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1、TUNISIA ECONOMICMONITORBetterConnectivityto GrowSpring 2025Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedTunisia Economic MonitorBetter Connectivity to GrowSpring 2025Middle East and North Africa Region 2025 International Bank for Rec

2、onstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone:202-473-1000 Internet:www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,interpretations,and conclu-sions expressed in this work do not necessarily

3、reflect the views of The World Bank,its Board of Executive Directors,or the governments they represent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy,completeness,or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors,omissions,or discrepancies in the informa

4、tion,or liability with respect to the use of or fail-ure to use the information,methods,processes,or conclusions set forth.The boundaries,colors,denominations,and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of an

5、y territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immuni-ties of The World Bank,all of which are specifically reserved.Rights and Permissions The material in this work

6、is subject to copyright.Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge,this work may be reproduced,in whole or in part,for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given.Any queries on rights and licenses,including subsidiary rights,should be addressed to

7、World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433,USA;fax:202-522-2625;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.Cover photos courtesy of:(top)awstoys/Shutterstock,(center left),Anton Kudelin/Shutterstock,(center right),bieszczady_wildlife/Shutterstock,and(bottom)Bermix Studio/Sh

8、utterstock.Further permission required for reuse.Publication design and layout by The Word Express,Inc.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSAcknowledgements.vList of Acronyms.viiExecutive Summary.ixRsum excutif.xiii.xviiPart A:Recent Economic Developments.11.The Tunisian economy grew moderately in 2024,pushed by the

9、 partial recovery of agriculture and tourism but weighed down by oil,mining and manufacturing.12.The current account deficit continued to moderate easing some of the pressure on external financing.33.Tunisias increasing reliance on domestic sources to fill the external financing gap,which are declin

10、ing from a high peak,would present medium-term risks to currency and price stability.64.The rising domestic financing of the public debt has increased the sovereign-banking nexus with potential effects on the credit market.85.Inflation continued to moderate,having converged to the pre-Covid average,

11、although it remains higher for food products.96.The budget continues to be under pressure as the low growth affects tax revenues.107.Assuming drought conditions ease,we expect a moderate growth uptick in 202527 assuming but downward risks remain elevated.11Part B:Improving Ports to support Tunisias

12、Development and Growth.15Summary.15List of FiguresFigure 1 Tunisias Elusive Economic Recovery.2Figure 2 Tunisian Economy is Diverging from Regional Peers .2Figure 3 Agricultures Recovery has been Modest after the 2023 Drop.2Figure 4 Hydrocarbons,Garments and Construction Dragged Growth in 2024.2Figu

13、re 5 Flattening Labor Participation and Unemployment.3Figure 6 Tunisia has a Lower FLFP than Most Countries at Similar Level of Economic Development.4TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROWivFigure 7 Having Children Decreases Labor Participation for Women but it Increases it for Men.4Fi

14、gure 8 Garments and Mechanic Industries Drove Down the 2024 Trade Balance Compensated by the Shrinking Deficit of Agriculture.5Figure 9 Rising Import Quantities have Driven the Expansion of the Trade Deficit.5Figure 10 The Trade Deficit along with Services Surplus Helped Reduce the Current Account D

15、eficit in Recent Periods.6Figure 11 A Declining Share of Gross External Budgetary Needs Estimated in the Budget have been Mobilized.6Figure 12 Limited FDI,Portfolio and Capital Flows Put Pressure on Tunisias Financing of its External Needs,which are Declining from the 2022 Peaks.7Figure 13 The Decli

16、ne in Reserves is Associated with a Widening CAD.7Figure 14 Tunisia Increasingly Relies on Domestic Financing of the Debt.8Figure 15 The Share of Net Government Receivables in Total Credits Continues to Increase(and Accelerates)as Receivables to the Economy Growth Falters.8Figure 16 Inflation Starte

17、d to Decline in 2023 and has Now Converged to its pre-Covid Average.10Figure 17 Real Interest Rate is at the Highest Level since March 2021.10Figure 18 Tax Revenues Under-Performed in 2024 Relatively to the Expectations a Year Earlier.11Figure 19 The Public Wage Bill Compression Contained Public Exp

18、enditures Growth.11Figure 20 Hydrocarbons and Cereals Account for More than Half of Volumes Traded in Tunisian Ports 16Figure 21 Tunisias Container Port Traffic Lags its North African Neighbors(GDP constant prices;2019=100).16Figure 22 Shipment Times to Rades are High by Regional Standards.17Figure

19、23 Tunisias Container Port Traffic Lags its North African Neighbors.18Figure 24 Tunisian Firms Perceive Customs and Trade Regulations as Significant Constraints.19Figure 25 Imported Containers Spend More Time in Rades than in Most other Ports in Africa.20List of BoxesBox 1 Expanding Affordable and Q

20、uality Childcare Services Could Raise FLFP in Tunisia,with Potentially Significant Impacts on Economic Growth.3Box 2 Ongoing Initiatives to Streamline Trade Facilitation in Tunisian Ports.19Box 3 Estimating Tunisias Potential Economic Gains from Improved Port Connectivity and Dwell Time.21List of Ta

21、blesTable 1 Key Macroeconomic Indicators,202227.13vACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe Tunisia Economic Monitor(TEM)is a report that provides information on recent economic developments and policies in Tunisia,as well as the countrys economic outlook and challenges to its development.The report is aimed at a divers

22、e audience,including policy mak-ers,business leaders,financial market actors,and analysts and professionals working on or in Tuni-sia.It is produced by the North Africa and Middle East department of the World Bank Groups Mac-roeconomics,Trade and Investment(MTI)global practice.Each issue of the TEM

23、contains a section on recent economic developments and a discussion on the economic outlook,followed by a special section based on the World Banks analysis of Tunisia.The report was originally published in English with the title“Better connectivity to grow”and was first published in 2025.In case of

24、any discrepancy,the original Eng-lish language version prevails.The report is authored by a team led by Massimiliano Cal(Senior Economist)and Mohamed Habib Zitouna(Consultant).The team also includes Jawhar Abidi(Consultant),Riadh Ammari(Communications Specialist),Asma Bouraoui Khouja(Senior Operatio

25、ns Officer)and Mhamed Ben Salah(Consultant).It benefited from inputs and comments from Federica Alfani(Poverty Economist),Majda Benzidia(Consultant),Jai Malik(Young Professional),Phuong Le Minh(Consultant)and Dominic Patella(Sr.Transport Specialist).The report was prepared under the direction of Mou

26、stapha Ndiaye(Division Director,Maghreb),Eric Le Borgne(Practice Manager,Economic Policy),Alexandre Arrobbio(Country Manager,Tunisia),and Abdoulaye Sy(Lead Economist,Prosperity Group).The opinions and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the World Bank staff and do not necessarily repre

27、sent the views of members of the World Bank Board of Directors or the countries they represent.For information on the World Bank and its activities in Tunisia,please visit:https:/www.worldb ank.org/en/country/tunisia or https:/www.albankald awli.org/ar/country/tunisia(Arabic).For questions or commen

28、ts on the content of this publication,please contact Massimiliano Cal(mcaliworldbank.org)or Eric Le Borgne(eleborgneworldbank.org).The deadline for input and forecast preparation is May 9th,2025.viiLIST OF ACRONYMSAEO Authorized Economic OperatorBL Budget LawBNA Banque Nationale AgricoleCAD Current

29、Account DeficitCIT Corporate Income TaxCPI Consumer Price IndexCTN Compagnie Tunisienne de NavigationEU European UnionFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentFLFP Female Labor Force ParticipationGDP Gross Domestic ProductINS Institut National de la StatistiqueLFS Labor Force SurveyLPI Logistics Performance Ind

30、exLSCI Liner Shipping Connectivity IndexMoW Ministry of Family,Women,Children,and the ElderlyOdC Office des CralesOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOMMP Office de la Marine Marchande et des PortsPCS Port Community SystemRo-RO Roll-on/Roll-offSOE State-Owned EnterpriseSTAM So

31、cit Tunisienne dAcconage et de ManutentionTEU Twenty-foot Equivalent UnitTND Tunisian DinarTOS Terminal Operating SystemTTN Tunisia Trade NetUGTT Union Gnrale Tunisienne du TravailUN United NationsUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUSD United States DollarVAT Value Added TaxWBL

32、 Women,Business,and the LawixEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Tunisian economy grew moderately in 2024,pushed by the partial recovery of agriculture and tourism but weighted down by oil,mining and manufacturingThe Tunisian economy grew by 1.4 percent in 2024 after the zero growth in 2023 and it is diverging fro

33、m its neighbors in North Africa,with a GDP below its pre-Covid level in 2024.The economy continues to operate in a challenging policy and financing envi-ronment,including regulatory barriers to invest-ment,which is not conducive to robust and sustained growth.The limited recovery of agriculturewith

34、ris-ing rainfall levels but still below historical averages along with the moderate performance of oil and gas,manufacturing and construction sectors dragged the growth of the economy in 2024.This modest recovery continued to weigh on the labor market.The unem-ployment rate in 2024 was almost a perc

35、entage point above its pre-Covid,and the labor force participa-tion rate hovered 1.2 percentage point below the pre-Covid rate.Expanding affordable and quality child-care services and strengthening parental leaves could raise labor force participation,particularly for women in Tunisia,with potential

36、ly significant impacts on economic growth.The current account deficit continued to moderate,easing some of the pressure on external financingThe trade deficit widened by 10.9 percent in 2024,remaining stable as a share of GDP at 11.4 percent.The deficit deteriorated further in the first quarter of 2

37、025,as it increased by two thirds relative to the same period in 2024,driven by a 5.9 percent decline in exports.The surge in agricultural exports compen-sated for the deterioration of the trade balance of gar-ments and mechanic industries in 2024.The energy deficit widened further on the back of ri

38、sing import prices,continuing to account for the bulk of the mer-chandise trade deficit.The stability of the trade deficit and the increase in the services surplus reduced the current account deficit(CAD)to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2024,compared with 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2023 and 8.8 per cent in 2022

39、.While the lower CAD eases the pressure on external financing needs,the latter remains significant especially due to the burdensome debt service.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROWxTunisias increasing reliance on domestic sources to fill the external financing gap would present medi

40、um-term risks to currency and price stabilityThe tightening financing conditions among bilat-eral and multilateral lenders are creating challenges for Tunisia in seeking to meet its external financing needs,as reflected in the declining share of external budgetary needs eventually financed by the en

41、d of the year.With shrinking sovereign financing,the shift towards domestic sources to cover its external needs accelerated,notably through monetary financing.The Budget Law authorizes the Central Bank to lend to the government directly up to 7 billion dinars(4.1 percent of GDP)in 2025,the same amou

42、nt that was also lent in 2024.The use of this facility for debt reim-bursement and the widening trade deficit caused for-eign reserves to decline below 100 days of import in March 2025,the first time in 2 years.While the Dinar has remained stable overall,the decline in reserves underscores the press

43、ure on external balances.The rising domestic financing of the public debt has increased the sovereign-banking nexus with potential effects on the credit marketGiven the challenging external financing environment and the rising public debt,the domestic banking sys-tem has continued to increase its ro

44、le in debt financ-ing.As a result,the share of domestic debt in total debt increased from 29.7 percent in 2019 to 53.8 percent in 2024,with a planned increase to 58.3 percent in 2025.The sustained use of local funding to finance public debt can stifle that growth.The share of central gov-ernment in

45、total claims of the banking sector increased from 31.3 percent in August 2023 to 40.8 percent in August 2024.Credit to the rest of the economy,on the other hand,declined from 8.6 to 4.8 percent during the same period(6-monthly average annual growth rate).These constraints to the credit market are co

46、m-pounded by the increasing banking exposure to SOEs and the recent overhaul on the use of bank cheques,which has restricted an important channel of short-term credit in Tunisia.Inflation continued to moderate,having converged to the pre-Covid average,although it remains higher for food productsInfl

47、ation continued to moderate since the peaks of two years ago on the back of lower global prices and lim-ited domestic demand.It reached 5.6 percent in April,in line with the pre-Covid rate.However,food inflation(7.3 percent in April 2025)remains above the pre-Covid average(3.7 percent in February 20

48、20),as the water scarcity and some import compression reduced the supply in domestic food markets,while the Rama-dan festivities raised the demand.With declining infla-tion and lower growth,the Central Bank reduced its policy rate from 8.0 to 7.5 percent,the first change since December 2022.The budg

49、et continues to be under pressure as limited economic activity affects tax revenuesThe budget deficit declined from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2023 to 5.8 percent in 2024,as the reduced growth in expenditures more than compensated the lower-than-expected increase in tax revenues.Indirect taxes fared wors

50、e than direct taxes,reflecting the impact of the limited growth environment,The continued com-pression of the wage bill,from 15.1 percent of GDP in 2022 to 13.4 percent in 2024,and the stalling of subsi-dies limited the growth of public expenditures.Revers-ing the decline in public capital expenditu

51、res would help to revive economic growth.Assuming drought conditions ease,we expect a moderate growth uptick in 202527 but downward risks remain elevatedWe expect the economy to grow by 1.9 percent in 2025,assuming continued improvement in rainfall and a delayed recovery of the manufacturing sector,

52、ExEcuTIvE SuMMARyxiwhich could be negatively affected by the effects of trade uncertainty.Growth is eventually expected to stabilize at around 1.61.7 percent in 202627,but the forecasts are subject to significant downside risks,related to the potential disruption of trade uncertainty,limited externa

53、l financing conditions and a further deterioration of water availability.While the macro sit-uation is expected to stabilize,Tunisias public finance and external position would remain vulnerable in the absence of sufficient external financing and progress in the economys modernization.Better port co

54、nnectivity and more efficient trade facilitation procedures could yield significant gains to the Tunisian economyAs a relatively small open economy,the performance of the port sector is crucial to the Tunisian economy.Efficient ports offer the chance to leverage Tunisias location along the Gibraltar

55、-Suez shipping lane,which accounts for over a third of containerized traffic in the world.Tunisias ports are relatively well equipped for roll-on/roll-off(Ro-Ro)units,but not for container cargo handling.They are also small and shallow com-pared to other Mediterranean ports,which aligns with Ro-Ro t

56、raffic but affects connectivity,congestion,and operating efficiency for containers.The lack of development of container shipping has constrained Tunisias connectivity to wider global markets.The equipment and infrastructure constraints are com-pounded by complexities in the processing of goods in po

57、rts,translating into high containers waiting times in ports,and significant firms logistics and inventory costs.New World Bank estimates suggest that Tunisia could gain 45 percent of GDP from higher port shipping connectivity and reduced dwell time within 34 years,with larger gains in the long run.V

58、arious infrastructure strengthening and policy options would improve Tunisias port connectivity and trade facilita-tion,enabling such large economic gains.One such option is to expand the authorized economic operator program,which according to our analysis can poten-tially lead to 94,000 jobs and an

59、 increase in the wage bill equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP.xiiiRSUM EXCUTIFLconomie tunisienne a connu une croissance modre en 2024,porte par la reprise partielle de lagriculture et du tourisme,mais freine par les hydrocarbures,les mines et lindustrie manufacturireLconomie tunisienne a progress de

60、1,4%en 2024 aprs une croissance nulle en 2023.La trajectoire est divergente par comparaison aux pays de la rgion Afrique du Nord,avec un PIB infrieur son niveau pr-Covid en 2024.Lconomie continue de fonction-ner dans un environnement complexe sur le plan des politiques et du du financement vu,notamm

61、ent,les contraintes rglementaires linvestissement qui ne favorisent pas une croissance robuste et soutenue.La reprise limite de lagriculture avec des niveaux de prcipitations en hausse mais toujours infrieurs aux moyennes historiques ainsi que la performance modre des secteurs du ptrole et du gaz,de

62、 lin-dustrie manufacturire et de la construction ont frein la croissance de lconomie en 2024.Cette modeste reprise a continu de peser sur le march du travail.Le taux de chmage en 2024 tait en effet prs dun point de pourcentage suprieur son niveau davant Covid,et le taux de participation au march du

63、travail se situait 1,2 point de pourcentage en dessous du taux davant la pandmie.Lexpansion de services de garde denfants abordables et de qualit,ainsi que le renforcement des congs parentaux pourraient accrotre la parti-cipation au march du travail,en particulier pour les femmes,avec des impacts po

64、tentiellement significa-tifs sur la croissance conomique.Le dficit du compte courant a continu de se rduire,allgeant une partie de la pression sur le financement extrieurLe dficit commercial sest creus de 10,9%en 2024,restant stable en pourcentage du PIB 11,4%.Le dficit sest encore dtrior au cours d

65、u premier trimestre de 2025,augmentant de deux tiers par rap-port la mme priode en 2024,sous leffet dune baisse de 5,9%des exportations.La forte hausse des exportations agricoles a compens la dtriora-tion de la balance commerciale des industries de lha-billement et des industries mcaniques et lectri

66、que en 2024.Le dficit nergtique sest encore creus en raison de la hausse des prix limportation,conti-nuant de reprsenter lessentiel du dficit commer-cial.La stabilit du dficit commercial et laugmen-tation de lexcdent des services ont rduit le dficit du compte courant(DCC)1,7%du PIB en 2024,contre 2,

67、3%du PIB en 2023 et 8,8%en 2022.Si la baisse du DCC attnue la pression sur les besoins de financement extrieur,ces derniers restent significa-tifs,notamment en raison du lourd service de la dette.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROWxivLa dpendance croissante de la Tunisie aux sources

68、 nationales pour combler le dficit de financement extrieur prsenterait des risques moyen terme pour la stabilit de la monnaie et des prixLe durcissement des conditions de financement auprs des bailleurs bilatraux et multilatraux com-plique la capacit de la Tunisie adresser ses besoins en financement

69、 extrieur,comme en tmoigne la baisse de la part des besoins budgtaires extri-eurs prvus qui arrivent finalement tre financs en fin danne.Avec la diminution du financement souverain,le recours aux sources nationales pour couvrir les besoins extrieurs sest acclr,notam-ment par le biais du financement

70、montaire.La loi de finances autorise la Banque centrale prter directe-ment au gouvernement jusqu 7 milliards de dinars(4,1%du PIB)en 2025,le mme montant que celui prt en 2024.Le recours cette solution de facil-it pour le remboursement de la dette et le creuse-ment du dficit commercial,ont entran une

71、 baisse des rserves de change,passant en dessous de 100 jours dimportation en mars 2025 pour la premire fois en deux ans.Bien que le dinar soit rest stable dans lensemble,la baisse des rserves souligne la pression exerce sur les quilibres extrieurs.Laugmentation du financement intrieur de la dette p

72、ublique a accru le lien entre le secteur bancaire et le budget de lEtat,avec des effets potentiels sur le march du crditCompte tenu du contexte difficile du financement ext-rieur et de laugmentation de la dette publique,le sys-tme bancaire national a continu accrotre son rle dans le financement de l

73、a dette.En consquence,la part de la dette intrieure dans la dette totale est pas-se de 29,7%en 2019 53,8%en 2024,avec une augmentation prvue 58,3%en 2025.La part du gouvernement central dans le total des crances du secteur bancaire est passe de 31,3%en aot 2023 40,8%en aot 2024.Le crdit au reste de

74、lconomie,en revanche,a diminu de 8,6 4,8%au cours de la mme priode(taux de croissance annuel moyen sur 6 mois).Malgr une lgre reprise de la part des crdits octroys au reste de lconomie,lutilisa-tion soutenue du financement local pour financer la dette publique peut crer un effet dviction et touf-fer

75、 cette croissance.Ces contraintes sur le march du crdit sont aggraves par lexposition croissante des banques aux entreprises publiques et la rcente refonte de lutilisation des chques bancaires pour les paiements,qui a restreint un important canal de crdit court terme en Tunisie.Linflation a continu

76、de ralentir convergeant vers la moyenne pr-Covid,mme si elle demeure plus leve pour les produits alimentairesLinflation a continu de ralentir depuis les pics de 2023,grce la baisse des prix mondiaux et une demande intrieure limite.Elle a atteint 5,6%en avril 2025,un niveau quivalent au taux davant C

77、ovid.Cependant,linflation alimentaire(7,3%en avril 2025)reste suprieure la moyenne davant la pandmie(3,7%en fvrier 2020),car la sche-resse et une certaine compression des importations ont rduit loffre sur les marchs alimentaires natio-naux,tandis que les festivits du Ramadan ont sti-mul la demande.F

78、ace la baisse de linflation et de la croissance,la Banque centrale a rduit son taux directeur de 8,0 7,5%,le premier changement depuis dcembre 2022 et la premire baisse depuis septembre 2020.Le budget continue dtre sous pression alors que lactivit conomique limite affecte les recettes fiscalesLe dfi

79、cit budgtaire a diminu,passant de 6,3%du PIB en 2023 5,8%en 2024,la croissance rduite des dpenses ayant plus que compens la hausse plus faible que prvu des recettes fiscales.Les impts indirects ont moins bien perform que les impts directs,refltant limpact du contexte de RSuM ExcuTIfxvcroissance limi

80、te.La compression continue de la masse salariale,de 15,1%du PIB en 2022 13,4%en 2024,et le rationnement des subventions ont limit la croissance des dpenses publiques.Inver-ser la tendance la baisse des dpenses publiques en capital contribuerait relancer la croissance co-nomique.En supposant que les

81、conditions de scheresse sattnuent,nous prvoyons une reprise modre de la croissance en 202527,mais les risques la baisse restent levsNous prvoyons une croissance conomique de 1,9%en 2025,en supposant une amlioration conti-nue des prcipitations et une reprise tardive du sec-teur manufacturier,qui pour

82、rait tre affect ngati-vement par les effets de lincertitude commerciale.La croissance devrait finalement se stabiliser autour de 1,61,7%en 202627,mais les prvisions sont soumises dimportants risques de baisse,lis la perturbation potentielle de lincertitude commer-ciale,aux conditions de financement

83、extrieur et une nouvelle dtrioration de la disponibilit de leau.Si la situation macroconomique devait se stabili-ser,les finances publiques et la position extrieure de la Tunisie resteraient vulnrables en labsence de financement extrieur suffisant et de progrs dans la modernisation de lconomie.Une m

84、eilleure connectivit portuaire et des procdures de facilitation des changes plus efficaces pourraient gnrer des gains significatifs pour lconomie tunisienneEn tant quconomie ouverte relativement petite,la performance du secteur portuaire est cruciale pour lconomie tunisienne.Des ports performants of

85、frent la possibilit de tirer parti de la situation gographique de la Tunisie le long de laxe maritime Gibraltar-Suez,qui reprsente plus dun tiers du trafic conteneuris mondial.Les ports tunisiens sont relativement bien quips pour les units roulires(Ro-Ro),mais pas pour la manutention de conteneurs.I

86、ls sont gale-ment petits et peu profonds par rapport aux autres ports mditerranens,ce qui convient au trafic de Ro-Ro mais affecte la connectivit,la congestion et lefficacit oprationnelle des conteneurs.Le manque de dveloppement du transport maritime par conte-neurs a limit la connectivit de la Tuni

87、sie de plus vastes marchs mondiaux.Les contraintes dquipe-ment et dinfrastructure sont aggraves par la com-plexit du traitement des marchandises dans les ports,ce qui se traduit par des dlais dattente le-vs pour les conteneurs et des cots importants de logistique et de stockage pour les entreprises.

88、De nouvelles estimations de la Banque mondiale sug-grent que la Tunisie pourrait gagner 4 5%de son PIB grce une meilleure connectivit maritime por-tuaire et une rduction du temps de sjour dici 3 4 ans,avec des gains plus importants long terme.Diverses options de renforcement des infrastructures et d

89、es politiques publiques pourraient amliorer la connectivit portuaire et faciliter les changes com-merciaux de la Tunisie,permettant ainsi des gains conomiques tout aussi importants.xvii 4202 .4.1 4202 0 3202 4202 91-.4202.4202 .2.1 .9.01 4202 4.11 .5202 4202 9.5 .4202.7.1 8.84202 3.2 3202 2202.7 (%1

90、.4 )5202 4202.001 5202 .TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROWxviii .%7.92 9102%8.35 4202%3.85 5202.%3.13 3202%8.04 4202.%6.8%8.4 (6).%6.5 5202 .%3.7 5202)(%7.3 0202).%0.8%5.7 .2022%3.6 3202%8.5 4202 .%1.51 2202%4.31 4202 .52027202%9.1 5202 .2026 6.1%7.1 7202 .-.4%5 34 .94%8.0 .1ARECEN

91、T ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS1.The Tunisian economy grew moderately in 2024,pushed by the partial recovery of agriculture and tourism but weighed down by oil,mining and manufacturingThe Tunisian economy grew moderately in 2024 after stagnating in 2023 and it remains below its pre-Covid level.The economy g

92、rew by 1.4 percent in real terms in 2024,with a slight uptick in the second half of the year,which allowed the economy to reach the same pre-Covid level in the last quarter(Figure 1).Despite this,the GDP in 2024 remains 0.8 percent below its pre-Covid level.Continued below average rainfall,limited d

93、omestic and external demand and challenging financing conditions slowed down an economic recovery marred by continued regulatory barriers to growth.1 The Tunisian economy continues to be diverging from the trajectory of its neighbors(Figure 2)and Tunisias real GDP in 2024 is still below that pre-pan

94、demic.2 The protracted slow recovery has also reduced Tunisias potential growth.3The limited recovery of agriculture along with the modest performance of oil and gas,man-ufacturing and construction sectors dragged the growth of the economy in 2024.While rainfall lev-els in 2024 were higher than in 2

95、023,they were still below historical averages,contributing to protracted water scarcity,with dams filling rates below 30 percent throughout the year.This reduced agricultural produc-tivity and yields as most agriculture is rainfed in Tuni-sia and irrigation was restricted.As a result,in 2024 agricul

96、ture recovered less than half of the losses expe-rienced in 2023,when sectoral GDP fell by 16.1 percent(Figure 3).This is compounded by the negative growth of three key sectors,accounting for 9.0 percent of GDP and for 0.6 percentage point of GDP growth in 2024(Figure 4).The first is oil and gas(18.

97、1 percent),whose production continues a decade-long decline due to the phasing out of various fields and lack of new invest-ments.The second is textile and garments(5.2 per-cent),whose exports contracted by 4.9 percent mainly as a result of the decline in the European Unions demand,PART1 See the 202

98、2 and 2023 issues of the Tunisia Economic Monitor.2 GDP in 2024 in comparator countries ranges between 9 percent(Morocco)and 21 percent(Egypt)above pre-Covid level.3 The average growth potential in 202224 is 60 percent the average in 201719.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW2Tunisi

99、as main export market.And the third is construc-tion(1.8 percent),affected by the limited domestic demand,both private and public,and by the challeng-ing financing environment.The continued recovery of tourismreflected in the growth of hotels,restaurants and caf(+6.8 percent)helped maintain some pos

100、i-tive growth rate,although it could not compensate the under-performance of most of the rest of the economy.The limited recovery continued to weigh on the labor market,whose performance remains subdued relative to the pre-Covid period.In the third quarter of 2024(last available data),unemployment i

101、ncreased slightly to 16 percent up from 15.8 percent a year before.This marks the 7th consecutive quarter of year-on-year increase,and it leaves the unemploy-ment rate almost a percentage point above its pre-Covid rate on an annual basis(Figure 5).At the same time,the labor force participation rate

102、increased to 46.2 percent in Q3-2024(up a percentage point a year earlier).However,it still hovers 1.2 percentage point fIGuRE 1 Tunisias Elusive Economic Recovery(Quarterly GDP,constant 2015 TD)2019201920212022202220232023202422,80023,60024,00024,20023,20023,40023,00023,800Q1Q2Q3Q4Source:Tunisias N

103、ational Statistics Institute(INS).fIGuRE 3 Agricultures Recovery has Been Modest After the 2023 Drop(Agriculture value-added,4-quarters moving average,TD mln constant prices and share in GDP)11%12%13%14%15%2,200 2,400 2,600 2,800 3,000 3,200 3,4002,00010%16%Value added(mTND)(left axis)Share in GDP(r

104、ight axis)Q4_10Q3_11Q2_12Q1_13Q4_13Q3_14Q2_15Q1_16Q4_16Q3_17Q2_18Q1_19Q4_19Q3_20Q2_21Q1_22Q4_22Q3_23Q2_24Source:INS and World Bank calculations.fIGuRE 2 Tunisian Economy is Diverging from Regional Peers (GDP constant prices;2019=100)9020192020951051151201001102021202220232024EgyptJordanMoroccoAlgeri

105、aTunisiaSource:World Bank Macro-Poverty outlooks.fIGuRE 4 Hydrocarbons,Garments and construction Dragged Growth in 2024(Half yearly GDP in constant 2015 prices;2019=100)4555S1-2021 S2-202165851051151257595S1-2022 S2-2022 S1-2023S2-2024S2-2023 S1-2024GarmentsOil and gasConstructionHotel/RestoSource:I

106、NS and World Bank calculations.REcENT EcoNoMIc DEvELoPMENTS3below the pre-Covid rate on an annual basis,suggest-ing a higher number of discouraged workers.Women continue to suffer a large penalty in the labor market,with an unemployment rate 61 percent higher than that of men and a participation rat

107、e only 43 percent that of men in the year ending in Q3-2024.In particu-lar,the structurally low female labor force participation(FLFP)constrains economic growth and the function-ing of labor market in Tunisia(Box 1).2.The current account deficit continued to moderate easing some of the pressure on e

108、xternal financingTunisias merchandise trade deficit widened in recent months as exports declined and imports increased.The trade deficit widened significantly in the fIGuRE 5 flattening Labor Participation and unemployment(Percent,4-quarter moving average)15.0Q3-20 16Q1-20 17Q3-2017Q1-20 18Q3-20 18Q

109、1-2019Q3-20 19Q1-20 20Q3-2020Q1-20 21Q3-20 21Q1-2022Q3-20 22Q1-20 23Q3-2023Q1-20 2416.017.017.518.015.516.545.046.047.047.548.045.546.5UnemploymentLabor part.rate(right axis)Source:World Bank staff calculations based on INS.Box 1:ExPANDING AffoRDABLE AND QuALITy cHILDcARE SERvIcES couLD RAISE fLfP I

110、N TuNISIA,WITH PoTENTIALLy SIGNIfIcANT IMPAcTS oN EcoNoMIc GRoWTHFemale labor force participation rate(FLFP)in Tunisia remains low despite improvements in education and legal rights and this hampers economic growth prospects.Despite significant improvements in GDP per capita,educational attainment,a

111、nd legal rights,FLFP only increased from 22.3 percent in 1991 to 27.0 percent in 2023.For example,Tunisias score of the Women,Business,and the Law(WBL)index,which measures the extent to which a countrys legal framework creates equal economic opportunities for women,improved from 53.1 in 1991 to 64.4

112、 in 2023.However,Tunisias FLFP remains below the rate prevalent among countries at similar level of economic development(figure 6).This matters not only for the fairness of society,but also for the economy,which would benefit from an increase in the labor force and its related skills.A recent modell

113、ing exercise suggests that increasing Tunisias FLFP to the average level of lower-middle-income countries by 2030 could enhance annual potential growth by 0.52 percentage points,resulting in cumulative GDP growth of 24 percent over the period from 2024 to 2030.aMarriage and parenthood significantly

114、are key factors that decrease FLFP,suggesting policy directions to smoothen these transitions.The participation rate of women without children reaches close to 70 percent before age 30,and it stays around 60 percent up to age 40,whereas womens participation with children diverges around age 20 and n

115、ever exceeds 40 percent(Figure 7).Conversely,the labor supply is higher for fathers compared to non-fathers(conditional on age).While education generally enhances labor force participation,the presence of young children is negatively correlated with FLFP across all education levels,with a more prono

116、unced effect among highly educated women.b Policies to help with this marriage/childbearing transition can significantly raise FLFP,including strengthening childcare options,the lack of which is perceived as the primary barrier to womens workforce entry in Tunisia.In fact,only 1 percent of Tunisian

117、children under 3 years old and 50 percent of children aged 36 attend formal childcare.In this context,the governments initiatives to expand quality childcare access appear important,although key regulations are still pending adoption.The Tunisian Ministry of Family,Women,Children,and the Elderly(MoW

118、)has launched initiatives to improve childcare services.However,key regulations are still pending adoption,and current childcare facilities are insufficient,with only 461 nurseries available for children under 3.Accelerating the implementation of existing programs,investing in nurseries located in e

119、mployment hubs and underserved areas,and encouraging public-private partnerships remain critical actions.Subsidy vouchers could alleviate the cost of childcare for low-income family.Enhancing training programs for childcare providers is also critical to ensure high-quality early education,a signific

120、ant challenge in Tunisian childcare.Effective uptake requires services that overcome barriers such as location,hours,cost,and cultural norms,and must be tailored to regional specifics.Moreover,harmonizing parental leave for both parents,including by extending paternal leave to fathers would also be

121、effective at raising FLFP.While there has been a reform project on paternal leave since 2017,the current paternal leave remains limited to two days for both the private and public sectors,with little clarity on the timeline for and enforcement of these reforms.(continued on next page)TUNISIA ECONOMI

122、C MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW4Box 1:ExPANDING AffoRDABLE AND QuALITy cHILDcARE SERvIcES couLD RAISE fLfP IN TuNISIA,WITH PoTENTIALLy SIGNIfIcANT IMPAcTS oN EcoNoMIc GRoWTHfIGuRE 6 Tunisia has a Lower fLfP than Most countries at Similar Level of Economic Development(Female Labor force partici

123、pation,percent and GDP per capita,log US$)04080FLFP(Percent)Log GDP per capita(2017 PPP)6068101220BDICAFCODNERMOZLBRTCDSOMMDGMWIAFGSLEGNBGMBZWEMLITGOBFARWALSOUGAETHSLBTZAGINVUTHTICOMZMBBENSTPSENPNGCMRCOGSDNNPLTJKMMRKHMKENDJIKGZNGATLSMRTPAKCIVGHAWSMHNDPSENICBGDAGOTONCPVINDUZBLAOBOLMARPHLIRQBLZGTMSWZS

124、LVNAMJORJAMFJIVNMECUDZABTNMNGIDNEGYPERUKRLBNLCALKAZAFPRYMDAGABVCTBRBARMAZEALBCOLTKMGNQBRASURBWAIRNGEOBIHMKDTHACHNDOMMDVMEXSRBBLRLBYMNEMUSCRIARGGUYTTOURYBGRCHLKAZMYSRUSGRCPANBHSROUTURLVAHRVSVKPRIHUNPRTOMNPOLESPESTLTUSVNCZEJPNISRITACYPNZLKORFRAGBRKWTMLTSAUCANFINAUSBHRBELISLDEUAUTSWENLDDNKHKGBRNUSANORM

125、ACARECHEQATIRLSGPLUXTUNSource:World Development Indicators,World Bank.fIGuRE 7 Having children Decreases Labor Participation for Women but it Increases it for Men(Labor force participation,percent and age,by parenthood status)04010080(Percent)WomenAge60202530354045505560652004010080(Percent)MenAge60

126、2025303540455055606520No childrenChild 05Source:Authors calculations based on the 2022/23 Labor Force Survey(ENPE)data,INS.a Kose,M.Ayhan,and Franziska Ohnsorge.2024.Falling long-term growth prospects:trends,expectations,and policies.World Bank Publications.b The probability of entering the labor ma

127、rket decreases by 3.3 percent for uneducated,6.7 percent for primary-educated,6.9 percent for secondary-educated,and 8.9 percent for tertiary-educated women.(continued)REcENT EcoNoMIc DEvELoPMENTS5last quarter of 2024,causing an expansion by 10.9 per-cent in nominal terms for the whole of 2024 over

128、2023.However,it remained stable as a share of GDP at 11.4 percent,as in 2023.The widening continued in the first quarter of 2025,when the trade deficit increased by two thirds relative to the same period in 2024,accounting for 2.8 percent of GDP(up from 1.8 per-cent in 2024).The widening deficit has

129、 been driven by a slowdown in exports,which stalled in 2024(vis-vis 2023)and declined by 5.9 percent in the first 3 months of 2025.This is an inversion of the previous trend,when the trade deficit shrank by two third after the adverse terms of trade shock due to the war in Ukraine in 2022.The surge

130、in agricultural exports compen-sated the deterioration of the trade balance of garments and mechanic industries.The trade def-icit expanded mainly as the result of the deterioration of the trade balance in garments and mechanical and electrical industries,both of which suffered from a reduction in d

131、emand in their main EU market(figure 8).The deficit of mechanical and electrical industries also deteriorated because of a 22 percent increase in motor vehicle imports(driven by a 17 percent increase in quantity).These trends were countered by the defi-cit reduction of agriculture(from 1.5 percent o

132、f GDP in 2023 and 0.2 percent in 2024)mainly thanks to boom-ing olive oil exports(Figure 8).Tunisias trade bal-ance in 2024 benefited overall from improved terms of trade,although the improvement was not as large as a year before(Figure 9).In 2024,average import prices declined by 11 percent over 20

133、23,while export prices decreased by 2 percent on average.However,these price trends were compensated by opposite trends in quantities.As a result,export values did not change while imports increased by 2.3 percent.The energy deficit widened further on the back of rising import prices,continuing to a

134、ccount for the bulk of the merchandise trade deficit.In 2024 the average price of imported oil by Tunisia increased by 1.4 percent,and for gas(imported from Algeria),the increase was 19 percent.As a result,the energy independence rate,which represents the ratio of primary energy resources to primary

135、 consumption,declined to 41 percent in 2024,down from 48 percent in 2023.As the quantities imported rose by 1 percent,the value of imports grew by 6 percent.This led the energy trade balance to deteriorate by 12.5 percent,account-ing for 57.4 percent of the merchandise trade deficit in 2024(up from

136、56.6 percent a year earlier).This share has more than doubled since 2017,making the recent development of renewable energy projects particularly important not only for Tunisias energy security but also fIGuRE 8 Garments and Mechanic Industries Drove Down the 2024 Trade Balance compensated by the Shr

137、inking Deficit of Agriculture(Annual trade balance by sector,percent of GDP)222022202320243Trade balanceGarmentMiningAgricultureMechanical and electricalOther manuf.Energy171272Source:World Bank staff elaboration based on INS data.fIGuRE 9 Rising Import Quantities have Driven the Expansion of the Tr

138、ade Deficit(Annual percent change)12%ExportsExportsImportsImports2023202413%Unit valueQuantityValue7%2%3%8%Source:World Bank staff elaboration based on INS data.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW6for its external balance(see Tunisia Economic Monitor,Spring 2024 issue.The stability

139、of the trade deficit and the increase in the services surplus reduced the cur-rent account deficit(CAD)in 2024.The travel service balancewhich accounts for a quarter of the services trade balanceincreased by 17 percent in 2024(com-pared to 2023).This added to the post-Covid tourism recovery,with the

140、 travel balance being 3.5 times larger than in 2020.In 2024,however,tourisms contribution to GDP was still below its pre-Covid level(3.3 versus 4.1 percent).Workers remittances were even higher than tourism receipts(9.8 billion dinars,or 5.9 percent of GDP,versus 4.8 percent for tourism),remaining a

141、n essential source of foreign currency for Tunisia.These flows and the stability of the trade deficit offset capital income(3.9 percent of GDP).As a result,the CAD nar-rowed to 1.7 percent of GDP,compared with 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2023 and 8.8 per cent in 2022(Figure 10).While the lower CAD eases

142、the pressure on gross external financing needs,the latter remain significant especially due to the burdensome debt service.Despite the reduced CAD,external financing needs remained significant in 2024(TD 4.7 billion,or 8.8 percent of GDP)with amortization accounting for 81.3 percent.4 These needs ro

143、se by 11 percent in 2024 compared to 2023,most of which(73 percent)again due to debt reimbursement.3.Tunisias increasing reliance on domestic sources to fill the external financing gap,which are declining from a high peak,would present medium-term risks to currency and price stabilityAmid tightening

144、 financing conditions among bilat-eral and multilateral lenders,Tunisia continues to face challenges in meeting its gross external financing needs.This tightening is reflected in the declining share of external budgetary needs eventu-ally financed by the end of the year.In 2024 only a fifth of the e

145、xternal needs forecast in the Budget Law was eventually covered,while in 20182019 the share covered was 93.4 percent on average(Figure 11).While the external financing needs are declining from the peak of 2022,alternative sources of funding con-tinue to be either inaccessible(international private f

146、inancing),5 or limited,as is the case for foreign direct 4 External financing needs are defined as current account deficit+debt(public+private)reimbursement.5 The Tunisian government has not been able to issue foreign-denominated bonds since 2019,as its sovereign credit rating has been consistently

147、assessed as noninvestment grade(including by Moodys,Fitch Ratings and Rating and Investment Information).fIGuRE 10 The Trade Deficit Along with Services Surplus Helped Reduce the current Account Deficit in Recent Periods(Percent GDP)252012108642020151050510152018201920202021202220232024Primary and s

148、econdaryServicesCurrent account(rhs)GoodsSource:World Bank staff estimates based on Central Bank of Tunisia data.fIGuRE 11 A Declining Share of Gross External Budgetary Needs Estimated in the Budget have been Mobilized(Percent)02014201520162017201820192020202120222023202416012010080604020140%GDP(rhs

149、)%Budget 0123456789Source:World Bank staff estimates based on Central Bank of Tunisia data.REcENT EcoNoMIc DEvELoPMENTS7investments(FDI),portfolio and capital account flows(Figure 12).Portfolio and capital account flows are vir-tually absent in Tunisia mainly as the country maintains strict controls

150、 on capital outflows.FDI is more signifi-cant,and it increased by 10 percent in 2024,though it only covers 17 percent of external financing needs.With shrinking sovereign financing,the shift towards domestic sources to cover its external needs has accelerated,notably through monetary financing.The 2

151、025 Budget Law authorized the Cen-tral Bank to lend to the government directly up to 7 bil-lion dinars(4.1 percent of GDP)in 2025,to be repaid over 15 years without interest.The Government used this facility drawing on foreign reserves to repay exter-nal debt,including a US$1 bn loan(1.9 percent of

152、GDP)to the international financial market.A similar financ-ing facility for the same amount was also instituted in 2024,which the government used largely to repay external debt service obligations.The timely repayment of the external debt,the declining debt level to interna-tional capital markets an

153、d the improvement in the CAD prompted Moodys to upgrade Tunisias long-term sover-eign rating from“Caa2”to“Caa1”with a stable outlook.6While the Dinar has remained stable over-all,the recent decline in foreign reserves follow-ing their use for debt reimbursement underscores the pressure on external b

154、alances.The use of reserves to reimburse external debt,7 along with the widening trade deficit contributed to reduce foreign exchange reserves to below 100 days of import cover(99 days on March 21st)for the first time in two years.This compares against 121 days at the beginning of the year.This leve

155、l still provides a buffer vis-vis both imports and short-term external debt repayment,help-ing to explain why the Dinar has remained stable in the face of large recent reimbursements.At the same time,the decline in reserves signals that if protracted,the use of monetary financing of the external deb

156、t could carry some challenges to currency and price stability.That is particularly the case if the trade defi-cit the largest component of the CAD-continues to expand as in the past months.Going back to 2018,a widening CAD has been associated with depleting reserves in Tunisia(figure 13).6 This impr

157、ovement comes after the improved Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer rating by Fitch(from CCC-to CCC+).Despite these improvements,the ratings of Tunisias bond still indicate a significant risk of default.Hence Tunisia continues to be unable to tap into international financial markets.7 This included a

158、 US$1 bn loan(1.9 percent of GDP)reimbursement to the international financial market in January.fIGuRE 12 Limited fDI,Portfolio and capital flows put Pressure on Tunisias financing of its External Needs,Which are Declining from the 2022 Peaks(Percent GDP)0%H1-09H1-10H1-11H1-12H1-13H1-14H1-15H1-16H1-

159、17H1-18H1-19H1-20H1-21H1-22H1-23H1-249%Ext.fin.needsCapitalFDIPortfolio1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%Source:Authors elaboration on Central Bank of Tunisia data.fIGuRE 13 The Decline in Reserves is Associated with a Widening cAD(million TND)4,0002,0000Quarter on quarter change in reserves(TND mln)Quarterly current

160、 account balance(TND mln)6,0004,0002,00015,00010,0005,00002023 Q32019 Q32018 Q42022 Q42019 Q22024 Q12021 Q1Source:Authors elaboration on Central Bank of Tunisia data.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW8fIGuRE 15 The Share of Net Government Receivables in Total credits continues to I

161、ncrease(and Accelerates)as Receivables to the Economy Growth falters(Year-on-year percent increase,six month moving average)25%20%15%30%40%35%4%2%0%6%10%8%3%1%5%9%7%Share of govt intotal credit(left axis)yr-o-yr growth incredit to theeconomy(right axis)Dec-20Mar-21Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-2

162、2Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23Dec-23Mar-24Jun-24Source:Central Bank of Tunisia.fIGuRE 14 Tunisia Increasingly Relies on Domestic financing of the Debt(Domestic debt,%of total debt and TD mln)Domestic debt(%GDP)2520212022202320242025(budget law)50304060554535Domestic debt(%total debt)Source:Central Bank o

163、f Tunisia and Ministry of Finance.4.The rising domestic financing of the public debt has increased the sovereign-banking nexus with potential effects on the credit marketGiven the challenging external financing envi-ronment and the rising public debt,the domestic banking system has continued to incr

164、ease its role in sovereign debt financing.As access to external financing became more limited,the nominal domestic debt stock rose rapidly over the past few years,mov-ing from TND 24.7 billion in 2019 to TND 72.7 billion in 2024.In parallel,the public debt grew rapidly as a result of rising public e

165、xpenditures and the decelera-tion of the economy:from 67.8 percent of GDP in 2019 to 84.6 percent in 2023,before declining to 81.2 per-cent in 2024.8 While the recent reduction in debt pro-vides some respite,financing the debt remains chal-lenging.As a result,Tunisia has increasingly tapped into loc

166、al markets as a financing source so that the share of domestic debt in total debt increased from 29.7 percent in 2019 to 53.8 percent in 2024,with a planned increase to 58.3 percent in 2025 according to the 2025 Budget Law(Figure 14).This domestic financing necessitated a high level of refinancing t

167、o local banks by the Central Bank.9While the growth of credit to the economy started again to increase in 2024,the sustained use of local funding to finance public debt can stifle that growth.The injection of liquidity through refinancing operations is directing bank liquidity towards government len

168、ding,which is likely to crowd out credit to the rest of the economy.In the last year through August 2024 the banking sectors exposure to the State grew at an annual rate of 39 percent.As a result,the share of central government in total claims of the banking sector increased from 26.8 percent in Aug

169、ust 2022 to 40.8 percent in August 2024,almost 3 times the average in 2015(14.4 percent)(figure 15).This long-term trend of rising share of claims to the 8 The debt figure covers only the central governments but not SOEs debt,much of which is guaranteed by the State as well as payment arrears to pub

170、lic and private companies.9 Refinancing consists of the Central Bank lending money to banks with liquidity needs,generally short-term.They are carried out on the initiative of central banks(through tenders)or banks(lending facilities).While refinancing is associated with money creation,the relation

171、is not one-to-one as it depends on the terms of the reimbursement and the loan maturities.REcENT EcoNoMIc DEvELoPMENTS9government displaced the credit to the rest of the economy,whose 6-monthly average annual growth rate declined from 8.6 to 4.8 percent between during the same period(Figure 15).Whil

172、e the credit growth rate started to rise again in 2024,it remained below the inflation rate.The constraints to the credit market are compounded by the increasing banking expo-sure to SOEs and the recent overhaul on the use of bank cheques.A case in point is the Banque Nationale Agricole(BNA),one of

173、the largest Tuni-sian banks,which increased its credits to the Office Des Crales(OdC)three-fold between 2019 and 2024.They now represent more than a third of the overall credit stock of the BNA,a very large single borrower concentration risk.In addition,the recent regulation on bank cheques introduc

174、ed in February 2025 seems to have restricted an important channel of short-term credit in Tunisia.By aiming to reduce the frauds through the use of cheques,the regulation has sought to limit the conditions in which cheques could be used for payment,thereby restricting their use as a means of short-t

175、erm.These conditions may amplify the constraints to access to credit,which are already particularly biting for Tunisian firms.In this context implementing some of the measures pro-posed in the 2022 governments emergency plan,such as facilitating the use of movable assets as col-lateral,could be impo

176、rtant to strengthen access to credit to the economy.5.Inflation continued to moderate,having converged to the pre-Covid average,although it remains higher for food productsInflation continued to moderate since the peaks of two years ago on the back of lower global prices and limited domestic demand,

177、and it is now slightly below the pre-Covid rate.Year-on-year price inflation continued its gradual decline from the record level of February 2023(10.4 percent),reach-ing 5.6 percent in April.That is slightly below the month before(5.9 percent),and in line with the pre-Covid rate in February 2020(Fig

178、ure 16).This decline followed the reduction in core inflation to 5.5 percent(April 2025)from 6.9 percent(April 2024)driven in part by a limited domestic demand given the slow-down in economic growth.10 The 10.6 percent decline in merchandise import prices in 2024(Figure 9 above),driven by the drop i

179、n international prices of energy and cereals,compounded this effect.11 At the same time electricity and gas inflation declined from 14.9 percent in February 2023 to 0.1 percent in Jan-uary 2025.However,food inflation is still above its pre-Covid average,as water scarcity and some import compression

180、reduced the supply in domestic markets.Food inflation declined in April 2025 to 7.3 percent down from 7.3 percent in March.How-ever,it remains well above the pre-Covid average(3.7 percent in February 2020),as the rate of price increases for food has been consistently higher than average inflation si

181、nce May 2021 with a widening gap over the past couple of years as water scarcity and import compression reduced the domestic supply of agricultural products.This presents a significant chal-lenge particularly for lower income households,for which food accounts for a relatively greater share of expen

182、ditures.12With declining inflation and lower growth,the Central Bank reduced its policy rate,the first change since December 2022.In March 2025 the Central Banks board decided to reduce the key policy rate by 50 basis points to 7.5 percent.13 The decision was motivated by the reduction in the infla-

183、tion rate and the need to provide the boost to the anemic growth rate of the economy.The real inter-est rate continues to remain positive in the face of the rate reduction(Figure 17).At the same time,10 Core inflation is computed by excluding energy and food products from the CPI.11 That is an avera

184、ge obtained by weighing each 2-digit sector level price change by the corresponding share in total Tunisian merchandise import in the first 6 months.12 According to the 2021 Household Budget survey,the share of food in total expenditures is 35.5 percent for the bottom quintile of the income distribu

185、tion and 27.2 percent for the top quintile.13 Other rates were also cut by the same amount,including the deposit facilities(6.5 percent),the overnight lending facilities(8.5 percent)and the floor savings rate(6.5 percent).TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW10the Central Bank points

186、to continuing pressures on prices,particularly for food,with products such as fresh food experiencing high inflation(15.0 per-cent in March 2025).14 Achieving the decline in infla-tion rate forecast by the Bank for 2025(5.3 percent)would require careful consideration in monetary pol-icy choices goin

187、g forward,including through policy rate changes.6.The budget continues to be under pressure as the low growth affects tax revenuesThe budget deficit declined slightly in 2024(6.2 percent of GDP)as the reduced growth in expenditures more than compensated the more modest than expected increase in tax

188、revenues.The 2024 budget execution shows that tax revenues grew by 9.7 percent in 2024 compared to 2023.That is below the 2024 Budget Laws(BL24)projection(16 percent)but higher than the 2023 growth rate(7.3 percent)(figure 18)and the inflation rate for 2024(7 percent).As a result,tax revenues accoun

189、ted for 25.1 percent of GDP,slightly below the 2023 share(25.4 percent)and the BL24 forecasts(25.6 per-cent).The comparatively modest performance of indi-rect taxes,which grew half the rate forecast in the BL24,weighted down overall tax revenues.Revenues from VAT(7.6 percent growth vs.12.7 percent i

190、n the BL24)and excises(4.6 percent vs.14.7 percent)were particularly subdued,consistently with the effect of the economic growth slowdown,with lower demand for consumption and investments.Direct taxes showed greater resilience(+11.1 percent),mainly thanks to the increased profitability of the hydroc

191、arbon sector due to higher energy prices.While this translated into higher corporate income taxes(CIT),tax revenues on income,notably wages,continue to be more than twice the revenues from CIT.This reflects the higher tax burden that labor income faces relative to capi-tal income in Tunisia,which is

192、 a source of distortion and potential inequality in the economy(see Tunisia Economic Monitor,Fall 2024).The continued compression of the wage bill and the stalling of subsidies limited the growth of public expenditures.Overall expenditures grew by 4.6 percent in 2024,which is below both the growth r

193、ate in 2023(6.5 percent)and that predicted by the BL24(6.7 percent).The main factor behind the lower-than-expected growth is the wage bill,which accounts for around 40 percent of expenditures,and which grew by 2.6 percent in 2024(against 4.1 percent expected by the 14 Source:Press Release from the C

194、BTs Board meeting,March 26,2025.fIGuRE 16 Inflation Started to Decline in 2023 and has Now converged to its pre-covid Average(Year-on-year percent increase)CPICore inflationFood inflation4%2%0%6%10%12%14%16%8%Jan-18Jul-18Jan-19Jul-19Jan-20Jul-20Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25S

195、ource:Central Bank of Tunisia.fIGuRE 17 Real Interest Rate is at the Highest Level since March 2021(Real interest,inflation and policy rates,in percent)8%5%7%5%4%9%11%10%4%3%2%1%0%3%2%1%CPIPolicy rateReal interest rate(rhs)Jan-21Mar-21May-21Jul-21Sep-21Nov-21Jan-22Mar-22May-22Jul-22Sep-22Nov-22Jan-2

196、3Mar-23May-23Jul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24May-24Jul-24Sep-24Nov-24Jan-25Mar-25Source:World Bank estimates based on INS and OECD.REcENT EcoNoMIc DEvELoPMENTS11BL 24).While Tunisia still has a high public wage bill by international standards,this declined from 15.1 percent of GDP in 2022 to 13.4 perc

197、ent in 2024,driving public expenditures down from 36.5 percent to 34.6 percent of GDP during the same period(figure 19).The relative compression of the wage bill follows the agreement between the government and the trade union(UGTT)in October 2022 and the continued freeze of public sec-tor recruitme

198、nt.Subsidy expenditures remained stable in nominal terms,and they declined from 7.7 percent of GDP in 2023 to 6.8 percent in 2024,further con-tributing to the moderation of expenditure growth.This includes a reduction in energy subsidies from 4.4 per-cent to 4.0 percent of GDP,driven by the reductio

199、n in international prices.On the other hand,interest pay-ment experienced a higher growth than overall expen-ditures in 2024(+8.0%)mainly as a result of increased domestic interests.Reversing the decline in public capital expenditures would help revive economic growth.While capital expenditures incr

200、eased by 7.8 percent in 2024,it slightly declined as a percent of GDP(from 3.7 percent in 2023 to 3.6 percent in 2024),and it remained well below the level of 2016(6.0 percent of GDP).With slowing economic growth and employ-ment creation,successive governments over the past decade have increased rec

201、urrent public expenditures to provide public employment and to keep market prices for basic goods and services below cost recov-ery.These measures crowded out public investments by the government,with crucial infrastructure,such as ports remaining under-funded(see Part B).Reversing this decline in c

202、apital expenditures is crucial to help revive Tunisias growth trajectory and improve public services to the citizens.7.Assuming drought conditions ease,we expect a moderate growth uptick in 202527 assuming but downward risks remain elevatedWe expect the economy to grow by 1.9 percent in 2025,assumin

203、g continued improvement in rain-fall and a delayed recovery of the manufactur-ing sector.The improved rainfall with the increase in dams filling rate is expected to help the agricultural sector recover fully the losses of 2023.However,the rising global trade uncertainty could impact the econ-omy thr

204、ough lower external demand,particularly in the EUthe main destination of Tunisian exports.15 fIGuRE 18 Tax Revenues under-Performed in 2024 Relatively to the Expectations a year Earlier(Year-on-year percent change)0%18%2023BL242024TotalDirectIndirectVATCustoms Excises2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%Source:Tunis

205、ias Ministry of Finance.fIGuRE 19 The Public Wage Bill compression contained Public Expenditures Growth(Percent of GDP)Public wage bill Public expenditures 12%37%17%22%27%32%20172018201920202021202220232024Source:Tunisias Ministry of Finance.15 However the direct effect of trade uncertainty on Tunis

206、ian manufacturing is unlikely to be significant as the US accounts only for 3.2 percent of overall Tunisian exports and US exports are equivalent to 1.2 percent of Tunisias GDP.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW12All of these would reduce the growth of the economy,particularly that

207、 of manufacturing,which we expect to still be negative in 2025.This would in turn decrease somewhat services growth through backward and for-ward linkages.Growth is eventually expected to stabilize at around 1.61.7 percent in 202627,but the fore-casts are subject to significant downside risks.The fo

208、recast is based on the convergence in sectoral growth rate to their medium-term rate.However,ris-ing global trade uncertainty,limited external financing conditions and a further deterioration of water avail-ability could raise growth and macroeconomic sta-bility challenges for Tunisia.If the increas

209、e in trade uncertainty escalated,this could further jeopardize global as well as Tunisian partners economic pros-pects.In addition,if external financing conditions did not improve,it may be challenging to secure sufficient foreign currency in the economy,which could lead to pressures on exchange rat

210、e and prices,exerting a negative impact on economic activity and employ-ment.Medium-term prospects would improve mark-edly if Tunisia took steps toward strengthening fiscal policies,modernizing SOEs and fostering greater domestic competition.While the macroeconomic situation is expected to stabilize

211、,Tunisias public finance and external position will remain vulnerable in the absence of sufficient external financing and prog-ress in the economys modernization.The bud-get deficit is expected to decline slightly to 5.8 per cent of GDP in 2025(from 6.2 percent in 2024)as the growth of subsidies rem

212、ains subdued,capital expenditures decline and tax revenues increase,sup-ported by some increases in some tax rates,particu-larly the CIT.The CAD is projected to increase slightly to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2025 with a widening of the trade deficit also due to the trade uncertainty,partly compensated b

213、y the moderate growth in tourism and the expected decline in oil prices.With FDI projected to increase somewhat,albeit from a low base and min-imal portfolio investments,external borrowing would remain an important source of financing of the current account as well as of debt reimbursement.The finan

214、cing of the deficits could require a scale-up of the external financing and more reforms in the face of the significant debt reim-bursement schedule in the near term.Despite the lower deficit,gross financing needs are expected to be stable in nominal terms in 2025(TD 28 bn,or 15.6 percent of GDP)due

215、 to rising debt reimburse-ment.Two-thirds of the financing is expected to be amortization,almost half of which external.Financ-ing the deficit will continue to be challenging given the strategy of limiting external indebtedness and con-straints to monetary financing.Given the paucity of other financ

216、ial inflows as described above,sovereign lending would have to cover most external financing needs if Tunisia were to avoid the dependence on monetary financing of the budget through reserves.REcENT EcoNoMIc DEvELoPMENTS13TABLE 1 Key Macroeconomic Indicators,202227Variable2022(A)2023(A)2024(A)2025(F

217、)2026(F)2027(F)Real GDP Growth,at constant market prices2.70.01.41.91.61.7 Private Consumption2.01.94.14.44.14.2 Government Consumption1.22.41.14.74.43.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation2.17.51.51.71.40.3 Exports,Goods and Services17.310.50.81.61.51.6 Imports,Goods and Services11.65.64.46.15.95.1Real G

218、DP Growth,at constant factor prices2.60.11.21.91.61.7 Agriculture1.916.18.38.30.90.6 Industry0.71.02.51.70.80.6 Services3.42.71.62.32.62.6Inflation(Consumer Price Index,period average)8.39.37.05.55.05.0Current Account Balance(%of GDP)8.82.31.71.82.02.4Net Foreign Direct Investment,Inflow(%of GDP)1.3

219、1.51.41.51.51.6Fiscal Balance(%of GDP)6.97.36.25.85.65.5Revenues(%of GDP)29.629.128.428.027.927.8Expenditures(%of GDP)36.536.334.633.833.633.4Primary Balance(%of GDP)3.63.42.41.81.51.1Gross financing needs of the Central Government(%GDP)13.112.716.015.617.419.8Debt(%of GDP)82.384.681.282.183.085.5*T

220、he figures for 20222024 are based on government data;202527 are based on World Bank staff forecast.15IMPROVING PORTS TO SUPPORT TUNISIAS DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTHBPARTSummaryAs a relatively small open economy,the performance of the port sector is crucial to the Tunisian economy.Efficient ports offer th

221、e chance to leverage Tunisias location along the Gibraltar-Suez shipping lane,which accounts for over a third of containerized traffic in the world.While Tunisian ports handle different cargo types,containers account for a low share of volumes as Tunisias legacy equipment and infrastructure constrai

222、nts have limited container shipping configurations.Tunisias ports are relatively well equipped for roll-on/roll-off(Ro-Ro)units,but not for container cargo handling.They are also small and shallow compared to other Mediterranean ports,which aligns with Ro-Ro traffic but affects connectivity,congesti

223、on,and operating efficiency for contain-ers.Despite some advantages of Ro-Ro over short distances,the lack of development of container shipping has constrained Tunisias connectivity to wider global markets.The equipment and infrastructure constraints are compounded by cumbersome physical and documen

224、-tary checks,and trade and foreign currency requirements,which slow down goods processing in ports.Partly as a result of these inefficiencies,the main Tunisian port of Rades has one of the highest waiting time of imported containers among African ports,which raises firms logistics and inventory cost

225、s.New World Bank estimates suggest that Tunisia could gain 45 percent of GDP from higher port ship-ping connectivity and reduced dwell time within 34 years,with larger gains in the long-run.Various infrastruc-ture strengthening and policy options would improve Tunisias port connectivity and trade fa

226、cilitation,enabling such large economic gains.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW16As a relatively small open economy,the performance of the port sector is crucial to the Tunisian economy.An efficient port sector is key to connecting Tunisian firms with the rest of the world,enablin

227、g the economy to access markets for prod-ucts and inputs more efficiently,predictably and eco-nomically.An efficient port sector will help Tunisia integrate into regional and global value chains,gen-erating income and employment gains and reducing the prices of goods and services for the economy.Eff

228、icient ports offer the chance to lever-age Tunisias location along a major trade route.Tunisias eight major portsthe largest of which is Rades(Tunis)collectively handled almost the entirety of the countrys sea traffic,29.6 million tons of cargo in 2023,with a value of US$45.5 billion(88 percent of G

229、DP).Maritime connections to the EU are the most important in the current trade flows,as Tunisias ports are strategically located close to the Gibraltar-Suez shipping lane,one of the most important globally.This lane accounted for nearly 37 percent(59.2 mil-lion TEUs)of containerized traffic in the w

230、orld in 202216 and it is growing rapidly as traffic in the major Mediterranean ports more than doubled from 2004 to 2020.17 There is ample opportunity for Tunisia to develop its ports and tap into this growing market.Tunisian ports handle different cargo types,and containers account for a relatively

231、 low share of volumes.Hydrocarbons and cereals accounted for over 52 percent of the volumes handled by Tunisian 8 main commercial ports in 2023,mainly through the ports of Skhira,Bizerte(hydrocarbons),Sfax and Rades(cereals)(Figure 20).Container traffic is con-centrated in Rades and accounted for on

232、ly 16 percent of volumes,despite containers being the main type of cargo handling merchandise trade globally.The vol-ume of container traffic handled by Tunisian ports has been persistently low compared to other ports in North Africa(Figure 21).Tunisias legacy equipment constraints have limited cont

233、ainer shipping configura-tions.STAM(Socit tunisienne dacconage et de manutention),a state-owned enterprise,performs most stevedoring services at ports along with special-ized SOEs from other line ministries(e.g.,Ministry of Agriculture)and private operators.These companies own most of the equipment

234、at Tunisias main ports,16 UNCTAD calculations,based on data from MDS Transmodal,World Cargo Database,June 202417 See Moschovou,T.P.,&Kapetanakis,D.(2023).A Study of the Efficiency of Mediterranean Container Ports:A Data Envelopment Analysis Approach.Civil Engineering,4(3),726739.The major ports in t

235、he Mediterranean are the following:Tanger Med(Morocco),Valencia(Spain)Piraeus(Greece)Algeciras(Spain)Barcelona(Spain)Gioia Tauro(Italy)Marsaxlokk(Malta)Genoa(Italy)Mersin(Turkey)Alexandria(Egypt)Marseille(France)Sines(Portugal)La Spezia(Italy)Koper(Slovenia).fIGuRE 20 Hydrocarbons and cereals Accoun

236、t for More than Half of volumes Traded in Tunisian PortsShare of cargo handled by Tunisias ports(metric tons in 2023)Bulk liquid3%Hydrocarbons35%Cereals17%Containers16%Solid bulk21%Rolling units8%Source:World Bank analysis of OMMP data;https:/www.ommp.nat.tn/import-export/.fIGuRE 21 Tunisias contain

237、er Port Traffic Lags its North African NeighborsContainer port traffic(TEU:20 foot equivalent units)EgyptMoroccoAlgeriaTunisia 1,000,0000 2,000,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 5,000,000 6,000,000 7,000,000 8,000,000 9,000,0002013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021Source:UN Data.IMPRovING PoRTS To SuPPo

238、RT TuNISIAS DEvELoPMENT AND GRoWTH17notably Rades.The latter is well equipped for hori-zontal handling of roll-on/roll-off(Ro-Ro)units,which entail wheeled trailer units rolled on and off ships at origins and destinations.At the same time,Rades suf-fers from shortages of vertical handling equipment

239、for containers,resulting in low productivity of container handling relative to Ro-Ro.This leads to congestion in ports and partly explains the large gap in average import dwell time,i.e.the time from the cargo spends in the port,between Ro-Ro and containers.For Ro-Ro cargo the dwell time is 5.5 days

240、,while for imported containers is 18.5 days.18 The difference also likely reflects differences in import composition between cargo and Ro-Ro,with the former subject to greater customs controls than products imported through Ro-Ro(see below).Tunisias ports are also relatively small and shallow compar

241、ed to other Mediterranean ports,which aligns with Ro-Ro traffic but affects con-nectivity,congestion,and operating efficiency.The depth of the draft at Tunisian ports that handle goods cargoes ranges from 911 meters.This is ade-quate for handling Ro-Ro ships and smaller classes of container ships,bu

242、t insufficient for larger classes of ships that dominate international trade.Quay length and basin area further constrain the use of larger ships.As a result,containers in and out of Tunisia typ-ically transload from larger to smaller ships at one or more deepwater ports outside Tunisian waters.Tran

243、s-loading adds additional handling costs,delays,and inventory carrying costs for shippers.The frequency of service via smaller ships that connect to Tunisia is also low,given the smaller domestic demand and volumes relative to higher frequency routes served by larger ships.This results into relative

244、ly high time and costs of container shipping in Tunisian ports,as evident in figure 22,which shows the estimated ship-ment time of a 20-foot container from 3 main global ports(Hamburg,Marseille and Shanghai)to different ports in North Africa.For example,the shipment time from Hamburg/Marseille to Ta

245、nger is half of the ship-ment time to Rades.While Ro-Ro offers advantages over short distances,expanding container shipping would significantly enhance Tunisias connectivity to global markets.Over short distances in the context of regular services,Ro-Ro offers many advantages relative to containeriz

246、ed transport,such as door-to-door speed,avoided container rental,and simpli-fied loading and unloading.19 This has resulted in 18 The difference is not as pronounced when exporting,where Ro-Ro averages 1.5 days and container averages 1.9 days.19 Indeed,Ro-Ro is extensively used in other countries in

247、 the MNA region and Europe for routes between Morocco and Europe(Tanger Med-Algsiras),the UK and France(Dover-Calais),Germany and Sweden(Travemnde-Trelleborg).fIGuRE 22 Shipment Times to Rades are High by Regional StandardsTime of shipping a 20-ft container from(Hamburg,Shanghai,or Marseille)to(Alex

248、andria,Rades,Bizerte,Sfax,Casablanca Tangier,or Alger)050HamburgShanghaiMarseilleDays10203040AICTRadesTangerAlgerCasablancaSource:World Bank staff estimates based on quotations obtained from shipping lines.TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW18multiple regular connections to France a

249、nd Italy via both Tunisian and foreign ferry operators.20 However,the dependence on Ro-Ro traffic has likely retarded a shift to containerized shipping,by congesting port space and delaying the modernization of stevedor-ing companies and port infrastructure.This result into Tunisias relative disconn

250、ect to global shipping routes despite its location less than 100 km from one of the worlds busiest shipping lanes(Gibraltar-Suez).The latest Liner Shipping Connectivity Index(3rd quarter 2024)ranks Tunisian port system 117th in the world in terms of connectivity,which is analogous to many isolated s

251、mall island states in the South Pacific(Figure 23).This sets Tunisia apart from the trends in global markets,which have increasingly relied on container shipping for non-bulk trade given the large cost advantage of this type of shipping,particularly for long-distance trade.The equipment and infrastr

252、ucture con-straints are compounded by the procedural complexities to process goods by border agen-cies in ports.Bottlenecks in trade processing include the excessive use of physical and docu-mentary checks,the cumbersome trade and for-eign currency requirements,inefficient procedures before the arri

253、val of the goods and obstacles to the removal of the goods.These bottlenecks appear to slowdown the customs clearance process,and are compounded by the weakness of multi-modal trans-port.A non-representative survey conducted by the World Bank among trading companies,freight for-warders and shipping

254、lines suggests that imports andto a less extentexport procedures generate large unnecessary delays.These include relatively high customs clearance time for goods that require documentary checks(orange lane)and physical inspections(red lane).The slow processing is partly due to the lack of implementa

255、tion of digitization of the procedures.While significant efforts have been made in the last decades to streamline trade facilita-tion processes within the port sector,these initiatives remain until now at an early stage across Tunisian ports(Box 2).Consistently with the severity of these issues,a hi

256、gher share of Tunisian firms identifies cus-toms and trade regulation as a major constraint than in comparator countries(Figure 24).The delays are compounded by weak multi-modal transport,both railway and road.These inefficiencies translate into a high import dwell time a key measure of port effi-ci

257、ency in Tunisian ports,raising firms logis-tics costs.Rades had one of the highest average import dwell times among the ports in Africa in 2023,according to data collected by the World Bank for the 20 These include Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation(CTN),and private ferry operators(Grimaldi Lines an

258、d Grandi Navi Veloci GNV).fIGuRE 23 Tunisias container Port Traffic Lags its North African NeighborsLiner shipping connectivity indexEgypt0805060702006Q12006Q32006Q12006Q32006Q12006Q32006Q12006Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q12010Q32010Q1201

259、0Q32010Q12010Q32020Q12020Q32020Q12020Q32020Q12020Q32020Q12020Q310203040MoroccoTunisiaAlgeriaLiner Shipping Connectivity IndexSource:UNCTAD.IMPRovING PoRTS To SuPPoRT TuNISIAS DEvELoPMENT AND GRoWTH19fIGuRE 24 Tunisian firms Perceive customs and Trade Regulations as Significant constraintsPercent of

260、firms identifying customs and trade regulations as a major constraint03551015202530MYS,2019THA,2016ALB,2019TUR,2019EGY,2020MAR,2023TUN,2020Source:Authors elaboration on World Bank Enterprise Survey data.Box 2:oNGoING INITIATIvES To STREAMLINE TRADE fAcILITATIoN IN TuNISIAN PoRTSThe challenges faced

261、by the reforms to trade facilitation process in Tunisia are illustrated by two key initiatives that,despite their potential,remain in the early stages of implementation.Tunisia Trade Net(TTN)Single Window:The TTN was established in 2000 as part of the World Bank-financed Export Development Program a

262、nd demonstrated Tunisias capability to digitalize key processes.It represents a key achievement in trade facilitation for a portion of the overall set of processes required for trade.TTN centralizes and simplifies administrative procedures for international trade in Tunisia.It allows businesses to s

263、ubmit import and export declarations online,integrates key stakeholdersincluding customs,importers,exporters,banks,freight forwarders,and port authoritiesand ensures real-time traceability of trade declarations.In 2006,TTN was also tasked with managing electronic document exchanges within the port c

264、ommunity(Liasse Transport)to improve logistics chain efficiency.However,the full-scale deployment of the Liasse Transport across all ports and stakeholders has been significantly delayed.Moreover,economic operators are still required to submit paper-based documents to customs before declarations are

265、 assigned to inspectors.Additionally,most technical control agencies involved in import inspections lack operational IT systems to manage their tasks and automate exchanges with TTN-connected entities.STAMs Terminal Operating System(TOS)and the Port Community System(PCS):With World Bank support,STAM

266、 completed the installation and partial implementation of a new TOS in 2020 at Rades port.One of the key objectives of this project was to foster better coordination among port stakeholders through a PCS.This system would combine TTNs Liasse Transport with the TOS to create a unified digital platfor

267、m that manages both administrative formalities and logistics operations.The PCSs envisioned functionalities are vessel scheduling,container tracking,and automated data exchange between all involved partiescustoms,importers,exporters,shipping lines,trucking and rail operators,terminal managers,logist

268、ics providers,and international port partners.The aim was to enable seamless global supply chain interconnections.However,the full realization of this objective has been delayed due to:(i)slow implementation of Liasse Transport across all Tunisian ports,(ii)delays in TOS deployment,as critical syste

269、m modules remain non-operational due to outdated equipment and handling machinery.As a result,expected productivity gains for STAM and more efficient spatial organization within Rades port have not yet materialized.Additionally,there has been a slow adoption of new technology by operational staff.Ga

270、ps in implementation can also be traced to gaps in the structural framework for implementation,including limited public-private dialogue and need for more institutional coordination among key public entities.Future initiatives may benefit from a clear roadmap to identify and implement operational,re

271、gulatory,and technical measures aimed at simplifying procedures and enhancing port efficiency.Logistics Performance Indicator(LPI)survey(figure 25).While various factors may contribute to this high dwell time,such as the timing of the importers pay-ment to the supplier and the importers inventory st

272、rat-egies,the inefficient trade processing and the limited productivity of handling procedures are key drivers of dwell time.Longer dwell times force firms to split orders into smaller and frequent batches,translating TUNISIA ECONOMIC MONITOR BETTER CONNECTIVITY TO GROW2021 Wilmsmeier,Gordon,Jan Hof

273、fmann,and Ricardo Sanchez.2006.“The Impact of Port Characteristics on International Maritime Transport Costs.”In Research in Transportation Economics,Volume 16,ed.Kevin Cullinane and Wayne Talley.Elsevier.22 Raballand,G.,Refas,S.,Beuran,M.,&Isik,G.(2012).Why cargo dwell time matters in trade.The Wor

274、ld Bank.Retrieved from https:/www.worldbank.org/economicpr emise.into higher logistics and inventory costs.21 Long dwell times also prevent new traders from entering markets,reinforcing monopolistic behaviors in supply chains.22New World Bank estimates suggest that Tunisia could gain 45 percent of G

275、DP from higher port shipping connectivity and reduced dwell time within 34 years,with larger gains in the long run.Our estimatesdetailed in Box 3show gains in the order of 2.63.5 percent if Tunisias port system achieved the same level of connectivity as countries in the region similar to Tunisia in

276、terms of population size and global integration,but with a more efficient port system.That would require some decisive improve-ments in infrastructure,which we estimate would be achievable within a period of 34 years.At the same time,our estimates suggest that addressing insti-tutional bottlenecks t

277、hat slow down procedures for clearing goods in ports could yield gains in excess of 1 percent of GDP.In the longer term,should Tunisia be able to strengthen the port system to the point of becoming a trans-shipment hub,the economic gains could even be in the order of 1114 percent of GDP.Various infr

278、astructure strengthening and policy options would improve Tunisias port con-nectivity and trade facilitation,enabling large eco-nomic gains.Such options would need to address:(i)physical constraints in the ports,such as through the development of a dedicated container terminal serving the Greater Tu

279、nis area,the equipment modernization for cargo handling,the reorganization of access across the Canal de Bizerte,a terminal investment program for Sfax port;(ii)institutional constraints which affect the value chain for maritime transport,such as the review of the tariffs for port storage and handli

280、ng to provide additional financial resources for STAM and the port authority(OMMP)and to dissuade shippers from leav-ing cargo in port areas for extended periods of time,the expansion of the AEO scheme,the relaunch TTN and update of TOS Gate system at Rades,the imple-mentation of a modern risk-based

281、 system in customs,the rationalization of non-tariff measures;and(iii)a mix-ture of physical and institutional constraints affecting logistics nodes that converge at the ports,such as the strengthening of the traction stocks for freight service to ports and the rehabilitation of railway lines to ena

282、ble freight traffic into and out of ports.These actions would be complementary to a more ambitious longer term port development plan,which would aim to make Tunisias port sector sufficiently competitive to become a trans-shipment hub.fIGuRE 25 Imported containers Spend More Time in Rades than in Mos

283、t other Ports in Africa(Average dwell time for imports across African countries in 2023,number of days)03551015202530CARMaliBurkina FasoAlgeriaTunisia(Rades)UgandaDRCEgyptNigerRwandaCameroonNigeriaChadBurundiZambiaTanzaniaLibyaBotswanaZimbabweSudanMalawiBeninGabonEthiopiaCte dIvoireMoroccoMauritania

284、GambiaCongo,Rep.Source:World Bank,Logistics Performance Indicator 2023.IMPRovING PoRTS To SuPPoRT TuNISIAS DEvELoPMENT AND GRoWTH21Box 3:ESTIMATING TuNISIAS PoTENTIAL EcoNoMIc GAINS fRoM IMPRovED PoRT coNNEcTIvITy AND DWELL TIMETo have a sense of the potential impact of improving Tunisias connectivi

285、ty,the World Banks analysis employed estimates by Fugazza and Hoffmann(2017),who studied the effects of changes in the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index(LSCI)on bilateral merchandise exports across a large sample of countries for the period 200613.a Their estimates suggest that a one standard deviat

286、ion increase in the bilateral LSCI is associated on average with a 30 percent increase in bilateral exports.Using this elasticity and the latest LSCI data available(for Q4-2024),it is projected that if Tunisia achieved the level of shipping connectivity of the most connected countries in North Afric

287、a,its exports would increase by 46 and 45 percent respectively,or around TND 28 billion(US$9 billion).A 46 percent increase in exports would lead to approximately a 10.814.0 percent increase in Tunisias GDP,based on the estimated manufacturing or total export elasticity of GDP growth of in the long

288、run.b Moving Tunisia to the shipping connectivity of a comparable regional peer with similar demographic characteristics,would raise its exports by 11 percent and GDP by 2.63.5 percent.We expect this to be a plausible order of magnitude of the gains associated with strengthening port infrastructure,

289、including also the connectivity of ports with the rest of the country.The World Bank also used the example of Tunisian firms that obtained the authorized economic operator(AEO)status(oprateur conomique agr)to estimate the potential economic benefits of lower dwell time in ports.The introduction of t

290、he AEO status has been one of the few operational or legal developments in Tunisia aiming to reduce dwell time in recent years.Started in 2010,the AEO program has so far granted special status to 150 trusted firms.This status significantly simplifies customs procedures such as through priority statu

291、s in the handling of the container,allowing advance import declaration submission and the physical inspection of the container(if needed)outside of the port.As customs procedures represent a key portion of dwell time,this simplification is likely to have reduced dwell time significantly for these op

292、erators,something that our interviews have confirmed.cThe AEO status was granted to different firms at different points in time since 2010.We link this information from customs to administrative data on the universe of registered firms in Tunisia(stored by the INS in the Repertoire Nationale des Ent

293、reprises).This allows us to compare the performance of firms before and after obtaining the AEO status with the same before-after difference of similar firms which did not obtain the AEO status.The results indicate that the AEO status increased on average the firms employment,wage bill and revenues

294、by 16,12 and 15 percent respectively.Matching these estimates with the average gains in dwell time from the AEO status(2.2 days),we calculate that faster customs procedure similar to those granted to the AEO firms can potentially lead to 94,000 jobs and an addition of TD 1.2 billion in wages,or 0.8

295、percent of GDP.ea Fugazza,M.,and Hoffmann,J.(2017).Liner shipping connectivity as determinant of trade.Journal of Shipping and trade,2(1),1.b The figures for total and manufacturing export elasticities are 0.24 and 0.32,respectively and are sourced from Hachicha,N.(2003).Exports,Export Composition,a

296、nd Growth:A Simultaneous Error-Correction Model for Tunisia.International Economic Journal,17(1),101120.c Two-thirds of the surveyed companies believe that having the AEO status facilitates foreign trade operations(shorter customs clearance times and exemption from technical controls).d Specifically

297、,we performed a staggered difference-in-difference with synthetic control methods based on Arkhangelsky et al.,2021,which allow to limit the endogeneity concerns when constructing the control group of firms.Our final clean dataset consists of 10,365 control firms,from which we construct a specific c

298、ounterfactual firm for each of the 56 firms that received the AEO treatment.e These estimates are computed by applying the effect of AEO on employment(16 percent)and the wage bill(12 percent)to the total number of formal-waged workers(625,000)and the related wage-bill(TND 10.4 billion)of all the firms that relied on export and import activities in 2022.1818 H Street,NWWashington,DC 20433