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5G泰坦尼克号.pdf

上传人: 竿*** 编号:981878 2025-11-29 46页 2.10MB

1、FAST IOT07/08/25Dr.Altaf Shaik-Fast IOTThe 5G TitanicDr.Altaf Shaik,Robert JaschekReference:https:/education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/titanic-sinks/Fast IOT&Technische Universitt Berlin407/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTTitanicOn April 15,1912,the RMS Titanic sunk in the North Atlantic Ocean07/08/25Dr.

2、Altaf Shaik-Fast IOT5What 5G assumes?607/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTCUPSControl user plane separation707/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTSecurity featuresDesign omits IPSec usage if the interface is physically protected.807/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOT5G data flowGTP:GPRS tunneling protocol(Age:26)907/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOT

3、Positioning the 5G attacker07/08/25Dr.Altaf Shaik-Fast IOT10But what if that separation fails?1107/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTProtocol tunneling via GTP-UEncapsulating one protocol inside user-plane traffic to reach a specific node Why GTP-U:A protocol that lacks built-in integrity checks or source authen

4、tication.Simple forwarding logic based solely on IP address and identifiersNo inspection of payload contentsDelivers encapsulated inner payloads to internal GTP-U-capable nodes(e.g.,UPF,gNodeB)Sending GTP-U encapsulated packets to networks is considered fraud1207/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTProtocol tunnel

5、ing-packetGTP-U-in-GTP-U encapsulated packetStandard protocol compliant1307/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTHow to craftDiscover and craft packet with internal IP addresses and portsfrom search engines,recon,insiders,intermediariesEnumerate and forge target users tunnel identifier,and IP address1407/08/25FAST

6、IOTFAST IOTProtocol tunneling-flow1507/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTProtocol tunneling-roaming5G has N9 interface connect roaming interfacesPacket could be tunneled internationally a vulnerable UPF will execute itHome NetworkVisited Network1607/08/25FAST IOTFAST IOTNetwork boundary bridgingRouting user-plan

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根据报告的内容,全文主要内容概括如下: - **5G网络安全漏洞**:5G网络中存在多个安全漏洞,特别是GTP-U协议的弱点,使得攻击者能够通过隧道和边界桥接攻击,控制用户数据路径和进行中间人攻击。 - **攻击方式**:攻击者可以通过伪造TEID和SEID、利用协议隧道和边界穿越等方式进行攻击。 - **影响**:攻击可能导致数据泄露、服务中断、欺诈等严重后果。 - **测试结果**:在测试的6个5G核心网络中,超过80%存在漏洞,包括商业核心网络。 - **建议**:建议加强GTP-U协议的安全性,实施防火墙,并改进UPF的安全设计实践。 核心数据: - 5G核心网络中超过80%存在漏洞。 - GTP-U协议缺乏内置的完整性和源认证检查。 - 攻击者可以在几秒钟内破解TEID-IP对。
揭秘网络边界危机" 你的数据安全吗?" 如何避免成为下一个受害者?"
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