布鲁盖尔研究所：中国寻求半导体自力更生对欧洲的启示（英文版）（10页）.pdf

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1、Alicia Garca-Herrero(alicia.garcia-herrerobruegel.org)is a Senior Fellow at BruegelPauline Weil is a former Research Analyst at BruegelExecutive summarySemiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods.The major economies want to be ab

2、le to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world,where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns.China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry.Since 2015,China

3、has spent$150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry.Success,however,has been limited.Chinas massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips,though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain.Progress on chip

4、design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming.The United States has also started implementing its$50 billion package to support the production of chips.The European Union,meanwhile,has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative,the European Chips Act.Chinas experience offers a

5、number of lessons.First,chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and,therefore,large subsidies,but with no guarantee of success.Second,one reason for the underwhelming results of Chinas semiconductor policy is US containment,through export controls and other measures.In this respect,

6、the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but,given the costs,focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach.Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity,given the financial resources already invested by Ch

7、ina.Recommended citation A.Garca-Herrero and P.Weil(2022)Lessons for Europe from Chinas quest for semiconductor self-reliance Policy Contribution 19/2022,BruegelPolicy Contribution Issue n19/22|November 2022Lessons for Europe from Chinas quest for semiconductor self-relianceAlicia Garca-Herrero and

8、Pauline Weil2Policy Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 20221 Introduction Semiconductors are Chinas main import item,ahead of oil.They are a critical input to information and communication technology production,which China dominates globally,and also to other industries which China either already do

9、minates(solar panels)or wants to dominate(electric vehicles and 5G-ready telecommunications hardware,among others).Chinese policymakers are fully aware of their countrys semiconductor production limita-tions.Since 2014,the Chinese government has supported its semiconductor industry,along-side severa

10、l other strategic industries,through an industrial policy that is oriented towards reducing excessive dependence on the rest of the world(so-called dual circulation).The semiconductor industry is probably the most important of all strategic sectors because sem-iconductors are an essential input to m

11、any other sectors and,thus,essential to climbing up the value chain.In addition,the United Statess push to contain Chinas technological devel-opment is very much centred around the semiconductor sector,which is perceived as Chinas technological Achilless heel.In fact,the USs so-called Entity List,or

12、 list of Chinese compa-nies,organisations and individuals targeted by US trade restrictions imposed by the Trump Administration1,focuses on limiting Chinas access to high-end semiconductors,among other products.This US pressure has accelerated Chinas quest for self-reliance,as clearly reflected in P

13、resident Xi dual circulation strategy,announced on 14 May 2020(Garca-Herrero,2021).While the importance of the semiconductor sector for China is by now crystal clear,other major economies have also sought more recently,especially since the pandemic,to ensure their semiconductor supplies.The US and t

14、he European Union have both announced major support plans for the design and/or production of semiconductors within their borders.Against such a backdrop,we evaluate Chinas industrial policy on semiconductors and com-pare is to more recent US and EU efforts,in order to assess whether China is an exa

15、mple to follow on the design and objectives of such industrial policies.2 Chinas early industrial policy on semiconductorsAware of its massive dependence on imports of semiconductors,China started in 2014 to step up its efforts to reduce its reliance on the rest of the world.Chinas comprehensive ind

16、ustrial policy strategy,Made in China 2025,published in 2015,includes semiconductors as one of the main areas where China wants to focus its industrial policy.The strategy identified ten high-tech sectors,including semiconductors,of major relevance to reduce Chinas techno-logical dependence on the W

17、est.Similarly,the National Guideline for the Development and Promotion of the IC Industry(in which IC refers to integrated circuit),published2 by the State Council in 2014,set out a strategy specifically to reduce the import reliance of the Chinese chips industry.Government support was offered via t

18、he creation of integrated-circuit funds at national and state levels,and through other channels,including by guiding banks to support firms(OECD,2019).The central government also set up two ad-hoc public funds(so called Big 1 See https:/www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-c

19、oncern/entity-list.2 Xinhua,China announces measures to boost IC industry,25 June 2014,http:/ Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 2022Funds).The first investment fund,created in 2014,raised$21 billion3(139 billion renminbi)to be administered by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology(MIIT

20、).The finance ministry disbursed 36 percent of the funds and Chinas largest development bank,China Development Bank(CDB)disbursed another 22 percent.Figure 1:Largest shareholders in Chinas first IC investment fundSource:Bruegel based on Huang(2019).Note:IC=integrated circuit.A second national Big Fu

21、nd was set up in October 2019,having raised$35 billion,or 204 billion renminbi4,and with similar major state-controlled shareholders(Figure 2).This time,another major state-owned financing vehicle,Shanghai Guosheng,contributed with 7 percent of total funding,even more than Beijing venture capital ag

22、ency E-Town Capital.In other words,the state plays a bigger role than might be apparant at first glance,as govern-ment-funded investment companies were important players in running these funds,as well as providing their funding.Private firms were included in both funds but represented less than 1 pe

23、rcent of total funding.In the second round,foreign investors were invited,although none have entered the fund5.Figure 2:Largest shareholders in Chinas second IC investment fundSource:Bruegel based on OECD(2019).Note:IC=integrated circuit.3 Wei Sheng,Where China is investing in semiconductors,in char

24、ts,technode,4 March 2021,https:/ Wei Sheng,Chinas second chip-focused“Big Fund”raises$29 billion,technode,28 October 2019,https:/ Bloomberg News,China invites foreign cash to build a world-class chip industry,25 April 2018,https:/ Capital 10%China National Tobacco 11%China Development Bank 22%Minist

25、ry of Finance36%China Mobile 5%Other16%E-Town Capital5%China National Tobacco7%China Development Bank 11%Ministry of Finance15%Shanghai Guosheng Group 7%Other55%4Policy Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 2022In addition to the two big national-level funds,at least 15 local government funds have been

26、 created at city or provincial level,totalling at least$25 billion in capital to invest in the sector(SIA,2021).National Big Funds and local government funds might have channelled up to$150 billion to support the Chinese semiconductor industry from 2014 to 2020(OECD,2019;Congressional Research Servi

27、ces,2021).While funding relies mainly on state-controlled entities,including state-owned enter-prises and local governments,investments also target privately-owned enterprises.In fact,reliance on market forces was the official strategy in the 2014 guidelines to increase the return on the public fund

28、s.The strategy was also for the Big Funds to remain minority investors.Overall however,ownership linkages are opaque,making it difficult to identify the ultimate beneficial owners(OECD,2019).While the state-controlled funds are not majority investors in most firms,the state has become a majority sha

29、reholder in most medium-and large-sized semiconductor enterprises in China(OECD,2019).Beyond the funds described above,government support for the semiconductor sector is also provided through government grants,tax incentives and low interest loans,for an amount estimated to hover around$50 billion(S

30、IA,2021).Tax breaks were introduced to encourage the production of higher-end semiconductors.Firms that have operated for more than 15 years were exempted from corporate income tax for up to 10 years if they manage to produce 28 nanometer(nm)chips or below6.Producers of chips from 65nm to 28nm,were

31、exempted from corporate income tax for five years,and could get a 50 percent discount on the corporate rate for the next five years.Additional financial support comes in the form of bor-rowing at below-market rates;banks were encouraged to support the sector.There are also tax incentives for the con

32、ducting of research and development(R&D),with companies allowed to deduct from its taxable income 200 percent of its R&D costs.While these measures have supported the chip industry in China,they have created distortions globally,especially given the sheer size of Chinas market.The government also su

33、pports semiconductor producers in raising equity on the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SSE)Science and Technology Innovation Board(STAR Market),established in 2019.On the SSE STAR Market,17 percent of companies were in the chips sector in January 2021,nearly half of which worked in design.Chinas regulatory

34、 environment has also helped when mass producing new semiconductors,including by easing consumer protection meas-ures.Lastly,semiconductor companies,both for fabrication and assembly,have been offered land at below market prices.3 Assessment of Chinas strategy of state supportChina provides more sup

35、port to its chips industry than any other economy.China has invested massively in chip companies,when compared with global peers(Figure 3).The Big Funds have also provided vast support to international mergers and acquisitions(M&A)in the sector.China became the second biggest player after the US in

36、semiconductor firm M&As,though it has fallen further behind since 2017 when Beijing introduced additional measures to control capital outflows(OECD,2019).6 Microchips are measured in nanometres(nm),with a lower nm indicating a more advanced chip.Chips are presently being produced down to 3nm.See for

37、 example https:/ Arjun Kharpal,Samsung aims to make the worlds most advanced chips in 5 years,as it plays catch up with TSMC,CNBC,4 October 2022,https:/ Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 2022Figure 3:Estimated total government support provided to semiconductor firms,2014-2018Source:OECD(2019).Note:

38、*indicates Chinese firms.Chinas largest semiconductor firms have attracted the biggest shares of state support since the two Big Funds were set up.In particular,Hua Hong Semiconductor,JCET,SMIC and Tsinghua Unigroup have received equity funding of about$10 billion,which represents slightly less than

39、 half of the funding available from the first national Big Fund(roughly$23 billion).These firms are active in the industrial steps of semiconductor production:fabrica-tion and assembly.Figure 4:Market shares of semiconductor production steps by firm headquarter location,2019Source:Bruegel based on I

40、C Insights,Seeking Alpha and Stiftung Neue Verantwortung.3.1 Big support and big losses in the fabrication segmentThe bulk of Chinese government support,estimated at 67 percent of the first Big Fund7,and of local government support,has been directed to the construction of foundries(semiconduc-tor ma

41、nufacturing plants).Although,Chinas capacity to fabricate chips has grown fast(SIA,2022),there have also been major setbacks,such as the bankruptcy of one of Chinas most 7 See footnote 3.051015202530354045*SMIC*Tsinghua Unigroup*Hua Hong*JCETSTMicroelectronicsMicronQualcommTSMCNXPRenesasUMCIntelInfi

42、neonNvidiaVanguard SemiconductorTexas Instruments%of company revenues65%8%13%17%60%53%15%6%19%19%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%DesignFabricationAssemblyUSTaiwanChinaEuropeSouth KoreaIsraelOther6Policy Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 2022important home-grown semiconductor companies,Tsinghua Uni

43、group(see below).How-ever,investment in the fabrication segment has yielded some success in the production of memory chips8.These achievements,however,are underwhelming compared to the objective set for Chinas industrial policy for the sector,namely to become self-sufficient in the high-end,smaller-

44、node,chips9.Another important development,against the stated objective,is the increase in state participation in key players in the sector.Tsinghua Unigroup and CXMT are state controlled,and state participation in Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation(SMIC),Chinas biggest chip compan

45、y,has also increased,from below 15 percent in 2004 to over 45 percent as of 2018,much of which was funded by the two Big Funds(OECD,2019).Moreover,Shanghais local government,together with$1 billion in funding from the national Big Funds,set up a joint venture with SMIC10 to build a foundry in Shangh

46、ai focus-ing on mid-sized chips,namely 14nm ones.In 2021,SMIC also announced plans for a new foundry in Shenzhen,based on a$2.35 billion joint investment with the local government,fol-lowing the same model as the Shanghai plant.Thanks to such massive investments,SMIC has become the fifth biggest pla

47、yer globally11.However,the company is on the US Entity List(see section 1)meaning production upgrades are suspended.SMIC cannot buy from key compa-nies,in particular ASML,a European producer of lithography equipment,which is necessary for the fabrication of high-end smallest nodes chips(below 14nm)(

48、NSCAI,2021).Tsinghua Unigroup became an integrated device manufacturer,or firm that both designs and fabricates chips,after it acquired in 2013 two of the four leading Chinese chip designers for the equivalent of$2.1 billion.The firm also collaborated with local governments and the Big Funds to inve

49、st in the construction of at least four factories producing memory chips(OECD,2019).However,in January 2021,Tsinghua Unigroup defaulted on several bond repayments,amounting to$3.6 billion.The company continues to struggle to generate pos-itive cash flows and remains highly indebted,making it a good

50、example of a firm receiving huge public funds without absorbing them successfully.Another large government-controlled chip company,Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Co(HSMC),founded in 2017,has benefitted greatly from$1.2 billion in financial support from the Wuhan Dongxihu district governme

51、nt to produce 7nm and 14nm chips12.However,the project was suspended in 2019 following a payment default and was abandoned in 2021.3.2 Chip assembly policy successesNotwithstanding failed companies and lots of money spent in other areas,Chinese compa-nies have expanded rapidly in the assembly of chi

52、ps(Figure 4).But this is,by far,the least-de-manding phase in the semiconductor cycle in terms of capital expenditure and know-how.The largest Chinese player is JCET,third globally with a market share of 14 percent(Poitiers and Weil,2021).JCETs acquisition of Singapore-based packaging and testing fi

53、rm STATS ChipPAC,instrumental in JCETs success,was partly financed by the Big Fund in 2015,raising state control to between 20 percent and 35 percent(OECD,2019).8 Memory chips are semiconductors used for digital data storage.Logic chips process information to complete tasks.9 See footnote 6.10 Bloom

54、berg News,Top China Chipmaker to Invest$8.9 Billion in Shanghai Plant,3 September 2021,https:/ Che Pan,Shanghais SMIC leads Chinese foundries in market share grab amid ongoing chip shortage,South China Morning Post,3 June 2021,https:/ Hui Tse Gan,Out of bargaining chips:Inside HSMCs billion-dollar g

55、rift,KrAsia,10 February 2021,https:/kr- Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 20223.3 Some strides in design,driven by the private sector Possibly an even more significant is the strides taken by some Chinese private companies specialising in chip design.Chinas global market share grew from 5 percent i

56、n 2010 to 15 per-cent in 201913.But Mainland China remains behind Taiwan and far behind the US in global market share(Figure 4).Furthermore,Chinas design sector has taken a hit since 2019 as it is has become exposed to US sanctions.HiSilicon,Huaweis subsidiary and Chinas biggest chip fab,has been un

57、der US sanctions since 2020,resulting in the cancellation of its fabri-cation contract with TSMC and leaving the firm unable to get its most cutting-edge designs produced.In the upstream part of the value chain,China also remains exposed to US trade restrictions and US firms remain market leaders in

58、 design software.4 General conclusions onChinas industrial policy Because of its strategic importance and capital-intensity,China has poured huge amounts of money into developing its semiconductor industry.The challenges posed by US export re-strictions have been a further trigger for the rapid depl

59、oyment of funds into the industry.The objective is clearly ambitious:reaching self-sufficiency through the rise of national champi-ons in the different steps of semiconductor production design,fabrication and assembly.The objective has been achieved for the last part of cycle,assembly.This has howev

60、er the least value added and is the least strategically important of the three phases.In terms of fabri-cation,producing standard chips,especially for memory cards,has become feasible in China but these are clearly not the highest-end chips.The availability of funds for Chinese compa-nies to assembl

61、e and in some cases produce low-end chips and,in particular,memory cards,has resulted in overcapacity and the collapse of prices.Furthermore,export restrictions on software design or manufacturing equipment,imposed by the US and some like-minded countries(such as the Netherlands),are making it even

62、harder than it already was for China to move up the ladder.All in all,and taking into account the massive financial support,estimated at$150 billion,Chinas industrial policy of developing an advanced chip industry has so far yielded mixed results,at best.External reliance on semiconductors,especiall

63、y high-end chips,continues unabated,even after the acquisition of foreign firms and building of fabrication plants.One reason for this coild be the increasingly limited role of the private sector in the context in which state funding has increased state control over the sector.In addition,companies

64、receiving such large amounts of funds have not been able to absorb them,and have become over-leveraged,leading to defaults in the case of several large companies.This development is not unusual in highly-competitive sectors where money cannot buy upgrades.Indeed,the semiconductor sector is character

65、ised by a high level of specialisation and concentration,with the US having leverage over several of the key bottlenecks in the production process.Along with the US export controls it faces,China is limited in its ability to secure production of high-end chips by shortages of talent.China has not su

66、cceeded in achieving its very specific objectives and timeline for becoming self-reliant and bypassing technological barriers.But more time will be needed for a full appraisal of the outcomes of Chinas massive investments in the semiconductor industry.China began supporting its semiconductors 13 Joe

67、l Hruska,Chinese Chip Designers Cant Meet Mandated Goals Without US Technology,ExtremeTech,26 June 2019,https:/ Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 2022sector in 2014,giving less than a decade for which a preliminary evaluation can be done.So far,Chinas ambitious chip industrial policy has certainly

68、grown its domestic high-tech eco-system and secured some market presence in the first steps of the value chain.But it remains short of its overblown goals of mastering the most high-tech segments.The current state of the market reflects these realities.In design,the US is dominant and leverages expo

69、rt restrictions.China has not managed to become self-reliant,although strides have been made,possibly thanks to the greater role of the private sector.In the fabrication segment,China remains confined to mature technologies.In assembly,which is both less competitive and less strategic,China has mana

70、ged to increase its global market share.For the Chinese government,the US sanctions regime in the chips sector represented an opportunity for an alignment of interests between private and public entities14,as both aim to shed reli-ance on the US(Duchtel,2021).However,China has not managed to overcom

71、e the bottle-necks and monopolies of companies such as ASML and TSMC.These high-tech bottlenecks are set to endure in the medium to long term,making full supply-chain decoupling impossi-ble.This will be especially the case with new sanctions hitting the sector,in the form of bans on exports to Russi

72、a by the largest semiconductor producers globally,except those in China(Marcus et al,2022).5 Lessons for the EUThe EU shares Chinas ambition of increasing its chip production capacities,especially in the cutting-edge segments.This had led to a rethinking of EU industrial policy,making it more active

73、,at least for this critical sector.The EU Chips Act,proposed in February 2022 by the European Commission with a promise to mobilise more than 43 billion in funding,aims to reduce semiconductor supply shortages and reverse years of decline in semiconductor investment in the EU.In particular,the propo

74、sed EU Chips Act is expected to boost Europes share of global chip production capacity to 20 percent from the current 10 percent of the glob-al chips value chain.Meanwhile,the US finalised in August 2022 the CHIPS and Science Act,with$52.7 billion of funding to increase the production of chips in th

75、e US.These EU and US initiatives can be considered commensurate to Chinas two Big Funds(which provide the equivalent of$60 billion),although more financial help has been offered by local government funds in China.However,the starting points are different.The US leads the design part of the chip valu

76、e chain,which has the most value added.Europe has some design firms,but much fewer than the US.Europe also has important technology especially on lithography for the fabrication phase and has a relatively strong position in some R&D areas.A few lessons for Europe can be taken from Chinas experience

77、of using industrial policy to become self-sufficient in chips.First and foremost,the Chinese governments eight-year long efforts to reach self-sufficiency in chip production have not been successful,even after pour-ing in a huge amount of funds.Upgrading production is challenging no matter the amoun

78、ts of available capital.This is also confirmed by the struggles faced by both Intel15 and Samsung16 in producing the latest generation of chips,after trailing TSMC which remains on the cut-ting-edge.Chinas unsuccessful attempts so far can be explained by its very low starting point 14 Dan Wang,China

79、s Sputnik Moment?Foreign Affairs,29 July 2021,https:/ Yatharth Sood,Intels Troubles in Shrinking Down,Medium,7 August 2020,available at https:/ Adrian Potoroaca,Low yield on Samsungs 4nm process node prompts Qualcomm to go with TSMC for future chips,Techspot,23 February 2022,https:/ Contribution|Iss

80、ue n19/22|November 2022in the highest-value parts of the chip supply chain.This might not necessarily be the case in the EU,though it is of course hard to tell.In other words,subsidising the fabrication of chips does not guarantee success.Second,China has suffered from US containment,especially in r

81、elation to export bans on designs of semiconductors.This,again,will probably not be the case for EU chip companies,but they could still be caught out if the aim is to export EU chips to China,because US sanc-tions in this respect are bound to affect the European chip industry too.Even without US con

82、tainment or sanctions,as is the case for China,it is not clear how the EU can make good use of the funds that could be stimulated by the Chips Act if the focus is fabrication.The reason for this is the EUs rather unclear comparative advantage.Thus,for the EU,focusing on the highest end of the value

83、chain design seems like a better idea,with a special focus on R&D.The EU does not really need to aim at semiconductor self-reliance,as it should be able to trust other sources of chip design and chip production,including the US,South Korea,Japan and Taiwan.Nevertheless,there is a major risk stemming

84、 from the very high concentration in the fabrication of advanced semincoductors in Taiwan(about 80 percent of the total for 7nm and below).The EU could seek alliances with other producers in case of a major geopolitical event in the Taiwan Strait.In any event,Chinas experiences should be taken into

85、account to avoid flooding the sector with funds that do not help develop a high-end European semiconductor ecosystem,but only create over-capacity at the lower end of the chip value chain.The Chinese experi-ences of defaults of semiconductor companies,after large amounts of funds were injected,also

86、confirm that the most capital-and technology-intensive phase of production,fabrication,is where losses happen most often.Yet policymakers,in China,and more recently the US,continue to channel the most investment into this most risky step of the supply chain.The Chinese experience also leads us to ma

87、ke a number of specific recommendations:If a decision is taken to subsidise production,it should at least be targeted to the highest value-added segment of the semiconductor cycle.Cooperation with other countries beyond the EU can help reduce the costs.Avoiding ex-cess investment is also important,c

88、onsidering that the sector is not only highly intensive in terms of capital,but also in terms of energy and water.Chinas increasing importance in assembly also calls for diversification strategies for the US and the EU for this final phase of the cycle.Otherwise,the EU and US will continue to be dep

89、endent on China as the provider of the final product in the semiconductor cycle.Dependence on Taiwan for the fabrication of advanced semiconductors needs to be ad-dressed given the geopolitical risks involved and the potential for natural disasters,such as earthquakes.This alone calls for the deploy

90、ment of public funds,and/or the pursuit of strategic alliances,to reduce potential shortages and bottlenecks.10Policy Contribution|Issue n19/22|November 2022ReferencesCongressional Research Service(2021)Chinas New Semiconductor Policies:Issues for Congress,CRS Report,available at https:/crsreports.c

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92、oitiers(2022)Europes promised semiconductor subsidies need to be better targeted,Bruegel Blog,17 October,available at https:/www.bruegel.org/blog-post/europes-promised-semiconductor-subsidies-need-be-better-targetedGrzegorczyk,M.,Marcus,J.S.,Poitiers,N.and P.Weil(2022)The decoupling of Russia:high-t

93、ech goods and components,Bruegel Blog,28 March,available at https:/www.bruegel.org/blog-post/decoupling-russia-high-tech-goods-and-componentsHuang,T.(2019)Government-Guided Funds in China:Financing Vehicles for State Industrial Policy,China Economic Watch,17 June,Peterson Institute for International

94、 Economics,available at https:/ Report,National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,available at https:/www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf OECD(2019)Measuring distortions in international markets:The semiconductor value chain,OECD Trade Policy Papers 234,Or

95、ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,available at https:/www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-in-international-markets_8fe4491d-enPoitiers,N.and P.Weil(2021)A new direction for the European Unions half-hearted semiconductor strategy,Policy Contribution 17/2021,Bruegel,av

96、ailable at https:/www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/new-direction-european-unions-half-hearted-semiconductor-strategy SIA(2021)Taking Stock of Chinas Semiconductor Industry,White Paper,Semiconductor Industry Association,available at https:/www.semiconductors.org/taking-stock-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/SIA(2022)Chinas Share of Global Chip Sales Now Surpasses Taiwans,Closing in on Europes and Japans,Blog Post,10 January,available at https:/www.semiconductors.org/chinas-share-of-global-chip-sales-now-surpasses-taiwan-closing-in-on-europe-and-japan/