1、Policy Research Working Paper9394 Growth of Global Corporate Debt Main Facts and Policy Challenges Facundo Abraham Juan J. Cortina Sergio L. Schmukler Development Economics Development Research Group September 2020 Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedP
2、ublic Disclosure Authorized Produced by the Research Support Team Abstract The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the pr
3、esentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Rec
4、onstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Policy Research Working Paper 9394 This paper surveys the literature to document the main stylized facts, risks, and policy challenges rel
5、ated to the expansion of global nonfinancial corporate debt after the 200809 global financial crisis. Nonfinancial corporate debt steadily increased after the crisis, especially in emerg- ing economies. Between 2008 and 2018, corporate debt increased from 56 to 96 percent of gross domestic product i
6、n emerging economies, whereas this ratio remained stable in developed economies. Nonfinancial corporate debt was mainly issued through bond markets, and its growth can be largely attributed to accommodative monetary policies in developed economies. Whereas increased debt financing has some positive
7、aspects, it has also amplified firms solvency risks and exposure to changes in market conditions, such as the economic downturn triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Because capital markets have a larger role in firm financing, policy makers have limited tools to mitigate the risks of growing firm deb
8、t. This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on th
9、e Web at http:/www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at fabrahamworldbank.org, jcortinalorenteworldbank.org, and sschmuklerworldbank.org. Growth of Global Corporate Debt: Main Facts and Policy Challenges Facundo Abraham Juan J. Cortina Sergio L. Schmukler * JEL Classification Codes: F
10、32, F34, F65, G0, G10, G15, G30 Keywords: capital raising, corporate bonds, corporate financing, currency risk, debt, emerging economies, foreign currency debt, global financial crisis * This paper was written for the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance, edited by A. Dixit, S. Edwa
11、rds, J. Hamilton, K. Judd, and K. Kletzer. We are grateful to Marta Guasch for excellent research assistance and to Ken Kletzer for helpful comments and for encouraging us to write the paper. Research support came from the World Bank Chile Research and Development Center, Knowledge for Change Progra
12、m (KCP), and Strategic Research Program (SRP). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Ba
13、nk or the governments they represent. Email addresses: fabrahamworldbank.org, jcortinalorenteworldbank.org, sschmuklerworldbank.org. 1 1. Introduction The level of global debt substantially increased after the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Global debt, which includes corporate (nonfinancial
14、), financial sector, government, and household debt, increased from 292 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 to 318 percent in 2018. Together with government debt, nonfinancial corporate debt was the main contributor to the rise in global debt after the GFC. The ratio of nonfinancia
15、l corporate and government debt to GDP increased from 78 to 92 percent and from 62 to 86 percent, respectively, between 2008 and 2018 (IIF, 2019). Whereas financial sector debt and household debt were important drivers of the buildup of global debt leading to the GFC, they did not contribute to the
16、increase in global debt in the post-crisis period. Household debt remained stagnant at about 60 percent of GDP and financial sector debt actually declined from 91 to 81 percent of GDP between 2008 and 2018. The increase in nonfinancial corporate debt can be a welcome development. It might signal tha
17、t firms are subject to fewer financing constraints, allowing them to raise more funds to conduct profitable investment projects and grow. In addition, firms might be obtaining the new funding outside the traditional banking system, helping them to diversify their financing sources and improve their
18、resilience to financial crises. The rise of nonfinancial corporate debt, however, also raised concerns. As nonfinancial corporate debt reached historic high levels, policy makers, academics, and practitioners increasingly cautioned that significant firm indebtedness could become a threat to the glob
19、al economy. In the post- GFC period, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recurrently urged policy makers to address the issue of rising nonfinancial corporate debt, as it increased financial stability risks (IMF, 2017, 2019a). In 2019, the United Nations (UN) recognized high nonfinancial corporate
20、 debt levels as one of the factors that could impair economic growth (UN, 2019). Some analysts predicted that the nonfinancial corporate debt boom could trigger a financial crisis comparable to the GFC (Financial Times, 2017; 2 Bloomberg, 2019; The Guardian, 2019; WEF, 2019). Others were somewhat mo
21、re optimistic and argued that risks were manageable or that, at least, a possible recession would not be as severe (Powell, 2017; S The Economist, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in 2020 raised new concerns about the high levels of nonfinancial corporate debt. As lockdowns and border clo
22、sures caused a plunge in global economic activity, the question of how firms manage their debt burden has become a central topic in economic discussions. High nonfinancial corporate debt could be the Achilles heel in the global economy that exacerbates the downturn and hampers economic recovery (The
23、 Economist, 2020; Lustig and Mariscal, 2020). In fact, some analysts have argued that corporate debt relief should be a central feature of emergency aid packages (Becker et al., 2020). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it presents some of the main stylized facts about the boom in nonfinancial
24、 corporate debt after the GFC, while discussing its drivers. Second, it summarizes the main risks and policy challenges associated with higher nonfinancial corporate debt. Whereas the paper shows a few new statistics, it is primarily a survey of the arguments presented in the growing literature on t
25、his topic. The main messages are summarized as follows. First, the rise of nonfinancial corporate debt was concentrated in emerging economies. Between 2008 and 2018, this type of debt grew almost twice as fast as GDP in emerging economies, rising from 56 to 96 percent of GDP. In contrast, nonfinanci
26、al corporate debt grew at the same pace as GDP since 2008 in developed economies. An expansion in bond issuances was a main driver of the growth in nonfinancial corporate debt in emerging economies. When excluding bond securities, the ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP remained fairly stagn
27、ant across emerging economies (aside from China). According to the literature, international financial conditions since the GFC, namely accommodative monetary policy in developed economies, played a major role in the boom in nonfinancial corporate debt. 3 Second, the rise in nonfinancial corporate d
28、ebt increased the levels of financial risk among emerging market firms in the years following the GFC, although there are some mitigating factors. In particular, high debt accumulation in a period of low economic growth and declining corporate earnings was accompanied by an increase in solvency risk
29、s. That is, the ability of emerging market firms to pay back their debts deteriorated. Although some factors seemed to exacerbate the risks associated with foreign currency financing and rollover capacity, other forces might have helped to dampen these risks. As regards the factors increasing risk,
30、the amount of foreign currency debt issuances increased after the GFC. Currency risks related to currency mismatches seemed to concentrate in specific regions (such as Latin America) and in the non-tradable sector. Moreover, rollover risks could have increased as the fastest growth in corporate debt
31、 occurred through bond financing, which is more difficult to restructure than bank debt. In addition, bond issuances experienced a decline in maturities during 2008-2018. Among the mitigating factors, despite the increase in foreign currency debt, the largest boom in corporate debt financing occurre
32、d in local bond markets through domestic currency issuances. As a result, the relative share of foreign currency denominated nonfinancial corporate bonds across emerging economies declined between 2008 and 2018. Furthermore, bond debt is typically longer term than bank debt, which might have helped
33、to mitigate rollover risks. Third, whereas the levels of risk did not seem excessively high per se at the end of 2019, shifts in market conditions could severely deteriorate emerging market firms balance sheets and trigger corporate distress. In this context, the economic downturn triggered by the C
34、OVID-19 pandemic increased risks in many emerging market firms, which suddenly faced lower revenues and higher financing costs. Sensitivity analyses conclude that, if the shock is large enough, the share of nonfinancial corporate debt held by firms with high risk of financial distress could signific
35、antly 4 increase in emerging economies. In several emerging economies these shares could be similar or even surpass values recorded before the Asian financial crisis (AFC). Fourth, policy makers in emerging economies face challenges to contain the risks associated with high nonfinancial corporate de
36、bt levels, as well as to limit the potential negative impact of corporate debt defaults. Because capital markets have gained importance in firm financing relative to banks, traditional prudential policies focused on the banking sector might not be as effective as in the past. New policies might be n
37、eeded to create safe conditions for corporate borrowing in capital markets. Policy makers could also put in place policies to deal with corporate debt distress similar to those aimed at the sovereign and banking sectors. The rest of the sections are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main
38、 stylized facts and drivers behind the boom in nonfinancial corporate debt. Section 3 examines the main risks associated with the rise in nonfinancial corporate debt. Section 4 analyzes how a weakening economy or a change in market conditions would impact highly indebted corporations. Section 5 conc
39、ludes with a discussion on what policies governments could implement to mitigate risks and manage distress in the nonfinancial corporate sector. Section 6 discusses some questions open for future research. 2. Rising Nonfinancial Corporate Debt: Stylized Facts and Drivers 2.1. Stylized Facts To obtai
40、n some basic stylized facts, we compute the levels and evolution of nonfinancial corporate debt by gathering data from the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). The BIS defines debt by the nonfinancial corporate sector as all liabilities (including loans, bonds, and other claims) issued domestica
41、lly and abroad by firms that produce market goods and nonfinancial services. These data show that nonfinancial corporate debt around the world multiplied by 1.6 times between 2008 and 2018, increasing from about $45 trillion in 2008 to $71 trillion in 2018, in constant 5 United States (U.S.) dollars
42、.1 As a result, the ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to world GDP increased by 14 percentage points, from 78 percent in 2008 to 92 percent in 2018 (Figure 1). The rise in nonfinancial debt occurred mainly within emerging economies. Nonfinancial corporate debt in emerging economies more than trip
43、led, from about $9 trillion in 2008 to $28 trillion in 2018. As a percentage of GDP, nonfinancial corporate debt in these economies grew from 56 to 96 percent during that period. In contrast to the trends in emerging economies, nonfinancial corporate debt in developed economies grew at a similar pac
44、e as GDP. In particular, the aggregate levels of nonfinancial corporate debt and GDP in developed economies grew by 17 and 15 percent, respectively, between 2008 and 2018. Thus, the ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP in developed economies remained fairly stable during 2008-18, increasing o
45、nly marginally from 87 to 89 percent. Although the rise of nonfinancial corporate debt has received much attention in the United States after the GFC, the ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP in 2018 was the same as that in 2008. Nonfinancial corporate debt steadily increased after 2013, but
46、this occurred after a sharp decline in the first years following the GFC (IIF, 2019). Among emerging economies, those in East Asia deserve special attention, as they accounted for most of the corporate financing activity among emerging regions after the GFC.2 Of particular relevance among East Asian
47、 economies is the case of China, which has emerged as a key player in nonfinancial corporate debt markets. Chinese nonfinancial corporate debt grew from 98 percent of GDP in 2008 to 152 percent in 2018. As a result, Chinas nonfinancial corporate debt in 2018 accounted for most of the debt accumulate
48、d by emerging economies and even surpassed levels in the United Sates. In 2018, Chinas nonfinancial corporate debt represented 28 percent of global debt and 1 All values are expressed in 2011 U.S. dollars. 2 East Asia captured about 70 percent of equity and bond financing to emerging market firms du
49、ring 2008-16 (Abraham et al., 2019). 6 70 percent of total debt accumulated by emerging economies (loans, bonds, and other claims), up from 10 and 49 percent, respectively, in 2008 (Figure 2). Bond markets were the fastest growing component of nonfinancial corporate debt in emerging economies. The literature distinguishes two phases of global liquidity, before and after the GFC (Shin, 2014; Turner, 2014; Aldasoro and Ehlers, 2018). Before the cri
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