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1、Growth in the Middle East and North AfricaMENA ECONOMIC UPDATEOCTOBER 2024Roberta Gatti,Jesica Torres,Nelly Elmallakh,Gianluca Mele,Diego Faurs,Mennatallah Emam Mousa,and Ilias SuvanovGrowth in the Middle East and North AfricaWORLD BANK MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGIONMENA ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER
2、 2024 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.orgSome rights reserved1 2 3 4 27 26 25 24This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,in
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7、commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo.Under the Creative Commons Attribution license,you are free to copy,distribute,transmit,and adapt this work,including for commercial purposes,under the following conditions:AttributionPlease cite the work as follows:Gatti,Roberta,Jesica Torres,Nelly Elmallakh,Gianluca
8、 Mele,Diego Faurs,Mennatallah Emam Mousa,and Ilias Suvanov.2024.Growth in the Middle East and North Africa.Middle East and North Africa Economic Update(October),Washington,DC:World Bank.DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-2179-0.License:Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.TranslationsIf you create a trans
9、lation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation.The World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.AdaptationsIf you crea
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11、orld Bank.Third-party contentThe World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within the work.The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those thi
12、rd parties.The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.If you wish to re-use a component of the work,it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that re-use and to obtain permission from the copyright owner.Examples of components can include,
13、but are not limited to,tables,figures,or images.All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-2179-0DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-2179-0Cover image:iS
14、modifications.Further permission required for reuse.Cover design:Jihane El Khoury RoedererContentsAcknowledgements.vAbbreviations.viForeword.viiCHAPTER I.OVERVIEW.1A fragile growth.1The economic consequences of the conflict centered in Gaza.2The long shadows of conflicts in MENA.2Prospects for a mor
15、e prosperous region.2CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK.4GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONTEXT 4Global economic growth:The global economy is stabilizing while the outlook remains subdued.4Global inflation and interest rates:Easing inflation with disinflation progressing slower than expected.5Food price inflation:Pr
16、ices of agricultural commodities decline but remain above pre-pandemic levels through 2025.6Oil production and global demand:Oil price fluctuations through 2024.7GROWTH FORECASTS AND MACROECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE MENA REGION 8Growth forecasts:Subdued growth in 2024 with important disparities within th
17、e region.8Real GDP per capita:Modest improvements in standards of living amidst high uncertainty.10Poverty in MENA:A troubling increase across the region.12Current account and fiscal account balances:Hydrocarbons shape oil exporters balances,while developing oil importers battle twin deficits.15Infl
18、ation in MENA:Inflation shows overall easing,but high levels persist in some countries.16Forecast revisions:Widespread growth downgrades with sharpest declines in fragile and conflict-affected situations.18Mounting uncertainty in the MENA region.20CHAPTER III.UPDATE ON THE CONFLICT CENTERED IN GAZA.
19、22Effects on the West Bank and Gaza.22Effects of the conflict on MENA and the global economy.24CHAPTER IV.THE COST OF CONFLICT IN MENA.27A significant rise in frequency and severity of conflicts in MENA.27The ripple effects of conflicts on afflicted countries.29Conflicts lead to human capital losses
20、,increased food insecurity,supply chain disruptions,and lower investment.32Peace is an essential prerequisite for economic development.34iCONTENTSGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICACHAPTER V.DRIVING GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.36Income per capita in the MENA region between 1970
21、 and 2019.36Development accounting for MENA.39Increasing employment rates and enhancing aggregate productivity are critical to boosting growth in the region.43Closing the gender employment gap would increase income per capita.48Transforming the role and the size of the state to improve the allocatio
22、n of resources.51Tapping into the frontier of technology through more international trade.54Data transparency for more growth.56References.58Appendix.63List of FiguresFigure II.1.Contributions to global growth.5Figure II.2.Inflation.6Figure II.3.Index of global price of important agricultural commod
23、ities from January 2020 to September 2024.6Figure II.4.Hydrocarbon spot prices and futures.7Figure II.5.Real GDP growth since 2020.8Figure II.6.Index of real GDP per capita levels in 20192024.12Figure II.7.Regional poverty estimates.13Figure II.8.Poverty in MENA.13Figure II.9.Inflation in MENA by co
24、untry groupings of exchange rate regimes(y/y inflation August 2024,August 2023).17Figure II.10.Private sector forecasts revisions of 2024 real GDP growth since January 2023.19Figure II.11.Share and magnitude of private sector forecast downgrades for 2024 real GDP growth since January 2023 among MENA
25、 countries and other EMDEs.20Figure II.12.Private sector forecast dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty.21Figure III.1.Energy and financial markets.26Figure III.2.Shipping disruption.26Figure IV.1.Conflicts and fatalities since 1990,by region.28Figure IV.2.The share of countries in conflict by regio
26、n since 1990.28Figure IV.3.Incidence of entry into conflicts in MENA by income group.29Figure IV.4.Counterfactual estimates of income per capita relative to the frontier for MENA countries in conflict.30Figure IV.5.Counterfactual estimates of income per capita relative to the frontier around selecte
27、d conflict events.31Figure IV.6.Composite risk rating in MENA and share of businesses facing political instability.33Figure V.1.Income per capita in MENA income groups,19702019.37Figure V.2.Income per capita in MENA,EMDEs,and advanced economies,19702019.37Figure V.3.In the past 50 years,income per c
28、apita in MENA oil importers has more than tripled.38iiCONTENTSMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Figure V.4.while income per capita in the rest of MENA developing economies has lagged further behind the frontier.38Figure V.5.Among oil importers,growth in income per capit
29、a has dramatically slowed;among oil exporters,growth is highly volatile.39Figure V.6.In MENA oil exporters,GDP per capita varies with the price of oil,but consumption per capita is less volatile.42Figure V.7.The difference between income per capita and consumption per capita,both relative to the fro
30、ntier economy,is not quantitatively significant.42Figure V.8.Low employment-to-population ratios and low aggregate productivity together explain most of the distance in standards of living in MENA from the frontier.46Figure V.9.The Arab Republic of Egypt exhibits the 3rd lowest capital-output ratio
31、among 180 economies.47Figure V.10.MENA developing economies exhibit the lowest employment-to-population ratios when compared to income peers.47Figure V.11.The productivity measure from the accounting exercise(TFP residual)for most MENA countries is significantly above average when compared to produc
32、tivity estimates from micro-data.47Figure V.12.Employment rates in the region have not kept pace with gains in years of schooling in the past 50 years.49Figure V.13.MENA countries exhibit some of the largest gaps between men and women in observed rates of labor force participation.49Figure V.14.Capi
33、tal-skill complementarities could amplify the gains from closing gender employment gaps as workers in MENA continue to acquire schooling.50Figure V.15.The public sector in MENA employs a disproportionate share of both men and women.52Figure V.16.MENA underperforms every other region in accountabilit
34、y.53Figure V.17.The size of the public sector in some developing economies in MENA might be too large relative to the level of efficiency of public goods.53Figure V.18.Countries in MENA produce relatively few scientific articles per capita.55Figure V.19.The knowledge generated in MENA has less impac
35、t in terms of citations compared to countries of similar size.55Figure V.20.The novelty of the knowledge produced in Saudi Arabia took off in the last 15 years,but it still very far away from the frontier(frontier economy=1).55Figure V.21.Most MENA economies are below the median in an index of openn
36、ess to non-oil exports,which points to potential outward barriers.56Figure A1.Propensity to consume in MENA oil importing countries and the frontier 19502019.63Figure A2.Propensity to consume in MENA developing oil exporters and the frontier,19502019.63Figure A3.Propensity to consume in GCC countrie
37、s and the frontier,19502019.64Figure A4.Index of Years of schooling relative to the frontier,2017.65iiiCONTENTSGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAList of TablesTable II.1.2024 real GDP forecasts by editions of the MENA Economic Update.10Table II.2.Actual and projected real GDP growth,real GDP
38、 per capita growth,current account balance,and fiscal account balance in the Middle East and North Africa,by economy,202225.11Table BII.1.Availability and access to household budget surveys at the World Bank circa 2013 and 2022 years.14Table II.3.Inflation in the Middle East and North Africa,by econ
39、omy,20222025.17Table BIV.1.1.Selected conflict episodes included in the analysis.32Table V.1.Breaking down income per capita for the Middle East and North Africa(values relative to the frontier).43Table V.2.Breaking down income per capita for the Middle East and North Africa,adjusted by the share of
40、 natural resources rents(values relative to the frontier).44Table V.3.Breaking down consumption per capita for the Middle East and North Africa countries(values relative to the frontier).45Table A1.Raw values for the development accounting exercise for the MENA region and the United States.64Table A
41、2.Total natural resources rents(as a percent of GDP)for the MENA countries and the United States,2017.65List of BoxesBox II.1.Poverty data limitations in the MENA region.14Box IV.1.Methodology used to construct counterfactual scenarios in the absence of conflict.31Box IV.2 The paradox of Europes ext
42、raordinary recovery following World War II.35Box V.1.Development accounting.40Box V.2.The rise in female labor force participation in Saudi Arabia.50ivCONTENTSMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024AcknowledgementsThe MENA Economic Update is a product of the Office of the Ch
43、ief Economist for the Middle East and North Africa region of the World Bank.This edition of the report was written by Roberta Gatti(Regional Chief Economist),Jesica Torres(Task Team Leader,TTL),Nelly Elmallakh,Gianluca Mele,Diego Faurs,Mennatallah Emam Mousa,and Ilias Suvanov.The team is grateful to
44、 Ousmane Dione,Regional Vice President,for his strategic guidance,and to Stefan G.Koeberle,Nadir Mohammed,Fadia M.Saadah,Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye,Safaa El Tayeb El-Kogali,Claire Kfouri,Djibrilla Adamou Issa,Maria Sarraf,Clelia Rontoyanni,and Abdoulaye Sy for their helpful comments.The team acknowled
45、ges with many thanks the technical advice of Chang-Tai Hsieh(Phyllis and Irwin Winkelried Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business)and of our World Bank Group colleagues Aart Kraay and Daniel Lederman.The team received critical analytical inp
46、uts,support,and comments from many colleagues,encompassing the World Banks MENA Macroeconomics Trade and Investment team,headed by Eric Le Borgne:Zeljko Bogetic,Sara Alnashar,Fatma Elashmawy,Dima Krayem,Nur Nasser Eddin,Ramy Ibrahim Farag Oraby,Alief Aulia Rezza,Sarah Sammy Farid Sammy,Zeina Alshark
47、as,Mohammad Al Akkaoui,Luan Zhao,Khaled Alhmoud,Cyril Desponts,Ashwaq Natiq Maseeh,Yasmine Osman,Diderot Guy Estaing Sandjong Tomi,Majid Kazemi,Mohammad Al Akkaoui,Massimiliano Cali,Javier Diaz Cassou,Daniel Prinz,and Muhammad Khudadad Chattha.The team is also grateful for the feedback and analytica
48、l inputs received from our Global Economic Prospects colleagues Naotaka Sugawara,Nikita Perevalov,and Paolo Agnolucci,and from our Poverty and Equity colleagues Alan Fuchs,Aziz Atamanov,and Laura Liliana Moreno Herrera.The team is also thankful for the feedback provided by our MENA Chief Economist O
49、ffice colleagues Harun Onder,Hoda Assem,Rana Lotfi,Leila Baghdadi,Federico R.Bennett,Asif M.Islam,and Ernest John Sergenti.Serene Jweied provided timely advice on messaging during the final stages in the production of this report.We thank James L.Rowe Jr for editing the manuscript,Jihane El Khoury R
50、oederer for the cover design,and Budy Wirasmo for typesetting.Help from the Translation and Printing and Multimedia and Interactive Media Units of the World Banks Global Corporate Solutions is acknowledged.Stellar administrative support was provided by Asma Saleh Al-Hanshali and Heran Getachew Negat
51、u.vACKNOWLEDGEMENTSGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAAEsAdvanced EconomiesAREUnited Arab EmiratesAvgAverageBHR BahrainblnbillionCOVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019CPIConsumer Price IndexCYCalendar yearDJI DjiboutiDOEDeveloping Oil ExportersDOIDeveloping Oil ImportersDZA AlgeriaeEstimateEAPEast
52、 Asia and PacificECAEurope and Central AsiaECBEuropean Central BankEGPEgyptian PoundEGY Arab Republic of EgyptEMDEsEmerging Market and Developing Economiesex-excludingfforecastFAOFood and Agriculture OrganizationFCSFragile and Conflict-Affected SituationsFDIForeign Direct InvestmentFLFPFemale Labor
53、Force ParticipationFXForeign ExchangeFYFiscal yearGCCGulf Cooperation Council GDPGross Domestic ProductGEPGlobal Economic ProspectsGoIGovernment of IsraelHICsHigh-Income Countriesh-indexHirsch indexICUIntensive Care UnitIEAInternational Energy AgencyIFSInternational Financial StatisticsIMFInternatio
54、nal Monetary FundIPCIntegrated Food Security Phase ClassificationIRN Islamic Republic of IranIRQ IraqJOR JordanKWT KuwaitLACLatin America and the CaribbeanLBN LebanonLBPLebanese poundLBYLibyaLICLow-Income CountryLMICLower Middle-Income CountryLNGLiquefied Natural GaslogLogarithmicMAR MoroccoMENA Mid
55、dle East and North AfricaMEUMENA Economic UpdateMMBtuMillion British thermal unitsMNACEMENA Chief Economist OfficeMPOMacro Poverty OutlookMSCIMorgan Stanley Capital InternationalN/ANot AvailableNANorth AmericaNECNippon Electric CompanyNPNot PresentedNTLNighttime Light Satellite data OECD Organizatio
56、n for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOMN OmanOPECOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesOPEC+OPEC and other oil-producing countriesp.p.Percentage PointsPAPalestinian AuthorityPHCsPrimary Healthcare CentersPIPPoverty and Inequality PlatformPPPsPurchasing Power ParitiesPSE West Bank an
57、d GazaPWTPenn World TablesQ QuarterQAT QatarR&DResearch and developmentREORegional Economic OutlookRHSRight-hand sideS&PStandard and Poors Global RatingsSASouth AsiaSAU Saudi ArabiaSCIScience Citation IndexSCMSynthetic Control MethodSOEsState Owned EnterprisesSSASub-Saharan AfricaSSCISocial Sciences
58、 Citation IndexSYRSyrian Arab Republic TFPTotal Factor ProductivityTUN TunisiaU.S.United StatesUCDP GED Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset UMIC Upper Middle-Income Country UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsUNFPAUnited Nations Population
59、FundUNICEFUnited Nations Childrens FundUS$United States DollarUSAUnited States of AmericaVATValue Added TaxWCIWorld Container IndexWDRWorld Development ReportWHOWorld Health Organizationy/yYear-on-yearYEM Republic of YemenAbbreviationsviABBREVIATIONSMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDAT
60、E OCTOBER 2024ForewordThe October 2024 edition of the Middle East and North Africa Economic Update comes out at a pivotal time for the region.The continuing conflict in the Middle East is causing profound suffering.The conflict is taking a terrible toll on human lives,societies,and economies,and has
61、 repercussions that go well beyond those areas directly affected.There is little that can be builtand much that can be lostin the face of conflict.At the World Bank,we know that peace is an essential prerequisite for development.The cost of conflict transcends what common economic indicators can mea
62、sure,but it certainly leads to immediate economic losses,with long-term detrimental effects on development.These impacts include human capital losses,the displacement of people,and the destruction of housing,infrastructure,and industry.The economic repercussions are far reaching.The report shows tha
63、t,without conflict,income per capita in conflict-affected countries in MENA could have been on average 45 percent higher,measured seven years after the onset.As we look to opportunities ahead,we must first acknowledge that peace and stability provide the foundation upon which a sustainable future ca
64、n be built.To realize the potential of this region,we must shift perspectives and view development not merely as a challenge for the MENA region,but as an opportunity to mobilize vast human resources for the regions growth and prosperityand the global community as well.These windows of opportunity a
65、re open.The report analyses important areas for action to boost inclusive growth and prosperity.Better allocating talent in the labor market,leveraging the regions strategic location,and promoting innovation are key parts of this.Closing the gender employment gap,rethinking the footprint of the publ
66、ic and private sectors,and facilitating technology transfers through trade can further help the region leap forward.Countries can better allocate their talent in the labor market and leverage their strategic location to boost innovation and sustain growth.The report is clear:talent misallocation has
67、 harmed living standards.The public sector may be pulling too much talent away from the private sector.Reallocating talent from public to the private sector could lead to substantial gains in aggregate productivity of up to 46 percent.Another fundamental is clear:for economies to thrive,women must b
68、e included.Womens labor force participation in MENA is currently at 19 percent.The report estimates that closing that gender gap in employment could increase GDP per capita by 51 percent in the average MENA economy.The gains from reforms and actions for womens economic empowerment can materialize qu
69、ickly.Saudi Arabia undertook reforms that removed barriers and made an environment more favorable for women to enter the workforce,with female labor force participation rate increasing from 22 to 35 percent in a matter of years.Jordan has launched the regions first comprehensive program addressing i
70、ssues such as safe transportation,childcare,and training holistically to open new economic opportunities for women.So many countries in the region are already showing the way,through successful reforms,investments,and initiatives.And at the World Bank Group,we will put the full power of our knowledg
71、e,technical assistance,financing,and partnership in supporting transformation to build this better future.We stand at a pivotal moment.The region and the world are facing multiple and complex challenges.These challenges know no borders.They interconnect us.We must reimagine approaches and scale up c
72、ollective action if we are to meet the needsand deliver on the ambitionsto create a future worthy of all people of the MENA region.Ousmane DioneVice PresidentMiddle East and North Africa RegionThe World BankviiFOREWORDGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICACHAPTER I.OVERVIEWMiddle East and North
73、Africa(MENA)economies are not catching up with the rest of the world.The regions average per capita income has increased by just 62 percent over the last 50 years.In comparison,over the same period,the increase was fourfold in emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)and twofold in advanced on
74、es.Only a few developing MENA economies have avoided diverging further from the richest countries living standards(what economists call the frontier),and those where conflicts erupted have accelerated in the wrong direction.To reach even half the level of GDP per capita of the current frontier,the r
75、egion would need to grow at an average of 3.8 percent per year in per capita terms over the next three decades.While current growth performance falls well below that rateand the region is strained by fragility,conflict,and uncertaintya more prosperous future for MENA is possible.This issue of the ME
76、NA Economic Update(MEU)focuses on growth from both a short-and a long-term perspective.First,it presents a summary of recent regional economic trends,including an update of the impact that the conflict centered in Gaza is having on the region and on the global economy.The report then delves into an
77、analysis of the factors that shape MENAs long-term growth potential,with special attention to the persistent effects of conflict.The results are clear:peace is a pre-condition for catching up to the frontier,as conflict can undo decades of progress,delaying economic development by generations.The go
78、od news is that the region can dramatically boost growth by better allocating talent in the labor market,leveraging its strategic location,and promoting innovation.Closing the gender employment gap,rethinking the footprint of the public sector,and facilitating technology transfers through trade unde
79、r enhanced data quality and transparency can help the region leap forward.The windows of opportunity remain open for MENA.A fragile growthIn 2024,real GDP growth in MENA is expected at 2.2 percent,a modest increase from 1.8 percent in 2023.This uptick masks important disparities within the region.It
80、 is driven by Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC)countries,where growth is forecast to rise from 0.5 percent in 2023 to 1.9 percent in 2024.Growth is expected to decelerate in the whole of developing MENA.In developing oil importers,it will decelerate from 3.2 percent in 2023 to 2.1 percent in 2024,as the
81、 repercussions of the ongoing conflict spill over directly onto some countries and exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities in others.Real GDP growth in developing oil exporters will decline from 3.2 percent in 2023 to 2.7 percent in 2024.Over the past year,MENAs 2024 real GDP growth forecasts have b
82、een substantially downgraded,with the largest downward revisions among fragile and conflict-affected situations(FCS).These downgrades partly reflect the extension of OPEC+oil production cuts and increased uncertainty due to the conflict centered in Gaza.Dispersion among private sector forecasters,a
83、measure of uncertainty,has risen in MENA by 13 percent since October 2023.This contrasts sharply with the downward trend observed in other EMDEs and high-income countries.As of September 2024,uncertainty in MENA is nearly twice as high as in other EMDEs.1CHAPTER I.OVERVIEWGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST A
84、ND NORTH AFRICAThe economic consequences of the conflict centered in GazaAmidst a deepening humanitarian crisis,Gazas economy has come to a near-total halt,with a staggering 86 percent contraction in Q2 2024.In the West Bank,the economy also contracted by 23 percent in Q2 2024,largely due to tighter
85、 restrictions on movement,a drop in consumption,and a severe fiscal crisis.As a result of increased deductions by Israel on the clearance revenue transfers and reduced domestic tax receipts,the Palestinian Authority(PA)is facing a projected financing gap of US$1.86 billion in 2024,according to offic
86、ial PA sourcesmore than double that of 2023.In neighboring economies,the conflict suppressed economic activity,for example through tourism receipts(e.g.,a 6.6 percent decrease in tourist arrivals in Jordan through August 2024,in annualized terms)and fiscal revenues(e.g.,a 62 percent drop in Suez Can
87、al revenues in the Arab Republic of Egypt in the first half of 2024 relative to the second half of 2023).As this issue of the MENA Economic Update was going to print,the escalation of the conflict in Lebanon is causing increasing human and economic tolls.The full extent of the impact of these escala
88、tions on Lebanon and the region will be shaped by the future trajectory of the conflict.Globally,energy and financial markets have so far shown resilience.Despite some early,short-term fluctuations,spot oil prices and oil futures have fallen considerably since October 2023 amidst robust supply and c
89、oncerns about sluggish demand.Disruptions in maritime transportation,especially through the Suez Canal,have increased shipping times and spot prices,with freight rates rising four-to fivefold by August 2024 compared to November 2023.With low global demand,increasing fleet sizes,and contractual price
90、-stickiness,however,the increase in shipping costs has not passed through to consumers to date.The long shadow of conflict in MENAThe conflict centered in Gaza underscores a wider trend of increasing violence in the region.There has been more than a twofold increase in conflict episodes and a sixfol
91、d increase in MENAs share of global fatalities since the 1990s.The cost of conflict transcends what common economic indicators can measure.Yet,conflicts certainly lead to immediate economic losses and can have long-term detrimental effects on development.These outcomes stem from human capital losses
92、,forced displacement,the destruction of physical infrastructure,and various forms of economic disorganization,including supply chain disruptions.A Synthetic Control Method(SCM)-based analysis in this report shows that income per capita in conflict-affected countries in MENA could have been,on averag
93、e,45 percent higher without conflict,measured seven years after its onset.This loss is equivalent to 35 years worth of progress in the region.Prospects for a more prosperous regionDespite the regions current challenges,there is significant untapped potential in MENA.Countries can better allocate the
94、ir talent in the labor market and leverage their strategic location to boost innovation and sustain growth.Talent misallocation,both in and out of the labor force and between the public and private sectors,has harmed living standards in the region.Over the past 50 years,schooling in MENA has rapidly
95、 increased,especially for women,but female labor force participation rates have stagnated.Closing gender employment gaps in MENA would result in a 51 percent increase in per capita income in the typical MENA country.2CHAPTER I.OVERVIEWMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024A
96、dditionally,public sector employment in MENA crowds out private sector employment,particularly for women.When women do participate in the labor market,they are more likely to work in the public sector.The female public sector employment share in MENA(37 percent)is the largest in the world,nearly dou
97、ble that of Europe and Central Asiathe second largest.Moreover,the public sector may be pulling too much talent away from the private sector,without translating into better public goods and services.Reallocating talent towards the private sector could lead to substantial gains in aggregate productiv
98、ity,ranging from 5 to 9 percent in the Islamic Republic of Iran,Tunisia,the Arab Republic of Egypt,and Jordan,to around 45 percent in Algeria and Iraq.Gains from reforms could materialize quickly.Starting in 2016,for example,Saudi Arabia removed barriers preventing women from participating in all pr
99、ofessions,driving,and accessing improved maternity leave.These changes were supported by programs that enhanced womens employment opportunities,such as job services,training,and childcare.They also created a regulatory environment favorable for women entering the workforce.These reforms likely contr
100、ibuted to the rise in female labor force participation,which increased from 22 percent in 2016 to 35 percent in 2023.Finally,to promote further productivity gains,MENA countries can leverage their location to access frontier knowledge and technology through increased international trade.The knowledg
101、e produced in the region currently lags in both impact and novelty.International trade,and the technology and knowledge spillovers that come with it,can serve as a lever to boost aggregate productivity.Improving data quality and transparency in the region can help remove bottlenecks against technolo
102、gy diffusion and facilitate more and better circulation of ideas.MENA has a long way to go,but the region also has large windows of opportunity.3CHAPTER I.OVERVIEWGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICACHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMain findings The global economy is stabilizing after enduring
103、several years of negative shocks,but the outlook remains lackluster,with growth at 2.6 percent,unchanged since last year.Global inflation has eased since the peak levels reached in 2022,yet the disinflation process has been slower than expected globally.Oil prices have fluctuated throughout 2024 bec
104、ause of high geopolitical tensions and,as of October 1,are expected to be slightly lower in 2024 than in 2023.The Middle East and North Africa(MENA)is expected to grow at 2.2 percent in 2024.Yet,the outlook remains subdued and reveals important disparities within the region:faster growth in the Gulf
105、 Cooperation Council(GCC)although at a slower pace than previously expecteddeceleration in developing MENA countries,and further economic contraction in countries plagued by some form of conflict or fragility.The GCC is set to grow at 1.9 percent in 2024.Growth in developing oil exporters is forecas
106、t at 2.7 percent in 2024 and at 2.1 percent for developing oil importers.Uncertainty in MENA is high and increasing,with risks tilted to the downside because of the conflict in the Middle East centered in Gaza,its escalation and its adverse spillovers affecting neighboring countriesthe focus of Chap
107、ter III of this report.GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONTEXTGlobal economic growth:The global economy is stabilizing while the outlook remains subduedThe global economy is steadying after enduring several years of negative shocks.According to the World Banks June 2024 forecast,global economic growth is expected t
108、o remain unchanged at 2.6 percent this year.This rate reflects sluggish investment growth because of restrictive monetary policies and moderate consumption growth,which has slowed as the savings built up during the pandemic diminish and government fiscal spending declines(World Bank,2024a).The World
109、 Bank has slightly revised its 2024 global growth forecast upward,from 2.4 percent in January to 2.6 percent in June(World Bank,2024a,2024b).This slightly faster pace of global economic growth primarily reflects the continued expansion of the U.S.economy(Figure II.1).In 2025,global economic growth i
110、s expected to pick up a bit to 2.7 percent in the wake of cautious monetary policy easingwhich supports economic activity in both advanced economies and Emerging Market and Developing Economies(EMDEs)along with modest improvements in trade and investment.4CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST
111、AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Still,over the forecast horizon(20242026),growth is expected to be half a percentage point below the average from 2010 to 2019(Figure II.1).1 Advanced economies and EMDEs alike are expected to grow at a much slower pace over 20242026 compared to th
112、e decade before the pandemic,albeit with diverging growth patterns.Growth in advanced economies is projected to be 1.5 percent in 2024,unchanged from 2023,reflecting weak economic activity in the euro area and Japan,which will be offset by resilient U.S.growth.Economic growth in advanced economies i
113、s anticipated to pick up to 1.7 percent in 2025 and 1.8 percent in 2026as growth firms in the euro area and Japan,while U.S.growth slows.Growth in EMDEs is expected to moderate to 4 percent in 2024,from 4.2 percent in 2023,and to remain around 4 percent over 202526.This deceleration reflects factors
114、 peculiar to some large economiesespecially,the growth slowdown in China and subdued growth among commodity exporters because of weak global demand.Growth in China is expected to slow to 4.8 percent in 2024 from 5.2 percent in 2023,and to decline further to 4.1 percent in 2025 and to 4 percent in 20
115、26 due to tepid investment growth and the continued property sector downturn.EMDEs,excluding China,are projected to grow at 3.5 percent in 2024 and to hover around 3.9 percent over 202526,a slight improvement from 3.4 percent in 2023(Figure II.1).Yet,significant challenges remain in vulnerable econo
116、mies,particularly in low-income countries and those experiencing high levels of conflict and violence,where growth prospects have worsened since January 2024.Global inflation and interest rates:Easing inflation with disinflation progressing slower than expectedGlobal inflation has decreased from the
117、 peak levels seen in 2022.In the last quarter of 2023,global inflation reached 4.1 percent,down from a peak of 9 percent in the third quarter of 2022(Figure II.2,Panel A).However,inflation remains above target in most advanced economies and in roughly 25 percent of EMDEs that have inflation targets.
118、In advanced economies,the disinflation in consumer goods prices seems to have levelled off,while inflation in consumer services remains high.In the United States,strong economic activity and rapid increases in shelter costs have led to persistently high prices for services and,more broadly,core infl
119、ation2 in recent months.In EMDEs,although headline inflation has continued to decline,persistently high core inflationdriven by services prices including sheltermirrors the situation in advanced economies(World Bank,2024a).According to the World Bank June 2024 forecast,global inflation is projected
120、to moderate to 3.5 percent in 2024,to decline further to 2.9 percent in 2025,and to settle at 2.8 percent by the end of 2026a scenario that aligns broadly with central bank targets.Yet,inflation has been declining at a slower pace globally than previously expected.Both 1 Relative to pre-pandemic lev
121、els,growth has particularly weakened in countries that experienced high inflation rates(World Bank,2024a).2 Core inflation factors out volatile food and fuel prices from the consumer price index.Figure II1 Contributions to global growth.Percentage pointsPercent4321043210201019 avg2024f2025f2026f USA
122、 Euro area China Other AEs Other EMDEs World(rhs)Source:World Bank.Global Economic Prospects,June 2024.Note:f=forecast;AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.GDP aggregates are calculated using real U.S.dollar GDP weights at average 201019 prices and market exchange ra
123、tes.5CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAadvanced economies and EMDEs are likely to adopt a cautious approach to policy easing,keeping rates higher than pre-pandemic levels.In advanced economies,rates are projected to remain more than double their 20002019 avera
124、ge over the coming years(World Bank,2024a).Currently,major economies,including the European Central Bank and the U.S.Federal Reserve,have begun cautiously easing interest rates.3Food price inflation:Prices of agricultural commodities decline but remain above pre-pandemic levels through 2025Prices of
125、 agricultural commodities have also declined from the high levels of 2022.The prices of U.S.yellow maize,U.S.wheat,and U.S.soybean oil steadily decreased in the first half of 2023.Their volatility increased during JulyAugust 2023 before pulling back in the last quarter of 2023 and into 2024(Figure I
126、I.3).Despite a decline in consumer food price inflation,acute food insecurity is estimated to have doubled worldwide since 2019(World Bank,2024a).As of October 1,2024,futures indicate that the prices of all agricultural commodities are expected to remain above pre-pandemic levels through 2025(Figure
127、 II.3).Only the price of U.S.wheat briefly returned to pre-pandemic levels between July and August 2024 before increasing again to exceed pre-pandemic levels.3 On September 18,2024,the U.S.Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark federal funds rate by 50 basis points to between 4.75 percent and 5 perce
128、nt.Effective September 18,2024,the European Central Bank(ECB)cut the deposit facility rate by 25 basis points to 3.5 percent to ease monetary policy restrictions.Figure II2 Inflation.Panel A.Global and MENAPanel B.MENA country groupsMedian country inflation(percent)Median country inflation(percent)1
129、21086420-2Q1-13Q3-13Q1-14Q3-14Q1-15Q3-15Q1-16Q3-16Q1-17Q3-17Q1-18Q3-18Q1-19Q3-19Q1-20Q3-20Q1-21Q3-21Q1-22Q3-22Q1-23Q3-23121086420-2Q1-13Q3-13Q1-14Q3-14Q1-15Q3-15Q1-16Q3-16Q1-17Q3-17Q1-18Q3-18Q1-19Q3-19Q1-20Q3-20Q1-21Q3-21Q1-22Q3-22Q1-23Q3-23 MENA World GCC DOE DOISource:World Bank staff calculations
130、 based on International Monetary Fund,International Financial Statistics.Note:MENA=Middle East and North Africa,(Algeria,Bahrain,the Arab Republic of Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Tunisia and the West Bank and Gaza).Gulf Cooperati
131、on Council=Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar and Saudi Arabia.Developing oil exporters=Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Libya.Developing oil importers=The Arab Republic of Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,Morocco,Tunisia,and West Bank and Gaza.All groups include the same countries for each period.From Q1 2013
132、to Q3 2023,World comprises 132 countries,including 15 MENA countries.For Q4 2023,World comprises 128 countries,including 14 MENA countries.Figure II3 Index of global price of important agricultural commodities from January 2020 to September 2024.Rebased,1/2/2020=10030025020015010050Jan-20Jul-20Jan-2
133、1Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26 Yellow maize Wheat Soybean oilSource:World Bank staff calculations based on Bloomberg L.P.Note:Commodities shown are U.S.yellow corn(maize),U.S.wheat,and U.S.soybean oil contracts.Solid lines indicate spot price per commodity through Octo
134、ber 1,2024;dotted lines indicate futures prices as of October 1,2024.The horizontal black line reflects a base of 100 on January 2,2020.6CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Oil production and global demand:Oil price fluctuations through 202
135、4In 2024,average oil prices are anticipated to be slightly lower than in 2023.As of October 1,the estimated average for calendar year 2024(based on spot and futures contracts)was US$81 per barrel,slightly lower than the US$83 average in 2023,and significantly lower than the average US$100 per barrel
136、 in 2022.4 Oil prices have fluctuated in 2024,with a significant increase in April 2024 to US$88 because of escalating tensions in the Middle East,but have since retreated(Figure II.4,Panel A).On October 1,2024,oil prices were trending at US$73.6 per barrel.Oil futures,as of October 1,2024,indicate
137、generally lower medium-term prices than in December 2023,March 2024,and June 2024,with end-2026 futures trading at US$71.5 per barrel(Figure II.4,Panel A).Natural gas prices fell sharply in the first quarter of 2024 from the previous quarter(Figure II.4,Panel B).After reaching a nearly 30-year low i
138、n March 2024,the price of U.S.natural gas surged in May 2024 to US$2.4 per 10,000 MMbtu(million British thermal units),partly due to an increase in liquefied natural gas(LNG)exports.U.S.natural gas prices were trending at US$2.9 per 10,000 MMbtu on October 1,2024.Natural gas futures in 2024 suggest
139、a more moderate outlook compared to 2023,with medium-term prices generally expected to be lower than those projected by 2023 futures.Metal prices,excluding precious metals,are expected to remain stable over 202425 but above pre-pandemic levels.This is due to increased demand from clean energy invest
140、ments and global industrial activity,offset by declining real estate activity in China(World Bank,2024a).4 The estimated oil price in calendar year 2024 is based on the staff calculations based on data from Bloomberg L.P.The estimate for the average 2024 price is calculated using the spot price for
141、the last trading day of each month between January and September 2024,and futures as of August 30,2024,from October 2024 through the end of the year(a total of 12 data points for 2024).The average prices for benchmark Brent crude oil prices in 2022 and 2023 come from the World Bank Commodity Price d
142、ata.Figure II4 Hydrocarbon spot prices and futures.Panel A.Generic Brent crude oilPanel B.Generic natural gasU.S.dollars a barrel;expiration dates on x-axisU.S.dollars 10,000 MMbtu;expiration dates on x-axisJan-20Jul-20Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25J-26ulJan-26140120100
143、806040200Jan-20Jul-20Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25J-26ulJan-26121086420 Spot Dec-23 Mar-24 Jun-24 latest Spot Dec-23 Mar-24 Jun-24 latestSource:World Bank staff calculations based on Bloomberg,L.P.Note:MMBtu=million British thermal units.The black lines indicate the da
144、ily closing spot price of generic Brent crude oil(Panel A)and generic natural gas(Panel B)through October 1,2024.The colored lines show the closing futures prices of generic Brent crude oil(Panel A)and generic natural gas(Panel B)on the indicated dates.The latest futures prices as of October 1,2024.
145、The latest futures observation is for December 2026.7CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAGROWTH FORECASTS AND MACROECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE MENA REGIONGrowth forecasts:Subdued growth in 2024 with important disparities within the regionLike the rest of the world,th
146、e MENA region has experienced a series of severe shocks since 2020beginning with the COVID-19 pandemic,followed by Russias invasion of Ukraine,high inflation and tightened financial conditions,and natural disasters.The COVID-19 pandemic led to a marked economic deceleration in 2020 in both high-inco
147、me countries and EMDEs,and in the region(Figure II.5,Panel A).MENA experienced a more tepid recovery in economic growth in 2021 than did high-income countries and EMDEs,particularly MENA oil exporting countriesboth high-income Gulf Cooperation Council countries(Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia
148、,and the United Arab Emirates)and developing oil exporters(Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,and Iraq)(Figure II.5,Panel B).In 2022,the region experienced extraordinarily rapid growthin the wake of the surge in oil prices that followed Russias invasion of Ukraineoutpacing economic growth in both
149、high-income countries and other EMDEs(Figure II.5,Panel A).The increase in oil prices boosted economic growth in oil-exporting economies in the region,while economic growth decelerated in developing oil importers(Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,Morocco,and the West Bank and Gaza)(
150、Figure II.5,Panel B)divergent growth patterns that were called the“tale of two MENAs,”in previous editions of the Economic Update.Figure II5 Real GDP growth since 2020.Panel A.MENA,HICs,and EMDEsPanel B.MENA country groups Real GDP growth rate(percent)Real GDP growth rate(percent)Real GDP growth rat
151、e(percent)86420-2-4-62020202120222023e2024f2025f86420-2-4-6-820151050-5-10-15-202020202120222023e2024f2025f HIC ex-MENA HIC ex-MENA,201019 avg.EMDE ex-MENA GCC DOE DOI ex-Egypt EMDE ex-MENA,201019 avg.MENA MENA,201019 avg.Egypt Other countries:LBN,LBY,SYR,YEM(rhs)Panel C.Fragile and conflict-affecte
152、d situations(FCS)by countryReal GDP growth rate(percent)Real GDP growth rate(percent)1050-5-10-15-20-253020100-10-20-30-40-50-60-702020202120222023e2024f2025f IRQ PSE LBN SYR YEM LBY(rhs)Sources:World Bank staff calculations based on the World Banks Macro Poverty Outlook,October 2024.Note:e=estimate
153、,f=forecast.MENA=Middle East and North Africa.EMDE(ex-MENA)=Emerging Market and Developing Economies,excluding MENA countries.Gulf Cooperation Council=Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates.Developing Oil Exporters=Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq.Developing Oil imp
154、orters ex-the Arab Republic of Egypt=Djibouti,Jordan,Morocco,Tunisia,the West Bank and Gaza.HIC ex-MENA=high-income countries excluding MENA.Other countries=Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen.LBN=Lebanon.LBY=Libya.SYR=The Syrian Arab Republic.YEM=The Republic of Yemen.I
155、RQ=Iraq.PSE=The West Bank and Gaza.Panel B.data for the Arab Republic of Egypt are for fiscal years(beginning on July 1 and ending June 30).Panel C.FCS=Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations=Iraq,Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic,the Republic of Yemen,and the West Bank and Gaza.Other countrie
156、s average in 2025f include Libya,the Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen.Iraqs real GDP growth rates are World Bank estimations at constant market prices.For the years between 2023 and 2025,real GDP growth rates for Iraq at constant market prices are identical to real GDP growth rates at
157、constant factor prices.Pre-2023,the two series for Iraq(constant market prices and constant factor prices)differ slightly.Numbers are as of October 2,2024.8CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024In 2023,successive oil production cuts by OPEC+c
158、ountries5including three rounds of deep cuts in April,June,and Novembercombined with relatively low oil price levels,marked the end of the“tale of two MENAs.”Despite OPEC+efforts to stabilize prices,average oil prices fell to US$83 per barrel in 2023 from US$100 in 2022,reducing receipts for oil exp
159、orters.Weaker global demand,driven by slower growth in China,exerted downward pressure on oil prices and is likely to continue doing so,potentially offsetting the impact of OPEC+production cuts(World Bank,2024c).Real GDP growth in GCC countries fell from 7.2 percent in 2022 to 0.5 percent in 2023.Gr
160、owth in developing oil importers,excluding the Arab Republic of Egypt,remained roughly unchanged from 2.2 percent in 2022 to 2.0 percent in 2023,while growth in developing oil exporters decreased from 3.9 percent in 2022 to 3.2 percent in 2023(Figure II.5,Panel B).Since the beginning of the conflict
161、 in the Middle East centered in Gaza in early October 2023,geopolitical tensions and uncertainty have been high in MENA,weighing on the regions growth outlook.MENA has returned to lackluster growth,a pattern that persisted in the decade leading up to the pandemic and the other shocks that started in
162、 2020(Belhaj et al.,2022,Gatti et al.,2023,Gatti et al.,2024).The outlook for 2024 remains subdued with important disparities within the region.In 2024,economic activity in MENA(excluding Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen)is expected to rise slightly to 2.2 percent in
163、2024,after slowing to 1.8 percent in 2023.Yet,growth in MENA in 2024 remains one percentage point below the pre-pandemic average between 2010 and 2019(Figure II.5,Panel A).The growth pickup in 2024 is primarily fueled by GCC countries,anticipated to grow at 1.9 percent in 2024 up from 0.5 percent in
164、 2023(Figure II.5,Panel B).Yet,growth in GCC countries is slower than previously anticipated because of the extension of oil production cuts6.Growth is expected to decelerate in developing oil exporters,from 3.2 percent in 2023 to 2.7 percent in 2024,and in developing oil importers(excluding the Ara
165、b Republic of Egypt),from 2.0 percent in 2023 to 1.3 percent in 2024,as the repercussions of the ongoing conflict directly impact some countries and exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities in others.Among developing oil importers,real GDP growth is expected to decelerate in all countries,except Tuni
166、sia where it is projected to rise to 1.2 percent in 2024 from zero percent in 2023.This increase reflects a mild recovery in the agricultural sector in Tunisia,which continues to suffer from the lingering effects of drought conditions following four years of below-average rainfall.Morocco,on the oth
167、er hand,is set to experience a deceleration in real GDP growth from 3.4 percent in 2023 to 2.9 percent in 2024 due to the contraction of the agricultural sector amidst a prolonged drought.Growth in the Arab Republic of Egypt is also forecast to decline from 3.8 percent in fiscal year 2023 to 2.5 per
168、cent in fiscal year 2024 due to weak manufacturing activity,import restrictions,a downturn in gas extraction operations,and reduced shipping through the Suez Canal(World Bank,2024a).The outlook for conflict-afflicted Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen remains highly unc
169、ertain,though they are expected to experience further economic contraction in 2024.7In 2025,MENA is expected to grow at 3.8 percent.Growth in GCC countries is expected to strengthen to 4.2 percent in 2025,up from 1.9 percent in 2024,driven by the gradual phasing-out of voluntary oil production cuts
170、starting from December 2024.Growth in developing oil exporters is projected to accelerate to 3.3 percent in 2025,from 2.7 percent in 2024.Meanwhile,growth in developing oil importers(excluding the Arab Republic of Egypt)is expected to improve from 1.3 percent in 2024 to 3.4 percent in 2025,while the
171、 Arab Republic of Egypts growth is expected to accelerate to 3.5 percent in fiscal year 2025 from 2.5 percent in fiscal year 2024.5 OPEC is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(Algeria,Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Kuwait,Libya,Nigeria,the Republic of the
172、 Congo,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela).OPEC+adds a number of other oil producers that signed an agreement with OPEC,the largest of which is Russia.6 In June 2024,oil production cuts agreed upon among OPEC+members were extended by a year until the end of 2025.On September 5,2024,
173、a total of eight OPEC+members,including Saudi Arabia,Russia,Iraq,the United Arab Emirates,Kuwait,Kazakhstan,Algeria,and Oman agreed to extend their additional voluntary production cuts of 2.2 million barrels per day until the end of November 2024.The cuts will be gradually phased out on a monthly ba
174、sis starting December 1,2024.7 The growth projections for Lebanon,reported in Table II.2,precede the recent significant escalation of conflict in Lebanon,as of September 2024.9CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAThe conflict in the Middle East,centered in Gaza,p
175、oses significant downside risks to the outlook.The current growth forecasts for 2024 and 2025(Table II.2)are made under the assumption that the conflict will not worsen.However,escalating conflict could lead to negative spillovers both within the region and globally.Heightened geopolitical tensions
176、could harm neighboring countries economies by undermining growth prospects through increased uncertainty,reduced business and consumer confidence,declining tourism,capital outflows,and tighter financial conditions.Chapter III of this report discusses the repercussions of the ongoing conflict on Gaza
177、 and the West Bank and on the region.Table II1 2024 real GDP forecasts by editions of the MENA Economic Update.October 2023April 2024October 2024MENA3.52.72.2Oil Exporters3.52.82.2Gulf Cooperation Council3.62.81.9Developing Oil Exporters3.42.82.7Developing Oil Importers3.42.52.1Source:World Bank,Mac
178、ro Poverty Outlook.Note:GCC=Gulf Cooperation Council(Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates).Developing oil exporters=Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq.Developing oil importers=Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Jordan,Morocco,Tunisia,the West Bank and Gaza.Data for
179、 the Arab Republic of Egypt are for fiscal years(beginning on July 1 and ending June 30).Numbers are as of October 2,2024.Downward revisions to the 2024 growth forecasts for the MENA region by World Bank economists reflect the highly turbulent environment the region is currently navigating(Table II.
180、1).Projected growth in MENA in 2024 has been revised downward by 0.5 percentage points since the April 2024 edition of the Economic Update(Gatti et al.,2024)and by 1.3 percentage points since the October 2023 edition(Gatti et al.,2023a).These downgrades partly reflect the extension of OPEC+oil produ
181、ction cuts and increased uncertainty due to the conflict in the Middle East.Real GDP per capita:Modest improvements in standards of living amidst high uncertaintyReal GDP per capita growth arguably better reflects changes in standards of living than real GDP growth.In 2024,population growth in the r
182、egion is expected to average 1.3 percent,roughly unchanged from last years 1.4 percent growth.Population growth in developing MENA countries in 2024 will slightly outpace that of the GCC.In 2024,population growth is projected to average 1.3 percent in both developing oil exporters and developing oil
183、 importers,and 1.2 percent in GCC countries.As a result,GDP per capita in MENA is expected to grow by a modest 0.9 percent in 2024,an improvement from the 0.5 percent in 2023.This growth is primarily driven by the GCC,where real GDP per capita is projected to grow by 0.7 percent in 2024 after contra
184、cting by 1 percent in 2023(Table 2.2).Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are expected to lead with 2024 real GDP per capita growth rates of 2.6 percent and 2.5 percent,driven by robust growth in the non-oil sector.By the end of 2024,10 out of 15 MENA countries(excluding Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Ar
185、ab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen)are expected to return to their 2019 real GDP per capita level.Iraq,Tunisia,the West Bank and Gaza,Kuwait,and Qatar will still fall short.Conflict-afflicted Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen are the furthest from recovering their p
186、re-pandemic GDP per capita levels(Figure II.6,Panel A).Notably,the West Bank and Gaza are projected to be 29 percent below their 2019 real GDP per capita level(Figure II.6,Panel B).10CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Table II2 Actual and
187、projected real GDP growth,real GDP per capita growth,current account balance,and fiscal account balance in the Middle East and North Africa,by economy,202225.Real GDP GrowthReal GDP per capita GrowthCurrent Account BalanceFiscal Balancepercentpercentpercent of GDPpercent of GDP20222023e2024f2025f202
188、22023e2024f2025f20222023e2024f2025f20222023e2024f2025fMENA5.81.82.23.84.40.50.92.510.55.32.93.13.0-1.4-2.0-2.5Middle-Income MENA4.43.22.43.43.01.81.12.13.61.8-1.7-2.1-1.5-3.8-4.6-5.6Oil Exporters6.01.42.23.94.60.10.92.614.06.84.44.45.1-0.6-1.5-1.8Gulf Cooperation Council7.20.51.94.25.7-1.00.72.915.7
189、8.16.67.46.30.50.20.1Qatar4.21.22.02.7-4.5-3.12.31.226.817.114.514.110.45.64.24.6United Arab Emirates7.93.23.34.17.02.42.53.411.79.27.57.410.85.14.94.7Bahrain6.03.03.53.35.32.12.62.414.65.97.36.7-5.4-10.4-9.1-9.4Kuwait6.3-3.6-1.02.55.8-4.5-1.91.732.426.221.620.212.5-4.8-5.8-8.1Saudi Arabia7.5-0.81.6
190、4.96.1-2.20.23.513.74.03.04.82.5-2.0-2.0-1.8Oman9.61.30.72.78.2-0.2-0.71.35.11.41.72.710.16.64.53.8Developing Oil Exporters3.93.22.73.32.61.91.42.09.84.10.0-1.32.0-2.7-4.8-5.5Islamic Republic of Iran3.85.03.72.93.04.32.92.23.42.01.21.0-2.8-3.4-2.1-2.5Algeria3.64.13.13.81.92.51.62.48.62.3-1.2-3.1-3.0
191、-5.2-9.8-9.9Iraq4.7-2.9-0.94.02.4-5.1-3.01.721.29.7-1.4-4.114.10.9-5.3-7.4Developing Oil Importers5.03.22.13.53.61.80.72.1-4.2-1.7-4.3-3.5-5.9-5.6-4.3-5.8Arab Republic of Egypt6.63.82.53.54.92.20.91.9-3.5-1.2-5.3-3.9-6.2-6.0-3.6-7.0Tunisia2.70.01.22.21.9-0.80.31.4-8.7-2.6-2.3-2.0-6.7-6.8-6.0-4.3Jord
192、an2.62.72.42.61.42.21.92.1-7.8-3.7-4.8-4.6-5.6-5.1-5.3-5.0Morocco1.53.42.93.90.52.41.92.9-3.6-0.6-1.0-1.3-5.4-4.4-4.2-3.8Djibouti3.76.75.95.32.35.24.53.917.915.614.413.50.20.2-0.50.6West Bank and Gaza4.1-5.4-17.15.51.6-7.6-18.83.2-10.6-16.6-18.1-17.9-1.8-3.9-12.0-8.7Other countriesLibya-8.310.2-10.1
193、10.7-9.38.9-11.19.521.23.0-21.8-5.72.7-0.1-5.71.9Lebanon-0.6-0.8-1.0NP-1.1-1.3-1.5NP-34.6-28.1-20.0NP-2.90.50.2NPSyrian Arab Republic0.7-1.2-1.5-1.0-2.9-5.9-6.0-4.6NPNPNPNP-4.6-4.3-4.1-3.8Republic of Yemen1.5-2.0-1.01.5-0.6-4.2-3.2-0.7-17.7-20.3-25.0-25.7-2.7-6.1-3.5-4.0Source:World Bank staff calcu
194、lations based on data from the World Banks Macro Poverty Outlook,October 2024.Note:e=estimate,f=forecast and NP=not presented.Countries are listed in descending order based on 2023 GDP per Capita(constant 2021 PPP$)within each category.Data are rounded up to a single digit.Data for the Arab Republic
195、 of Egypt are for fiscal years(beginning on July 1 and ending June 30).Other countries=Lebanon,Libya,Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen,which are excluded from MENA regional and sub-regional averages due to uncertain values.Middle Income MENA includes the Islamic Republic of Iran,Algeria
196、,Iraq,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Tunisia,Jordan,Morocco,the West Bank and Gaza and Djibouti.The macroeconomic forecasts for Iraq presented in this table are based on the World Bank estimations of real GDP at constant market prices.For the years between 2023 and 2025,real GDP growth rates and real GD
197、P per capita growth rates for Iraq at constant market prices are identical to those at constant factor prices.The constant market prices and the constant factor prices series for real GDP growth and real GDP per capita growth rates marginally differ for the year 2022.Iraqs current account balance an
198、d the fiscal account balance(as percent of GDP)at constant market prices differ marginally from those at constant factor prices.Real GDP growth regional and sub-regional weighted averages are calculated using previous year real GDP as weights.Real GDP per capita growth regional and sub-regional weig
199、hted averages are calculated by finding real GDP per capita for each category,then calculating yearly growth rates.Current account balance and fiscal balance regional and sub-regional averages are calculated using current year nominal GDP levels as weights.Numbers are updated as of October 2,2024.11
200、CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAFigure II6 Index of real GDP per capita levels in 20192024.Panel A.MENA country groupsPanel B.Fragile and conflict-affected situations(FCS)by countryIndex of GDP per capita(2019=1)Index of GDP per capita(2019=1)1.151.101.051.0
201、00.950.900.850.800.750.700.6520192020202120222023e202 f41.151.101.051.000.950.900.850.800.750.700.6520192020202120222023e202 f4 GCC DOE DOI ex-Egypt IRQ PSE LBN LBY SYR YEM Egypt(CY)Other countries:LBN,LBY,SYR,YEMSource:World Bank staff calculations,based on data from the Macro Poverty Outlook(MPO),
202、October 2024.Note:e=estimate,f=forecast.MENA=Middle East and North Africa(Algeria,Bahrain,Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Jordan,Kuwait,Morocco,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Tunisia,the United Arab Emirates,and the West Bank and Gaza).The Gulf Cooperation Council=Bahr
203、ain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,and the United Arab Emirates.Developing oil exporters=Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,and Iraq.Developing oil importers excluding the Arab Republic of Egypt=Djibouti,Jordan,Morocco,Tunisia,and the West Bank and Gaza.Other countries=Libya,Lebanon,the Syrian Ara
204、b Republic,and the Republic of Yemen.LBN=Lebanon.LBY=Libya.SYR=The Syrian Arab Republic.YEM=The Republic of Yemen.IRQ=Iraq.PSE=The West Bank and Gaza.Panel A.Real GDP estimates for the Arab Republic of Egypt correspond to calendar years.Panel B.Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations(FCS)=Iraq,Liby
205、a,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic,the Republic of Yemen,and the West Bank and Gaza.Regional and subregional rebased real GDP per capita levels were calculated as the sum of real GDP of each group category divided by the sum of its population.All values are rebased to 2019(with 2019=1).Numbers are u
206、pdated as of October 2,2024.Poverty in MENA:A troubling increase across the regionEconomic growth must be inclusive to improve living standards for everyone,including the poor and vulnerable.This requires that the poorest segments of the population do at least as well as the overall population(Raval
207、lion,2004).Since 1990,the World Bank has monitored poverty using an international poverty line currently defined as$2.15 per capita daily in 2017 purchasing power parities(PPPs).8 In addition to the international poverty line,the World Bank uses two higher poverty lines to measure and monitor povert
208、y in higher income countries that have a lower incidence of extreme poverty:a$3.65 per day line(2017 PPPs)for lower-middle-income countries and a$6.85 per day line(2017 PPPs)for upper-middle-income countries.Few countries have survey estimates of poverty available every year.To estimate poverty at t
209、he regional and global level,the survey estimates need to be aligned to a reference year and aggregated.9 One important rule for displaying regional estimates for a given reference year is that data must cover 50 percent of the regions population.The World Bank currently reports poverty rates for th
210、e 2022 reference year.As can be seen in Figure II.7,the latest estimates for the MENA region are available only for 2019 because of inadequate population coverage in more recent years.Despite challenges with data and inconsistencies in survey comparability over time,recent trends show a troubling ri
211、se in poverty across the MENA region even before the COVID-19 pandemic.The MENA region was the only one in which poverty increased at both the lower-middle and upper-middle income thresholds(Figure II.7).Poverty at the$3.65 line(2017 PPPs)rose from 12 percent to 14.6 percent between the 2013 and 201
212、9 reference years,while poverty at the$6.85 per day line(2017 PPPs)rose from 44.3 percent to 45.4 percent.8 The international poverty line is the median of harmonized national poverty lines for low-income countries.9 For countries that do not have welfare aggregates for a specific reference year,but
213、 that do have earlier welfare aggregates available,their most recent aggregate is extrapolated forward using growth rates from national accounts,either real GDP per capita or real household final consumption expenditure per capita.12CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION
214、|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Of the countries in the MENA region with available survey data around 2019(Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran,the Syrian Arab Republic,Tunisia,and the West Bank and Gaza),all had an increase in poverty estimates at both the lower-middle and
215、upper-middle income thresholdsexcept Tunisia and Djibouti,which had small declines at both poverty thresholds(Figure II.8).In the Arab Republic of Egypt,poverty at the lower-middle income line rose from 13.7 percent in 2012 to 17.6 percent in 2019partly driven by a devaluation of the Egyptian pound,
216、rising inflation,and the erosion of real incomes.In the Syrian Arab Republic,the 2011 civil war led to a sharp increase in poverty at the lower-middle income threshold,from 16 percent in 2009 to 67 percent in 2022.In the West Bank and Gaza,even before the current conflict,poverty at the lower-middle
217、 income threshold increased from 1.8 percent in 2011 to 3.1 percent in 2016,while at the upper-middle income threshold,it rose from 17.6 percent to 20.5 percent over the same period.Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Iran also increased at both income thresholds,with poverty at the upper-middle inco
218、me threshold rising from 19.7 percent in 2012 to 21.9 percent in 2022.Figure II7 Regional poverty estimates.Panel A.Poverty at$3.65 2017 PPPs poverty line for reference yearsPanel B.Poverty at$6.85 2017 PPPs poverty line for reference yearsPoverty headcount ratePoverty headcount rate2013201820192020
219、2021202270605040302010066.558.720.512.012.03.363.938.814.68.95.41.7201320182019202020212022100908070605040302010088.188.551.344.331.214.887.378.845.427.425.28.2 EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSASource:World Bank(2024),Poverty and Inequality Platform(version 20240627_2017_01_02_PROD),ac
220、cessed September 23,2024.Note:EAP=East Asia and the Pacific.ECA=Europe and Central Asia.LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean.MENA=Middle East and North Africa.SA=South Asia.SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa.The graph shows the trend in poverty headcount ratio at$3.65 a day(lower-middle income class line)and$6.8
221、5 a day(upper-middle income class line)at 2017 PPP for reference years.The poverty headcount ratio at$3.65 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than$3.65 a day at 2017 PPP(Panel A)and poverty headcount ratio at$6.85 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than$6.
222、85 a day at 2017 PPP(Panel B).Figure II8 Poverty in MENA.Panel A.Percent of the population living below the lower-middle income class line at 2017 PPP$3.65/dayPanel B.Percent of the population living below the upper-middle income class line at 2017 PPP$6.85/dayPoverty headcount ratePoverty headcount
223、 rate80706050403020100DOEDOILICUMICYEM54.4N/A20142018SYRIRQDZAIRNPSEDJIMARJORLBNTUNEGY200920122011201220112013201320102011201520122022201820182022201620172018201820182021201916.067.02.4N/A4.0N/A2.53.81.83.147.843.89.8N/A0.4N/A0.1N/A2.22.013.717.6LMIC120100806040200DOEDOILICUMICYEMSYRIRQDZAIRNPSEDJIM
224、ARJORLBNTUNEGYLMIC85.4N/A47.796.024.7N/A36.3N/A19.721.917.620.580.578.542.1N/A8.2N/A1.7N/A17.916.267.868.8201420182009201220112012201120132013201020112015201220222018201820222016201720182018201820212019 Circa 2013 Circa 2018 Circa 2013 Circa 2018Source:World Bank(2024),Poverty and Inequality Platfor
225、m(version 20240627_2017_01_02_PROD),accessed September 23,2024.Note:N/A=not available.YEM=The Republic of Yemen.SYR=The Syrian Arab Republic.IRQ=Iraq.DZA=Algeria.IRN=The Islamic Republic of Iran.PSE=the West Bank and Gaza.DJI=Djibouti.MAR=Morocco.JOR=Jordan.LBN=Lebanon.TUN=Tunisia.EGY=The Arab Repub
226、lic of Egypt.DOE=developing oil exporters(Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,the Syrian Arab Republic).DOI=developing oil importers(Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,Morocco,Tunisia,and the West Bank and Gaza).UMIC=upper middle-income countries(Algeria,the Islamic Republic of
227、 Iran,Iraq).LMIC=lower middle-income countries(Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,Morocco,Tunisia and the West Bank and Gaza).LIC=low-income countries(the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Yemen).Countries are ordered in ascending 2023 GDP per capita(2021 constant PPP)within i
228、ncome classification and MENA country categorization.13CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICABox II1 Poverty data limitations in the MENA region.Poverty is measured using household per capita consumption or income data from nationally representative household surv
229、eys.Despite improvements in public access to microdata,the availability of household budget surveys is poor in the MENA region.Lack of data timeliness and lack of sharing further compound availability issues(Atamanov et al.2020,Ekhator-Mobayode and Hoogeveen 2021).To illustrate data issues,Table BII
230、.1 shows the availability and access status of the household budget surveys in the MENA region between roughly 2013 and 2022.Besides reporting years of the surveys collected closest to 2013 and 2022,the table also highlights the access status to the data.Thirteen countries in the region(Algeria,Djib
231、outi,the Arab Republic of Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Jordan,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,the Syrian Arab Republic,Tunisia,the West Bank and Gaza,the Republic of Yemen)had surveys collected around 2013,and all but Libya shared the data with the World Bank.However,the Banks ability to measure po
232、verty after the COVID-19 pandemic is severely constrained.Nine of the thirteen MENA countries collected household budget surveys after the pandemic year of 2020,but access to microdata differs across the countries.While there is a productive collaboration with statistical agency counterparts in the
233、Arab Republic of Egypt,Libya,and Morocco,available microdata needed to calculate poverty rates for more recent years are not publicly available for research and public policy purposes.Data from Iraq,Lebanon,and the West Bank and Gaza are accessible to the World Bank and will be included in the calcu
234、lation of regional poverty during the next update of the Poverty and Inequality Platform in March/April 2025.10 No post-COVID-19 household budget surveys were collected in Algeria,Jordan,and the Republic of Yemen.Table BII1 Availability and access to household budget surveys at the World Bank circa
235、2013 and 2022 years.circa 2013circa 2022Algeria2011Djibouti20132017Arab Republic of Egypt20122021Islamic Republic of Iran20132022Iraq20122023Jordan20102017Lebanon20112022Libya20072022Morocco20132022Syrian Arab Republic20092022Tunisia20152021West Bank and Gaza20112023Republic of Yemen2014Source:World
236、 Bank staff compilations.Note:Green indicates that the data are available to the World Bank.Yellow indicates that the data are available to the World Bank but not yet included in the estimation of the poverty rates.Red indicates that the survey exists,but the data are not accessible.10 To include th
237、e data in the calculation of international poverty in the MENA region,the World Bank always tries to use official consumption aggregates,which are used to monitor national poverty rates.The most recent data from Iraq,Lebanon,and the West Bank and Gaza will be included in early 2025.14CHAPTER II.MACR
238、OECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Little is known about changes in poverty during and after the COVID-19 due to the lack of household budget surveys after 2020,as highlighted in Box II.1.Nevertheless,Hoogeveen and Lopez-Acevedo(2021)used phone surveys t
239、o show that COVID-19 has had unequal impacts in the regionoften disproportionately affecting the poor and vulnerable.According to poverty simulations in Mahler and Lakner(2022),the poverty rate at the$2.15 line(2017 PPPs)might have increased by 0.30.4 percentage points in 2020 because of COVID-19.Th
240、e poverty rate at the$3.65 line(2017 PPPs)might have increased by 0.10.8 percentage points,and the poverty rate at the$6.85 line(2017 PPPs)might have increased by 2.22.3 percentage points.According to the Poverty,Prosperity and Planet Report 2024,extreme poverty in MENA is also projected to rise thr
241、ough 2030,primarily driven by the highly uncertain growth outlooks for the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Yemen(World Bank,2024f).11Current account and fiscal account balances:Hydrocarbons shape oil exporters balances,while developing oil importers battle twin deficitsThe current account a
242、nd fiscal balances for GCC countries are expected to be strongly influenced by oil prices and production levels in 2024.Despite ongoing diversification efforts,hydrocarbon revenues will remain crucial to shaping the regional outlook for the GCC(World Bank,2024c).12 The extension of OPEC+oil producti
243、on cuts through the end of 2025coupled with relatively low oil prices in 2024 compared to 2022is expected to lead to current account and fiscal account balances significantly below the high levels of 2022 for most MENA oil-exporters(both GCC and developing oil-exporting countries).For GCC economies,
244、the current account surplus is projected to decrease from 8.1 percent of GDP in 2023 to 6.6 percent in 2024.13 Although all GCC countries have consistently maintained current account surpluses in both years,most are expected to have a decline in 2024.In Saudi Arabia,the current account surplus is pr
245、ojected to narrow to 3.0 percent in 2024 from 4.0 percent of GDP in 2023 due to heightened volatility in oil exports.The United Arab Emirates current account surplus is also expected to decline to 7.5 percent in 2024 down from 9.2 percent of GDP in 2023,despite continued diversification efforts.In Q
246、atar,the current account surplus is also expected to decline but should remain robust at 14.5 percent of GDP in 2024,supported by a growing tourism sector.Fiscal surpluses among GCC countries are expected to narrow,reaching 0.2 percent of GDP in 2024,down from 0.5 percent in 2023,and 6.3 percent in
247、2022(Table II.2).Individual country outlooks will diverge in 2024:Bahrain,Kuwait,and Saudi Arabia are projected to run fiscal deficits,while Oman,Qatar,and the United Arab Emirates will maintain surpluses.Saudi Arabias deficit is projected to remain stable at 2 percent of GDP because of lower oil re
248、venues and an expansionary fiscal policy.Kuwaits deficit,forecast at 5.8 percent of GDP,is driven by rising expendituresparticularly on salaries,grants,and subsidiesunderpinned by weak economic diversification.Bahrains deficit is expected to slightly shrink to 9.1 percent of GDP in 2024,benefiting f
249、rom higher non-oil revenues and ongoing fiscal consolidation.In contrast,Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are expected to sustain fiscal surpluses of 4.2 percent of GDP and 4.9 percent of GDP,respectively.Qatars surplus will be supported by stable gas revenues secured through long-term contracts,w
250、hile the United Arab Emirates will benefit from the expansion of non-oil revenues.11 MENA is the only region in which eradication of extreme poverty(at 2017 PPP$2.15 per day)has reversed.Poverty rates increased after 2014 because of factors such as inflation,heightened fragility and conflict,limited
251、 job creation,and shocks like the pandemic(World Bank,2024f).12 Despite efforts to diversify non-oil revenues through taxes and fees,these revenues still fall short of offsetting declines in oil income.However,the broadening of GCC tax systems is continuing.For example,Bahrain raised its value-added
252、 tax(VAT)to 10 percent in 2022,Saudi Arabia maintained its 15 percent VAT,and the United Arab Emirates introduced a 9 percent federal corporate tax in July 2023(World Bank,2024c).13 The current account balance is the sum of net income from abroad,net transfers,and the trade balance.15CHAPTER II.MACR
253、OECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAThe current account balance for developing oil exporters is projected to reach zero percent of GDP in 2024,from a surplus of 4.1 percent in 2023 and 9.8 percent in 2022(Table II.2).Similar to the GCC countries,the decline reflects lower hydr
254、ocarbon revenues.The fiscal balance in developing oil-exporters in MENA is also expected to worsen,with the deficit increasing from 2.7 percent in 2023 to 4.8 percent in 2024.Both Algeria and Iraq are expected to experience widening fiscal deficits in 2024 because of increased government spending.14
255、In 2024,the current account balances of virtually all MENA developing oil-importing countries are in deficitprojected to reach 4.3 percent of GDP,a significant increase from the 1.7 percent deficit recorded in 2023.Djibouti is the sole exception within this group,projecting a current account surplus
256、 of 14.4 percent in 2024,driven by increased Ethiopian imports through Djibouti.All other MENA oil importersthe Arab Republic of Egypt,Tunisia,Jordan,Morocco,and the West Bank and Gazaare forecast to post current account deficits this year.Specifically,the Arab Republic of Egypts current account def
257、icit is set to widen to 5.3 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2024,from a 1.2 percent deficit in fiscal year 2023.The widening deficit is largely driven by an expanding trade deficit,resulting from a reduction in oil exports coupled with an increase in non-oil imports,as well as decreased revenue from r
258、educed shipping through the Suez Canal.Additionally,Moroccos current account deficit is projected to increase to 1 percent of GDP in 2024,up from a 0.6 percent deficit in 2023,which was the lowest since 2007.This anticipated widening is primarily due to a surge in cereal imports caused by a drought-
259、related decline in domestic production.All developing oil importers are projected to face fiscal deficits as well in 2024.As a group,their fiscal deficit is projected to be 4.3 percent of GDP in 2024,an improvement from 5.6 percent deficit in 2023.The Arab Republic of Egypts fiscal deficit is antici
260、pated to decline to 3.6 percent in fiscal year 2024 from 6 percent in fiscal year 2023.This improvement is primarily due to the one-off recording of the EGP equivalent of half of the fresh inflows from the Ras El-Hekma deal,amounting to US$12 billion into fiscal revenues.15 This exceptional revenue
261、boost has outweighed the constrained fiscal space caused by high interest payments and low domestic tax revenue,which reflects ongoing challenges in consumption and economic activity,especially affecting value-added tax revenues.Moroccos fiscal deficit is also expected to slightly improvedeclining t
262、o 4.2 percent of GDP in 2024,from 4.4 percent in 2023,as the country continues fiscal consolidation efforts,focusing on the mobilization of tax and non-tax revenues and the gradual removal of butane and gas subsidies(World Bank,2024e).Inflation in MENA:Inflation shows overall easing,but high levels
263、persist in some countriesInflation in the MENA region is easing,reflecting the global trend of moderating price increases.In 2023,inflation in the region decreased to 3.6 percent from 5 percent in 2022 and is projected to further decline to 2.2 percent in 2024(Table II.3).Yet,there are important dis
264、parities within MENA.Inflation has been well contained in GCC countries,which maintain pegged exchange rates,while inflation has been elevated in other developing oil exporters,particularly,the Islamic Republic of Iran,and in some developing oil importersnotably,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Lebanon,an
265、d the West Bank and Gaza(Figure II.9).14 The projected fiscal account deficit(as percent of GDP)for Iraq in Table II.2 is based on World Bank estimations of real GDP at constant market prices.For the year 2024,Iraqs fiscal account is in deficit of 5.3 percent of GDP using constant market prices,comp
266、arable to estimates using real GDP at constant factor prices(a deficit of 5.6 percent of GDP in 2024).15 This is a real estate development agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates involving FDI inflows of US$24 billion during fiscal year 2023/24,focusing on the coast
267、al area of Ras El-Hekma.The deal aims to boost tourism and economic growth through the construction of luxury resorts,residential units,and commercial facilities.16CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Figure II9 Inflation in MENA by country
268、groupings of exchange rate regimes(y/y inflation August 2024,August 2023)y/y inflation rates(percent)EGY,IRN,PSE and LBN:y/y inflation rates(percent)151050-5-10-15240160800-80-160-240Fixed/conventional pegDJIJORIRQ*OMNSAUKWT*BHR*UAE(Dubai)QATMARTUNDZAPSELBNIRNEGYOther FX-arrangementsOutliers(rhs)Aug
269、-23 Aug-24Sources:World Bank staff calculations based on Haver Analytics and National Statistics Offices.Note:DJI=Djibouti.JOR=Jordan.IRQ=Iraq.OMN=Oman.SAU=Saudi Arabia.KWT=Kuwait.BHR=Bahrain.UAE=the United Arab Emirates.QAT=Qatar.MAR=Morocco.TUN=Tunisia.DZA=Algeria.PSE=The West Bank and Gaza.LBN=Le
270、banon.IRN=The Islamic Republic of Iran.EGY=The Arab Republic of Egypt.National Statistics Offices Consumer Price Indices(CPI)releases,as of October 2,2024.The figure shows year-on-year headline inflation in August 2023 and August 2024 for countries with available data.Countries highlighted with an a
271、sterisk have the latest datapoint as of July 2024 and are compared to July 2023.Within each currency system category,countries are ordered in ascending 2023 GDP per capita(2021 constant PPP).The Arab Republic of Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Lebanon,and the West Bank and Gaza are presented on t
272、he secondary Y-axis.Dubai is used as a proxy for the United Arab Emirates because of a lack of monthly CPI data for the entire United Arab Emirates in recent months.Table II3 Inflation in the Middle East and North Africa,by economy,20222025.Inflationpercent20222023e2024f2025fMENA5.03.62.22.7Gulf Coo
273、peration Council3.82.01.72.0Qatar5.03.11.31.9United Arab Emirates4.81.62.22.1Bahrain3.60.11.31.5Kuwait4.03.63.12.7Saudi Arabia2.52.32.12.3Oman2.50.91.01.4Developing Oil Exporters9.39.34.04.9Islamic Republic of Iran46.552.331.930.0Algeria9.39.34.04.9Iraq5.04.43.73.3Developing Oil Importers5.96.05.02.
274、6Arab Republic of Egypt8.524.133.617.2Tunisia8.39.37.06.0Jordan4.22.12.02.2Morocco6.66.11.52.7Djibouti5.11.43.01.8West Bank and Gaza3.75.935.82.5Other CountriesLibya4.62.32.52.4Lebanon171.2221.345.7NPSyrian Arab Republic63.792.537.711.3Republic of Yemen29.50.916.320.7Source:World Bank,Macro Poverty
275、Outlook,October 2024.Note:e=estimate,f=forecast,NP=not presented.Regional and subregional figures are based on the median of the countries in each group.Data are rounded to a single decimal place.Data for the Arab Republic of Egypt are for fiscal years(beginning on July 1 and ending June 30).In the
276、table,countries within each group are ranked in descending order by 2023 GDP per capita(constant 2021 PPP$).Numbers are updated as of October 2,2024.17CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAIn the GCC,inflation is projected to ease to 1.7 percent in 2024,from 2.0 p
277、ercent in 2023 and 3.8 percent in 2022(Table II.3).In 2023,inflationary pressures in the GCC were effectively managed through proactive monetary policies in line with the U.S.Federal Reserves monetary tightening.In 2024,inflation in Kuwait decreased to 3.1 percent,driven by monetary policy adjustmen
278、ts.In Qatar,inflation has also eased,supported by government subsidies and lower commodity prices.Conversely,in the United Arab Emirates,inflation has increased to 2.2 percent in 2024 driven by a rise in housing and utilities costs.Central banks in GCC countries eased their policy rates in September
279、 2024,following the U.S.Federal Reserves decision to lower its benchmark federal funds rate.Inflation has declined in all developing oil exporters,but it remains high in the Islamic Republic of Iranwhere it was 31.9 percent in fiscal year 2024,from 52.3 percent in fiscal year 2023.For developing oil
280、 importers,inflation decreased from an average of 6 percent in 2023 to 5 percent in 2024.Starting from high levels,inflation in the Arab Republic of Egypt has been on a declining trend.As of August 2024,inflation in the Arab Republic of Egypt was 25.6 percent after averaging 33.6 percent in fiscal y
281、ear 2024 and 24.1 percent in fiscal year 2023.16 This decline in inflation follows the Central Bank of Egypts decision in March 2024 to allow the local currency to depreciate against the dollar,unifying the exchange rate,and to increase key policy rates by 600 basis points(a basis is 1/100th of a pe
282、rcentage point)to anchor inflation expectations.In Tunisia,inflation fell from 9.3 percent in 2023 to 7.0 percent in 2024.However,food price inflation remains elevated in Tunisia,in part due to a drought-induced reduction in agricultural production and reduced importscaused by tighter external finan
283、cial conditions(World Bank,2024d).In Morocco,inflation sharply decelerated from 6.1 percent in 2023 to 1.5 percent in 2024,contributing to Bank Al-Maghribs decision to cut policy rates in June 2024.In the West Bank and Gaza,inflation has soared to 53.2 percent in August 2024 from 4.9 percent in Augu
284、st 2023(Figure II.9),driven by distinct underlying factors in Gaza and in the West Bank.In Gaza,the economic shock is primarily a supply-side disruption,stemming from severe constraints on the movement of goods and access to the Strip.This imbalance between supply and demand led to a dramatic inflat
285、ion spike,reaching close to 250 percent in August 2024.Conversely,in the West Bank,the shock is predominantly demand driven.The primary transmission mechanism has been a significant loss of income in both the public sector(due to the fiscal crisis)and the private sector(due to increased restrictions
286、 on mobility and access to the Israeli labor market for Palestinian commuters);consequently,inflation in the West Bank remained relatively stable by mid-2024.Lebanons inflation,though still elevated,receded to 35 percent in August 2024 from 229.8 percent in August 2023.This decline is mostly due to
287、having started from such a high levelinflation peaked in April 2023 following the central banks decision to devalue the official exchange rate for the first time since 1997,setting it at LBP 15,000 per U.S.dollar.Forecast revisions:Widespread growth downgrades with sharpest declines in fragile and c
288、onflict-affected situationsIn 2023,the 2024 growth forecast for MENA(excluding Lebanon,Libya,the Syrian Arab Republic,and the Republic of Yemen)was initially revised upward by 0.2 percentage points in May,following the first OPEC+oil production cuts announced in April.This revision reflected expecta
289、tions of accelerated growth in oil-exporting economies,with the GCC forecast raised by 0.3 percentage points(Figure II.10,Panel A).However,forecasts were downgraded after additional deep production cuts were announced in June and Novemberprivate sector forecasters changed their expectations,after in
290、itially believing that the cuts would be short-lived.16 The Arab Republic of Egypts fiscal year begins on July 1st and ends on June 30.Fiscal year 2023 begins on July 1st,2023,and ends on June 30,2024.18CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024E
291、ven before the Gaza-centered conflict in the Middle East,growth forecasts for developing oil importers were downgraded by 0.3 percentage points in September 2023 compared to January 2023(Figure II.10,Panel A).These revisions reflected constrained economic activity,partly due to the ripple effects of
292、 tighter financial conditions.After the onset of the conflict in the Middle East on October 7,2023,private sector forecasts have been substantially revised downward among all country groups in the region.By December 2023,private sector forecasts for MENA were significantly downgraded but aligned wit
293、h the projections from January 2023.17 As of October 2024,growth forecasts for the region are 0.9 percentage points below the forecasts made in January 2023(Figure II.10,Panel A).These additional downgrades partly reflect the extension of additional oil production cuts and a reassessment of the effe
294、cts of the Gaza-centered conflict in the Middle East.Figure II10 Private sector forecasts revisions of 2024 real GDP growth since January 2023Panel A.MENA country groupsPanel B.Fragile and conflict-affected situations(FCS)by country2024 forecast revision difference from Jan-23 forecast(p.p.)2024 for
295、ecast revision difference from Jan-23 forecast(p.p.)0.50-0.5-1.0-1.51.50.5-0.5-1.5-2.5-3.5-4.5Jan-23Mar-23M-23ayJul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24M-24ayJul-24Sep-24Conflict in theMiddle Eastcentered in Gaza1.00.50-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0-4.5-5.0-5.5Jan-23Mar-23M-23ayJul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-2
296、4M-24ayJul-24Sep-24Conflict in theMiddle Eastcentered in Gaza MENA GCC DOE DOI Other countries:LBN,LBY,YEM(rhs)IRQ LBN YEM LBYSource:Authors calculations based on Focus Economics consensus forecasts,forecasts from January 2023 to October 2024.Note:The graph shows the difference in 2024 GDP growth ra
297、tes forecast over time compared to forecasts made in January 2023.GCC=Gulf Cooperation Council(Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates).Developing oil exporters=Algeria,the Islamic Republic of Iran,and Iraq.Developing oil importers=The Arab Republic of Egypt,Djibouti,Jordan,M
298、orocco,and Tunisia.MENA=Middle East and North Africa,which comprises countries in all three groups.Other countries=Libya,Lebanon,and the Republic of Yemen.FCS=Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations,and includes Iraq,Libya,Lebanon,and the Republic of Yemen.LBN=Lebanon.LBY=Libya.YEM=Republic of Yeme
299、n.IRQ=Iraq.Focus Economics Forecasts do not include data for the West Bank and Gaza,and do not include real GDP growth for the Syrian Arab Republic.The Arab Republic of Egypt data for 2024 are adjusted fiscal year estimates transformed into calendar year estimates:the average of the FY2024 and FY202
300、5 forecasts.The Arab Republic of Egypts FY2024 started on July 1,2023,and ended on June 30,2024.MENA and other category averages are weighted growth rates using previous year GDP levels as the weights.The conflict-afflicted Lebanon,Libya,and the Republic of Yemen have had the largest downgrades in p
301、rivate sector forecasts since the onset of the conflict in the Middle East centered in Gaza.By October 2024,the forecasts for these countries were downgraded by 4.5 percentage points from the January 2023 forecasts(Figure II.10,Panel A).Among fragile and conflict-affected situations,downgrades were
302、the sharpest in Libya and the Republic of Yemen,where the October 2024 forecasts were about 5.5 percentage points and 4.9 percentage points below the January 2023 forecasts,respectively(Figure II.10,Panel B).These substantial downgrades highlight the highly volatile and uncertain outlook for these c
303、ountries in 2024.18In situations of conflict or natural disasters,nighttime light satellite data(NTL)may offer timely,granular,comprehensive,and potentially more reliable means of tracking economic activity than official statistics.These data are available daily and cover all of a countrys territory
304、.The recent Syria Economic Monitor(World Bank 2024g),for example,contrasts the contraction in GDP during a decade of conflict starting in 2010 between official statistics and NTL-based estimates of GDP.Whereas official statistics indicate a contraction of 54 percent during 201019,NTL data suggest a
305、sharper 84 percent contraction.At the same time,nighttime gas flaring data analysis indicates significantly higher oil and gas 17 This is because of an initial upgrade in the regional 2024 growth forecast for MENA by 0.2 percentage points in September 2023 compared to January 2023,which was reversed
306、 by December 202318 Consensus forecasts from Focus Economics do not include real GDP growth forecasts for either the West Bank and Gaza or Syrian Arab Republic.19CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAoutput than official estimates,suggesting growth in informal and
307、 illicit economic activity within the energy sector that is not captured in official statistics.A stark divergence in 2024 real GDP growth downgrades between MENA and EMDEs also underscores the uniquely turbulent environment in the MENA region.Between January and September 2023,the share of MENA cou
308、ntries experiencing downgrades in their 2024 real GDP growth forecasts,relative to January 2023,were consistently lower than that of other EMDEs(Figure II.11,Panel A).However,following the outbreak of the conflict,forecasts were downgraded for a growing proportion of MENA countriesat a rate consiste
309、ntly higher than for other EMDEs.By September 2024,GDP growth forecasts for 65 percent of MENA countries had been downgraded since January 2023,compared with 51 percent of other EMDEs.Figure II11 Share and magnitude of private sector forecast downgrades for 2024 real GDP growth since January 2023 am
310、ong MENA countries and other EMDEs.Panel A.Share of private sector forecast downgrades for 2024 real GDP growthPanel B.Magnitude of private sector forecast downgrades of 2024 real GDP growthShare of countries experiencing downgradesMedian downgradesJan-23Mar-23M-23ayJul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24M-2
311、4ayJul-24Sep-241.21.00.80.60.40.20Conflict in theMiddle Eastcentered in GazaJan-23Mar-23M-23ayJul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24M-24ayJul-24Sep-240-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0-2.5Conflict in theMiddle Eastcentered in Gaza EMDE ex-MENA MENA EMDE ex-MENA MENASources:World Bank staff calculations based on Consensus Ec
312、onomics and Focus Economics.Note:MENA=Middle East and North Africa(Algeria,Bahrain,Djibouti,the Arab Republic of Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Tunisia,the United Arab Emirates,and the Republic of Yemen).EMDE(ex-MENA)=emerging mark
313、et and developing economies,excluding MENA countries,and comprises 45 economies.Focus Economics Forecasts do not include data for the West Bank and Gaza,and do not include real GDP growth for the Syrian Arab Republic.Private sector GDP growth forecast downgrades refer to 2024 real GDP growth forecas
314、ts made from January 2023 through September 2024.The share of downgrades was calculated by assigning a value of 1 to each month in which the GDP growth rate forecast for 2024 was below the January 2023 growth rate forecast.Months with equal or higher 2024 real growth rate forecasts were assigned a v
315、alue of 0.The average of these values was determined for each group and visualized as a trend line over time.The magnitude of the median GDP growth forecast downgrades represents the median decline in growth rates for countries experiencing downward revisions compared to their January 2023 forecasts
316、.The median downgrade in MENA countries is significantly larger than that in other EMDEs(Figure II.10,Panel B).Specifically,as of September 2024,the median MENA economy that was downgraded had a reduction of 1.6 percentage points in its 2024 real GDP growth forecast since January 2023,compared to a
317、0.5 percentage point downgrade for the median EMDE economy that also experienced a downgrade.19Mounting uncertainty in the MENA regionThe Gaza-centered conflict in the Middle East has also heightened uncertainty around private sector growth forecasts,as evidenced by increased dispersion among privat
318、e sector forecasters(Gatti et al.,2024).The wider range of forecasts indicates a growing lack of consensus,underscoring the elevated uncertainty in the region.19 The results are qualitatively similar when using the average downgrades within each group instead of downgrades for the median economy wit
319、hin each group.20CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKMIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION|ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Gatti et al.(2024)introduced a measure of uncertainty that reflects the level of disagreement among forecasters at any given time.Analysts often use consensus forecastswhich average forec
320、asts from various institutions,banks,and analysts into a single aggregate.However,this aggregate can obscure significant variability among individual forecasts,which could mask the true extent of disagreement among private sector forecasters.The degree of uncertainty around an economys prospects can
321、 be captured by looking at the dispersion in forecasts.Greater dispersion indicates higher uncertainty,and to some extent reduced confidence in the forecasts.Uncertainty in the MENA region has been consistently higher than in other EMDEs and high-income countries(Figure II.12,Panel A).Following the
322、COVID-19 shock,global uncertainty spiked,before starting to decline gradually by the end of 2021.However,uncertainty in EMDEs briefly surpassed MENAs levels after Russias invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.Since the outbreak of the conflict in October 2023,uncertainty in MENA has risen by 13 perce
323、nt and remained elevated,while uncertainty dropped in other EMDEs(Figure II.12,Panel A).Rising uncertainty in MENAs 2024 real GDP growth forecasts contrasts sharply with the downward trend observed in other EMDEs and high-income countries(Figure II.12,Panel B).Compared to other EMDEs,uncertainty in
324、one-year-ahead real GDP growth forecasts is now,as of September 2024,double that of other EMDEs.Typically,as forecasts approach the target forecast date,uncertainty tends to decreasea pattern seen in other EMDEs and high-income countries(excluding those in MENA).However,this pattern does not hold in
325、 the MENA region,where persistent geopolitical tensions continue to fuel uncertainty around the regions 2024 growth outlook.Figure II12 Private sector forecast dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty.Panel A.Uncertainty in one-year ahead real GDP growth forecastsPanel B.Uncertainty in 2024 real GDP gr
326、owth forecastsUncertainty Index,smoothed(forecast dispersion of the median economy)Uncertainty Index(forecast dispersion of the median economy)1.61.41.21.00.80.60.40.20Jan-15Conflict in theMiddle Eastcentered in GazaCOVID-19pandemicMay-15Sep-15Jan-16May-16Sep-16Jan-17May-17Sep-17Jan-18May-18Sep-18Ja
327、n-19May-19Sep-19Jan-20May-20Sep-20Jan-21May-21Sep-21Jan-22May-22Sep-22Jan-23May-23Sep-23Jan-24May-24Sep-24Jan-23Mar-23M-23ayJul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24M-24ayJul-24Sep-241.00.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10Conflict in theMiddle Eastcentered in Gaza HIC ex-MENA EMDE ex-MENA MENA HIC ex-MENA EMDE ex-MENA
328、 MENASources:World Bank staff calculations based on Consensus Economics and Focus Economics.Note:MENA=the Middle East and North Africa(Algeria,Bahrain,the Arab Republic of Egypt,Iraq,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Morocco,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Tunisia,and the United Arab Emirates).Panel A.the time series d
329、epicts the dispersion of one-year-ahead forecasts for real GDP growth of the median country within each group.Dispersion is captured by the interquartile range across forecastersthat is,the difference between the forecast in the 75th percentile and the forecast in the 25th percentile.The monthly tim
330、e-series is smoothed using a local regression model.Panel B.the time series depicts the dispersion of 2024 real GDP forecasts of the median country within each group.Dispersion is captured by the interquartile range across forecasters,namely the difference between the forecast in the 75th percentile
331、 and the forecast in the 25th percentile at each point in time.The latest observation is for September 2024.21CHAPTER II.MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOKGROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICACHAPTER III.UPDATE ON THE CONFLICT CENTERED IN GAZAMain findings Amidst a deepening humanitarian crisis,the economy
332、in Gaza has come to a near-total halt.Military activity and road closures have led to severe shortages of food,water,fuel,and medical equipment.The West Bank faces significant economic decline,driven by low demand and reductions in incomes and jobs,as a result of tighter restrictions on movement and
333、 on the labor market,and uncertainty on the amount of clearance revenue transfers.The fiscal crisis for the Palestinian Authority remains very severe,despite an anticipated rise in donor contributions.The MENA region faces increasing uncertainty.In countries directly affected by violence like Lebanon,the conflict has already imposed a significant human and economic toll.In other neighboring econom
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