESTMENT TRENDSTotal domestic climate finance during 2017-2018 was RMB 4.3 trillion (USD 640 billion), or an annual average of RMB 2.1 trillion (USD 320 billion), making China the largest contributor of climate finance globally over the same time period. The following figures in this section are expressed as the annual average unless stated otherwise.17The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaFigure 3. Chinas green finance, from financing source to sector allocation342.2.1 SOURCES AND SECTOR ALLOCATIONPublic sources accounted for 51% of total green finance, or RMB 1.1 trillion (USD 162 billion). Policy banks were the largest contributors with RMB 643 billion (USD 96 billion), or 44% of public finance. Their main contribution was to the transportation sector, accounting for 71% (RMB 389 billion (USD 58 billion) of total investment in the transportation sector. CSOEs, including enterprises directly overseen by the central SASAC and other non-bank institutions regulated by the Ministry of Finance,35 contributed RMB 228 billion (USD 34 billion), or 21% of total public finance. Chinas “Big Five” power generation companies36 and two national utilities37 accounted for more than half (58%) of all CSOE finance, contributing RMB 90 billion (USD 13.5 billion) and RMB 40 billion (USD 6 billion) to wind and solar respectively. Major state-owned and joint-stock commercial banks38 contributed an estimated RMB 228 billion (USD 34 billion). This estimate is based on the 21 major banks that report their green credit portfolio figures to the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC). The Big Four state-owned commercial banks contributed RMB 157 billion (USD 23.5 billion), 34Other major state-owned banks and green PPP data is estimated based on CBIRC and WIND data. N.b. investment in fossil fuel efficiency, large hydro, and waste incineration are excluded.35Policy banks (excluding CDB), State-owned Commercial Banks and Joint-Stock Commercial Banks are covered under “Other major state-owned banks.”36State Power Investment Corporation, Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, China Energy Investment Corporation37State Grid, China Southern38Excluding policy banksPublic FundsJoint OwnershipPrivate FundsUnknownCSOE (Top 5 Power& State Utilities) $19Other CSOEs $14Other Public $9Green PPP $60Private $53EV Sales $20Unknown $5Adaptation $10AFOLU $12Biofuel/Biomass $2EcologicalConstruction andEnvironmentalProtection $47Pollution Control $9Transportation$82Solar $61Water and Wastewater management $20Wind $44Other RE $21Policy Banks $92ResourceConservation $21State-ownedcommercial banks $39Joint-stockcommercial banks $1718The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinawhile joint stock commercial banks contributed RMB 67 billion (USD 10 billion). Under CBIRC guidelines, banks may report a wide range of green projects including industrial water saving, waste disposal, drinking water safety, and disaster prevention. Another category of green finance for banks is the “strategic emerging industry,” which includes manufacturing of energy conservation and environmental protection products, new energy products, and new energy vehicles.39 An estimated RMB 134 billion (USD 20 billion) went towards manufacturing of new energy products and other smart grid projects, which are excluded from the overall green finance figures in this report in line with CPIs methodology for tracking climate finance. These banks are also the largest financiers of CSOEs, and therefore partly responsible for the investment flowing from the wind and solar sectors through the CSOEs in Figure 4. Green PPP projects accounted for around a fifth of total finance, or RMB 459 trillion (USD 68.5 billion). A majority of these projects were labeled “Ecological Construction and Environmental Protection,” a catch-all term for a portfolio of projects at the village or county level, which include river restoration, constructing wetlands and ecological corridors, improving rural drinking water, and waste management.40 This category accounted for RMB 315 billion (USD 47 billion), or 15% of all domestic climate finance flows. PPP projects are largely financed through green funds established by government budgets (Box 3). Private sources accounted for 24% of total finance at RMB 516 billion (USD 77 billion). These sources included project developers, corporates, leasing companies, and institutional investors. Together they made the largest contribution to the solar industry, with RMB 301 billion (USD 45 billion), or 70% of the sector total. This is indicative of the generous government incentives and subsidies that the solar industry benefited from over the past decade. Solar installed capacity in China grew from 2.5GW in 2011 to 205GW at the end of 2019.41 Despite the states sudden decision in May 2018 to halt all subsidies for utility-scale solar in favor of competitive bidding,42 momentum for solar remains relatively strong. 39N.B. the GLCF methodology excludes investment in manufacturing considering the possibility that these costs may be double counted in the investment amounts of new projects. However, the “strategic emerging industry” category is included in this report as Chinas green credit taxonomy tracks this investment category separately. 40 For inclusion in this report as a green PPP, projects were screened to exclude roads, plantations, and waste incineration plants (excluding waste-to-energy plants). 41 PowerTechnology (2019)42 NDRC (2018)Box 3. Green PPP and green fundsGreen PPP projects and green funds started to be actively promoted in China in 2014 as a way to mobilize social (private) capital. The PPP model is largely financed through green funds that aim to blend public and private sources of capital and are initiated by local government budgets. More than 780 green funds have been established to date.1 According to different funding sources, it can be divided into green industry funds, regional green PPP funds, green industry merger and acquisition funds, and green guarantee funds. While detailed information on the composition of funds, how they operate, and their private capital leverage ratios are not disclosed, available information on fund composition suggests that these funds aim to achieve leverage ratios of around 3:7 to 1:4. The success of these funds in reaching their targets is unclear, however, and PPP projects have been known for their inadequately designed return mechanisms and low incentives for private investors to participate.2 95% of green PPP projects are supported by a direct government subsidy or feasibility study subsidy.31. Tsinghua; 2. Interviews; IIGF 2018; 3. WIND19The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaClimate finance investments from domestic sources largely remained within the country. During the period 2017-2018, around RMB 28 billion (USD 4 billion) Chinese-origin sources was outbound, while there were RMB 17 billion (USD 2.5 billion) of inbound investment from foreign sources. Foreign sources were largely public institutions, with 67% provided by multilateral development finance institutions. An additional 25% was via private corporations and commercial banks.2.2.2 MITIGATION VS ADAPTATIONOverall, sectors with mitigation benefits received RMB 1.3 trillion (USD 193 billion), or 60% of the total. Of this total, 55% went to wind and solar. “Other environment” sectors, or sectors with indirect mitigation and adaptation benefits, including AFOLU (agriculture, forestry and other land use), resource conservation, and ecological construction, received an estimated RMB 791 billion (USD 118 billion).Adaptation related projects received RMB 56 billion (USD 8.3 billion), or 4% of total climate finance. This mainly included financing for disaster risk prevention and flood control measures, such as building sponge cities, dikes, and drainage systems. This figure is likely underestimated considering the potential adaptation benefits of projects such as those in the category of ecological construction and water management, as well as difficulties in tracking adaptation finance among private entities. Tracking adaptation finance is a challenge globally, given the difficulty of defining and measuring adaptation benefits, as well as issues related to drawing boundaries with traditional development finance. Table 2. Investment by sector and mitigation vs adaptation benefitsMitigation SECTORS INCLUDEDINVESTMENT AMOUNTSolarRMB 429 billion (USD 64 billion)WindRMB 288 billion (USD 43 billion)Biofuel/biomassRMB 3 billion (USD 0.46 billion)Other renewable energy (includ-ing smart power grids and other renewable energy projects)RMB 27 billion (USD 4 billion)TransportRMB 549 billion (USD 82 billion)AdaptationDisaster prevention, flood control measuresRMB 56 billion (USD 8.3 billion)Other EnvironmentResource conservationRMB 114 billion (USD 17 billion)Pollution controlRMB 60 billion (USD 9 billion)AFOLURMB 77 billion (USD 11.5 billion)Water and wastewater manage-mentRMB 221 billion (USD 33 billion)Ecological construction and Envi-ronmental ProtectionRMB 315 (USD 47 billion)20The Potential for Scaling Climate in China2.2.3 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTIONInvestments were concentrated north and southeast, especially along the coastal provinces. Solar dominated in the northeastern provinces, led by Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia. Wind was prominent in the southeast, led by Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Henan. The green finance pilot zones selected by the State Council in 201743 are well distributed across the country to reflect the different development contexts and natural resource conditions in each. These include Zhejiang in the east, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guizhou in the south, and Xinjiang and Gansu in the west. The cities in these provinces were selected to establish local green finance policies and establish innovative market mechanisms for mobilizing green finance. Figure 4. Regional distribution of climate finance (wind and solar)4443 Huzhou and Quzhou in Zhejiang province; Ganjiang in Jiangxi province, Guangzhou in Guangdong province, Guian in Guizhou province, Hami, Changji, and Kelamayi in Xinjiang province; in December 2019, Lanzhou in Gansu province was added as the ninth pilot city.44 Figures exclude China Development Bank, residential spending, and EV sales. Sources: GLCF, WINDYunnanHainanGuangdongGuangxiGuizhouFujianZhejiangShanghaiShandongHebeiHenanBeijingTianjinInner MongoliaJilinLiaoningHeilongjiangShanxiShaanxiGansuNingxiaJiangsuAnhuiJiangxiSichuanQinghaiTibetXinjiangHunanHubeiChongqingUSD, annual average$0-500 million USD$500million-1 billion USD$1-2billion USD$2-3 billion USD$3-4 billion USD$4 billion USDWind21The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaYunnanHainanGuangdongGuangxiGuizhouFujianZhejiangShanghaiShandongHebeiHenanBeijingTianjinInner MongoliaJilinLiaoningHeilongjiangShanxiShaanxiGansuNingxiaJiangsuAnhuiJiangxiSichuanQinghaiTibetXinjiangHunanHubeiChongqingUSD billion, annual average$0-2 billion USD$2-3 billion USD$3-4 billion USD$4-6 billion USD$6-10 billion USD$10 billion USDSolarYunnanHainanGuangdongGuangxiGuizhouFujianZhejiangShanghaiShandongHebeiHenanBeijingTianjinInner MongoliaJilinLiaoningHeilongjiangShanxiShaanxiGansuNingxiaJiangsuAnhuiJiangxiSichuanQinghaiTibetXinjiangHunanHubeiChongqingUSD, annual average$0-500 million USD$500million-1 billion USD$1-1.5 billion USD$1.5-2 billion USD$2-3 billion USD$3 billion USDTotal22The Potential for Scaling Climate in China2.3 INSTRUMENT ANALYSISThe majority of climate finance was funded through project-level debt, followed by project-level equity and balance sheet financing (Figure 5). Project-level debt is estimated to be as high as RMB 1 trillion (USD 164 billion), including funds raised through green bonds. Annual onshore green bond issuance was around RMB 215 billion (USD 32 billion) during 2017-2018, accounting for about 10% of domestic climate finance flows.45 However, considering the level of green bond proceeds that may be allocated to working capital under Chinese guidelines, up to RMB 31 billion (USD 4.6 billion) of proceeds could have been used to replenish working capital of the issuers.46Figure 5. Estimated Instrument breakdown by financing actorThe investment figures discussed above do not adequately capture all potential climate finance channels in China, such as those flowing through consumer channels. For instance, digital retail consumer finance channels such as Alipay and WeBank are innovating new ways to encourage consumers, retail investors, and SMEs to adopt green practices through their mobile payment platforms. In 2019, mobile payment transaction volumes reached RMB 347 trillion (USD 50 trillion), an increase of more than 28 times from six years ago.47 Platforms like Ant Forest, initiated by Alibabas Ant Financial, utilize customers mobile payment data to track and incentivize green behavior among users, in exchange for planting physical trees. Over a 122 million trees have been planted by August 2019, resulting in 7.92 45 WIND Financial Terminal46 Corporate bonds may allocate up to 30%, and enterprise bonds may allocate up to 50% of proceeds to working capital. See Escalante et al. (2020)47 Paulson Institute (2020)Project-level debt$167Project-levelequity $55Balance sheetfinancing (debtportion) $24Balance sheetfinancing (equityportion) $25Grant $1Green Bond $32Unknown $25Public FundsJoint OwnershipPrivate FundsUnknownCSOE (Top 5 Power& State Utilities) $19Other CSOEs $14Other Public $9State-ownedcommercial banks $39Joint-stockcommercial banks $17Green PPP $60Private $53EV Sales $20Unknown $5Policy Banks $9223The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinamillion tons of CO2 avoided (see section 3.3.1).There are also several initiatives researching blockchain applications for the green bond and insurance markets, which could considerably decrease verification and other transaction costs. Such investments in improving operations and reducing transaction costs for identifying and verifying green assets and environmental impacts help accelerate and improve the quality of climate finance flows.The potential for these new financing channels to drive innovative climate finance is discussed in Section 3.1.24The Potential for Scaling Climate in China3. SCALING UP CLIMATE FINANCE While annual climate finance flows of RMB 2.1 trillion (USD 320 billion) is not trivial, this figure must increase by at least four times to meet Chinas annual investment needs of RMB 9.5 trillion (USD 1.4 trillion) over the next decade. Mobilizing private capital will be key to meeting estimated needs. However, the current climate finance landscape indicates that the private sector has played a limited role to date.3.1 POTENTIAL TO SCALE UPThere is tremendous potential for climate finance to grow, simply given the size of Chinas financial assets. The current green penetration of Chinas financial system remains at around 4% (Figure 6).Figure 6. Comparison of the green share in financial assets48As Chinas capital market continues to evolve and actors become familiar with green financial instruments, uptake in the market will continue to grow. Already the green credit and green bond portfolios have achieved tremendous growth. Green credit has more than doubled over six years to RMB 10.6 trillion (USD 1.5 trillion), and green bonds have grown to RMB 977 billion (USD 140 billion) outstanding over four years. Around RMB 866 billion (USD 124 billion) worth of green bonds in China reach maturity in the next 5 years49, representing new opportunities for green refinancing. As for green stocks, discussions are under way to 48 Data from CBIRC and CSRC (As of Q1 2020), estimated green portion based on IIGF (2018), CBI (2020), Xinhuafinance49CBI (2020)Bank loans outstandingBond marketStock marketInsurance024681012141618202224265% greenGreen portionNon-green portion(trillion USD)1% green1% green7% green$23.8 trillion$13 trillion$9.4 trillion$2.6 trillion25The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinalaunch expedited listing processes for green company IPOs, and multiple green indices and funds have been established. China is providing more support for SMEs. Similar to their green credit guidelines, regulators have advised banks to increase lending to SMEs and track progress on their growth. These recent efforts are part of the states ongoing campaign to reduce banks preferential treatment for SOEs, reduce the perception of implicit government guarantees, and reduce unsustainable levels of local government sponsored debt. As banks start lending to more SMEs and become more familiar with managing different credit risk profiles, this will increase opportunities for banks to take interest in more innovative, risk sharing arrangements. New sources of concessional capital for climate finance are on the way. In 2016, the central government announced plans to set up a unified National Green Development Fund (NGDF) to invest in green industries. The Fund was jointly launched in July 2020 by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and the Shanghai municipal government with an initial capital of RMB 88.5 billion (USD 13 billion).50 The Fund will adopt the PPP model for its operation and will largely focus on green development along the Yangtze River Economic Belt, in various projects including environmental protection, pollution prevention and control, ecological restoration, energy conservation and utilization, green transportation, and clean energy.There is growing interest in exploring innovative structures. For instance, Chinas Clean Development Mechanism Fund (CDM Fund) was launched in 2010 to support Chinas efforts to address climate change and promote sustainable development. By April 2020, the CDM Fund had implemented 317 clean concessional loan projects in 27 provinces, municipalities, and districts, with a total loan value of RMB 19.4 billion (USD 2.8 billion), and leveraging capital of nearly RMB 100 billion (USD 15 billion).51 In May 2020, the CDM Fund signed a Green Innovation Investment Cooperation Agreement with the Department of Finance of Jiangsu Province and Industrial Bank Nanjing Branch. The three parties will initiate risk-sharing arrangements to support low-carbon development, energy conservation and emission reduction projects at the local level. According to the business model determined by the Agreement, the Department of Finance of Jiangsu Province will be responsible for project origination, the CDM Fund will provide concessional funds, and Industrial Bank will provide financing guarantees for projects. This would enable Jiangsu enterprises to obtain loans from a bank at lower interest rates. Similar arrangements are also in place with the Finance Bureau and Qilu Bank in Shandong Province, the Department of Finance and China Everbright Bank in Yunnan Province, and the Department of Finance and Industrial Bank in Hunan Province.The prevalence of mobile payment technologies and online banking represents new financing avenues for consumers, retail investors, and small businesses. Chinas volume of credit asset issuance is expected to grow from RMB 57 trillion (USD 8.4 trillion) in 2018 to RMB 80 trillion (USD 11.7 trillion) in 2022. 54% of this growth will be driven by the expansion of credit to long-tail customers who have had difficulties accessing finance from traditional financial institutions.52 For instance, Tencent-backed online bank WeBank automates risk-based pricing using nearly 6,000 factors including credit history, consumption, and other behavioral data to price loans for specific customers. The capability to price customer-50China Forum of Environmental Journalists (2020)51CDM Fund Website52Oliver Wyman (2019)26The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinaspecific risks allows WeBank to reach a wider range of clients who may not have had prior access to finance from traditional banks. As another example, Alibabas Ant Financial leverages more than 20 million SME accounts and nearly 1.2 billion individual consumer accounts globally to incentivize customers to adopt green practices in exchange for access to discounted loans. Finally, there are growing opportunities for foreign private capital participation. Foreign private capital only accounted for RMB 9 billion (USD 1.34 billion) of inbound climate finance flows in 2017-2018. Chinese domestic actors are increasingly encouraged to establish funds with foreign investors, and restrictions on foreign ownership are gradually being lifted. Several new funds established by foreign investors with participating Chinese institutions include Innovator Capitals Sustainable Finance & Investment Corporation (SFIC) and Milltrusts Climate Impact Asia Fund (CIAF). SFIC will receive a RMB 6.85 billion (USD 1 billion) contribution from the Investment Association of China to invest in sustainable technology innovation, while CIAF is targeting RMB 3.4 billion (USD 500 million) to invest in green companies across Asia and make revenue-based donations to WWF conservation programs. Foreign investors may also establish long-term partnerships with local businesses through Joint Ventures. An example is the Asian Environment Impact Fund launched by a Joint Venture between Huaneng and Invesco, a US-based private equity firm. Finally, Chinese bonds are now represented in major global bond indices, such as the Bloomberg Barclays Index, which is expected to lead to more than RMB 685 billion (USD 100 billion) of additional foreign inflows.53 3.2 BARRIERS TO SCALING UPWhile the top-down approach to implementing green finance reform has led to the mobilization of large pools of green capital, access to capital remains concentrated among public actors. There is a lack of incentives for private actors to get involved in climate-related projects, and explore blended finance structures for sharing risk. SOEs and local governments tend to be the first to benefit from concessional capital sources like CDB and local green funds. Few incentives to explore innovative structures. Green finance in China is dominated by large players and flows largely through plain vanilla instruments. As shown in the section above, public sources accounted for half of green finance, with nearly 95% of that amount attributable to CSOEs, policy banks, and the Big Four state-owned commercial banks (Figure 5). Sophisticated funding structures to blend different financing actors risk appetites are generally not very well understood, nor are they considered necessary. Limited success of PPP structures. PPP structures, which were widely promoted to leverage government funds and mobilize private investment, have not been very effective to date and incentives for private actors to participate remain low.54 While many local governments have adopted the PPP model, a system to efficiently allocate funding and track key outcomes is often missing. In some cases, the PPP model may be adopted for unsuitable projects due to the lack of a feasibility study. Another risk with the PPP model is that it may add to local hidden debts, as PPPs are largely funded by public sources. To 53Bloomberg (2019)54Interview; IIGF (2018)27The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinaenhance PPP performance management, the Ministry of Finance issued the Notice of Issuing the Operational Guidelines for the Performance Management of Public-private Partnership Projects in 2020, requiring local governments to better manage and evaluate PPP projects.55 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance and local governments have established information centers of PPP project pipelines to increase the transparency and information sharing of PPPs.56 Lack of diverse sources of capital. Chinas capital market is less developed than those in many developed countries and remains dominated by traditional banking. This means there is a relatively small class of impact-oriented investors. Corporate actors rely heavily on traditional bank loans. According to start-up accelerator Plug and Plays recent internal survey, the vast majority of start-ups in China looked to bank loans rather than seeking PE/VC funding.57 Furthermore, domestic concessional capital providerslike NGOs and foundationsthat could drive research and early stage climate action through technical assistance and grants are largely missing in China. Access barriers to formal financing channels and investment deals. There is a strong tendency for the formal financial sector to prefer large state-owned clients and others with political connections, leaving smaller players to fund growth through informal, more expensive channels. Several factors contribute to the overall inaccessibility of Chinas financial system to private actors: 1) implicit government guarantees for SOEs and state-owned banks; 2) senior managers of the major banks are often appointed by the government; 3) government officials sometimes intervene in loan decisions in ways that circumvent traditional credit procedures.58 Moreover, CDB is the largest provider of concessional capital, but the majority of its clients remain SOEs and local governments. CDBs decision-making processes are not transparent.59 Preliminary analysis on PPP projects shows that many of the disclosed private capital participants have actually been central and local SOEs, which could be potentially crowding out private capital opportunities.60 Asymmetric information. There are high search costs for investors interested in impact investing, not to mention investors interested in making climate action their investment thesis. Green definitions and taxonomies often do not identify thresholds for meeting specific standards. Environmental impact reporting is limited to aggregate metrics, not supported by a standardized methodology. Project origination is dominantly led by national and local economic development authorities. High policy uncertainty. Even though China is known for long-term planning and sending strong policy signals through key policy documents, it can sometimes unexpectedly reverse those decisions as well. For example, the NDRC announced its decision to abruptly halt solar subsidies in May 31, 2018, reversing an era of generous subsidies that made China the worlds largest renewable energy market. This led to a turbulent period for many solar producers who initially entered the market attracted by the subsidies. Producers with business models that relied more heavily on the subsidies were forced to exit the market.55China Public Private Partnership Center56Guangdong Department of Finance57Results of undisclosed internal Plug and Play survey58Brookings (2013)59China is not a member of the OECD and not bound by OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) or other reporting requirements60Wind Financial Terminal28The Potential for Scaling Climate in China3.3 CASE STUDIES: INNOVATIVE CLIMATE FINANCESome of the barriers outlined above may be addressed through innovative financing structures that align incentives for diverse groups of actors, leverage public funds to catalyze private capital, and channel finance to green project pipelines. The Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance has produced several ideas for such innovative financing mechanisms, across various sectors and geographies (Box 4). While China-specific ideas have not been featured in the Lab, the following case studies highlight Chinas potential for scaling up innovative climate finance, while overcoming some of the barriers identified in section 3.2. 3.3.1 GREEN FINTECHFintech was identified as one of the three major research topics under the G20 Sustainable Finance Study Group for its potential to scale up climate finance.61 Digital technologies, including big data, artificial intelligence (AI), mobile platforms, blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT), can overcome traditional barriers for climate finance such as limited access to capital and cost burden of issuance and verification. Digital finance can also significantly increase data availability and transparency on environmental and financial information. It also encourages greater financial inclusion and innovation, expanding financial access for citizens and SMEs, and cultivating new business models. China has been a leader in mobile payment systems due to the popularity of Alipay and WeChat pay. In 2019, mobile payment transaction volumes reached RMB 347.11 trillion (USD 51 trillion), an increase of more than 28 times from six years ago.62 The leading example of green fintech in China is Ant Forest, an initiative led by Ant Financial, the financial arm of Alibaba. It represents the worlds first large-scale effort to promote green consumption behavior by combining mobile payment, big data, and social media. 61UNEP Inquiry (2018)62 Paulson Institute (2020)Box 4. The Global Innovation Lab for Climate FinanceThe Lab identifies, develops, and launches innovative finance instruments that can drive billions in private investment to take action on climate change and sustainable development. Since 2014, the Lab has launched 41 innovative solutions that have collectively mobilized $2.07 billion in sustainable development to date, with $370 million in original investment contributed by Lab Member institutions. These ideas represent a range of financial innovations that are led by enterprises, fund managers, market experts, and others, that are all structured to tackle investment barriers for climate projects in the most critical regions and sectors. For the 2020 cycle, the Lab had a special call for ideas in sustainable energy access, sustainable cities, sustainable agricultures, and nature-based solutions, and ideas targeting the geographies of India, Brazil, and Southern Africa. Once selected, ideas receive robust technical and financial modeling support, including development of promotional content and market implementation strategies. Idea proponents also gain access to the Labs network of investors and advisors. The Lab is composed of over 60 expert institutions in government, development finance, philanthropy, and the private sector. Funders include the Australian, UK, German, and Netherlands governments, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Rockefeller Foundation, and the Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation. Climate Policy Initiative serves as the Lab Secretariat. 29The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaAnt Forest was initiated in August 2016 on the Alipay platform, incentivizing users to reduce their carbon footprint in exchange for a physical tree planted in Alashan, China. In order to plant a tree, each individual has to grow a virtual tree through earning “green energy” on an individual carbon account from activities such as walking or taking public transportation, using online payment, and stop using plastic bags. By August 2019, over 500 million people across China were participating in Ant Forest, resulting in over 7.92 million tons of cumulative carbon avoided and over 122 million trees planted in arid regions in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai, and Shanxi provinces. Currently, Ant Financial manages 900 million individual consumer accounts in China and 1.2 billion globally. Ant Financial joined UNEP to launch the Sustainable Digital Finance Alliance (SDFA) in 2017, to explore further opportunities for leveraging digital technologies to accelerate financing in sustainable development. 3.3.2 MATCHMAKING PLATFORMSOne of the green finance pilot cities, Huzhou, is pioneering new approaches for matching local SMEs with green financing opportunities. Huzhou is one of nine pilot cities for green finance reformation, located in Zhejiang province in Southeast China. To support the green growth of local SMEs, the municipal government launched a Green Finance One-Stop Service Platform in 2018. The platform provides three primary financial services for SMEs. First, the platform connects business with banks, facilitating the green lending process. By combining 36 local banks and 300 financial products, it efficiently matches SMEs with banks and products that can support their diverse needs.The platform also compiles information on businesses from 31 government departments including commercial operations, tax, and environmental performance, which makes data-sharing across departments possible. Second, the platform directly connects businesses with investors, lowering administrative costs and increasing transparency. Investors may review detailed information and compare all available enterprises and projects; businesses can attract more investors and expand their financing sources through the platform. Third, the platform establishes a green credit rating system to identify qualified green projects and businesses. The government plans to issue subsidies for those rated as “green.”Since its launch in 2018, the platform has attracted over 16,000 SMEs, over 30 financial institutions, and nearly 80 investors. In terms of green lending, over 13,000 SMEs have successfully received more than RMB 160 billion (USD 23 billion) in credit from banks. It also connected investors to 73 projects, which received funding totaling more than RMB 6.6 billion (USD 1 billion).To complement the municipal governments efforts, the Bank of Huzhou initiated a Green Credit Management System in 2019 to identify green projects and improve social and environmental risk management. The system has two major functions. First, it employs AI and machine learning to automatically filter financial transactions and projects that do not meet national or local standards. Then, it will give “smart green labels” to projects that pass those standards and it will also estimate those projects environmental benefits. Second, it uses big data to help manage environmental and social risks. The system will extract environmental risk information, such as pollutant permits, send warnings about potential 30The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinarisk factors, and monitor environmental performance including regulatory penalties and workplace accidents. The system leverages digital technology to support green lending, increasing its efficiency and lowering costs. In July 2019, Huzhou Bank became the third bank in China to officially announce its commitment to the Equator Principles.3.3.3 GREEN INSURANCEGreen insurance is an important financial tool for internalizing the cost of environmental risks and managing performance risks. The risk prevention mechanism of insurance instruments can help increase climate resilience and encourage investment. There are two major types of green insurance in China: Environmental Pollution Liability (EPL) insurance and climate risk insurance. EPL insurance was formally established through Guiding Opinions in 2016, which pointed out the need to develop insurance mechanisms for environmental protection. It also provided guidelines to establish compulsory liability insurance in fields with high environmental risks and encouraged innovation of green insurance products and services. The Management Method of Compulsory Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in 2017 required businesses in high risk industries, such as heavy metal and hazardous waste, to register. The Reform Plan for Ecological Environment Damage Compensation System was also launched in 2017, extending the pilot green insurance schemes in seven provinces to the national level. Climate risk insurance in China was initially developed to address the vulnerability of the agricultural sector to extreme weather and other climate events. The State Councils Strategy Plan for Rural Revitalization (2018-2022) proposed to improve the agricultural insurance system by designing insurance products with different levels of protection, as well as to encourage index-based weather insurance. Peoples Insurance Company of China (PICC), one of Chinas two largest insurance companies overseen by the Ministry of Finance, has been developing a remote damage assessment and claim assessments scheme for its catastrophe insurance product. Currently being piloted in Ningbo, the platform may be used for generating flood maps and a database for residential buildings to calculate the number of affected households and the expected total amount of claims. This process expedites the claim settlement process to as little as four days. Although green insurance can be an important market mechanism for managing environmental liabilities and climate risks, it is still in the initial stages of development. Additionality, the proportion of Chinas insurance funds invested in the green sector is still low. Insurance companies assets under management is around RMB 17.8 trillion (USD 2.6 trillion), of which only 5% (RMB 882 billion (USD 130 billion) is invested in green sectors.63 More innovative products that help de-risk projects and businesses, making them more attractive to private investors, need to be developed and applied at a wider scale.63 Xinhua Finance (2020)31The Potential for Scaling Climate in China4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR GREENING CHINAS OUTBOUND FINANCEThere are important opportunities for greening Chinas outbound finance. Chinas outbound investment was more than USD 2 trillion from 2013-2019, of which USD 730 billion, or 37%, went to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries (Figure 7). 138 countries have signed BRI MoUs with China as of March 2020. The investment decision-making processes for BRI are driven by host country demands and largely financed through Chinas policy banks and the Big Four state-owned banks. Figure 7. Chinas finance to BRI partner countries (2013-2019)64Energy-related investments to BRI countries over the same period was USD 292 billion, half of which went to fossil fuels (Figure 8). The two leading financiers of outbound BRI energy-related investments were CDB and EXIM Bank, providing 35% of the total (Figure 9). There is little transparency on the composition of the remaining 65%. Available data indicates that many projects are financed through syndicates in which the Big Four state-owned banks are common participants. If BRI countries follow historical growth trajectories while the rest of the world decarbonizes, their share of global carbon emissions could grow to 66% by 2050, or double the level of emissions required to limit warming to two degrees Celsius.65 There is an opportunity for China to support the greening of growth trajectories in BRI countries, rather than continuing fossil-based growth. A number of approaches could support this goal, including raising environmental standards in BRI partner countries, establishing fossil exclusion lists for financing institutions, and developing pipelines for green BRI opportunities. Especially in the 64Data calculated from American Enterprise Institute and Boston University65 Tsinghua PBSCF (2019)32The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinacontext of COVID-19 recovery, BRI may support partner countries sustainable recovery plans by stimulating investment in green infrastructure.Figure 8. Chinas BRI energy investments by typeFigure 9. Chinas BRI energy investments by financing sourceSeveral initiatives are underway to embed green standards in BRI investments. These include the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environments BRI Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan, the BRI International Green Development Coalition (involving more than 20 UN agencies and programs), and other more thematic initiatives such as the BRI Green Cooling Initiative, BRI Green Lighting Initiative, and the BRI Green Going-Out Initiative (targeting Chinese companies investments abroad).0201320142015201620172018201951015202530354045505560BillionUnknownAlternativeCoalGasHydroOil10.7 bn46.3 bn53 bn49.2 bn39.5 bn55.2 bn38.3 bnBillion010203040506054.1 bn41.9 bn57.0 bn42.9 bn2016201720182019UnknownCDBCDB-EXIM CofinanceEXIM Bank33The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaThe Green Investment Principles (GIP) led by the Green Finance Committee (GFC) and City of London Corporations Green Finance Initiative brings together all BRI stakeholders to agree to common standards for BRI investments (Box 4). Signatories include all major Chinese banks involved in BRI and other large financial institutions across 12 countries, including Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Luxembourg Stock Exchange, Natixis, and UBS Group. Another initiative led by the GFC is a “traffic light” system for BRI projects that categorize projects on their greenness, with a red light issued for high-emission projects. While such initiatives are promising, green definitions must be ambitious, clearly articulated, and mandatory to make an impact. So far, the GIP and other green standards remain voluntary and loosely articulated, allowing much room for interpretation depending on host-country context. Exclusion lists for high-emission projects should be developed and accompanied by pecuniary measures for noncompliance. Nonetheless, initiatives such as the GIP that bring together large financial institutions in China and abroad can potentially serve as an important platform for raising global climate standards. Finally, there is an opportunity to increase climate investments in developing countries through debt-swap arrangements. Especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, many developing countries have sought debt relief to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and finance economic recovery. In response, the G20 nations launched a debt service suspension initiative in April 2020 for the poorest countries until the end of June 2021.66 As a participant of the G20 initiative, China has a potentially influential role given its position as the largest bilateral creditor to Africa and many low-income developing countries elsewhere. It accounts for USD 104 billion, or 20% of the total debt owed by 73 countries eligible for the initiative.67 This is more than the total debt owed to all Paris Club lenders combined, which include debts owed to the US, Britain, and Japan. Climate-for-debt swap arrangements could be used to earmark funds for climate investment in exchange for debt relief, while also contributing to a sustainable recovery in these countries.66 G20 communique (April 2020) 67 Economist (2020)Box 5. BRI Green Investment PrinciplesPrinciple 1: Embed sustainability into corporate governancePrinciple 2: Understand environmental, social and governance risksPrinciple 3: Disclose environmental informationPrinciple 4: Enhance communication with stakeholdersPrinciple 5: Utilise green financial instrumentsPrinciple 6: Adopt green supply chain managementPrinciple 7: Build capacity through collective action34The Potential for Scaling Climate in China5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSChinas green financial reform made great progress during the 13th Five-Year Plan. Key factors such as high-level political support, leadership of the central bank, development of green taxonomies and pilot zones, and substantial incentives, all contributed to this success. Green credit and green bonds emerged as particular success stories, mobilizing a combined RMB 4 trillion for green projects in the past five years. Financial and regulatory infrastructure also evolved, with new methodologies for green rating and risk evaluation, the development of numerous green stock indices, and green insurance products. However, China also has high potential to further green financial reform, particularly by expanding to new actor groups and markets. Access to the pools of green capital that are being mobilized remains concentrated among public actors. Private actors lack incentives or reliable information that would facilitate getting involved in climate-related projects, and few are interested in exploring blended finance structures for sharing risk. The relatively underdeveloped capital markets, dominance of the traditional banking sector, and lack of access to formal financing channels and investment deals inhibits innovation and access by smaller actors. Concessional capital providers that help drive innovative climate action in other regions, like NGOs and foundations, are largely missing in China. Overall investment needs to scale up by more than four times its current levels to meet investment needs. As much as RMB 95.45 trillion (USD 14 trillion) will be needed over the next decade to meet Chinas climate targets from 2015. Average annual climate finance in 2017 and 2018 remained at around RMB 2.14 trillion (USD 320 billion). While private capital mobilization will be key in meeting estimated needs, the current climate finance landscape indicates that private actors have played a limited role to date.There is great potential to scale up climate finance in China. The current green penetration of Chinas financial system remains at around 4%. As Chinas capital market continues to evolve and actors become familiar with green financial instruments, uptake in the market will grow. The government has started to direct more financial support for SMEs, there are increasing sources of concessional capital for climate projects, and there is growing interest in exploring innovative structures. Mobile payment platforms and online banking represent new avenues for channeling green finance and changing consumption habits for more than a billion customers. There are also growing opportunities for foreign private capital participation, through funds, joint ventures, and bond markets. Finally, there are opportunities for greening Chinas outbound finance, through initiatives such as the Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road. While the outbreak of COVID-19 has imposed immediate challenges for Chinas economy and green finance development, the government has sent positive signals through policies that increase support for renewables and support small businesses. Stimulus measures emphasize investment in “new infrastructure” projects such as 5G networks, ultra-high voltage transmission lines, high-speed rail and EV charging infrastructure. The State Council also 35The Potential for Scaling Climate in Chinaremoved the 2020 GDP target to focus on recovery, reversing a decades-long practice. This relieved significant pressure from local governments that would have otherwise increased their unsustainable debt loads to fund investments. 5.1 RECOMMENDATIONSThe following recommendations for tapping into Chinas potential for climate finance build on the existing strengths of Chinas policy framework for green financial reform, which combines top-down design and high-level political buy-in with bottom-up experimentation and innovation. Recommendations include: 1. Continue raising the ambition of high-level targets and green standards. Key targets in national policy documents like five-year plans provide important signals for economic actors across the country. The updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and 14th Five-Year-Plan which will be released in 2021 are opportunities to raise climate ambitions and demonstrate Chinas continued leadership in the field. For instance, absolute carbon emission targets could be introduced in lieu of carbon intensity targets. The coal cap and target share of coal in primary energy consumption could be further decreased (current targets are 1100GW and less than 58%). Raising green standards in taxonomies and articulating clear thresholds for exclusion can improve the quality of green assets and projects that receive financing. Currently, three green taxonomies are in place for loans, bonds, and industry, but they allow room for investment in fossil fuels and other high-emission sectors. As one of the first countries to enter the COVID-19 pandemic recovery phase, China faces a historic opportunity to reiterate climate ambitions and mainstream green considerations in its recovery efforts.2. Incentivize experimentation and implementation of innovative financing structures. Regulatory authorities can encourage experimentation by rewarding innovation efforts through inclusion in performance evaluation schemes and other monetary benefits. For example, the qualitative portion of macroprudential assessments undertaken by the PBoC could reward banks for participating in results-oriented, innovative green funds and blended finance structures without encouraging excessive risk taking. The PBoC could also provide increased access to green re-lending facilities at low costs. Risk weighting green assets in favor of polluting assets is already a topic under discussion at the PBoC given the lower NPL ratios achieved by green credit portfolios. Funds from the National Green Development Fund and the Clean Development Mechanism Fund could be deployed to provide grants and guarantees to fund early-stage projects, feasibility studies, and results-based projects. Green insurance schemes could be used not only for protection against environmental liabilities, but also to provide guarantees against performance risks undertaken by private investors in impact-oriented climate projects. 36The Potential for Scaling Climate in China3. Build and increase visibility on the pipeline of green projects for private actors. There is little transparency in the investment decision-making processes in large banks and government-established green funds, disincentivizing actors without connections to SOEs or local governments. Matchmaking platforms such as Bank of Huzhous Green Credit Management Platform and the Huzhou municipal governments Green Finance One-stop Service Platform can reduce search costs and increase efficiency by linking interested investors with qualified green projects and investment products. The recently issued “Guidance on Investment and Financing to address climate change” encourages the development of various mechanisms to attract private capital, which should aim to widely promote collaboration opportunities and lessons learned.4. Track and monitor finance flows for ultimate allocation and impact. Without robust tracking and impact reporting standards, it will be difficult to ensure that climate finance flows are being effectively allocated to projects that can generate the most impact. Currently, green finance policies only suggest some key metrics that actors can report at the aggregate level, using their own methodologies. Ensuring that reported climate impacts are ex-post, and pro-rated to an actors share of contributions to a project could be one way to improve impact tracking and avoid double counting. The China Securities Regulatory Commission forthcoming mandatory environmental information disclosure for listed companies is an opportunity to strengthen tracking and monitoring of progress. The measure will ask companies to report on their climate finance and are currently taking suggestions on which metrics to include. 5. Introduce mandatory exclusion lists and negative incentives for high-emission sectors. Green financial reform is not only about increasing the green, but also about decreasing support for high-emission sectors. Chinas green credit guidelines discourage banks from investing in high-polluting industries and overcapacity sectors but have not introduced mandatory targets or pecuniary measures for continued investment in these sectors. The Ministry of Ecology and Environments list of polluting industries that require pollution liability insurance is a practice that could be further expanded and applied in other areas. The recently proposed “Climate Investment and Finance Standard System” is an opportunity to establish concrete criteria for screening climate investments and encourage robust monitoring of ex-post performance.37The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaThe COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the urgency of building back better and ensuring a sustainable recovery, presenting a real opportunity for China to demonstrate its strengthened leadership in green and climate finance. The CCICEDs policy recommendations for recovery highlight the close relationship between public health and environmental issues and promote a shift towards a green development model to drive resilient economic growth.68 How China implements these recommendations in its actions over the next few years will have implications not just for Chinas recovery but also for the global community and its capacity to meet global climate targets.68 CCICED (2020) From Recovery to Green Prosperity: Accelerating the transition toward high-quality green development during the 14th FYP period38The Potential for Scaling Climate in China6. REFERENCESAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 2018. “Sustainable Cities Strategy: Financing Solutions for Developing Sustainable Cities in Asia.” https:/www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/operational-policies/sustainable-cities/.content/_download/sustainable-cities-strategy.pdf.Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 2017. “Energy Sector Strategy: Sustainable Energy for Asia” https:/www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/strategies/.content/index/_download/aiib-energy-sector-Strategy-2017.pdf.China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会. 2015. “Research on Green Finance Reform and Promotion of Green Transformation .” http:/ 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会. 2020. “From Recovery to Green Prosperity: Accelerating the transition toward high-quality green development during the 14th Five-Year Plan period.” https:/cciced.eco/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/cciced-2020-en-policy-recommendations-2020.pdf.Chen T., Lee A. 2019. “Index Inclusion Seen Making China Bond Market No. 2 Globally.” Bloomberg News. https:/ Forum of Environmental Journalists. 2020. “The National Green Development Fund focuses on the green development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt .” http:/ Action Tracker. 2020. “Current Policy Projections - China.” https:/climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/current-policy-projections/.Climate Bonds Initiative. 2020. “China Green Bond Market - 2019 Research Report .” https:/ Policy Initiative. 2019. “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019 - Methodology.” https:/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GLCF-2019-Methodology-Document.pdf.Department of Finance, Guangdong Provinec. 2020. “List of Public Private Partnerships.” http:/ 2020. “The poorest countries may owe less to China than first thought.” https:/ D., Yan K. 2013. “The Chinese Financial System.” Brookings. https:/www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/chinese-financial-system-elliott-yan.pdf.39The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaEscalante D., Choi J., Chin N., Cui Y., Larsen M. 2020. “Green Bonds in China: the State and Effectiveness of the Market / 中国绿色债券市场：趋势与分析.” Climate Policy Initiative. https:/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/green-bonds-in-china-the-state-and-effectiveness-of-the-market/.European Investment Bank, Green Finance Committee of China Society for Finance and Banking. 2017. “The need for a common language in Green Finance.” https:/www.eib.org/attachments/press/white-paper-green-finance-common-language-eib-and-green-finance-committee.pdf.Fan G., Hope N. 2012. “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy.” China US Focus. https:/ D., Cho Y. 2019. “Wanda Group sheds assets as fast as it bought them.” Nikkei Asia. https:/ Laura. 2019. “Having dumped US$25 billion in assets, Wanda still about halfway through cutting its debt burden.” South China Morning Post. https:/ Energy Agency. 2019. “Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2019.” https:/www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-co2-status-report-2019/emissions.International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF). 2018. “China Green Finance Development Report .” .Ma Jun, Cheng Lin, Chen Yunhan, Wu Yue . 2020. “Chinas Pioneering Green Finance.” Tsinghua Research Center for Green Finance Development . .Ma Jun, Zadek, S. 2019. “Decarbonizing the Belt and Road- A Green Finance Roadmap.” Tsinghua PBCSF. https:/www.climateworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Decarbonizing-the-Belt-and-Road_report_final_lo-res.pdf.Myllyvirta, Lauri. 2020. “Analysis: Chinas CO2 emissions surged past pre-coronavirus levels in May.” CarbonBrief. https:/www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-chinas-co2-emissions-surged-past-pre-coronavirus-levels-in-may.National Development and Reform Commission. 2018. “Notice on Matters relating to PV Power Generation.” https:/ Institute. 2020. “Fintech Drives Sustainable Development in China.” https:/www.paulsoninstitute.org/green-finance/green-scene/fintech-drives-sustainable-development-in-china-executive-summary/.PBoC (Peoples Bank of China). 2016. “The Peoples Bank of China and six other agencies jointly issue“Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System”.” http:/ Bank of China and UNEP Inquiry . 2015. “Establishing Chinas Green Financial System.” http:/unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Establishing_Chinas_Green_Financial_System_Final_Report.pdf.40The Potential for Scaling Climate in ChinaPeoples Bank of China. 2016. “The Peoples Bank of China and six other agencies jointly issue “Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System”.” http:/ Technology. 2019. “Solar PV capacity additions in China fell by 32% in 2019.” https:/www.power- Action Network. 2020. “Banking on Climate Change.” https:/www.ran.org/bankingonclimatechange2020/.S&P. 2020. “The Worlds Largest Banks, 2020.” https:/ C., Qian H., Mo M. 2019. “China Credit-Tech Market Report: Technology-Driven Value Generation In Credit-Tech.” Oliver Wyman. https:/ Inquiry. 2016. “Definitions and Concepts: Background Note .” http:/unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1_ Definitions_and_Concepts.pdf.UNEP Inquiry. 2018. “G20 Sustainable Finance Study Group Synthesis Report 2018.” http:/unepinquiry.org/g20greenfinancerepositoryeng/.World Bank. 2020. “COVID 19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative.” https:/www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative.Xinhua Finance. 2019. “三年多来16家绿色能源企业IPO 3家募资超10亿元.” http:/ Finance. 2020. “China Green Finance Development Trends and Outlook - 2020年中国绿色金融发展趋势展望.” http:/
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