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1、2023GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 20222023www.irena.org IRENA 20232GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023 IRENA 2023Unless otherwise stated,material in this publication may be freely used,shared,copied,reproduced,printed and/or stored,provided that appropriate acknowledgeme

2、nt is given of IRENA as the source and copyright holder.Material in this publication that is attributed to third parties may be subject to separate terms of use and restrictions,and appropriate permissions from these third parties may need to be secured before any use of such material.Citation:IRENA

3、 and CPI(2023),Global landscape of renewable energy finance,2023,International Renewable Energy Agency,Abu Dhabi.ISBN:978-92-9260-523-0 Acknowledgements This report was jointly prepared by the International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)and Climate Policy Initiative(CPI).The report was developed und

4、er the guidance of Rabia Ferroukhi(Director,IRENA Knowledge,Policy and Finance Centre)and Ute Collier(IRENA),and Barbara Buchner and Dharshan Wignarajah(Climate Policy Initiative).The report was authored by Diala Hawila and Faran Rana(IRENA),Costanza Strinati,Sean Stout,Jake Connolly,and Sandy Fajri

5、an(Climate Policy Initiative),Antonio Barbalho and Sandra Lozo(IRENA consultants).Input was also provided by IRENA and CPI colleagues,including Divyam Nagpal,Abdullah Abou Ali,Jinlei Feng,Emanuele Bianco,Dennis Akande,Gerardo Escamilla,Mirjam Reiner,and Hannah Guinto(IRENA),and Chavi Meattle,and Bay

6、sa Naran(CPI).Valuable review and feedback were provided by IRENA colleagues Elizabeth Press,Xavier Casals and Paul Komor.The report benefitted from comments of experts including Christine Eibs Singer(Catalyst Energy Advisors),Charlotte Gardes-Landolfini(International Monetary Fund),Jonathan Coppel(

7、International Energy Agency),Kingsmill Bond(Rocky Mountain Institute),Laura Fortes(GOGLA),Olivia Coldrey(Sustainable Energy for All),Miquel Muoz Cabr,and Danial Duma(Stockholm Environment Institute).The report was edited by Fayre Makeig.For further information or to provide feedback:publicationsiren

8、a.orgThis report can be downloaded from www.irena.org/publicationsDisclaimerThis publication and the material herein are provided“as is”.All reasonable precautions have been taken by IRENA to verify the reliability of the material in this publication.However,neither IRENA nor any of its officials,ag

9、ents,data or other third-party content providers provides a warranty of any kind,either expressed or implied,and they accept no responsibility or liability for any consequence of use of the publication or material herein.The information contained herein does not necessarily represent the views of al

10、l Members of IRENA.The mention of specific companies or certain projects or products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by IRENA in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.The designations employed and the presentation of material herein do not imply the exp

11、ression of any opinion on the part of IRENA concerning the legal status of any region,country,territory,city or area or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.Cover photos:Kletr S,Evgeny_V S,Mabeline72 S,Alex Traveler S and isak55 SAbout IRENA The International

12、Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)is an intergovernmental organisation that supports countries in their transition to a sustainable energy future and serves as the principal platform for international co-operation,a centre of excellence,and a repository of policy,technology,resource and financial knowle

13、dge on renewable energy.IRENA promotes the widespread adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy,including bioenergy,geothermal,hydropower,ocean,solar and wind energy,in the pursuit of sustainable development,energy access,energy security,and low-carbon economic growth and prosper

14、ity.3 CONTENTSFigures.4Tables and boxes.6Abbreviations.7FOREWORD.8EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .10OVERVIEW.3001RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT IN CONTEXT .321.1Investment needs for the energy transition .331.2Global transitionrelated investment to date .341.3Renewable energy vs.fossil fuel investments up to 2021.3

15、61.4Impacts of recent macroeconomic and geopolitical events .4002 THE LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE FROM 2013 TO 2022 .422.1 Investments by technology.462.2Investments by application(power vs.end uses).522.3Investments by region.542.4Investments by financial instrument.642.5Investments by so

16、urce.7303 THE LANDSCAPE OF OFF-GRID RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.843.1Overview of the off-grid financing landscape.863.2Off-grid renewable energy investments by energy use and product.893.3Off-grid renewable energy investments by region.923.4Off-grid renewable energy investmen

17、ts by type of financing instrument.973.5 Off-grid renewable energy investments by financing source and type of investor.9904CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD .106REFERENCES.1224GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023FIGURESFigure S.1 Annual global investment in renewable energy,energy efficiency

18、 and transition-related technologies,2015-2022 .10Figure S.2 Annual investment in renewable energy vs.fossil fuels,2015-2022 .11Figure S.3 Annual fossil fuel subsidies by region,2013-2020.12Figure S.4 Annual financial commitments in renewable energy,by technology,2013-2022.13Figure S.5 Annual invest

19、ment in off-grid renewable energy and average transaction size,2010-2021.14Figure S.6 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by off-grid product,and energy use,2010-2021.15Figure S.7 Investment in renewable energy by region of destination,2013-2022.16Figure S.8 Debt and equity investment by

20、type of investor,2013-2020.18Figure S.9 Private investment in renewable energy by investor,2013-2020.19Figure S.10 Investment in renewable energy,by financial instrument,2013-2020.19Figure S.11 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by financing instrument and local versus foreign currency d

21、ebt,2013-2021.20Figure S.12 Public investment in renewable energy by investor type,2013-2020.21Figure S.13 Portion of DFI funding in the form of grants and low-cost debt.22Figure S.14 Annual commitments to off-grid renewable energy by type of investor,2015-2021.23Figure S.15 The flow of public finan

22、ce for a just and inclusive energy transition.24Figure 1.1 Annual global investment in renewable energy,energy efficiency and transition-related technologies,2015-2022 .34Figure 1.2 Share of new electricity capacity,2001-2021.36Figure 1.3 Annual investment in renewable energy vs.fossil fuels,2015-20

23、22 .37Figure 1.4 Annual investments in renewable energy vs.fossil fuel by region,2015-2020 .38Figure 1.5 Annual fossil fuels subsidies by region,2013-2020.40Figure 2.1 Annual financial commitments in renewable energy,by technology,2013-2022.43Figure 2.2 Global landscape of renewable energy finance,2

24、019-2020(USD billion).45Figure 2.3 Share of annual renewable energy investments,by technology,2013-2022.46Figure 2.4 Annual investments vs.capacity additions for solar energy technologies,2013-2022.48Figure 2.5 Annual investments vs.capacity additions for wind energy technologies,2013-2022.49Figure

25、2.6 Annual investments vs.capacity additions for renewable energy technologies other than solar and wind,2013-2021.51Figure 2.7 Annual renewable energy investment by application,2013-2022 .52Figure 2.8 Investment in renewable energy by region of destination,2013-2022 .54Figure 2.9 Public and private

26、 investments in offshore wind,China,2013-2020 .55Figure 2.10 Renewable energy investments in Viet Nam and Thailand,2013-2020.57Figure 2.11 Renewable energy investments in developing and emerging markets,by top countries,2013-2020 .585FiguresFigure 2.12 Cumulative renewable energy investment in Afric

27、a and globally,2000-2020.60Figure 2.13 Cumulative domestic and international investment in renewable energy,by region of destination,2013-2020 .62Figure 2.14 Investment in renewable energy by region of origin,2013-2020.63Figure 2.15 Regional providers and receivers of international renewable energy

28、investments,2013-2020.63Figure 2.16 Investment in renewable energy,by financial instrument,2013-2020.65Figure 2.17 Solar PV and onshore wind investments by instrument,2019/2020 average.65Figure 2.18 Renewable energy investment by region and type of investment(debt vs.equity),2013-2020.67Figure 2.19

29、Debt and equity investment by type of investor,2013-2020.67Figure 2.20 Green bonds cumulative issuances,2007-2021.68Figure 2.21 GSSS bonds annual issuances,2007-2021.70Figure 2.22 Public and private investment in renewable energy,2013-2020.73Figure 2.23 Share of public/private investments by renewab

30、le energy technology,2020 .74Figure 2.24 Private investment in renewable energy by investor,2013-2020 .75Figure 2.25 Annual financial commitment in renewable energy projects made by institutional investors,2013-2020 .76Figure 2.26 Public investment in renewable energy by investor type,2013-2020.78Fi

31、gure 2.27 Portion of DFI funding in the form of grants and low-cost debt .80Figure 2.28 Annual international public financial commitments to developing countries in support of renewable energy production,and research and development,by region,2000-2019.81Figure 2.29 Annual commitments to LDCs and no

32、n-LDCs in support of renewables,2010-2019.82Figure 2.30 Proportion of countries in debt distress,or at high risk of debt distress(as of 31 March 2022).83Figure 3.1 Population served by off-grid renewable power in developing and emerging economies,2012-2021.86Figure 3.2 Annual investment in off-grid

33、renewable energy and average transaction size,2010-2021.87Figure 3.3 Landscape of off-grid renewable energy finance,2010-2021(USD million).88Figure 3.4 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by energy use,2010-2021.90Figure 3.5 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by off-grid produ

34、ct,and energy use,2010-2021.92Figure 3.6 Shares of annual investment in off-grid renewables by subregion of destination,2015-2021 .94Figure 3.7 Investment with respect to RISE scores and populations served by off-grid renewables in access-deficit countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,2010-2021.96Figure 3.

35、8 Cumulative off-grid renewable energy investments by type of flow and region of origin,2010-2021.97Figure 3.9 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by financing instrument and local versus foreign currency debt,2013-2021.99Figure 3.10 Annual commitments to off-grid renewable energy by type

36、 of investor,2015-2021.101Figure 3.11 Shares of annual off-grid renewable energy investments by public/private investor,pre-pandemic years(2015-2019)versus 2020-2021.102Figure 3.12 Public finance framework for universal energy access .103Figure 4.1 The flow of public finance for a just and inclusive

37、 energy transition.1136GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023TABLESTable 1.1 Annual investment needs by technological avenue in the short and long terms.33Table 1.2 African countries with the highest capital expenditure on oil and gas exploration,2020-2022.39Table 2.1 Investment per capit

38、a by region and population growth,2015-2021.59Table 4.1 Macroeconomic policies that affect the delivery of public funds .114BOXESBox 1.1 Hydrogen investments.35Box 2.1 Scope of CPI data:Power generation vs.end-use applications.53Box 2.2 Renewable energy trends in Viet Nam and Thailand .57Box 2.3 The

39、 role of institutional investors .76Box 2.4 International public finance flows to developing countries in support of renewable energy.81Box 3.1 PAYG model to attract financing in the off-grid solar sector.93Box 3.2 Off-grid renewable energy investments and enabling policy frameworks.95Box 3.3 Limite

40、d exits and capital recycling in the off-grid sector.101Box 3.4 Public financing framework for energy access.103Box 4.1 The Just Energy Transition Partnership.110Box 4.2 Energy Transition Accelerator Financing .112Box 4.3 The Bridgetown Initiative .115Box 4.4 Liquidity facilities supported by the Wo

41、rld Bank and KfW-ATI.117Box 4.5 Risk mitigation in partially denominated PPAs in local currency.1207ABBreViATiONsABBREVIATIONSBNEF Bloomberg New Energy FinanceC degree CelsiusC&I commercial and industrialCAGR compound annual growth rateCFD contract for differenceCOVID-19 Coronavirus diseaseCPI Clima

42、te Policy InitiativeCSP concentrated solar powerDFI development finance institutionEU European UnionFI financial institutionFIP feed-in premiumFIT feed-in tariffFMO Dutch Entrepreneurial Development BankGSSS BOND green,social,sustainable and sustainability-linked bondGW gigawattKFW German Developmen

43、t Bank IEA International Energy AgencyIRENA International Renewable Energy AgencyLDC least-developed countryOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPAYG pay-as-you-goPPA power purchase agreementPV photovoltaicSDG Sustainable Development GoalSHS solar home systemSOE state-owned ent

44、erpriseSOFI state-owned financial institutionUSD United States dollars USDFC US International Development Finance CorporationESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance ProgramRISE Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable EnergyFEI Facility for Energy Inclusion8GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANC

45、E 2023Global investment in technologies related to the energy transition,including for energy efficiency,reached USD 1.3 trillion in 2022-a new record-high.Nonetheless,annual investments need to at least quadruple to remain on track to achieve the 1.5C Scenario laid out in IRENAs World energy transi

46、tions outlook 2022.Ongoing global crises present both a challenge and an opportunity for the accelerated deployment of renewable energy.The tighter fiscal space and uncertain macroeconomic outlook are negatively impacting flows of investment towards renewables,while the present energy crisis is forc

47、ing countries to urgently deploy alternative sources of energy that are sustainable,reliable and affordable.Meanwhile,733 million people had no access to electricity and nearly 2.4 billion people relied on traditional fuels and technologies for cooking at the end of 2020.While global investment in r

48、enewable energy,specifically,reached a record high in 2022-at USD 0.5 trillion-it represented less than 40%of the average investment needed each year between 2021 and 2030 according to IRENAs 1.5C Scenario.Investments are also not flowing at the pace or scale needed to achieve the improvements in li

49、velihoods and welfare called for under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.For example,investments in off-grid renewable energy solutions in 2021-at USD 0.5 billion-fell far short of the USD 2.3 billion needed annually in the sector between 2021 and 2030 to accelerate progress towards univer

50、sal energy access.Moreover,investments have become further concentrated in specific technologies and uses,and in a small number of countries/regions.In 2020,solar photovoltaic alone attracted 43%of the total investment in renewables,followed by onshore and offshore wind(at 35%and 12%,respectively).T

51、o best support the energy transition,more funds need to flow to less mature technologies and to sectors beyond power(e.g.heating and cooling,transport,energy efficiency and system integration).FOREWORDFrancesco La CameraDirector-GeneralInternational Renewable Energy Agency9FOrewOrdMore importantly,a

52、bout 70%of the worlds population,mostly residing in developing and emerging countries,received only 15%of global investments in 2020.Sub-Saharan Africa,for example,received less than 1.5%of the amount invested globally between 2000 and 2020.The disparity in renewable energy financing received by dev

53、eloped versus developing countries has increased significantly over the past six years.For example,the renewable energy investment per capita in Europe and North America(excluding Mexico)was about 22 times higher than that in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2015.In 2021,investment per capita in Europe was 127

54、 times that in Sub-Saharan Africa,and in North America it was 179 times more.For the energy transition to have a positive impact,governments and development partners need to play a more active role in ensuring a more equitable flow of finance that recognises the different endowments and starting con

55、ditions of countries.This report underscores the need to direct public funds to regions and countries that have considerable untapped potential but find it difficult to attract investment.These funds should be directed to support energy transition infrastructure development,and enabling policy frame

56、works to drive investment and address persistent socio-economic gaps.Achieving an energy transition in line with the 1.5C Scenario requires the redirection of USD0.7trillion per year from fossil fuels to energy-transition-related technologies;but following a brief decline in 2020 due to COVID-19,fos

57、sil fuel investments are on the rise.In addition,the fossil fuel industry continues to receive considerable support through subsidies.Subsidies doubled in 2021 across 51 countries,with consumption subsidies expected to have risen even further in 2022 due to contemporaneous price pressures.The phasin

58、g out of investments in fossil fuel assets should be coupled with the elimination of subsidies to level the playing field with renewables.However,the reduction of subsidies needs to be accompanied by a robust safety net to ensure adequate standards of living for vulnerable populations.This report em

59、phasises how lending to developing countries seeking to deploy renewables must be reformed.The analysis highlights the limitations of using public funds mainly for de-risking investments and emphasises the need for a much stronger role for public financing.Recognising the limited public funds availa

60、ble in the developing world,the need for stronger international collaboration to achieve a substantial increase in financial flows from the Global North to the Global South is highlighted.The report also discusses the different sources,intermediaries and policy instruments that can channel public fi

61、nancing into the energy sector and the broader economy to support a just and inclusive transition.10Global investments in energy transition technologies reached USD1.3trillion in 2022,a record high.Yet,the current pace of investment is not sufficient to put the world on track towards meeting climate

62、 or socio-economic development goals.In 2022,global investments in energy transition technologies renewable energy,energy efficiency,electrified transport and heat,energy storage,hydrogen and carbon capture and storage(CCS)reached USD1.3trillion despite the prevailing macroeconomic,geopolitical and

63、supply chain challenges.Global investments were up 19%from 2021 levels,and 50%from 2019,before the COVID-19 pandemic(Figure S.1).This trend demonstrates a growing recognition of the climate crisis and energy security risks associated with over-reliance on fossil fuels.Yet,the current pace of investm

64、ent is not sufficient;annual investments need to at least quadruple.Keeping the world on track to achieving the energy transition in line with the 1.5C Scenario laid out in IRENAs World energy transitions outlook 2022 will require annual investments of USD5.7trillion on average between 2021 and 2030

65、,and USDtrillion3.7 between 2031 and 2050(IRENA,2022a).04002001 4001 2001 00080060020152016201720182021*2022*20202019USD billion6626567497647728391 0961 308Electrified heatRenewable energyElectrified transportEnergy efciencyEnergy storageHydrogenCarbon capture and storageFigure S.1 Annual global inv

66、estment in renewable energy,energy efficiency and transition-related technologies,2015-2022 Notes:Renewable energy investments for 2021 and 2022 represent preliminary estimates based on data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance(BNEF).As BNEF does not include large hydropower investments,these were esti

67、mated at USD 7 billion per year,the annual average investment in 2019 and 2020.Energy efficiency data are from IEA(2022a).These values are in constant 2019 dollars,while all other values are at current prices and exchange rates.Due to the lack of more granular data,the units could not be harmonised

68、across the databases.For this reason,these numbers are presented together for indicative purposes only and should not be used to make comparisons between data sources.Data for other energy transition technologies come from BNEF(2023a).Based on:IEA(2022a)and BNEF(2023a).EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11execuTiVe

69、summAryAchieving an energy transition in line with the 1.5C Scenario requires the redirection of USD0.7trillion per year from fossil fuels to energy-transition-related technologies;but fossil fuel investments are still on the rise.Fossil fuel investments had declined in 2020(down 22%from the USD1tri

70、llion invested in 2019)mainly due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global energy markets(IEA,2022c).Nevertheless,2021 saw fossil fuel investments bounce back up 15%to USD897billion(Figure S.2),and preliminary data for 2022 suggest they might have almost returned to their pre-pandemic level

71、s(+6%),reaching USD953billion(IEA,2022c).Investment in energy is still going into funding new oil and gas fields instead of renewables and it is estimated that USD570billion will be spent on new oil and gas development and exploration every year until 2030(IISD,2022).Investors and banks have already

72、 committed to financing fossil fuel development over and above the limit needed to meet the 1.5C target.Over the six years following the Paris Climate Agreement,some large multi-national banks maintained and even increased their investments in fossil fuels at an average of about USD750billion dollar

73、s per year(Environmental Finance,2022a).The worlds 60 largest commercial banks invested around USD4.6trillion in fossil fuels between 2015 and 2021,more than one-quarter of which came from US banks(Environmental Finance,2022a).04002001 4001 2001 00080060020152016201720182021202220202019USD billionRE

74、FFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFF1 0221 0191 0341 0037838979532633513223293484304304991 216Fossil fuel power generationOil and gas upstreamOil and gas downstream and infrastructureOther renewable energyCoal mining and infrastructureSolarOnshore and ofshore windFigure S.2 Annual investment in renewable

75、energy vs.fossil fuels,2015-2022 Note:FF=fossil fuel;RE=renewable energy.Based on:CPI(2022a)and IEA(2022b).12GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023Fossil fuel companies based in emerging markets and developing economies have continued to attract substantial volumes of financing.Between 20

76、16 and 2022,their outstanding debt rose by 400%for coal and 225%for oil and gas,despite the need to align investments with the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement(IMF,2022a).In Africa,capital expenditures for oil and gas exploration rose from USD3.4billion in 2020 to USD5.1billion in 2022.African

77、companies accounted for less than one-third of this sum.In addition to direct investments in assets,the fossil fuel industry continues to receive considerable support through subsidies.Between 2013 and 2020,USD2.9trillion was spent globally on fossil fuel subsidies(Fossil Fuels Subsidy Tracker,2022)

78、.In 2020,Europe was the region providing the most subsidies,having overtaken the Middle East and North Africa(MENA)(Figure S.3).On a per capita basis,fossil fuel subsidies in Europe totalled USD113 per person,more than triple those in MENA(USD36 per person).However,fossil fuel subsidies in MENA make

79、 up 1.56%of the gross domestic product(GDP)while in Europe,they constitute only 0.3%of GDP.040201401201001801608060USD billion20132014201520162017201820192020EuropeEurasiaEast Asia and the PacificLatin America and the CaribbeanMiddle East and North AfricaSouth AsiaSub-Saharan AfricaNorth America(exc

80、luding Mexico)Other AsiaOther OceaniaFigure S.3 Annual fossil fuel subsidies by region,2013-2020Source:Fossil Fuels Subsidy Tracker(2022).13execuTiVe summArySubsidies doubled in 2021 across 51 countries,from USD362billion in 2020 to USD697billion,with consumption subsidies expected to have risen eve

81、n further in 2022 due to contemporaneous price pressures(OECD and IEA,2022).The phasing out of investments in fossil fuel assets should be coupled with the elimination of subsidies to ensure that the full costs of fossil fuels are reflected in their price and to level the playing field with renewabl

82、es and other energy-transition-related technologies.However,the phaseout of subsidies needs to be accompanied by a proper safety net to ensure adequate standards of living for vulnerable populations(IRENA,2022a).Investments in renewable energy continue to grow,but not at the pace needed to achieve c

83、limate,energy access and energy security objectives along with other socio-economic development goals by 2030.Despite multiple economic,social and geopolitical challenges,annual investments in renewable energy continued a positive trend that began after 2018(see Figure S.4).Preliminary data suggest

84、that in 2021,investments reached USD430billion(24%up from 2020)and in 2022 they further increased by 16%reaching almost USD0.5trillion(BNEF,2023b).1 Yet,investment in 2022 was 40%of the average investment needed each year between 2021 and 2030(about USD1.3trillion in renewable power and the direct u

85、se of renewables)according to IRENAs 1.5C Scenario.0200100600500400300USD billionOnshore windOfshore windSolar thermal including CSPSolar PVBiofuelsHydropowerUnknownMarineBiomassGeothermal20132014201520162017201820192021*2022*2020239288340263351322329348430499Compound annual growth rate 2013-2022:8.

86、5%Figure S.4 Annual financial commitments in renewable energy,by technology,2013-2022Note:CAGR=compound annual growth rate;CSP=concentrated solar power;PV=photovoltaic.Source:CPI(2022a).Investments for 2021 and 2022 are preliminary estimates based on data from BNEF(2023b).As BNEF data has limited co

87、verage of large hydropower investments,these were assumed to be USD 7 billion per year,equivalent to the annual average investment for the preceding two years.1 These figures represent“primary”financial transactions in both large-and small-scale projects that directly contribute to deployment of ren

88、ewable energy,and therefore exclude secondary transactions,e.g.refinancing of existing debts or public trading in financial markets.Note that this is different from investments discussed in Chapter 3 for the off-grid renewable energy sector which relates to corporate-level transactions(both primary

89、and secondary)and is therefore different from investments discussed in Chapter 2(although some overlap is possible).For more details,please see the methodology document(Appendix).As previously noted,2021 and 2022 investment numbers in Chapters 1 and 2 are preliminary estimates based on BNEF(2023b).1

90、4GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023Investments are also not flowing at the pace or scale needed to achieve the improvements in livelihoods and welfare envisioned in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.Despite progress in energy access,approximately 733million people had no acc

91、ess to electricity and nearly 2.4billion people relied on traditional fuels and technologies for cooking at the end of 2020(IEA,IRENA,et.al.,2022).Between 2010 and 2021,the off-grid renewables sector attracted more than USD3billion(Wood Mackenzie,2022a).Investments in off-grid solutions reached USD5

92、58million in 2021,a 27%increase from 2020(Figure S.5).But this amount is far short of the USD2.3billion needed annually in the sector between 2021 and 2030 to accelerate progress towards universal energy access(ESMAP et al.2022a).2 Although on the rise,off-grid investments are concentrated among sev

93、en large incumbent companies that have already reached scale and are looking to further solidify their market position through their ability to attract capital.The average transaction size climbed from USD1.1million in 2017 to 1.7million by 2020,before more than doubling to USD3.7million in 2021(Fig

94、ure S.5).While a trend of growing ticket size is a sign of sector growth and maturity,it may also indicate existing challenges for enterprises looking for smaller investments.Overall investmentsUSD million(constant 2020)010060020030040050000.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.0Average ticket size(USD million)1215

95、3023110264332409438468438558201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021Overall investmentsAverage ticket sizeFigure S.5 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy and average transaction size,2010-2021Based on:Wood Mackenzie(2022a).2 This will be needed on both the supply side for off-grid

96、renewable energy companies and demand side(mainly in the form of public funding)to enhance affordability for consumers.Investments have become further concentrated in specific technologies and uses.To best support the energy transition,more funds need to flow to less mature technologies and to secto

97、rs beyond power.While annual renewable energy investments have been growing over time,these have been concentrated in the power sector.Between 2013 and 2020,power generation assets attracted,on average,90%of renewable investments each year,and up to 97%in 2021 and 2022.15execuTiVe summArySolar and w

98、ind technologies consistently attract the largest share of investment by a wide margin.In 2020,solar photovoltaic(PV)alone attracted 43%of the total,followed by onshore and offshore wind(at 35%and 12%,respectively).Investments in end uses,i.e.direct applications,which include heat generation(e.g.sol

99、ar water heaters,geothermal heat pumps,biomass boilers)and transport(e.g.biofuels)are lagging;they will need to increase from USD17billion in 2020 to an average USD284billion each year between now and 2030 and USD115billion through 2050 to achieve the energy transition(IRENA,2022a).In the off-grid s

100、pace,solar PV products also dominate,attracting 92%of overall investments in 2010-2021,owing chiefly to their modular and distributed characteristics,and their adaptability to a wide variety of applications.Solar home systems(SHSs)are the most funded technology(FigureS.6).Even though the majority of

101、 off-grid investments went to residential applications between 2010 and 2021,the share going to commercial and industrial(C&I)applications has been expanding over time(from 8%in 2015 to 32%in 2021)as consumer needs grow beyond basic household access to more energy-intensive uses in local industry an

102、d agriculture.Powering C&I applications can promote local economies by creating jobs and spurring economic growth,while also enhancing food security and resilience against the impacts of climate variability on agri-food chains(IRENA,2016b).USD million(constant 2020)0100600500Investments insolar home

103、 systems by sectorInvestments inmicro/mini grids by sector400300200121530231102643324094385584384682010Commercialand industrial1%Communities and othereconomic activities1%Communitiesand othereconomicactivities9%Multiple8%Residential89%20112012201320142015201620172018202120202019Micro-/mini-gridsMult

104、ipleSolar lightsSolar home systemsAncillary products and servicesOther of-grid solarMultiple46%Commercialand industrial39%Residential7%Figure S.6 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by off-grid product,and energy use,2010-2021Based on:Wood Mackenzie(2022a).16GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE

105、ENERGY FINANCE 2023Investments are increasingly focused in a number of regions and countries.They need to be more universal for a more inclusive energy transition.Although renewable energy investments are on the rise globally,they continue to be focused in a number of countries and regions.The East

106、Asia and Pacific region continues to attract the majority of investment two-thirds of the global total in 2022(Figure S.7)primarily led by China.A suite of policies including tax exemptions have driven investments in solar and wind in China,putting the country on track to meeting the targets set out

107、 in the 14th Five-Year Plan(Carbon Brief,2021).Viet Nam saw investment in solar PV grow by an average of 219%per year between 2013 and 2020,driven mainly by feed-in tariffs(Lorimer,2021).North America excluding Mexico attracted the second-largest share of investment in 2022,mainly driven by the prod

108、uction tax credit in the United States,followed by Europe,where net-zero commitments and extensive policies to phase out fossil fuels are driving growth in renewables.In the United States,the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act encompassing new tax credits,USD30billion in grants and loans for clean energy

109、generation and storage,and USD60billion in support of manufacturing of low-carbon components is expected to attract USD114billion investment by 2031.In Europe,the European Commission presented a Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age,which would provide investment aid and tax breaks towards

110、 technological development,manufacturing,production and installation of net-zero products in green sectors including renewables and hydrogen(Bloomberg,2023;European Commission,2023).The plan looks to mobilise EUR225billion in loans from its existing Recovery and Resilience Facility,and an additional

111、 EUR20billion in grants(European Commission,2023).50%60%70%80%90%0%10%20%30%40%100%2013201420152016201720182019202042%44%46%42%52%36%44%51%14%14%14%19%16%22%20%15%26%25%23%20%16%25%22%22%EurasiaSouth AsiaSub-Saharan AfricaOthersEuropeEast Asia and PacificNorth America(excluding Mexico)Latin America

112、and the CaribbeanFigure S.7 Investment in renewable energy by region of destination,2013-2022Note:“North America(excluding Mexico)”includes Bermuda,Canada and the United States.“Others”include the Middle East and North Africa,Other Oceania,Transregional,Other Asia and Unknown.For more details on the

113、 geographic classification used in the analysis,please see methodology document(Appendix).Source:CPI(2022a).17execuTiVe summAryRegions home to about 120 developing and emerging markets continue to receive comparatively low investment.Across these regions,the bulk of renewable energy investments is c

114、aptured by a handful of countries:Brazil,Chile and India.In other words,more than 70%of the worlds population,mostly residing in developing and emerging countries,received only 15%of global investments in renewables in 2022.Further,the share of renewable energy investments going to these regions has

115、 been progressively declining year on year(e.g.from 27%in 2017 to 15%in 2020).In absolute terms,annual investments have been declining precipitously since 2018 at an average rate of 36%.Countries defined as“least developed”by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change attracted only 0.84%of renew

116、able energy investments on average between 2013 and 2020.Looking at investments on a per capita basis further reveals the disparity in investments.In East Asia and Pacific,investment per capita increased by 19%between 2015 and 2021 from USD88/person in 2015 to USD105/person in 2021.The bulk of the i

117、ncrease took place in China,and in fact,the region excluding China experienced a decrease of 20%.In South Asia,investments per capita declined by 26%between 2015 and 2021;however,the true extent of the decline is masked by India which saw investment per capita grow by 34%in the same period.Excluding

118、 India,investment per capita declined by 76%from USD20/person in 2015 to USD5/person in 2021.The most striking and rapidly growing disparity is between Sub-Saharan Africa and both North America(excluding Mexico)and Europe.In 2015,renewable energy investment per capita in North America(excluding Mexi

119、co)or Europe was just about 22 times higher than that of Sub-Saharan Africa.In 2021,investment per capita in Europe was 127 times that in Sub-Saharan Africa(which in 2021 fell to just USD1/person from USD7/person in 2015),and North America was 179 times more.Sub-Saharan Africa remains the primary de

120、stination for investment in off-grid renewables.The region attracted USD2.2billion in 2010-2021 more than 70%of global off-grid investments.Electrification rates are among the lowest in the world,with 568million people lacking access to electricity in 2020(IEA,IRENA et al.2022).Within Sub-Saharan Af

121、rica,East Africa home to three of the top five recipient countries of off-grid investment(Kenya,the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda)-attracted 43%of the total.Investment in these destinations benefited from the existing mobile money ecosystem,which was leveraged by the pay-as-you-go(PAYG)busi

122、ness model.Approximately 78%of the total commitments in off-grid renewables in 2010-2021(or USD2.4billion)involved the funding of companies or projects using PAYG,with East Africa accounting for USD917million.During the COVID-19 pandemic,off-grid renewable energy investments in Southeast Asia declin

123、ed by 98%,leaving key off-grid markets even more vulnerable.Although the majority of countries in the region have achieved high or near-universal rates of electricity access,parts of the populations in countries such as Myanmar and Cambodia(26%and 15%,respectively in 2020)still lack access to electr

124、icity(World Bank,2022).Whereas the region attracted USD137million in off-grid renewable energy investments over 2018-2019(led primarily by Myanmar),during 2020-2021,investments plummeted to USD3million,likely due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and political developments(ESMAP et al.2022b).1

125、8GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023Investments have been primarily made by private actors.Private capital flows to the technologies and countries with the least risks real or perceived.The private sector provides the lions share of global investments in renewable energy,committing aro

126、und 75%of the total in the period 2013-2020(Figure S.8).The share of public versus private investments varies by context and technology.Typically,lower shares of public finance are devoted to renewable energy technologies that are commercially viable and highly competitive,which makes them attractiv

127、e for private investors.For example,in 2020,83%of commitments in solar PV came from private finance.Meanwhile,geothermal and hydropower rely mostly on public finance;only 32%and 3%of investments in these technologies,respectively,came from private investors in 2020.5006007000100200300400800DebtEquit

128、y2013-2020,USD billionPublicPrivateHouseholds/IndividualsState-owned FISOENational DFIMultilateral DFIMultilateralclimate fundsGovernmentExport CreditAgencyBilateral DFIInstitutionalinvestorsFundsCorporationCommercial FI607182525%75%56%44%PrivatePublicFigure S.8 Debt and equity investment by type of

129、 investor,2013-2020Note:DFI=development finance institution;FI=finance institution;SOE=state-owned enterprise.Source:CPI(2022a).Globally,commercial financial institutions and corporations are the main private finance providers,accounting together for almost 85%of private finance for renewables in 20

130、20(Figure S.9).Up until 2018,private investments came predominantly from corporations(on average,65%during 2013-2018),but in 2019 and 2020 the share of corporations went down to 41%per year,and a larger share of investments was filled by commercial financial institutions(43%).19execuTiVe summAryThis

131、 aligns with the falling share of equity financing globally,from 77%in 2013 to 43%by 2020(Figure S.10)as corporations together with households/individuals provided 83%of equity financing during 2013-2020(Figure S.8).During this time,the share of debt financing increased from 23%in 2013 to 56%in 2020

132、(Figure S.10).This is likely linked to the maturation and consolidation of major renewable technologies such as solar PV and onshore wind that are able to attract high levels of debt,as lenders are able to envision regular and predictable cash flows over the long term,facilitated by power purchase a

133、greements(PPAs)in many countries.201320142015201620172018201920200%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%12%20%14%69%18%20%43%41%63%58%62%63%13%43%41%12%22%19%11%10%9%13%77%8%Institutional investorsCommercial FIHouseholds/IndividualsFundsCorporationFigure S.9Private investment in renewable energy by invest

134、or,2013-2020Note:FI=finance institution.Source:CPI(2022a).50%60%70%80%90%0%10%20%30%40%100%20132014201520162017201820192020UnknownProject-level equityGrantBalance sheet financing(equity portion)Project-level market rate debtLow-cost project debtBalance sheet financing(debt portion)Figure S.10Investm

135、ent in renewable energy,by financial instrument,2013-2020Source:CPI(2022a).20GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023In the off-grid space,debt and equity investments contributed about 47%and 48%of the overall financing,respectively between 2010 and 2021,with an additional 5%contributed by

136、grants.By technology,debt financing constituted the majority of the investments in solar home systems and solar lights(54%of the total and rising over time)while equity financing dominated the micro-/mini-grid space.Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,the majority of off-grid financing came from equity i

137、nvestments owing to the domination by private equity,venture capital and infrastructure funds and the lack of debt access for the sector.Ever since,the share of private equity has seen a relative decline(Figure S.11),in part due to the uncertainties posed by the pandemic,and the limited track record

138、 of exits and capital recycling in the sector.The contribution of debt has increased sharply over the past two years,particularly as debt-preferring DFIs bolstered their support during the pandemic(Figure S.15)and major off-grid companies were able to capitalise on their strong market position to se

139、cure(large-size)predominantly debt-based deals from both public and private investors(ESMAP et al.2022b).Another remarkable trend is the increase in local currency debt,driven mainly by markets in Kenya and Nigeria.Going forward,widespread mobilisation of low-cost debt will be critical for deploymen

140、t of capital-intensive renewable energy projects,while equity financing will also remain key,particularly to kick-start relatively less mature technologies,and finance projects in relatively high-risk or credit-constrained contexts.USD million(constant 2020)050100150200250300350201320142015201620172

141、018202120202019Foreign currency debtEquityGrantLocal currency debtFigure S.11 Annual investment in off-grid renewable energy,by financing instrument and local versus foreign currency debt,2013-2021Based on:Wood Mackenzie(2022a).21execuTiVe summAryThe majority of public investments are made domestica

142、lly with relatively little international collaboration.The international flow of public money to renewable energy has been in decline since 2018.Public funds are limited,so governments have been focusing what is available on de-risking projects and improving their risk-return profiles to attract pri

143、vate capital.Globally,the public sector provided less than one-third of renewable energy investment in 2020.State-owned financial institutions,national DFIs and state-owned enterprises were the main sources that year,providing more than 80%of public finance(Figure S.12).Multilateral DFIs provided 9%

144、of public finance in line with their past annual commitments and accounted for about half of international flows coming from the public sector.Commitments from bilateral DFIs in 2020 fell 70%compared to 2019,largely due to a 96%decline in international commitments by the German Development Bank(KfW)

145、.This means that multilateral and bilateral DFIs provided less than 3%of total renewable energy investments in 2020.201320142015201620172018201920200%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%4%36%5%32%20%24%19%48%25%10%41%20%12%19%14%23%32%23%24%6%9%37%28%11%6%7%10%24%21%4%8%17%6%7%11%12%5%8%8%11%11%8%4%29%31

146、%Multilateral climate fundsPublic fundExport Credit AgencyState-owned FIGovernmentBilateral DFIMultilateral DFISOENational DFIFigure S.12Public investment in renewable energy by investor type,2013-2020Note:DFI=development finance institution;FI=finance institution;SOE=state-owned enterprise.Source:C

147、PI(2022a).In addition,financing from DFIs was provided mainly in the form of debt financing at market rates(requiring repayment with interest rates charged at market value).Grants and concessional loans amounted to just 1%of total renewable energy finance,equivalent to USD5billion.Since the interest

148、 rates are the same,the only difference that DFI financing provides is to making finance available,albeit at the same high costs for users.Figure S.13 illustrates the portion of DFI funding provided in the form of grants and low-cost debt.22GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 20232013201420

149、15201620172018201920200%20%40%60%80%100%GrantUnknownProject-level market rate debtProject-level equityLow-cost project debt201320142015201620172018201920200%20%40%60%80%100%Bilateral DFIsMultilateral DFIsUnknownProject-level market rate debtGrantProject-level equityLow-cost project debtBalance sheet

150、 financing(equity portion)Figure S.13Portion of DFI funding in the form of grants and low-cost debtNote:DFI=development finance institution.Source:CPI(2022a).In the off-grid space,the role of the public sector,in particular DFIs,is much more important.DFIs were the largest public capital providers(a

151、ccounting for 79%of the public investments in off-grid solutions and 27%of the total investments in off-grid solutions in 2010-2021).Notably,DFIs contributions after the pandemic constitute half of their overall contributions since 2010(Figure S.14).Public finance flows to the Global South are essen

152、tial to achieving the 1.5C Scenario and its socio-economic benefits(together with progressive fiscal measures and other government programmes such as distributional policy,as outlined in IRENA 2022a).In fact,almost 80%of the off-grid investments between 2010 and 2021 involved NorthSouth flows.Howeve

153、r,the international flow of public finance going to renewable energy in the broader context has been in decline since 2018(IEA et al.2022).Preliminary data show that the downtrend continued through 2021.23execuTiVe summAryTo achieve a just and inclusive energy transition,public financing including t

154、hrough international collaboration has a critical role to play across a broad spectrum of policies.Among risk mitigation instruments,sovereign guarantees have been preferred for lenders looking to obtain a“one-size-fits-all”solution for credit risks.But such guarantees are treated as contingent liab

155、ilities and may hamper a countrys ability to take on additional debt for critical infrastructure development and other investments(IRENA,2020a).Moreover,sovereign debts are already stressed to their breaking point in many emerging economies grappling with high inflation and currency fluctuations or

156、devaluations in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.In this macroeconomic environment,many countries cannot access affordable capital in international financial markets or provide sovereign guarantees to mitigate risk.Given the urgent need to step up the pace and geographic spread of the energy transi

157、tion,and to capture its full potential in achieving socio-economic development goals,more innovative instruments are needed that help under-invested countries reap the long-term benefits of the energy transition without putting their fiscally constrained economies at a further disadvantage.USD milli

158、on(constant 2020)010020030040050060023110264332409438468438558201320142015201620172018202120192020Institutional investorsPrivate equity,venture capital and infrastructure fundsDevelopment finance InstitutionsGovernment agencies and intergovernmental institutionsIndividuals(incl.crowdfunding platform

159、s)Corporations and business associationsUndisclosedOthers(incl.non-profit/impact funding)Commercial financial institutionsFigure S.14Annual commitments to off-grid renewable energy by type of investor,2015-2021Note:Definitions of all investor type included in this analysis are provided in the accomp

160、anying methodology document(Appendix).Based on:Wood Mackenzie(2022a).24GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023Public funding must flow into the renewable energy sector(covering all segments of the value chain),the wider energy sector and the economy as a whole,for a just and equitable ener

161、gy transition.Public funds can be mobilised and provided using a variety of instruments.Figure S.15 shows the types of instruments that can be used to channel public finance,the sources of public funds(domestic or international through collaboration)and the intermediaries that can help channel them(

162、e.g.governments,national DFIs,local banks,multilateral and bilateral DFIs,export credit agencies,global funds including the Just Energy Transition Partnership JETP and UN-linked funds such as the Green Climate Fund).These instruments can be existing or newly designed and may include(1)government spe

163、nding such as grants,rebates and subsidies;(2)debt including existing and new issuances,credit instruments,concessional financing and guarantees;(3)equity and direct ownership of assets(such as transmission lines or land to build projects)and(4)fiscal policy and regulations including taxes and levie

164、s,exemptions,accelerated depreciation,deferrals and regulations such as PPAs(especially when the tariffs paid to producers in addition to the cost of running the system are lower than what is collected by consumers and the difference is paid through a government subsidy).As shown in Figure S.15,publ

165、ic finance flows via instruments in various policy categories of IRENAs broad policy framework.Examples include the following:PotentialinstrumentsCategoriesof policies IntermediariesSourcesof fundsGovernmentsNationalInternationalSOFIs/SOEs/National DFIsLocal banks/Micro Finance InstitutionsCo-operat

166、ives/Foundations/NGOs Crowdfunding platformsDirect investments ingovernment-ownedassets,designing andfunding policiesInvestment ininfrastructure thatsupport integrationof renewables intothe energy systemSupport for long-termenergy planning,capacity buildingand training,researchand development,techni

167、cal assistance,etc.Policies to addressmisalignmentsand market failuresGovernment spendingincluding grants,rebates,subsidiesDebt includingexisting and newissuances,creditinstruments,concessionalfinancing,guaranteesEquity and directownership of assetsFiscal policy andregulations includingtaxes and lev

168、ies,exemptions,accelerateddepreciation,andregulations suchas PPAsMultilateral andbilateral DFIsExport Credit AgenciesGlobal funds(e.g.GCF,JETP)Carbon Finance PlatformsInternational and South-South collaborationMacroeconomic policies(formulate and implement fiscal,monetary and foreign exchange polici

169、esthat impact the delivery of public funds)Structural changeand just transitionpoliciesEnablingpoliciesIntegratingpoliciesDeploymentpoliciesFigure S.15The flow of public finance for a just and inclusive energy transitionNote:DFI=development finance institution;GCF=Green Climate Fund;JETP=Just Energy

170、 Transition Partnership;NGO=non-governmental organisation;PPA=power purchase agreement;SOFI=state-owned financial institution;SOE=state-owned enterprise.25execuTiVe summAry1.Under deployment policies,public funds can flow as direct investments in government-owned energy-transition-related assets,pub

171、lic-private partnerships,or in designing and funding policies that can attract or support private investment(e.g.capital subsidies,grants and tariff-based mechanisms such as auctions,feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums).2.Under integrating policies,public investments can go into infrastructure and

172、assets that support the integration of renewables into the energy system(e.g.regional and national transmission lines,pumped hydroelectric energy storage facilities).3.Under enabling policies,public money can support long-term energy planning,capacity building and training,research and development,t

173、he development of local industry and value chains,as well as technical assistance offered via multilateral development banks(MDBs)and inter-governmental organisations such as IRENA.4.Under structural change and just transition policies,public funds can go into the redesign of power markets to make t

174、hem more conducive for large shares of variable renewable energy,towards compensation for the phasing-out of fossil fuels,as well as policies to ensure that the energy transition promotes gender equality and social inclusion,among many other priorities.5.The global policy framework defines internati

175、onal and South-South collaboration,which is key to structuring and ensuring the international flows from the Global North to the Global South.6.In addition,although not directly related to any specific sector,there are macroeconomic policies(fiscal,monetary and currency exchange policies)that affect

176、 the delivery of public funds towards the energy transition.Some elements presented in the framework(Figure S.15)might overlap.For example,tax incentives are at the same time fiscal or macroeconomic policies while acting as deployment policies,and funding grid infrastructure can be viewed as an enab

177、ling or an integrating policy.While funding capacity building is part of an enabling policy,these funds also facilitate structural change,being part of social development programmes,and education,social protection and compensation policies,etc.Thus,there are complex inter-linkages and feedback loops

178、 between the different policies and instruments.By understanding the broad structural workings underlying the renewable energy“economy”,public policy and financing can be strategically used to advance the energy transition.Governments from developed and developing countries will play a central role

179、in providing an enabling environment for both public and private investments.A more comprehensive way of defining risk(including risk sharing)is needed.A narrow investor-centric focus on the risk of investment in energy assets not paying off needs to be broadened to include environmental,planetary a

180、nd social risks.These include the risk of leaving a large part of 26GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023the population out of the energy transition and locked in underdevelopment,and the risk of the Sustainable Development Goals remaining far from being met.This is how investment risks

181、must be viewed from the perspective of governments and the international community.And with the very limited public funds available in the developing world,the international community must step up.The availability of capital for public investments in renewable energy will need to be increased,and le

182、nding to developing nations transformed.Todays environment calls for a fundamental shift in how lending is made to developing nations,especially those affected by economic and climate crises,and particularly how countries in the Global North support countries in the Global South to cope with and ada

183、pt to crises related to climate change,the cost of living and debt.The situation in developing countries is being made more difficult amid tightening monetary policies and a strengthening US dollar.One in five countries is experiencing fiscal and financial stress,which left unaddressed would deepen

184、hardship,increase debt defaults,widen inequality and delay the energy transition.At the 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference(COP27)a decision was reached to establish a loss and damage fund,particularly for those nations most vulnerable to climate events.Details regarding the amounts involv

185、ed,and how the facility will be set up and operationalised are yet to be negotiated.The fund is expected to address adverse effects of climate impacts such as droughts,floods,rising seas and other disasters that impair the deployment of renewable energy.Tapping pools of public funds for both develop

186、ed and developing countries without burdening the fiscal space remains a key priority.Governments should adopt a“doing more with what is available”approach through enhanced collaboration among DFIs and MDBs,and by exploring the following mechanisms:Capital release from balance sheets of DFIs.Balance

187、 sheets of investors and financial institutions disclose rights and obligations connected to the owning and lending of assets.It is possible for DFIs to use those elements to raise additional funds through posting existing assets as collateral(provided their value is free and clear of any encumbranc

188、es),and partially repackaging receivables from guaranteed loan repayments(e.g.loans that are guaranteed by insurers)into new financial structured products in the market.The DFIs could offer a(high rated)new debt product(e.g.a collateralised debt obligation)3 guaranteed and managed by a bank such as

189、an MDB to qualified investors(e.g.pension funds,insurers,institutional investors,etc.)and traded on international exchanges.However,such a product should be used with rigorous due diligence.3 Collateralised debt obligations are asset-backed securities that bundle together a diversified portfolio of

190、instruments(e.g.loans,bonds).Cash flows from underlying assets are used to repay investors.27execuTiVe summAryProduct innovation among MDBs.Multilaterals benefit from the convening power granted by shareholders in both developed and developing countries,to craft,implement and operate innovative fram

191、eworks to mobilise capital and mitigate risks.In particular,liquidity facilities can be scaled up to assist renewable energy investors in fulfilling their business obligations by ensuring an uninterrupted flow of payments from off-takers without posing a burden on the fiscal space of developing coun

192、tries(local-currency-denominated PPAs can also benefit from this facility).These liquidity facilities can evolve to incorporate the role of guarantor supported by MDBs and DFIs in compliance with guidelines issued by multilaterals and agreed by shareholders.The highly capitalised guarantor becomes a

193、 supranational facility to mitigate credit and foreign exchange risks for renewable energy investors and lenders.MDBs,under the approval of host governments,can allocate funds and credit lines to the facility up to prudent limits determined by ministries of finance and central banks.Broadening capit

194、alisation routes for MDBs.Capital calling from shareholders has been the common approach adopted by multilaterals to expand technical assistance and lending programmes.The new capital increases MDBs fund availability and enables them to place bonds in the global capital market,thereby raising additi

195、onal capital.Bonds are placed as AAA-rated obligations guaranteed by MDBs de facto,such institutions have an enviable track record recognised by countries and market participants in managing risks that can be placed in the market,if appropriate financing vehicles are used and target markets are iden

196、tified.MDBs should now consider risk-tiered debt obligation placements with a different investment grade(BBB+and above,e.g.multi-rated green bonds),implying different level of returns to bondholders.The initiative broadens access to the investor base from institutional investors and sovereign wealth

197、 funds to corporate/qualified investors increasing the amount of capital that could become available and deployed in renewable energy investments.Meanwhile,public finance and policy should continue to be used to crowd in private capital.Policies and instruments beyond those used to mitigate risks ar

198、e needed.Public finance should continue to be used strategically to crowd in additional private capital.Risk mitigation instruments(e.g.guarantees,currency hedging instruments and liquidity reserve facilities)will still play a major role,but public finance and policy must go beyond risk mitigation.E

199、xamples include funding capacity building,support for pilot projects and innovative financing instruments such as blended finance initiatives,etc.In addition,policy makers may consider the following:Incentivise an investment swap from fossil fuels to renewable energy by banks and national oil compan

200、ies.Incentivising investors to divert funds towards the energy transition can be done through measures such as phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies and adapting fiscal systems to account for the environmental,social and health impacts of a fossil-fuel-based energy system.However,the phaseout of subs

201、idies should be accompanied by a proper safety net to ensure adequate standards of living for vulnerable populations(IRENA,2022a).28GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023A supplemental way of incentivising this shift is through highlighting and recognising the leadership role of those ins

202、titutions that are paving the road through early investments in the energy transition.More than 30 significant financial institutions including banks,insurers,asset owners and asset managers have committed to stop financing fossil fuels.Governments and civil societies can take action to reward their

203、 leadership and encourage other institutions to take similar steps.After that,public pressure,along with policy and regulation,can further influence financial decision-making in favour of renewable energy and other energy transition technologies(Environmental Finance,2022a).Mobilise institutional in

204、vestment and promote greater use of green bonds for renewables.With about USD87trillion of assets under management,institutional investors have a key role to play in reaching the investment levels required for the ongoing global energy transition.Greater participation of institutional capital will r

205、equire a combination of effective policies and regulations,capital market solutions that address the needs of this investor class(e.g.green bonds),as well as a variety of internal changes and capacity building on the part of institutional investors(IRENA,2020d).Green bonds can help attract instituti

206、onal investors and channel considerable additional private capital in the renewable energy sector,helping to fill the significant outstanding investment gap.Green bonds have experienced significant growth over the past decade(about 103%a year in 2011-2021),increasing from about USD800million of issu

207、ances in 2007 to about USD545billion of issuances in 2021 an all-time annual high despite pandemic-induced economic challenges.The cumulative value of green bond issuances broke the USD1trillion threshold at the end of 2020 and stood at about USD1.64trillion as of the end of 2021(Environmental Finan

208、ce,2022b).Some recommended actions for policy makers and public finance providers to further increase green bond issuances include the adoption of green bond standards in line with international climate objectives,the provision of technical assistance and economic incentives for green bond market de

209、velopment and the creation of bankable project pipelines(IRENA,2020e).Implement regulatory sandboxes for broadening access to capital and credit instruments.Regulatory sandboxes designed to serve broader social and environmental goals can help unlock more investments.By enacting regulatory sandboxes

210、 for start-ups and investors for both grid and off-grid initiatives,new solutions may emerge towards enabling access to pools of capital/credit instruments.Such initiatives can benefit from MDBs support(Barbalho et al.2022)in connection with other available funding agencies at local,regional and glo

211、bal levels.Furthermore,companies can be invited to participate in the sandbox with a view to pilot innovative concepts that facilitate risk mitigation,including foreign exchange risks in electricity exchanges.Facilitate local currency lending and denominate PPAs(at least partially)in local currencie

212、s.Local currency PPAs are helpful to address the risks of currency devaluations which may otherwise cripple power off-takers ability to make payments to power producers in hard currency(such as the USD)at times when the domestic currency plummets.Relatively established markets in the off-grid space,

213、for instance,such as Kenya and Nigeria are seeing more local currency debt financing.29execuTiVe summAryDuring 2020-2021,about 28%of debt in the two countries was denominated in local currencies(primarily the Kenyan shilling,followed by the Nigerian naira),compared with just 11%during the pre-pandem

214、ic years.Going forward,low-cost local currency financing will be preferred for the next phase of the off-grid renewable energy sectors development.A complementary mechanism to address foreign currency risks is to facilitate local currency lending for projects with development capital channelled thro

215、ugh intermediaries including national banks or non-banking financial institutions.Several countries,including Bangladesh,Brazil and Jordan,have piloted such approaches to catalyse investment into the renewable energy sector.Enhance the participation of corporate actors.Although companies that produc

216、e renewable energy are already providing substantial investment in the sector,non-energy-producing corporations have a preeminent role to play in the energy transition by driving demand for renewable energy.By setting up the right enabling framework,policy makers can encourage active corporate sourc

217、ing and unlock additional capital in the sector.Recommended actions include,for example,establishing a transparent system for the certification and tracking of renewable energy attribute certificates,enabling third-party sales between companies and independent power producers,and creating incentives

218、 for utilities to provide green procurement options for companies(IRENA,2018b).Incentivise the participation of philanthropies.According to Oxfams report titled Survival of the Richest:How We Must Tax the Super-Rich Now to Fight Inequality,the richest 1%own almost half of the worlds wealth while the

219、 poorest half of the world own just 0.75%(Oxfam,2023).To tap into the existing wealth,governments should look at incentivising philanthropies to mobilise additional funds into support for renewable energy that can help fight poverty,inequality,climate change and humanitarian crises.Philanthropies ar

220、e playing an increasingly important role in bridging funding gaps,especially in the energy access context,where funds have gone into market development(e.g.technology innovation funds)and delivering financing for end users and enterprises through various instruments,such as results-based grants and

221、equity.Individuals(high-net-worth individuals,families or households)invested an average of USD20million per year in off-grid renewables during 2015-2021,primarily through dedicated crowdfunding platforms(IRENA,2022f).In 2021,individuals,bequests,foundations and corporations gave an estimated USD485

222、billion to charities in the United States alone.These were distributed towards education,human services,foundations,public-society benefit organisations,health,international affairs,and environmental and other social services(Giving USA 2022).The energy transition being tied to all these objectives,

223、tapping into these funds can help fill gaps left by governments,and support the livelihoods and well-being of relatively poor populations without relying on fossil fuels(Dennis,2022).30Renewables are at the heart of the global energy transition,a transition that promises to put the world on a climat

224、e-safe pathway while ensuring universal access to sustainable,reliable and affordable energy.The urgent need for accelerated renewable energy investments is further underscored by the widening effects of climate change around the world,growing food shortages and the looming energy crisis.An energy s

225、ector based on renewables can offer improved energy security and independence,price stability and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,all of which are required to achieve climate and sustainable development goals.To that end,significant capital must be shifted from fossil fuels to renewables at a

226、 faster pace.Investments in renewables must more than triple from their current level.This is the third edition of the biannual Global landscape of renewable energy finance report,jointly produced by the International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)and the Climate Policy Initiative(CPI).Since the las

227、t edition of the report,the world has experienced a multitude of crises including COVID-19,the conflict in Ukraine and associated supply chain disruptions,more frequent and destructive climate-induced disasters,and global inflation.The current crises present both a challenge and an opportunity for a

228、ccelerated deployment of renewable energy.On the one hand,they provide the political momentum for hurrying the deployment of energy transition technologies.Indeed,the crisis in Ukraine has forced a global reckoning with the fact that 80%of the worlds population live in countries that are net energy

229、importers,a situation that carries profound implications for energy security and affordability.On the other hand,tighter fiscal circumstances and higher costs of capital are dimming the prospects for renewable energy,which is particularly capital intensive.The current uncertain macroeconomic outlook

230、,with inflation at levels not seen in many countries for over 40 years and the possibility of sovereign defaults,could threaten renewable energy development,especially in low-income countries.OVERVIEW31execuTiVe summAry1 The analysis of renewable energy investments in 2021 and 2022 in Chapters 1 and

231、 2 are based on data from BNEF(2023b).Investment figures for previous years(2013-2020)come from the CPI Global Landscape of Climate Finance database,which gathers and cleans data from several sources,including Bloomberg New Energy Finance(BNEF).These figures represent“primary”financial transactions

232、going into both large-and small-scale projects that directly contribute to deployment of renewable energy.They therefore exclude secondary transactions,e.g.refinancing of existing debts or public trading in financial markets.For more details,please see the methodology document(Appendix).2 The data i

233、n Chapter 3 cover 2010-2021 and come from Wood Mackenzie(2022a).They relate to corporate-level transactions(both primary and secondary)and therefore differ from the investments discussed in Chapters 1 and 2,although some overlap is possible.These figures are important as they provide an indication o

234、f how this rapidly emerging sector is evolving,given its importance to achieving universal energy access.Like the first two editions,this report analyses investment trends and financing gaps,the goal being to inform policy making for the deployment of renewable energy at the scale needed to achieve

235、the energy transition.This third edition looks at key investment trends between 2013 and 2020 and provides preliminary insights and figures for 2021 and 2022.1 The report is structured as follows:Chapter 1 presents an overview of the investment needed for IRENAs 1.5C Scenario.Investments made to dat

236、e are compared with those made in fossil fuel technologies.Chapter 2 presents the landscape of global renewable energy finance,providing insights into key trends by technology and sector,region,source of finance(public and private)and financial instrument.Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of o

237、ff-grid renewable energy finance in developing and emerging economies,analysing trends by technology,country,type of investor and financial instrument.2 Chapter 4 presents recommendations for policy makers and financial institutions to accelerate renewable investments globally across technologies an

238、d sectors.GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT IN CONTEXT Travel Stock S33reNewABle eNergy iNVesTmeNT iN cONTexT 1.1 Investment needs for the energy transition Keeping the world on track to achieving the energy transition in line with the 1.5C Scenario laid ou

239、t in IRENAs World energy transitions outlook 2022 will require a cumulative investment totalling around USD131trillion between 2021 and 2050.In the short term,the report estimated that investments would need to reach USD5.7trillion per year between 2021 and 2030,including the redirection of USD0.7tr

240、illion per year from fossil fuels to energy transitionrelated technologies.Between 2031 and 2050,around USD trillion 3.7 would be needed on average per year.Table1.1 shows the breakdown of annual investment needs in the short term(2021-2030)and long term(2031-2050)by technological avenue.Investment

241、needs for IRENAs 1.5C Scenario(billion/year)Technological avenue2021-20302031-2050Renewable power generation capacity1 045897Direct use of renewables,including district heat284115Power grids and energy flexibility648775Energy efficiency(including circular economy)2 2851 106Electrification in end-use

242、 sectors 240229 Charging infrastructure for electric vehicles86153 Heat pumps15477Hydrogen and its derivatives133176CCS and BECCS4177Other(including fossil fuel,nuclear,innovation)1 010321Total 5 6863 696Table 1.1 Annual investment needs by technological avenue in the short and long termsNote:CCS=ca

243、rbon capture and storage;BECCS=bioenergy coupled with carbon capture and storage.Source:IRENA(2022a).0134GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 20231.2 Global transitionrelated investment to date In 2022,global investments in energy transition technologies reached USD1.3trillion,a record high,

244、up 19%from 2021 investment levels,and 50%from before the pandemic in 2019(Figure1.1).These include investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency,electrified transport and heat,energy storage,hydrogen and carbon capture and storage.While renewable energy and energy efficiency remained the lar

245、gest sectors with a combined value of USD772billion in 2022 their share in total energy transition investments has progressively declined as other technologies have begun to attract larger amounts of investments.This is the case for electrified transport technologies(including electric vehicles and

246、associated charging infrastructure),3 which reached USD 466 billion in 2022,a 54%increase compared to 2021.Investments in electrified heat4 have grown rather modestly over the last few years,reaching USD64billion in 2022,while hydrogen5 investments more than tripled from 2021,attracting USD1.1billio

247、n in 2022(Box 1.1).04002001 4001 2001 00080060020152016201720182021*2022*20202019USD billion6626567497647728391 0961 308Electrified heatRenewable energyElectrified transportEnergy efciencyEnergy storageHydrogenCarbon capture and storageFigure 1.1 Annual global investment in renewable energy,energy e

248、fficiency and transition-related technologies,2015-2022 Notes:Renewable energy investments for 2021 and 2022 represent preliminary estimates based on data from BNEF.As BNEF has limited coverage of large hydropower investments,these were assumed to be USD 7 billion per year,equivalent to the annual a

249、verage investment in 2019 and 2020.Energy efficiency data are from IEA(2022a).These values are in constant 2019 dollars,while all other values are in current prices and exchange rates.Due to the lack of more granular data,the units could not be harmonised across the databases.For this reason,these n

250、umbers are presented together for indicative purposes only and should not be used to make comparisons between data sources.Data for other energy transition technologies come from BNEF(2023a).Based on:CPI(2022a),IEA(2022a)and BNEF(2023a).3 Electrified transport investments include sales of electric c

251、ars,commercial vehicles and buses,as well as home and public charging investments(BNEF,2023a).4 Electrified heat investments include residential heat pump investments(BNEF,2023a).5 Hydrogen investments include hydrogen electrolyser projects,fuel cell vehicles and hydrogen refuelling infrastructure(B

252、NEF,2023a).35reNewABle eNergy iNVesTmeNT iN cONTexT The increase in transition-related investments in 2022 was driven chiefly by national policies introduced for objectives related to climate,energy security,access and socio-economic development,but some of the increase can be attributed to higher c

253、osts.After years of declines,the costs of solar panels and wind turbines rose temporarily by 10%to 20%between 2020 and 2022(IEA,2022b).The increases were due mainly to supply chain issues and higher costs for labour,financing,shipping and construction materials such as steel and cement.Although hydr

254、ogen has been identified as a key technology for the energy transition,it has so far attracted only a fraction of energy transitionrelated investments:USD1.1billion in 2022,0.08%of the total(BNEF,2023a).Hydrogens role in decarbonisation lies in hard-to-abate sectors,where electrification is deemed t

255、echnologically infeasible,impractical or not cost effective.Among these are heavy industrial processes,such as steel,aluminium and cement production,as well as energy-intensive modes of transport such as aviation,shipping and heavy-duty trucks.Hydrogen will also prove useful as a fuel in continental

256、 countries with remote cities,for storing energy and for providing grid flexibility.Green hydrogen is expected to become significantly cheaper than alternative methods.It could reach production costs as low as USD 1/kilogramme by 2050,compared to a lower bound of close to USD3/kilogramme in 2021(IRE

257、NA,2019).Although prospects for cost reduction are good,the cost-effective long-distance transport of large volumes of hydrogen remains a challenge being addressed by major technology developers.Hydrogen technologies are gaining momentum across the world.Investment has been led by the Americas(parti

258、cularly the United States),which made up 44%of overall investments in 2022,followed by Asia and the Pacific(mainly China)accounting for 33%of the USD1.1billion global total.Despite receiving relatively lower investments,China commissioned 2.5 times more electrolyser capacity than the Americas,but el

259、ectrolysers sold in China are more than 70%cheaper than elsewhere.Europe and the Middle East made up the remainder of investments;many projects in the region struggled to reach financial close due to uncertainties over hydrogen standards and subsidies(BNEF,2023c).As of October 2022,more than 60count

260、ries had developed or were preparing hydrogen strategies,up from just onecountry(Japan)in 2017.It is expected that 115gigawatts of electrolyser capacity will be added by 2030,73%of it in Europe(IRENA,2022b).While current investment is significantly less than for mature renewable energy technologies

261、such as wind and solar,hydrogen technology has seen strong inflows of early-stage capital as well as high levels of national funding in recent years.A substantial portion is in the form of venture capital.In 2021,hydrogen start-ups in Europe received more investment than their US counterparts(IEA,20

262、21a).Meanwhile,the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States,as well as similarly robust public policy in Europe,led to governments committing USD126billion to developing the hydrogen ecosystem in the first half of 2022.Box 1.1Hydrogen investments36GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 202

263、31.3 Renewable energy vs.fossil fuel investments up to 2021Looking at new power generation capacity only,investments in new renewable power assets were consistently higher than those in new fossil fuelpowered electricity plants in the period between 2015 and 2021.On average,USD339billion per year wa

264、s committed globally for renewable power generation,compared to USD135billion,on average,for fossil fuel power generation(IEA,2022b).These investments correspond with capacity addition trends:renewables capacity grew by 130%between 2011 and 2021,compared to only 24%growth in non-renewables(Figure1.2

265、),with solar photovoltaic(PV)showcasing the fastest capacity growth,mostly due to technological advancement,high learning rates,policy support and innovative financing models(IRENA,2022a).Beyond new power generation capacity,however,investments in renewable energy are dwarfed by those in fossil fuel

266、s.Considering upstream,downstream and infrastructure investments,6 fossil fuel capital investments with an average USD991billion invested annually between 2015 and 2022 were almost three times higher than renewable energy investments estimated at an average USD360billion annually(Figure1.3).New capa

267、city renewables(GW)New capacity non-renewables(GW)Renewable share(%)04527090135180225015903045607520012003200520072011200920132015201720192021Annual capacity installations(GW/yr)Share of new electricity generating capacity(%)Figure 1.2 Share of new electricity capacity,2001-2021Note:GW/yr=gigawatts

268、per year.Source:IRENA(2022a).6 Upstream investments refer to those in exploration and production of oil and gas,while downstream and infrastructure investments usually refer to those in refining,manufacturing,and distribution assets of oil,gas and their products.37reNewABle eNergy iNVesTmeNT iN cONT

269、exT Fossil fuel investments declined in 2020(down 22%from the USD1trillion invested in 2019),mainly due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global energy markets(IEA,2022c).Nevertheless,2021 saw them bounce back up to USD 897 billion,and preliminary data for 2022 suggest they might have almos

270、t returned to their pre-pandemic levels(+6%),reaching USD953billion(IEA,2022c).This recovery is partly driven by rising costs across the entire energy sector globally,particularly in relation to reserves replacement,and partly by the conflict in Ukraine,which,together with high oil and gas prices,is

271、 incentivising fossil fuel exploration in emerging markets and developing economies,at least in the short run(see Section 1.4).Regionally,fossil fuel investments(including upstream,downstream and infrastructure investments)were highest in Asia and the Pacific followed by North America.Asia and the P

272、acific saw high fossil fuel investments across all aspects of the sector power generation,upstream and downstream oil and gas infrastructure,and coal mining and associated infrastructure totalling over USD1.7trillion between 2015 and 2020(Figure1.4).North America followed at USD1.5trillion invested

273、over the same period,much of which was directed towards upstream oil and gas.However,it was Eurasia and Central Asia that showed the biggest gulf,proportionately,between renewable energy and fossil fuel investments,with the latter 58 times higher than the former.The Middle East followed,with fossil

274、fuel investment 28 times higher than renewable energy investment.The African continent also exhibited a wide gap between renewable energy investment and fossil fuels(the latter 10 times higher).04002001 4001 2001 00080060020152016201720182021202220202019USD billionREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFF1 0

275、221 0191 0341 0037838979532633513223293484304304991 216Fossil fuel power generationOil and gas upstreamOil and gas downstream and infrastructureOther renewable energyCoal mining and infrastructureSolarOnshore and ofshore windFigure 1.3 Annual investment in renewable energy vs.fossil fuels,2015-2022

276、Note:FF=fossil fuel;RE=renewable energy.Based on:CPI(2022a)and IEA(2022b).38GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023Fossil fuel investments must be urgently phased out,with capital redirected to energy transition-related assets if the world is to meet the goals outlined in the Paris Agreeme

277、nt.Investment in energy is still going into funding new oil and gas fields instead of renewables.Investors and banks have already committed to financing fossil fuel development over and above the limit needed to stay within 1.5C.Over the six years since the Paris Climate Agreement,some large multi-n

278、ational banks maintained and even increased their investments in fossil fuels at an average of about USD 750 billion dollars a year(Environmental Finance,2022a).The worlds 60 largest commercial banks invested around USD 4.6 trillion in fossil fuels between 2015 and 2021,more than a quarter of which

279、came from US banks(Environmental Finance,2022a).Fossil fuel companies based in emerging markets and developing economies have continued to attract substantial volumes of financing.Between 2016 and 2022,their outstanding debt rose by 400%for coal and 225%for oil and gas,despite the need to align inve

280、stments with the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement(IMF,2022a).In Africa,substantial investments have been made in 48 countries over the past few years,both in exploration and in exploitation of recently discovered reserves,with the majority of projects being export oriented and undertaken by for

281、eign companies.A study by Ganswindt etal.(2022)shows that total capital expenditures for oil and gas exploration in Africa rose from USD3.4billion in 2020 to USD5.1billion in 2022.African companies accounted for less than one-third of this sum(Table1.2).04002001 4001 2001 0002 0001 8001 600800600USD

282、 billionREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFAsiaand the PacificNorth America(incl.Mexico)Eurasia andCentral AsiaMiddle EastEurope(incl.Trkiye)AfricaCentral andSouth America1 526643932368112339246976375164503541 722Fossil fuel power generationOil and gas upstreamOil and gas downstream and infrastructureOther

283、 renewable energyCoal mining and infrastructureSolarOnshore and ofshore windFigure 1.4 Annual investments in renewable energy vs.fossil fuel by region,2015-2020 Note:FF=fossil fuel;RE=renewable energy.Based on:CPI(2022a)and IEA(2022b).39reNewABle eNergy iNVesTmeNT iN cONTexT Looking ahead,it has bee

284、n estimated that USD 570 billion will be spent annually on new oil and gas development and exploration through 2030(IISD,2022),despite the pledges made to halt such investments.The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero(GFANZ),for example,a coalition of financial institutions formed at the 26th Uni

285、ted Nations Climate Change Conference(COP26)and representing USD 150 trillion in assets,announced one year after its launch that it has scrapped membership criteria that demanded net-zero plans and eliminated an independent vetting mechanism called Race to Zero(Environmental Finance,2022a).In additi

286、on to direct investments in fossil fuel assets,the industry continues to receive considerable support through subsidies.Between 2013 and 2020,USD2.9trillion was spent globally on fossil fuel subsidies(Fossil Fuels Subsidy Tracker,2022).In 2020,Europe was the region providing the most subsidies,havin

287、g overtaken the Middle East and North Africa(MENA)(Figure 1.5).On a per capita basis,fossil fuel subsidies in Europe totalled USD 113/person,more than triple those in MENA(USD 36/person).However,fossil fuel subsidies in MENA make up 1.56%of the Gross Domestic Product(GDP)while in Europe,they constit

288、ute only 0.3%of GDP.Subsidies doubled in 2021 across 51 countries,from USD362billion in 2020 to USD697billion,with consumption subsidies expected to have risen even further in 2022 due to contemporaneous price pressures(OECD and IEA,2022).These subsidies create significant market distortions wherein

289、 the negative environmental,health and social impacts of burning fossil fuels are not properly priced,thus affecting the competitiveness of cleaner alternatives.The phasing out of investments in fossil fuel assets should be coupled with the elimination of subsidies to ensure that the full costs of f

290、ossil fuels are reflected in their price and to level the playing field with renewables and other energy transitionrelated technologies.However,the phaseout of subsidies should be accompanied by a proper safety net to ensure adequate standards of living for vulnerable populations(IRENA,2022a).Countr

291、yCapital spending for exploration(USD million)Companies that spent USD 100 million or more on explorationAlgeria3 256SonatrachEgypt1 744Eni,BP,APA Corporation,Edison E&PNigeria1 331Shell,ExxonMobil,Sunlink,TotalEnergiesNamibia1 124Qatar Energy,Shell,TotalEnergies,Namcor,Maurel&PromAngola977TotalEner

292、gies,Sonangol,EniMozambique498ExxonMobilTable 1.2 African countries with the highest capital expenditure on oil and gas exploration,2020-2022Source:Ganswindt et al.(2022).40GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 20231.4 Impacts of recent macroeconomic and geopolitical events The global pandemi

293、c and the crisis in Ukraine have severely disrupted energy markets,on both the supply and demand sides.The price increases witnessed over the past year 60%for oil and 400%for natural gas in Europe(CER,2022)first arose as post-pandemic demand surged around the world;they grew as Western sanctions cut

294、 imports from Russia.Although the prices for natural gas had returned to pre-pandemic levels by January 2023,the Ukraine crisis has forced a global reckoning that 80%of the worlds population lives in countries that are net energy importers(IRENA,2022a),a fact that has profound implications for energ

295、y security and affordability.The European Unions REPowerEU strategy,which aimed to cut Russian gas imports by two-thirds in 2022,has had cascading effects worldwide.In Africa,key oil and gas producers,notably Algeria,Mozambique and Nigeria,have been given a new opportunity to cement their place in t

296、he global energy supply landscape,while in Asia,where liquefied natural gas(LNG)prices rose in response to higher European demand,some countries are turning back to coal or oil to meet power generation needs.Japan and the Republic of Korea returned to nuclear energy to ease supply concerns before th

297、e winter(ING,2022).040201401201001801608060USD billion20132014201520162017201820192020EuropeEurasiaEast Asia and the PacificLatin America and the CaribbeanMiddle East and North AfricaSouth AsiaSub-Saharan AfricaNorth America(excluding Mexico)Other AsiaOther OceaniaFigure 1.5 Annual fossil fuels subs

298、idies by region,2013-2020Source:Fossil Fuels Subsidy Tracker(2022).41reNewABle eNergy iNVesTmeNT iN cONTexT The current global energy crisis serves as an opportunity to speed up the renewable energy transition;however,supply chain costs and regulatory hurdles are obstacles to deployment,mainly in de

299、veloped markets.France,Germany and the United Kingdom,among other countries inside and outside Europe,have set more aggressive renewable energy targets.France and Germany have committed to addressing red tape and the lengthy permitting process for offshore wind,while the United Kingdom is set to tri

300、ple the pace of developing wind and solar projects(Ashurt,2022).While steep fossil fuel prices make renewable energy comparatively more cost competitive,a big challenge will be supply chains,with the costs of solar and wind turbine components affected by spiralling inflation.The risk persists that p

301、rices for energy transition components will rise and limit demand growth if supply does not keep pace.In this context,actions to support circularity(e.g.mandating recycling of retired equipment;funding for research and development to reduce materials intensity or enable substitution)can help reduce

302、these risks(Wood Mackenzie,2022b).Indeed,solar panel supply chains have been marked by continued disruptions from COVID-19 lockdowns in China and by the sudden constraints on steel production in Ukraine and aluminium from Russia(Ashurt,2022).At the same time,policies in Europe still focus on further

303、 compressing prices,threatening the sustainability of the industry(IISD,2022).But on a more positive note,expansionary fiscal stimulus packages(through industrial policy measures)by governments for example,the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States,which provides tax incentives for wind,solar

304、and other renewables could help spur a new wave of public and private investment in renewables,especially as other jurisdictions look to enact similar packages of support for clean energy(see Section 2.3.1).However,countries outside the developed world may lack the fiscal space for such measures,whi

305、ch is why IRENA has been proposing a transfer of funds from the Global North to the Global South based on equity considerations(IRENA,2022a).Tighter monetary policy pushing up interest rates and therefore the cost of capital is hitting clean energy hard(Rockefeller Foundation,2022),especially in dev

306、eloping markets.The current uncertain macroeconomic outlook,with inflation at levels not seen in many countries for over 40 years(ECB,2022),could threaten renewable energy development globally.Public funding for the energy transition,especially in low-income countries,is enduring more challenges in

307、a deteriorating economic context as governments divert attention and funds towards adjustment policies to deal with inflation,misalignment of supply chains,food shortages and slow growth(Chapter 4).The global energy crisis has served as a reminder to policy makers of the potential that renewable ene

308、rgy offers for solving the interlinked issues of energy security,energy sustainability,energy affordability and energy access,particularly for the Global South.Renewables also create a much broader industry/economy for shareholders,investors,lenders,producers,technology providers and users.The follo

309、wing chapter focuses on investments in renewables.GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023THE LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE FROM 2013 TO 2022 Mabeline72 S43The lANdscApe OF reNewABle eNergy FiNANce FrOm 2013 TO 2022 02Despite multiple economic,social and geopolitical challenges,annu

310、al investments in renewable energy continued a positive trend that began after 2018(see Figure 2.1).In 2020,renewable energy investments reached USD348billion,representing a 5.6%increase from 2019.The Sankey diagram in Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the global landscape of renewable energy finan

311、ce,depicting flows along their investment life cycle in 2019 and 2020.Preliminary data suggest that investments further accelerated in 2021 and 2022.In 2021,investments reached USD430billion(24%up from 2020)and in 2022 they further increased by 16%reaching USD499billion(BNEF,2023b).1 020010060050040

312、0300USD billionOnshore windOfshore windSolar thermal including CSPSolar PVBiofuelsHydropowerUnknownMarineBiomassGeothermal20132014201520162017201820192021*2022*2020239288340263351322329348430499Compound annual growth rate 2013-2022:8.5%Figure 2.1 Annual financial commitments in renewable energy,by t

313、echnology,2013-2022Note:CAGR=compound annual growth rate;CSP=concentrated solar power;PV=photovoltaic.Source:CPI(2022a).Investments for 2021 and 2022 are preliminary estimates based on data from BNEF(2023b).As BNEF data has limited coverage of large hydropower investments,these were assumed to be US

314、D 7 billion per year,equivalent to the annual average investment for the preceding two years.1 These figures represent“primary”financial transactions in both large-and small-scale projects that directly contribute to deployment of renewable energy,and therefore exclude secondary transactions,e.g.ref

315、inancing of existing debts or public trading in financial markets.Note that this is different from investments discussed in Chapter 3 for the off-grid renewable energy sector which relates to corporate-level transactions(both primary and secondary)and is therefore different from investments discusse

316、d in Chapter 2(although some overlap is possible).For more details,please see the methodology document(Appendix).As previously noted,2021 and 2022 investment numbers in Chapters 1 and 2 are preliminary estimates based on BNEF(2023b).44GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023The increase in

317、renewable energy investments has been driven by 1)policy makers growing awareness of the importance of renewable energy in fighting climate change,strengthening energy security and reducing dependence on volatile energy sources;and 2)investors appetite for alternatives to balance out the volatility

318、and risks of investments in fossil fuels.The years 2020 and 2021 also coincided with deadlines in some jurisdictions for achieving renewable energy targets and applying for support mechanisms,notable examples being the feed-in tariffs(FiTs)in China and Viet Nam(Do et al.2021;Jaghory,2022),both of wh

319、ich demonstrate the power of policy incentives in the deployment of renewable energy.While annual investments have continued to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 8.5%over 2013-2022 renewable energy costs declined dramatically during that period,meaning that a dollar invested today translates

320、into higher capacity installed than it did in the past.For instance,between 2013 and 2021 the global weighted average of total installed costs for solar PV,onshore wind and offshore wind came down by 69%,33%and 45%,respectively(IRENA,2022c).Without these cost reductions,far higher investments would

321、be needed to bring the same level of capacity online.Thorsten Schier S45The lANdscApe OF reNewABle eNergy FiNANce FrOm 2013 TO 2022 SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARIESWhich types of organisations are sources orintermediaries of capital for renewable energy finance?INSTRUMENTSWhat mix of financialinstruments

322、are used?REGIONSWhere is financeflowing?TECHNOLOGIESWhich technologiesare funded?PublicPrivate*Middle East and North Africa-$8.5,Sub-Saharan Africa-$4.5*Transregional-$1.1,Unknown-$3.3Governments$6.3National DFIs$27.9Bilateral DFIs$4.9Multilateral DFIs$9.9State-owned enterprises$10.9State-ownedfinan

323、cial institutions$45.0Other public$1.4Other private$5.8Commercialfinancialinstitutions$100.8Households/Individuals$29.8Corporations$95.8Africa andMiddle East$13.1*Americas$79.8Latin Americaand the Caribbean$19.1East Asiaand Pacific$153.4Other Asia$1.6Other Oceania$5.2South Asia$15.0Europe$60.5Eurasi

324、a$5.7North America(excluding Mexico)$60.6Asia and the Pacific$175.2Europe and Eurasia$66.2Others$4.3*Solar PV$137.4Solar thermalincluding CSP$16.3Bioenergy$8.4Hydropower$7.8Other$11.1Onshore wind$126.3Ofshore wind$31.3Grants$1.0Low-cost project debt$2.4Project-levelmarket rate debt$84.6Project-level

325、 equity$36.4Unknown$4.3Balance sheetfinancing(debt portion)$102.4Balance sheetfinancing(equity portion)$107.5USD 339 billionAnnual average investmentin 2019-2020Figure 2.2 Global landscape of renewable energy finance,2019-2020(USD billion)Note:CSP=concentrated solar power;DFI=development finance ins

326、titution;PV=photovoltaic,$=USD.46GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023462.1 Investments by technologyBetween 2013 and 2022,solar and wind technologies consistently attracted the largest share of investment in renewables by a wide margin,as shown in Figure 2.3.In 2020,solar PV alone attra

327、cted 43%of the total,followed by onshore wind(at 35%)and offshore wind(at a record 12%).2 Solar thermal attracted just 4%of total investments.The attractiveness of solar and wind over other renewable energy technologies can be traced back to their increasing maturity,efficiency advances and continue

328、d declines in technology costs(with the exception of the temporary increases experienced in 2021 and 2022),in part due to the greater policy support these technologies have received compared to the other technologies.In addition,the shorter lead times of these technologies and the modular and distri

329、buted nature of solar PV make them the most suitable technologies to deliver specific objectives.0%20%10%60%50%40%30%100%90%80%70%Onshore windOfshore windSolar thermal including CSPSolar PVBiofuelsHydropowerUnknownMarineBiomassGeothermal201344%8%27%3%201449%6%26%6%201543%6%31%8%201646%6%31%10%201749

330、%4%30%6%201847%4%31%7%201938%6%40%7%202043%4%35%12%2021*51%2%32%9%2022*60%2%28%7%Share of annual renewable energy investments(%)Figure 2.3 Share of annual renewable energy investments,by technology,2013-2022Note:Note:CSP=concentrated solar power;PV=photovoltaic.Source:CPI(2022a).Investments for 2021

331、 and 2022 represent preliminary estimates based on data from BNEF(2023b).As BNEF data has limited coverage of large hydropower investments,these were assumed to be USD 7 billion per year,equivalent to the annual average investment over 2019-2020.2 The analysis of renewable energy investments in this

332、 chapter is mainly based on data from the CPI Global Landscape of Climate Finance database covering investments made up to 2020.Investments for 2021 and 2022 are presented as preliminary data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance(BNEF).47The lANdscApe OF reNewABle eNergy FiNANce FrOm 2013 TO 2022 2.1.1S

333、olar technologiesInvestment in solar technologies reached a combined total of USD162billion in 2020,an 11%increase from 2019,but still slightly lower than average investments in the preceding two years of 2017-2018.However,solar investments shot up in the past two years(based on preliminary data from BNEF)reaching USD226 billion in 2021(an almost 40%increase from 2020)and USD308billion in 2022(a f