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1、2024World OilOutlook2050Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesWorldOilOutlook2050Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries2024OPEC is a permanent,intergovernmental organization,established in Baghdad,Iraq,on 1014 September 1960.The Organization comprises 12 Members:Algeria,Republi

2、c of the Congo,Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,the Islamic Republic of Iran,Iraq,Kuwait,Libya,Nigeria,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.The Organization has its headquarters in Vienna,Austria.Digital access to the WOO:an interactive user experience 24/7DownloadOPEC WOO AppAccess theinterac

3、tive versionOPECs World Oil Outlook(WOO)is part of the Organizations commitment to market stability.The publication is a means to highlight and further the understanding of the many possible future challenges and opportunities for the oil industry.It is also a channel to encourage dialogue,cooperati

4、on and transparency between OPEC and other stakeholders within the industry.As part of OPECs ongoing efforts to improve user experience of the WOO and provide data transparency,two digital interfaces are available:the OPEC WOO App and the interactive version of the WOO.The OPEC WOO App provides incr

5、eased access to the publications vital analysis and energy-related data.It is ideal for energy professionals,oil industry stakeholders,policymakers,market analysts,academics and the media.The Apps search engine enables users to easily find information,and its bookmarking function allows them to stor

6、e and review their favourite articles.Its versatility also allows users to compare graphs and tables interactively,thereby maximizing information extraction and empowering users to undertake their own analysis.The interactive version of the WOO also provides the possibility to download specific data

7、 and information,thereby enhancing user experience.Available for Android and iOS OPEC Secretariat,September 2024Helferstorferstrasse 17 A-1010 Vienna,Austria www.opec.orgISBN 978-3-9504890-8-8The data,analysis and any other information(the“information”)contained in the World Oil Outlook(the“WOO”)is

8、for informational purposes only and is neither intended as a substitute for advice from business,finance,investment consultant or other professional;nor is it meant to be a benchmark or input data to a benchmark of any kind.Whilst reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the infor

9、mation contained in the World Oil Outlook,the OPEC Secretariat makes no warranties or representations as to its accuracy,relevance or comprehensiveness,and assumes no liability or responsibility for any inaccuracy,error or omission,or for any loss or damage arising in connection with or attributable

10、 to any action or decision taken as a result of using or relying on the information in the World Oil Outlook.The views expressed in the World Oil Outlook are those of the OPEC Secretariat and do not necessarily reflect the views of its governing bodies or Member Countries.The designation of geograph

11、ical entities in the World Oil Outlook,and the use and presentation of data and other materials,do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of OPEC and/or its Member Countries concerning the legal status of any country,territory or area,or of its authorities,or concerning the e

12、xploration,exploitation,refining,marketing and utilization of its petroleum or other energy resources.Full reproduction,copying or transmission of the World Oil Outlook is not permitted in any form or by any means by third parties without the OPEC Secretariats written permission,however,the informat

13、ion contained therein may be used and/or reproduced for educational and other non-commercial purposes without the OPEC Secretariats prior written permission,provided that it is fully acknowledged as the copyright holder.The World Oil Outlook may contain references to material(s)from third parties,wh

14、ose copyright must be acknowledged by obtaining necessary authori-zation from the copyright owner(s).The OPEC Secretariat or its governing bodies shall not be liable or responsible for any unauthorized use of any third party material(s).All rights of the World Oil Outlook shall be reserved to the OP

15、EC Secretariat,as applicable,including every exclusive economic right,in full or per excerpts,with special refer-ence but without limitation,to the right to publish it by press and/or by any communications medium whatsoever;translate,include in a data base,make changes,transform and process for any

16、kind of use,including radio,television or cinema adaptations,as well as a sound-video recording,audio-visual screenplays and electronic processing of any kind and nature whatsoever.Download:All the data presented in this Outlook is available at www.opec.org.AcknowledgementsSecretary General,Chairman

17、 of the Editorial BoardHE Haitham Al GhaisDirector,Research Division,Editor-in-Chief and Office in Charge,PR&Information DepartmentAyed S.Al-QahtaniHead,Energy Studies Department,EditorAbderrezak BenyoucefMain contributorsChapter 1:Key assumptionsMohammad Alkazimi,Mohannad Al-Suwaidan,Joerg Spitzy,J

18、an Ban,Masudbek Narzibekov,Maciej Filipek,Eleni Kaditi,Daniel McKirdyChapter 2:Energy demandHaris Aliefendic,Jan Ban,Raed Al-Aameri,Mohammed AttabaChapter 3:Oil demandJan Ban,Mohammed Attaba,Raed Al-AameriChapter 4:Liquids supplyJulius Walker,Haris AliefendicChapter 5:Refining outlookHaris Aliefendi

19、c,Mohammed AttabaChapter 6:Oil movementsHaris Aliefendic,Mohammed AttabaChapter 7:Energy scenariosJan Ban,Julius WalkerChapter 8:Key challenges and opportunitiesJulius Walker,Jan Ban,Eleni Kaditi,Reem AlNaeimi,Irene Etiobhio,Mohammed Attaba,Haris Aliefendic,Raed Al-AameriOther contributorsBehrooz Ba

20、ikalizadeh,Huda Almwasawy,Mohammad Hassani,Mhammed Mouraia,Yacine Sariahmed,Sulaiman Saad,Ali Dehghan,Aziz Yahyai,Pantelis Christodoulides,Klaus Stoeger,Mohammad Sattar,Mihni Mihnev,Justinas PelenisEditorial TeamJames Griffin,Maureen MacNeill,Scott Laury,Mathew Quinn,Richard Murphy,Boris KudashevDes

21、ign&Production TeamCarola Bayer,Andrea BirnbachEditorial SupportDaniel McKirdy,Mai Salama,Xenia DixonOPECs Economic Commission Board(as of August 2024)Samir Madani,Antimo Asumu Obama Asangono,Fernand Epigat,Afshin Javan,Mohammed Adnan Ibrahim Al-Najjar,Abdullah Al Sabah,Mele Kyari,Yousef Al Salem,Sa

22、lem Hareb Al Mehairi,Ronny Rafael Romero RodriguezContentsFOREWORD 1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5INTRODUCTION 17CHAPTER 1 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 211.1 Population and demographics 221.2 Economic growth 271.3 Energy policies 411.4 Technology and innovation 45CHAPTER 2 ENERGY DEMAND 532.1 Major trends in energy demand

23、542.2 Energy demand by major regions 582.3 Energy demand by fuel 662.4 Energy intensity and consumption per capita 82CHAPTER 3 OIL DEMAND 873.1 Oil demand outlook by region 893.2 Oil demand outlook by sector 1103.3 Oil demand outlook by product 132CHAPTER 4 LIQUIDS SUPPLY 1374.1 Global liquids suppl

24、y outlook 1384.2 Drivers of medium-term and long-term liquids supply 1394.3 Breakdown of liquids supply outlook by main regions 1424.4 Breakdown of liquids supply by type of liquids 1524.5 DoC liquids 1554.6 Upstream investment requirements 155CHAPTER 5 REFINING OUTLOOK 1595.1 Existing refinery capa

25、city 1605.2 Distillation capacity outlook 1655.3 Secondary capacity 1885.4 Investment requirements 197CHAPTER 6 OIL MOVEMENTS 2016.1 Logistics developments 2026.2 Crude oil,condensate and refined product movements 2056.3 Crude oil and condensate movements 2096.4 Refined product movements 220CHAPTER

26、7 ENERGY SCENARIOS 2237.1 Alternative energy scenarios 2247.2 Energy demand and the energy mix 2267.3 Oil demand 2337.4 Cooperation is critical 236CHAPTER 8 KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2398.1 Pace of energy transitions 2408.2 UN climate processes and implementation of the Paris Agreement 2418.3

27、 Progress and critical issues in the context of sustainable development 2438.4 Oil upstream investments and strategies of major oil companies 2458.5 Refining and petrochemical industries 2488.6 Potential role of CCUS and hydrogen 2508.7 Data centres and electricity demand 252Annex AAbbreviations 257

28、Annex B 261OPEC World Energy:regional definitionsAnnex C 265World Oil Refining Logistics and Demand:regional definitionsAnnex D 269Major data sourcesList of tablesTable 1.1 Population by region 22Table 1.2 Working population(aged 1564 years)by region 25Table 1.3 Net migration by region 27Table 1.4 M

29、ediumterm annual real GDP growth rate 31Table 1.5 Longterm annual real GDP growth rate 38Table 2.1 World primary energy demand by fuel type,20232050 55Table 2.2 Total primary energy demand by region,20232050 57Table 2.3 OECD primary energy demand by fuel type,20232050 60Table 2.4 Non-OECD primary en

30、ergy demand by fuel type,20232050 62Table 2.5 China primary energy demand by fuel type,20232050 64Table 2.6 India primary energy demand by fuel type,20232050 65Table 2.7 Oil demand by region,20232050 67Table 2.8 Coal demand by region,20232050 69Table 2.9 Natural gas demand by region,20232050 71Table

31、 2.10 Nuclear demand by region,20232050 75Table 2.11 Hydro demand by region,20232050 76Table 2.12 Biomass demand by region,20232050 78Table 2.13 Other renewables demand by region,20232050 81Table 3.1 Medium-term oil demand in the Reference Case 90Table 3.2 Long-term oil demand in the Reference Case

32、92Table 3.3 Sectoral oil demand,20232050 111Table 3.4 Number of passenger cars,20232050 115Table 3.5 Number of commercial vehicles,20232050 116Table 3.6 Number of electric vehicles,20232050 118Table 3.7 Oil demand in the road transportation sector by region,20232050 119Table 3.8 Oil demand in the av

33、iation sector by region,20232050 122Table 3.9 Oil demand in the petrochemical sector by region,20232050 123Table 3.10 Oil demand in the residential/commercial/agricultural sector by region,20232050 126Table 3.11 Oil demand in the marine bunkers sector by region,20232050 128Table 3.12 Oil demand in t

34、he other industry sector by region,20232050 129Table 3.13 Oil demand in the rail and domestic waterways sector by region,20232050 130Table 3.14 Oil demand in the electricity generation sector by region,20232050 131Table 3.15 Global oil demand by product,20232050 132Table 4.1 Long-term global liquids

35、 supply outlook 139Table 4.2 US total liquids supply outlook 144Table 4.3 Non-DoC liquids supply outlook by type 152Table 4.4 Non-DoC tight oil outlook 152Table 4.5 Long-term non-DoC biofuels and other liquids supply outlook 154Table 5.1 Assessed available base capacity as of January 2024 163Table 5

36、.2 Distillation capacity additions from existing projects by region,20242029 167Table 5.3 Refinery distillation capacity additions by period 169Table 5.4 Crude unit throughputs and utilization rates,20232050 183Table 5.5 Net refinery closures by region,recent and projected 186Table 5.6 Secondary cap

37、acity additions from existing projects,20242029 189Table 5.7 Global capacity requirements by process,20242050 191Table 5.8 Global cumulative potential for incremental product output,20242029 196List of figuresFigure 1.1 World population growth,19962023 versus 20232050 23Figure 1.2 World population t

38、rends,19902050 24Figure 1.3 Urbanization rate for selected regions,20002050 26Figure 1.4 Longterm GDP growth rates by components,20232050 35Figure 1.5 Size of major economies,20202050 37Figure 1.6 Distribution of the global economy,2023 and 2050 40Figure 1.7 Real GDP per capita in 2023 and 2050 40Fi

39、gure 2.1 Growth in primary energy demand by fuel type,20232050 56Figure 2.2 Growth in primary energy demand by region,20232050 58Figure 2.3 Total primary energy demand by fuel and region,2023 and 2050 59Figure 2.4 Growth in energy demand by fuel type and region,20232050 60Figure 2.5 Incremental coal

40、-fired generation,selected regions and global 68Figure 2.6 Coal demand by major region,20232050 69Figure 2.7 Natural gas demand by region,20232050 71Figure 2.8 Global nuclear generation and the share in total electricity generation 73Figure 2.9 Nuclear capacity under construction in selected regions

41、,2023 74Figure 2.10 Nuclear energy demand by region,20232050 75Figure 2.11 Hydro demand by region,20232050 77Figure 2.12 Biomass demand by region,20232050 79Figure 2.13 Other renewables demand by region,20232050 81Figure 2.14 Evolution and projections of energy intensity in major world regions,19902

42、050 83Figure 2.15 Average annual rate of improvement in global and regional energy intensity,20232050 84Figure 2.16 Energy consumption per capita versus GDP at PPP per capita,20232050 85Figure 3.1 Annual incremental oil demand by region,20232029 90Figure 3.2 Incremental oil demand by region,20232029

43、 91Figure 3.3 Average annual oil demand increments by region,20232050 93Figure 3.4 Annual oil demand growth in the OECD,20232029 94Figure 3.5 OECD oil demand by sector,20232050 95Figure 3.6 OECD oil demand by product,20232050 97Figure 3.7 Annual oil demand growth in non-OECD countries,20232029 98Fig

44、ure 3.8 Non-OECD regional oil demand growth,20232029 99Figure 3.9 Non-OECD regional oil demand growth,20292050 100Figure 3.10 Non-OECD oil demand by sector,20232050 100Figure 3.11 Oil demand in India by sector,2023 and 2050 102Figure 3.12 Oil demand in India by product,20232050 103Figure 3.13 Oil de

45、mand in China by sector,20232050 105Figure 3.14 Oil demand in China by product,20232050 106Figure 3.15 Oil demand in Other Asia by sector,20232050 108Figure 3.16 Oil demand in the Middle East by sector,20232050 109Figure 3.17 Oil demand growth by sector,20232050 112Figure 3.18 Sectoral oil demand in

46、 OECD countries,2023 and 2050 113Figure 3.19 Sectoral oil demand in non-OECD countries,2023 and 2050 113Figure 3.20 Global fleet composition,20232050 119Figure 3.21 Regional demand in the petrochemical sector by product,20232050 125Figure 3.22 Demand growth by product category between 2023 and 2050

47、132Figure 3.23 Growth in global oil demand by product 133Figure 4.1 Composition of global liquids supply growth 138Figure 4.2 Composition of non-DoC annual medium-term liquids supply growth 140Figure 4.3 Select contributors to non-DoC total liquids change,20232029 140Figure 4.4 Long-term non-DoC liq

48、uids supply outlook 141Figure 4.5 Global upstream(oil only)capital expenditure 141Figure 4.6 Non-DoC liquids supply outlook by region 142Figure 4.7 US total liquids supply outlook 143Figure 4.8 Canada total liquids supply outlook 145Figure 4.9 Norway total liquids supply outlook 146Figure 4.10 UK to

49、tal liquids supply outlook 147Figure 4.11 Brazil total liquids supply outlook 147Figure 4.12 Argentina total liquids supply outlook 148Figure 4.13 Qatar total liquids supply outlook 149Figure 4.14 Non-DoC Africa total liquids supply outlook 150Figure 4.15 China total liquids supply outlook 151Figure

50、 4.16 US tight oil supply breakdown 153Figure 4.17 DoC total liquids 155Figure 4.18 Cumulative oil-related investment requirements by segment,20242050 156Figure 4.19 Annual upstream investment requirements,20242050 156Figure 5.1 Refinery throughputs,indexed to 2005 161Figure 5.2 Secondary capacity r

51、elative to distillation capacity,January 2024 164Figure 5.3 Annual distillation capacity additions and total project investment 166Figure 5.4 Distillation capacity additions from existing projects,20242029 167Figure 5.5 Distillation capacity additions and oil demand growth,20242050 170Figure 5.6 Cru

52、de distillation capacity additions,20242050 172Figure 5.7 Additional global cumulative refinery crude runs,potential and required 174Figure 5.8 Additional cumulative crude runs in US&Canada,potential and required 175Figure 5.9 Additional cumulative crude runs in Europe,potential and required 175Figu

53、re 5.10 Additional cumulative crude runs in China,potential and required 176Figure 5.11 Additional cumulative crude runs in Asia-Pacific(excl.China),potential and required 177Figure 5.12 Additional cumulative crude runs in the Middle East,potential and required 177Figure 5.13 Additional cumulative c

54、rude runs in Russia&Caspian,potential and required 178Figure 5.14 Additional cumulative crude runs in Africa,potential and required 178Figure 5.15 Additional cumulative crude runs in Latin America,potential and required 179Figure 5.16 Net cumulative regional refining potential surplus/deficits versu

55、s requirements 180Figure 5.17 Historical and projected global refinery utilization,20192029 181Figure 5.18 Global oil demand,refining capacity and crude runs,19802029 182Figure 5.19 Net refinery closures by region,recent and projected 186Figure 5.20 Conversion projects by region,20242029 189Figure 5

56、.21 Global capacity requirements by process type,20242050 192Figure 5.22 Conversion capacity requirements by region,20242050 193Figure 5.23 Desulphurization capacity requirements by region,20242050 194Figure 5.24 Desulphurization capacity requirements by product and region,20242050 195Figure 5.25 Oc

57、tane capacity requirements by process and region,20242050 195Figure 5.26 Expected surplus/deficit of incremental product output from existing refining projects,20242029 197Figure 5.27 Refinery investments by region,20242050 198Figure 6.1 Interregional crude oil,condensate and products exports,202320

58、50 208Figure 6.2 Global average API gravity and sulphur content 209Figure 6.3 Global crude and condensate exports by origin,20232050 210Figure 6.4 Middle East share in global crude and condensate trade,20232050 211Figure 6.5 Crude and condensate exports from the Middle East by major destination,2023

59、2050 212Figure 6.6 Crude and condensate exports from Latin America by major destination,20232050 213Figure 6.7 Crude and condensate exports from Russia&Caspian by major destination,20232050 214Figure 6.8 Crude and condensate exports from Africa by major destination,20232050 215Figure 6.9 Crude and c

60、ondensate exports from US&Canada by major destination,20232050 215Figure 6.10 Crude and condensate imports to the US&Canada by origin,20232050 216Figure 6.11 Crude and condensate imports to Europe by origin,20232050 217Figure 6.12 Crude and condensate imports to Asia-Pacific by origin,20232050 219Fi

61、gure 6.13 Regional net crude and condensate imports 220Figure 6.14 Regional net product imports 221Figure 7.1 Global primary energy demand in the Reference Case and in alternative scenarios,20232050 226Figure 7.2 Global primary energy demand in the Reference Case and in alternative scenarios,2030 22

62、7Figure 7.3 Global primary energy demand in the Reference Case and in alternative scenarios,2050 228Figure 7.4 Change in primary energy demand between the Technology-Driven Scenario and the Reference Case in 2050 229Figure 7.5 Change in primary energy demand between the Equitable Growth Scenario and

63、 the Reference Case in 2050 230Figure 7.6 Global energy demand by sector in the Reference Case and alternative scenarios,2050 231Figure 7.7 Global energy system in the Reference Case and alternative scenarios,20202050 233Figure 7.8 Global oil demand in the Reference Case and alternative scenarios,20

64、232050 234Figure 7.9 Oil demand in the Reference Case and alternative scenarios,20232050 234Figure 8.1 Global upstream(oil only)capital expenditure 246Figure 8.2 Data centre peak demand and energy forecast in Virginia,US,2023,2030 and 2038 254FOREWORD2World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petrol

65、eum Exporting CountriesForewordFOREWORD1FWorld Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesFor OPEC,it is a great honour to launch the World Oil Outlook(WOO)2024 in Brazil.The countrys comprehensive and inclusive approach to energy issues has been on display through its G20 pres

66、idency in 2024,and will no doubt be central to its hosting of COP30 in 2025.This stance is fully in line with OPECs development of its WOO,as well as the Charter of Cooperation between OPEC and participating non-OPEC countries,a voluntary framework for dialogue and a platform for multilateralism.Thi

67、s years WOO provides governments,policymakers and people around the world with realistic and sustainable future energy pathways.Central and common realities pervade all pathways:the fact that the world requires more energy in the decades to come,available in a secure,stable and sustainable manner;th

68、e imperative of energy access for all;and the need to reduce emissions.Over the past year,there has been further recognition that the world can only phase in new energy sources at scale when they are genuinely ready,economically competitive,acceptable to consumers and with the right infrastructure i

69、n place.Moreover,there is a need to continually recognize the different national circumstances and approaches for all nations,keeping in mind inclusivity,and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.The WOO 2024,with the Outlook this year extended to 2050,looks to weave together a

70、ll the various strands of the current debates and discussions on energy.This means understanding the needs and ambitions of every energy consumer around the world,appreciating what each energy source can offer,and finding ways forward that can deliver energy security,energy availability,affordabilit

71、y and emissions reduction.It is not about fixating on one part to the detriment of the others.The world needs to deliver on them all.The need for more energy comes as economies grow,populations expand and urbanization levels increase.We should also remember the fact that billions of people are playi

72、ng energy catch up,with too many lacking access to modern energy services,such as basic lighting and clean cooking options,and many more having never owned a car,been on an airplane,or travelled outside of their home country.Global energy demand in this years WOO is set to expand by 24%in the period

73、 to 2050,driven by significant expansion in the non-OECD region.The Outlook sees the need for an expansion in all energy sources,with the exception of coal.For oil alone,we see demand reaching over 120 million barrels a day by 2050,with the potential for it to be higher.There is no peak oil demand o

74、n the horizon.What the Outlook underscores is that the fantasy of phasing out oil and gas bears no relation to fact.Combined they make up well over 50%of the energy mix today and are expected to do the same in 2050.A realistic view of demand growth expectations necessitate adequate investments in oi

75、l and gas,today,tomorrow,and for many decades into the future.For oil alone,investment requirements out to 2050 total$17.4 trillion.All policymakers and stakeholders need to work together to ensure a long-term investment-friendly climate,one that works for producers and consumers,as well as develope

76、d and developing countries.At the same time,the WOO also highlights the need to ramp up efforts to reduce emissions,continually improve efficiencies,and introduce lower carbon solutions.In this regard,the oil industry is already playing a role.FOREWORD2World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petro

77、leum Exporting CountriesHaitham Al GhaisSecretary GeneralAt COP28,in OPEC Member Country,the United Arab Emirates,50 oil and gas companies representing more than 40%of global oil production pledged to reach near-zero upstream methane emissions and end routine flaring in their operations by 2030.The

78、oil industry is also investing in technologies,such as carbon capture utilization and storage,direct air capture,clean hydrogen technologies,and others.The industry is showing that it is possible to reduce emissions,while also producing the oil the world needs.As the WOO underscores once again,the p

79、latform for building a sustainable energy future for all not only comes from stability in energy markets,as pursued by OPEC through the Declaration of Cooperation with non-OPEC producers,but also through teamwork,data transparency and international cooperation.The WOO 2024 provides a basis for this,

80、underlining the realities on the ground,and the importance of developing pragmatic policies that can help the world navigate the complexities of tomorrows energy landscape.Ones that deliver for consumers,producers,and enable societal mobility,economic growth and a reduction in emissions.I would also

81、 like to take this opportunity to thank all those involved in producing this years WOO.It is a tremendous achievement,one that everyone should be proud of,and a publication we believe offers valuable insights into the key questions that are central to our shared energy future.FOREWORD3FWorld Oil Out

82、look 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesEXECUTIVE SUMMARY4World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesExecutive SummaryEXECUTIVE SUMMARY5ESWorld Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesOutlook extended to 2050,further underscoring

83、 the challenges of energy security and reducing emissionsThis years World Oil Outlook(WOO)extends its perspective through to 2050,shedding further light on pivotal global trends and shifts.This includes looking at what each energy can offer in terms of delivering energy security,energy availability

84、and reducing emissions,with an emphasis on the need for just and inclusive future energy pathways for all.The outlook examines economic,demographic,policy and technological developments to provide a balanced and realistic outlook based on real world data.Global population growth,urbanization trends,

85、drive energy demand requirementsThe outlook is underscored by a robust increase in the worlds population,with projections indicating a rise to 9.7 billion by 2050 from a level of just over eight billion today.This growth is predominantly driven by a substantial demographic surge in non-OECD regions.

86、Urbanization trends are set to intensify,with an estimated two-thirds of the population,translating to over 6.6 billion people,expected to inhabit urban centres by the end of the forecast period.The global workforce,comprised of individuals between 15 and 64 years,is on course to exceed six billion

87、by 2050,effectively integrating nearly 870 million new entrants into the labour market.Average global economic growth of 2.9%p.a.through 2050Global GDP is set to grow robustly,with an average annual increase of 2.9%per annum(p.a.)between 2023 and 2050.Non-OECD countries are set to lead this growth,e

88、xpanding at an annual rate of 3.7%,while OECD nations experience more modest annual growth at 1.6%.As a result,in absolute terms the global economy is expected to more than double in size from$165 trillion in 2023 to$358 trillion in 2050.Size of major economies,20202050Source:OPEC.Energy policy ambi

89、tions remain high,but pushback on overly ambitious targetsCOP28 in OPEC Member Country,the UAE,marked a significant milestone as it conducted the first global stocktake(GST)under the Paris Agreement.The importance of national contributions to emissions reduction was underscored,however,the GST also

90、acknowledged the potential for disruptions due to various uncertainties.While energy policy ambitions 01020304050607080902020202520302035204020452050$(2021 PPP)trillionOECD EuropeOECD AmericasIndiaOECD Asia-PacificChinaOther AsiaOPECRest of the WorldEXECUTIVE SUMMARY6World Oil Outlook 2024Organizati

91、on of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesremain high,the outlook expects greater scrutiny and pushback on some overly ambitious policy targets,both from policymakers and populations.It is evident that energy security continues to be a paramount concern.Technology will continue to significantly impact

92、energy demand and supplyThe WOO recognizes incremental technological advancements that help to improve efficiency and reduce costs,but does not assume sudden technology breakthroughs.Internal combustion engine(ICE)vehicles are expected to continue to dominate road transportation.Electric vehicles(EV

93、s)are poised for a larger market share,but obstacles remain,such as electricity grids,battery manufacturing capacity and access to critical minerals.Elsewhere in transportation,the aviation sector is grappling with decarbonization challenges,while maritime shipping is embracing alternative fuels.A s

94、ignificant expansion of carbon abatement capacity,mainly carbon capture utilization&storage(CCUS),is expected.Global primary energy demand to increase by 24%to 2050,driven by the non-OECDGlobal primary energy demand is set to increase from 301 million barrels of oil equivalent a day(mboe/d)in 2023 t

95、o 374 mboe/d in 2050,an increase of 24%over the outlook period.Energy demand growth is driven by developing regions(non-OECD),which are projected to see an increase of 73.5 mboe/d.Around 30%of non-OECD growth comes from India alone.At the same time,primary energy demand in OECD countries drops sligh

96、tly.The share of the non-OECD in global primary energy demand increases to 71.5%in 2050,up by 7 percentage points from 2023.Source:OPEC.Total primary energy demand by fuel and region,2023 and 2050Other renewablesBiomassHydroNuclearCoalGasOilNon-OECDOECD05010015020025030035040020232050mboe/d31%26%23%

97、64%36%5%3%10%3%29%13%24%72%7%3%10%14%28%Demand for all energy sources increases,except coal;wind and solar grow at the fastest rateIn the Reference Case,with the exception of coal,demand for all primary fuels is set to increase over the outlook period.The largest increase is expected to come from ot

98、her renewables(mainly wind and solar),with absolute growth of almost 43 mboe/d,expanding from 9.6 mboe/d in 2023 to 52.4 mboe/d in 2050.The second largest increase is anticipated from natural gas,rising by 20.5 mboe/d through 2050.Oil demand is expected to grow significantly,increasing by 16.7 mboe/

99、d.Increments in the period 20232050 are expected from nuclear energy(9.6 mboe/d)and biomass(8.2 mboe/d),as well as hydro(4 mboe/d).Due to stringent energy policies in most regions,coal demand is forecast to decline by almost 29 mboe/d between 2023 and 2050.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY7ESWorld Oil Outlook 2024O

100、rganization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesLong-term oil demand by region mb/d Growth20232030203520402045205020232050OECD Americas25.025.624.923.522.221.13.8OECD Europe13.413.112.111.010.09.24.2OECD Asia-Pacific7.27.26.76.15.75.22.0OECD45.745.943.740.637.935.610.1China16.418.619.019.219.118.92.

101、5India5.37.18.610.211.813.38.0Other Asia9.311.212.313.113.814.55.2Latin America6.78.08.89.29.59.73.0Middle East8.610.711.512.112.613.04.4Africa4.55.46.27.07.98.94.4Russia3.84.14.14.14.14.00.2Other Eurasia1.21.41.51.51.61.60.4Other Europe0.80.80.80.80.80.70.1Non-OECD56.667.472.777.281.184.628.0World1

102、02.2 113.3 116.4 117.8 118.9 120.1 17.9 Source:OPEC.World primary energy demand by fuel type,20232050Levelsmboe/dGrowthmboe/dGrowth%p.a.Fuel share%202320302035204020452050202320502023205020232050Oil92.9103.1106.0107.4108.5109.616.70.630.929.3Coal78.071.666.160.054.449.128.91.725.913.1Gas69.175.980.6

103、84.887.989.620.51.023.024.0Nuclear14.817.018.920.922.724.39.61.94.96.5Hydro 7.68.69.29.910.711.64.01.62.53.1Biomass29.132.134.035.536.537.48.20.99.710.0Other renewables9.619.027.135.143.652.442.96.53.214.0Total301.1327.3342.0353.7364.4374.172.90.8100.0100.0Source:OPEC.The share of oil and gas in the

104、 energy mix stays above 53%through 2050,with oil retaining the largest share at above 29%Big shifts in the energy mix are seen throughout the outlook period,but oil and gas are set to remain crucial for energy supply in the period to 2050.Their combined share in the energy mix is expected to stay ab

105、ove 53%throughout the outlook period.Oil retains the largest share at 29.3%in 2050,with gas at 24%.Oil demand sees robust medium-term growth and reaches over 120 mb/d by 2050,driven by the non-OECDGlobal oil demand is projected to reach 112.3 million barrels a day(mb/d)in 2029,representing a strong

106、increase of 10.1 mb/d compared to 2023.However,the regional breakdown of this medium-term expansion shows a contrasting picture between continued non-OECD demand growth and rather stagnating OECD demand.Non-OECD oil demand is projected to increase by a healthy 9.6 mb/d between 2023 and 2029 to reach

107、 66.2 mb/d,while OECD demand is set to oscillate around 46 mb/d over the same period.In the long term,global oil demand is expected to increase by almost 18 mb/d,rising from 102.2 mb/d in 2023 to 120.1 mb/d in 2050.While non-OECD demand is projected to increase by 28 mb/d between 2023 and 2050,OECD

108、demand is set to witness a decline.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY8World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesSource:OPEC.Oil demand growth by sector,20232050India drives incremental long-term demand growthExtending the outlooks time horizon to 2050 amplifies the role of India,Other As

109、ia,Africa and the Middle East as the key sources of incremental demand in the coming years.Combined demand in these four regions is set to increase by 22 mb/d between 2023 and 2050.India alone will add 8 mb/d to its oil demand during the forecast period.Chinas oil demand is projected to increase by

110、2.5 mb/d.Non-OECD regional oil demand growth,20232050Source:OPEC.102.2120.1Road 4.6Aviation 4.2Other 1.2Petrochemicals4.9Other industry 1.8Electricity gen.0.8 Resid./Comm./Agr.2.19095100105110115120125Demand in 2023Growth intransportationGrowth in industryGrowth in other sectorsDemandin 2050mb/d0.50

111、.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.510123456789%mb/d%average growth p.a.RHSIndiaAfricaMiddleEastLatinAmericaChinaOtherAsiaOtherEurasiaOtherEuropeRussiaPetrochemicals,road transport and aviation are critical for future demand growth The largest incremental demand during the forecast period is projected for

112、the petrochemicals,road transportation and aviation sectors.Oil demand in these sectors in the long term is set to increase by 4.9 mb/d,4.6 mb/d and 4.2 mb/d,respectively.Demand projections in the road transportation sector indicate strong growth over the current decade before stabilizing at levels

113、above 50 mb/d for the rest of the forecast period.By then,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY9ESWorld Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesthe penetration of EVs is set to increasingly play a role.The global vehicle fleet is forecast to increase from 1.7 billion in 2023 to 2.9 billion in 2

114、050 with the fastest growth expected in the EVs segment.Nevertheless,ICE-based vehicles are expected to continue to dominate the global fleet and still account for more than 70%in 2050.Source:OPEC.Global fleet composition,20232050010203040506005001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0002023202620292032203520382041

115、204420472050millions%FCEVsEVsNGVsHEVsConventionalShare of EVs(RHS)Share of AFVs(RHS)Petrochemical and transportation trends shift the global product slate to a much lighter average barrelWith respect to refined products,strong long-term demand growth is expected for ethane/liquefied petroleum gas(+4

116、.2 mb/d).The larger part of this demand growth relates to the use of ethane as a petrochemical feedstock,mainly in OECD Americas and the Middle East.The strong projected demand growth in the petrochemical sector,especially in Asia,is set to lead to increased naphtha demand(+2.8 mb/d)too.Demand growt

117、h in the aviation sector sees jet/kerosene rising by 4 mb/d between 2023 and 2050,while road transportation is the key sector for increases in diesel/gasoil(+3.5 mb/d)and gasoline(+2.5 mb/d).US,Brazil and Canada drive medium-term non-DoC liquids supply growth of 7.1 mb/dThis years WOO focuses on non

118、-Declaration of Cooperation(non-DoC)liquids supply.In the medium term,non-DoC liquids supply is projected to increase from 51.7 mb/d in 2023 to Select contributors to non-DoC total liquids change,20232029Source:OPEC.2.31.00.60.50.30.20.00.51.01.52.02.5USBrazilCanadaQatarArgentinaNorwaymb/dEXECUTIVE

119、SUMMARY10World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesSource:OPEC.Declaration of Cooperation(DoC)total liquids46485052545658606264662023202620292032203520382041204420472050mb/d58.8 mb/d in 2029,or by 7.1 mb/d.Once again,the largest medium-term source of non-DoC liquids supp

120、ly growth is the US,where total output is set to rise by 2.3 mb/d in the 20232029 period,or from 20.9 mb/d to 23.2 mb/d.Other significant supply increments in this timeframe come from Brazil(1 mb/d),Canada(0.6 mb/d),Qatar(0.5 mb/d),Argentina(0.3 mb/d)and Norway(0.2 mb/d).Non-DoC supply growth slows

121、in the long term,after US supply peaks in 2030Long-term non-DoC liquids supply expands from 51.7 mb/d in 2023 to 57.3 mb/d in 2050,or by 5.5 mb/d.Despite US production declining over this time horizon,after peaking around 2030,this is more than offset by higher output in Latin America,Canada,the(non

122、-DoC)Middle East and global refinery processing gains.Other regions see only modest change.DoC liquids supply grows by 12.7 mb/d from 20232050,increasing market share to 52%DoC liquids supply is projected to expand from 50.3 mb/d in 2023 to 53.8 mb/d in 2029.After non-DoC liquids supply peaks in the

123、 early 2030s,DoC liquids supply by contrast keeps growing,rising to 62.9 mb/d by 2050.This means that the DoCs share in global liquids supply increases from 49%in 2023 to 52%in 2050.Oil sector requires cumulative investments of$17.4 trillion by 2050 to meet growing demand needsIn order to reliably m

124、eet expected oil demand growth,oil sector investment needs are significant.Total cumulative requirements between 2024 and 2050 are estimated at$17.4 trillion,or around$640 billion p.a.on average(all in US$2024).The bulk of this is required in the upstream,where total investment needs are$14.2 trilli

125、on,or around$525 billion p.a.Downstream and midstream investment needs over the same period are forecast to be$1.9 trillion and$1.3 trillion,respectively.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY11ESWorld Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesSource:OPEC.Cumulative oil-related investment requirem

126、ents by segment,20242050UpstreamDownstreamMidstream14.21.91.3$(2024)trillionSource:OPEC.Annual distillation capacity additions and total project investment0204060801000.00.51.01.52.02.520192020202120222023202420252026202720282029$(2024)billionmb/dAnnual additionsInvestment(RHS)Developing regions dri

127、ve medium-term refinery expansionsIn the medium term,around 6.3 mb/d of refining capacity additions are expected at the global level.The majority of new capacity is projected for the Asia-Pacific(3.2 mb/d),Africa(1.4 mb/d)and the Middle East(1.2 mb/d).The global annual average rate of capacity addit

128、ions for the period from 20242029 is estimated at just above 1 mb/d.New crude distillation capacity requirements estimated at 19.2 mb/d through 2050Global required refining additions to 2050 are projected at 19.2 mb/d(including creep capacity expansions).Similar to oil demand growth,refining capacit

129、y additions are front-loaded,with a slowdown in the rate of additions after 2040.Almost 90%of new refining capacity is set to be located in the Asia-Pacific,Africa and the Middle East.This is a continuation of the historical trend that sees refining capacity migrating from developed to developing co

130、untries.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY12World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesCrude unit throughputs,20232050 mb/dUS&CanadaLatin AmericaAfricaEuropeRussia&CaspianMiddle EastChinaOtherAsia-PacificGlobal202317.74.61.811.86.68.014.816.781.8203018.05.63.511.56.59.616.318.989.8203518.

131、06.14.411.26.210.016.520.092.4204018.06.55.09.96.110.216.320.993.0204517.66.75.29.76.110.416.321.493.4205017.06.95.59.56.110.616.222.093.8Source:OPEC.Strong refinery throughput growth expected in developing countries Refinery runs are expected to increase from 81.8 mb/d in 2023 to almost 90 mb/d in

132、2030.The growth is set to be slower in the post-2030 period with global runs reaching 93 mb/d in 2040 and nearly 94 mb/d in 2050.US&Canada and Europe,as well as developed Asia-Pacific,are set to decline from 2030 onwards.This is more than offset by strong increases in developing regions,such as Asia

133、-Pacific,Middle East,Africa and Latin America.Source:OPEC.Crude distillation capacity additions,20242050US&CanadaLatinAmericaAfricaEuropeRussia&CaspianMiddleEastChinaOtherAsia-Pacific0123456789mb/d2045205020402045203520402030203520242030Global crude and condensate trade flows rise to 46.2 mb/d by 20

134、50Global interregional crude oil and condensate trade are expected to increase from 36.5 mb/d in 2023 to 41.2 mb/d by 2030 on the back of strong oil demand growth.After 2030,trade is expected to continue to increase further,reaching levels around 46.2 mb/d by 2050.The Middle East and Latin America a

135、re expected to be the main contributors to global crude and condensate exports throughout the outlook period.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY13ESWorld Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries*Only trade between major regions is considered,intratrade is excluded.Source:OPEC.*Including Latin

136、 America,Russia&Caspian,Africa and the US&Canada.Source:OPEC.Global crude and condensate exports by origin*,20232050Middle East share in global crude and condensate trade,20232050303540455055606570202320302035204020452050%Others*Middle East0510152025303540455055202320302035204020452050mb/d US&Canada

137、Latin AmericaAfricaEuropeRussia&CaspianMiddle EastAsia-PacificMiddle East increases its share in global crude and condensate trade Global crude and condensate exports are heavily dominated by the Middle East,with its share standing at almost 49%in 2023.Due to a strong increase in crude and condensat

138、e exports from Latin America and the US&Canada,the Middle Easts share is expected to decline marginally by 2030.In the post-2030 period,however,the Middle Easts share in the total export mix is projected to increase to almost 58%by 2050.Asia-Pacific crude and condensate imports rise by almost 10 mb/

139、d by 2050Total crude and condensate import volumes to the Asia-Pacific reached levels of around 24 mb/d in 2023.They are expected to increase to above 29 mb/d in 2030 and rise further EXECUTIVE SUMMARY14World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesto around 33.8 mb/d in 205

140、0.This is predominantly due to increasing oil demand in the Asia-Pacific,but also because of declining domestic supply from ageing local oilfields.The major source of incremental volumes is set to come from the Middle East,with shipments increasing from 15.1 mb/d in 2023 to 23 mb/d in 2050.Source:OP

141、EC.Global liquids demand in the Reference Case and alternative scenarios,202320507080901001101201302023202620292032203520382041204420472050mb/dReference CaseTechnology-DrivenEquitable GrowthScenarios emphasize wide range of uncertainty for future energy and oil demandThis Outlook describes two alter

142、native scenarios relative to the Reference Case.The Technology-Driven Scenario illustrates a different pathway to the dominant narrative on emissions reduction;one that achieves the goal of limiting the global temperature increase at well below 2C,while avoiding a substantial negative economic impac

143、t on developing economies,especially those who export energy,and at the same time,ensuring a high degree of energy security.Global oil demand in this scenario stabilizes at a level above 100 mb/d in the period to around 2040,before moderately slowing to 96 mb/d over the last ten years Source:OPEC.Cr

144、ude and condensate imports to the Asia-Pacific by origin,20232050US&CanadaLatin AmericaMiddle EastAfricaEuropeRussia&Caspian0510152025303536202320302035204020452050mb/dEXECUTIVE SUMMARY15ESWorld Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesof the outlook period.This represents a

145、demand difference of 24 mb/d compared to the Reference Case in 2050.By contrast,the Equitable Growth Scenario illustrates a pathway that envisages a more equitable and prosperous economic future for developing countries,coupled with a differentiated approach to how and when to achieve emission reduc

146、tion targets.This scenario results in higher long-term energy demand,in general,and oil,in particular.Oil demand in this scenario tops 115 mb/d by 2030 and continues growing to 127 mb/d in 2050.Compared to the Reference Case,this is higher by almost 2 mb/d in 2030 and by 7.1 mb/d in 2050.Energy and

147、oil industry face both challenges and opportunitiesThe long-term outlook for the energy sector remains uncertain.The challenge of how to balance sustainable,equitable development with much-needed energy affordability and energy security,while at the same time addressing climate concerns,has led to m

148、uch debate and polarization among key stakeholders.The Outlook discusses critical issues,challenges and opportunities that the global energy industry,in general,and the oil industry,in particular,could face in the coming decades,touching on such factors as energy policy and climate negotiations,inve

149、stment and the role of new technologies.INTRODUCTION16World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesIntroductionINTRODUCTIONINT17World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesUntil a few years ago,the main focus of policymakers was on emissions reduc

150、tion,with the dominant mainstream narrative almost exclusively on a wholesale transition to using renewable energy and EVs,as if this were a silver bullet to solve all the worlds climate and energy issues.Since then,voices have increasingly been calling out the shortcomings of this approach given th

151、e realities of following this path.This includes renewables integration costs,the sourcing of critical minerals,electricity grid requirements,battery manufacturing capacity,rising prices for consumers,and more generally,the wider public beginning to understand what the real-life implications of thes

152、e kinds of major transitions actually are.In the midst of this debate,developments in 2022 also provided a wake-up call.Energy prices surged on the back of geopolitical developments;major concerns about supply chains and energy flows were raised,especially in Europe,albeit with clear ramifications f

153、or other regions.At this point,the focus returned to the inter-linked challenges of energy security,energy affordability and energy accessibility,alongside reducing emissions.The result of this was that policymakers were required to re-assess policy targets and a broad debate about the speed of ener

154、gy transitions ensued.These developments were the main reason for OPEC making upward revisions to the outlook for both energy and oil demand projections in 2023,as published in last years edition of the WOO.Since then,the public discussion on these issues has intensified and broadened,and increasing

155、ly,the debate has shifted towards a more comprehensive and holistic view,one advocated by OPEC.Moreover,there were also important market signals in 2023 that serve to underpin the growing realization that any large-scale restructuring of the global energy system will take time.Global oil demand incr

156、eased by 2.5 mb/d in 2023,rising to its highest level ever,while coal demand,despite all policies and efforts to target a reduction in use,also reached levels unseen previously.At the same time,it should be noted that with regard to renewables,the world saw the greatest annual increase in capacity o

157、ver the course of 2023,and EVs saw their strongest ever annual sales.When zooming in on the details,however,strikingly,a large part of this growth was concentrated in China,while growth in other countries and regions was not as expected.Additionally,renewables and EVs expansion is coming from a low

158、base.It is becoming increasingly evident that one key lesson policymakers are taking into consideration is that initial,overly optimistic assumptions that renewable energy deployment costs would inevitably and irreversibly decline in line with technology advances and with growing economies of scale,

159、was misguided.It is important to be reminded that this theoretical concept only works assuming that all other factors remain constant.However,this is clearly not the case given the real-world impacts of geopolitics,macro-economic and trade developments,as well as often unforeseen knock-on consequenc

160、es of attempting to scale up at a such a rapid pace.These can all throw up barriers,and offset the impact of progress on technology,for instance.To be specific,the example of EVs is instructive.Again,the expectation underpinning policymakers calculations has been that the purchase cost of EVs will i

161、nevitably drop over time,thus incentivizing consumers to buy an EV over a conventional vehicle.Recent announcements of scaling back or delaying investments in EV production capacity by several major car manufacturers speaks volumes.Moreover,it is unlikely that consumers in Europe INTRODUCTION18World

162、 Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesand the US will see lower EV prices that could be offered by Chinese EV producers as these are being offset by trade barriers thrown up in an atmosphere of protectionism and support for domestic carmakers.There is also now more talk o

163、f giving consumers a choice,not pushing policy on them in one direction.On the policy level too,recent much-softened proposals for Euro-7 emissions norms,the US debate to temper emissions standards on vehicle model years as of 2027,or even the UK decision to entirely push back a 2030 sales ban on IC

164、Es are instructive in this regard.To be clear,these examples are not an indication that EV and renewable energy deployment costs will not decline further,or that EV sales and renewable energy capacity will not increase in the years to come.The point is that overly ambitious expectations about how fa

165、st they will penetrate energy markets and substitute oil-based products can be viewed as overblown.Elsewhere in this years WOO,it is also important to highlight that the economic outlook has brightened since the publication of the WOO 2023,with inflation pressure dwindling,and central banks starting

166、 to lower interest rates.Combined with other factors,this has led to an upward revision to global oil and energy demand within the outlook horizon,which has now been extended to 2050.On the supply side,a new methodology has been introduced to reflect oil production by countries participating in the

167、Declaration of Cooperation(DoC)and other countries(non-DoC).Once again,this WOO aims to provide insightful views,be thought-provoking and instructive,and thus provide perspectives to underpin a broadening and deepening of the ever-important global debate on our common energy future.INTRODUCTIONINT19

168、World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesCHAPTER ONE20World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesKey assumptionsKEY ASSUMPTIONS21World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1Key takeaways This years WOO extends the

169、outlook period to 2050.The global population is expected to rise by about 1.6 billion,from its current level of just over eight billion in 2023 to an estimated 9.7 billion by 2050.The global working-age population is projected to surpass six billion by 2050,with around 870 million workers added to t

170、he labour force over the forecast period.An estimated 68%of the worlds population,or over 6.6 billion people,are expected to live in urban areas by the end of the outlook period.Global gross domestic product(GDP)growth between 2023 and 2050 is expected to remain robust and increase at an average rat

171、e of 2.9%p.a.Non-OECD countries dominate the growth outlook with an expected average rate of 3.7%p.a.,while OECD countries are expected to grow at a rate of 1.6%p.a.The global economy is set to more than double in size in absolute terms from$165 trillion in 2023 to$358 trillion in 2050,while global

172、average income is projected to rise from roughly$20,600(2021 PPP)in 2023 to$36,800(2021 PPP)by 2050.COP28 concluded the first GST under the Paris Agreement,emphasizing the importance of national contributions to the reduction of emissions.Energy security concerns are likely to remain paramount for d

173、ecision makers,with an anticipated greater pushback and scrutiny of new energy policies on several fronts.The WOO assumes a gradual evolution of technology,with no sudden technological breakthroughs,the timing and impact of which are challenging to forecast.ICE vehicles will remain predominant in ro

174、ad transport,while EVs continue to encounter challenges related to driving range,supply chains and reliable charging infrastructure.However,these issues are expected to improve over the long term.Aviation transport remains one of the most difficult sectors to decarbonize,whereas major technological

175、advancements have resulted in the adoption of alternative fuels in the maritime shipping sector.The oil industrys infrastructure,technological expertise and capacity for investment,position it uniquely to lead in hydrogen production,distribution and storage.CHAPTER ONE22World Oil Outlook 2024Organiz

176、ation of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesThis years WOO considers a multitude of pivotal key assumptions,including population and demographic trends,as well as the potential for economic growth.The expected effects of significant shifts in energy policies and the potential technology advancements w

177、ithin the energy sector also serve as key underpinnings.These assumptions have been thoroughly analyzed in establishing the Reference Case.1.1 Population and demographicsNumerous factors,including continuous advances in healthcare,multi-dimensional wellness and access to both water and sanitation se

178、rvices have enhanced the standard of living and thus extended the average lifespan globally in recent decades.However,the rate of population growth is decelerating,particularly in OECD countries.Certain developing nations may witness a similar demographic transition as to that observed in the OECD,a

179、lthough others may not.This chapter thoroughly examines various demographic factors to guide the projections within the WOOs Reference Case.Furthermore,the extension of the outlook period in this years WOO to 2050 provides a longer horizon for population and demographic trends to play out.This Outlo

180、ok utilizes the 2024 revision of World Population Prospects from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs(UNDESA).This document,being the 28th edition of the UNs definitive population estimates and projections,encompasses a wide range of crucial demographic indicators,all of whic

181、h are comprehensively addressed in this section.Based on the projections,the total global population is expected to rise by roughly 1.6 billion,increasing from its current level of 8.1 billion in 2023 to an estimated 9.7 billion by Source:UN.Table 1.1Population by regionLevelsGrowth20232030203520402

182、045205020232050OECD Americas53655857158259259963OECD Europe59059058958758357713OECD Asia-Pacific21721521220920520215OECD1,3431,3631,3721,3781,3801,37734Latin America47849851051952452749Middle East&Africa1,2841,5071,6721,8392,0072,175891India1,4381,5251,5791,6231,6561,680242China1,4231,3981,3731,3431

183、,3061,260162Other Asia1,2801,3671,4281,4841,5331,575295OPEC505564605646684721216Russia1451421401381371369Other Eurasia19620420620921121317Non-OECD6,7497,2067,5137,7998,0608,2871,538World8,0928,5698,8859,1779,4409,6641,573millionsKEY ASSUMPTIONS23World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Ex

184、porting Countries1Figure 1.1World population growth,19962023 versus 20232050Source:UN.2050(Table 1.1).However,an important point highlighted in recent demographic data is the persistent drop in fertility rates.On a regional basis,as per the WOOs regional classifications(see Annex B),it is clear that

185、 non-OECD regions are set to provide almost all of the worlds population growth,with the Middle East and Africa(excluding OPEC nations)projected to account for over half of the global population additions.Other notable increases are in OPEC,where the size of the population increases by 43%by 2050 an

186、d in Other Asia,which increases by 23%.For the OECD region,population growth to the year 2050 is expected to be only 34 million,which is drastically lower than the 210 million increase experienced during a similar timeframe between 1996 and 2023.In fact,growth in OECD Americas is expected to more th

187、an compensate for a combined 28 million drop in OECD Europe and OECD Asia-Pacific.Among non-OECD countries,China stands out as the only one projected to experience a significant population decline,with an estimated drop of 162 million over the next 27 years.This represents,by far,the largest decline

188、 among the major economies and is in stark contrast to Chinas previous population growth of approximately 192 million during the period from 1996 to 2023,as shown in Figure 1.1.Moreover,China lost its position as the worlds most populous country to India in 2022,as illustrated in Figure 1.2.Indias p

189、opulation is projected to grow by 242 million between 2023 and 2050,although growth is set to be much slower than the level of 458 million it witnessed over the previous 27 years.India is expected to remain the most populous region until the early 2030s,when the Middle East&Africa region is anticipa

190、ted to surge past it on the back of a significant increase of 891 million from 2023 to 2050,to become,by far,the region with the largest population.This is noticeably larger than the 638 million people added between 1996 and 2023.OPEC is the only other region with a population growth rate comparable

191、 to the previous 27 years,with an expected increase of 216 million people from 2023 to 2050.Latin AmericaOECDChinaRest of the WorldOPECOther AsiaIndiaMiddle East&Africa2002006001,0001,4001,8002,2001996202320232050millionsCHAPTER ONE24World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun

192、triesFigure 1.2World population trends,19902050Source:UN.1.1.1 Working-age populationThe global working-age population(i.e.between 15 and 64 years)is projected to surpass six billion by 2050,contributing an additional 859 million workers to the labour force over the next 27 years(Table 1.2).This gro

193、wth trajectory,however,is tempered by an ageing global population.Thus,while the worlds total population continues to expand,the percentage of the population that is of working age is set to drop from 65%in 2023 to 63%in 2050.Furthermore,regional disparities are expected to emerge.Non-OECD countries

194、 are expected to retain the majority of their workforce,with their share dropping only slightly from 65%in 2023 to 64%in 2050.In contrast,OECD countries are set to experience a more pronounced decline,falling from 65%to just over 59%over the same period a loss of 54 million people in the working pop

195、ulation.Within the OECD,only OECD Americas is positioned to experience a modest increase in its working-age population,primarily attributable to immigration.In contrast,the OECD Asia-Pacific region is expected to have to confront a significant decline of 20%in its working-age population during the o

196、utlook period.OECD Europe sees a more moderate,but still noteworthy reduction of 12%.The gap between the working populations of the OECD and non-OECD region widens further in the long term.Leading non-OECD working population growth is the Middle East&Africa region with an estimated surge of 638 mill

197、ion by 2050.After the Middle East&Africa,OPEC countries see the largest relative increase,with the working population jumping by 50%by 2050.Additionally,both Other Asia and the worlds most populous country,India,are set to add a robust 192 million and 156 million to their working-age cohorts,respect

198、ively.In contrast to these regions is China,which is projected to experience a large decline of 238 million in its working-age population by 2050 the equivalent of 24%of its current workforce.05001,0001,5002,0002,5001990199520002005201020152020202520302035204020452050millionsOECDLatin AmericaMiddle

199、East&AfricaIndiaChinaOther AsiaOPECRest of the WorldKEY ASSUMPTIONS25World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1Table 1.2Working population(aged 1564 years)by region 202320302035204020452050Growth20232050OECD Americas35236136636937237220OECD Europe38037336535534433347OEC

200、D Asia-Pacific13613112611911310927OECD86786585784382881354Latin America32433834434634533915Middle East&Africa7368901,0061,1271,2521,375638India9781,0531,0921,1181,1331,134156China983972930859807745238Other Asia8359039459791,0071,027192OPEC311360392420446468157Russia96939290868213Other Eurasia1271311

201、321341331325NonOECD4,3914,7404,9345,0735,2085,304913World5,2585,6055,7915,9166,0366,117859millionsSource:UN.1.1.2 UrbanizationUrbanization,a critical driver of improved energy access,plays a pivotal role in mitigating energy poverty.As both economic development and energy consumption rise,urbanizati

202、on becomes increasingly intertwined with these factors.In 2023,approximately 4.6 billion people,constituting over 57%of the global population,resided in urban areas(Figure 1.3).This represents a substantial surge from the 44%recorded just three decades earlier.Looking ahead,urbanization is projected

203、 to continue its upward trajectory across all regions,with an estimated 68%of the worlds population equivalent to around 6.6 billion people expected to inhabit urban areas by the end of the outlook period.In 2023,OECD and Latin America were the most urbanized regions globally,with over 80%of their p

204、opulations residing in urban areas.Within the OECD,the Asia-Pacific region boasts the highest urbanization rate,reaching nearly 89%,closely followed by OECD Americas at 83%.Remarkably,the historical upward trajectory in urbanization is expected to persist,despite already elevated rates.By 2050,proje

205、ctions indicate that OECD and Latin America will achieve urbanization rates of 88%and 87%,respectively,while the OECD Asia-Pacific region is poised to surpass 92%.The most incredible transformation in urbanization has been seen in China.At the beginning of the 21st century,its urbanization rate was

206、at 36%,already up almost 10 percentage points(pp)from 1990.Alongside swift economic advancement in the economy,the rate had increased to almost 65%in 2023.However,as Chinas economy matures,urbanization is projected to proceed at a more gradual pace,culminating in an anticipated urbanization rate of

207、80%by the year 2050.Indias experience of urbanization is very CHAPTER ONE26World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesdifferent to what has been witnessed in China.While China surged ahead with rapid urbanization,Indias shift in its urban population remained measured,resu

208、lting in an urbanization rate of 36%by 2023.For the previous three decades,India has consistently had the lowest urbanization rate,and this is expected to remain true in the long term despite the urbanization rate accelerating to reach nearly 53%.Notably,urbanization in Other Asia mirrors Indias tra

209、jectory throughout the projection period,albeit from a higher starting point.OPEC Member Countries presently exhibit an urbanization rate of 68%,and this trajectory is poised to reach 78%by 2050.Notably,the Middle East&Africa region anticipates significant urbanization growth in the ensuing decades,

210、transforming itself from a majority rural to a majority urban region.The urbanization rate is set to increase from 43%in 2023 to approximately 57%in 2050.1.1.3 MigrationMigration represents a dynamic force within the landscape of demographic disparities at the regional level.Migration could help to

211、offset population declines in some regions with low fertility rates,such as in many OECD countries,or support local economies by increasing the size of their working-age populations.Specifically,net migration,as seen in Table 1.3,quantifies the population change arising from the contrast between the

212、 UNs medium variant case and its zero migration case.In the short term,net migration figures are markedly influenced by geopolitical instability,leading to a considerable outflow of individuals from one region to another.In both the medium and long term,net migration is expected to revert to histori

213、cal patterns,characterized by a consistent influx of individuals relocating to OECD countries from non-OECD Figure 1.3Urbanization rate for selected regions,20002050Source:UN.203040506070809010020002005201020152020202520302035204020452050%IndiaChinaOPECMiddle East&AfricaNon-OECDLatin AmericaOther As

214、iaWorldOECDKEY ASSUMPTIONS27World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1Table 1.3Net migration by regionmillions2023203020302035203520402040204520452050OECD Americas10.57.07.07.17.1OECD Europe5.44.13.93.83.7OECD Asia-Pacific2.61.61.61.61.6OECD18.512.812.512.512.5Latin Ame

215、rica1.71.00.80.70.7Middle East&Africa0.93.43.64.24.7India3.71.91.91.91.9China2.11.11.11.01.0Other Asia14.25.85.85.55.2OPEC1.70.40.20.20.1Russia0.81.51.51.61.7Other Eurasia1.60.70.70.60.6Non-OECD18.512.812.512.512.5Source:UN.regions.However,the trajectory of future migration will likely remain suscep

216、tible to evolving geopolitics and major world developments.1.2 Economic growthThe global economic forecast,the analysis of key trends,challenges and opportunities,is pivotal to understanding future energy market developments.This comprehensive overview will provide insights as to the future trajecto

217、ry of the global economy in the medium to long term.Since 2019,the global economic landscape has undergone significant shifts.Prior to that,the world economy experienced a period of steady growth,albeit with increasing concerns over geopolitical uncertainties,slowing economic momentum in key regions

218、 and a trend towards global fragmentation that started to accelerate before the COVID-19 pandemic.The pandemic exacerbated these issues,plunging the world into an economic recession.Governments responded with unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus,but supply chain disruptions,labour shortages an

219、d rising inflation,resulting in a rapid monetary tightening in key economies from 2022 onwards,provided significant challenges.This was then compounded by geopolitical conflicts in Eastern Europe in 2022.Considering these developments in recent years,it has become increasingly likely that the struct

220、ure of the global economy will witness change,albeit gradually.The advanced economies will continue to account for a major part of wealth and income in the global economy and are expected to expand at moderate growth levels up to the end of the long-term horizon in 2050.Developing and emerging econo

221、mies,however,are set to produce relatively higher growth rates during the outlook period,catching up not only on per-capita growth,but also in terms CHAPTER ONE28World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesof accumulated wealth.This trend will boost the influence of these

222、economies within the global economy and impact future energy demand developments.To accompany the economic outlook in this chapter that forms the basis for the Reference Case,an Equitable Growth Scenario is presented in Chapter 7 to shed light on an alternative future based on higher economic growth

223、.1.2.1 Current situation and short-term growthThe global economic growth dynamic held up relatively well in 2023 given the rapid rise in key policy rates in major economies,the increasingly limited fiscal space,the rising global fragmentation and the consequences of geopolitical conflicts.This dynam

224、ic provides a sound footing for the years to come,although numerous challenges remain.It is important to note,however,that economic momentum in various key economies has continued to see diverging trends.The US,India and,to some extent,Brazil surprised to the upside in 2H23,with stronger-than-expect

225、ed growth rates.China and Russia recorded steady growth towards the end of the year.Nonetheless,the Eurozone and Japan,jointly representing almost 20%of the global economy,experienced declines in 2H23,although there are tentative signs suggesting a potential recovery in 2024.While inflation stayed a

226、t relatively high levels during 2023,it has retracted from past year highs.While it is expected to continue retracting in 2024 and 2025,in most key economies it is set to remain relatively higher than that seen in the pre-pandemic years.An exception,so far,has been China,which experienced a deflatio

227、nary trend in 2H23 and 1H24,but this dynamic is expected to normalize towards 2025 and beyond.With these consumer price trends,monetary easing is anticipated to continue,albeit with ongoing tight financial conditions,particularly when compared to the pre-pandemic environment.In terms of pursuing les

228、s stringent monetary policies in the near term,India and Brazil have possibly more room to manoeuvre and,in China,the continuation of a more accommodative monetary policy is likely,at least in the medium term.Although 2024 global economic growth is technically at its lowest level since the pandemic

229、impacted recession of 2020,at slightly below 3%,growth in 2024 and 2025 is expected to remain resilient.Moreover,although challenges remain,additional upside to global economic growth beyond the current outlook is possible,particularly if inflation drops at a faster rate than currently anticipated.T

230、his would not only boost disposable income levels,but also prompt major central banks to consider relatively more accommodative monetary policies.Furthermore,prospects for a more robust growth trajectory in Asian economies,predominantly India and China,have the potential to provide further impetus t

231、o global economic growth in both 2024 and 2025.In the case of China,in particular,there is upside potential driven by additional government-led stimulus.Additionally,within the non-OECD group of countries,Brazil and Russia have the potential to surpass expectations with further improvements in domes

232、tic demand and external trade.Elsewhere,the expected steady growth momentum in the US throughout 2024 and 2025 could potentially accelerate,resulting in economic growth surpassing current expectations with a positive carry-over into the medium-term period.KEY ASSUMPTIONS29World Oil Outlook 2024Organ

233、ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries11.2.2 Medium-term economic growthThe key trends in economic activity for the medium to long term as described in last years WOO have broadly continued.Furthermore,it is evident that certain structural shifts are taking place,either caused or advanced by t

234、he impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.Therefore,the differentiation between pre-pandemic and post-pandemic trends seems even more relevant in this years edition.In the medium to long term,several significant trends are expected to shape the global economic outlook.Ongoing global fragmentation persists,

235、posing challenges to international trade and cooperation.This fragmentation is compounded by expectations of higher inflation levels compared to pre-pandemic times,particularly affecting major economies like the US,the Eurozone and the UK.The resulting tight financial conditions,combined with high g

236、lobal debt levels from pandemic-era fiscal measures,may dampen the future economic growth dynamic.Growing fiscal constraints,rising government income requirements driven by debt obligations and growing defense spending,among other factors,could lead to higher levies worldwide.These fiscal dynamics i

237、ntersect with widening income and wealth disparities within and between nations,potentially fueling social tensions and necessitating income and wealth redistribution.Additionally,the shortage of skilled labour,exacerbated by stagnant or declining working-age populations in key economies,may offset

238、productivity growth gains.Despite these challenges,advancements in artificial intelligence(AI)and robotics may contribute to improving productivity growth.As short-term issues are expected to continue shaping the trajectory of the medium-term economic growth dynamic,the following major assumptions a

239、re taken into consideration for the Reference Case.Inflation is expected to witness a gradual further drop in the coming years and then normalize towards the end of the medium-term period.While global inflation stood at more than 6%in 2023,the level is expected to retract to stand at above 4%in 2024

240、 and then move to around 3%in 2025.From 2025 onwards,the medium-term inflation path is anticipated to see a gradual slowdown,reaching 2.5%by 2029.As inflation retracts,monetary policies are expected to become relatively more accommodative in key economies,the exception being Japan,which has a diverg

241、ing monetary policy path compared to the rest of the major economies.Outside of Japan,interest rates are forecast to peak in 2024,followed by gradual monetary easing from 2025 onwards.While key policy rates are set to gradually normalize in most key economies from 2024 onwards,an additional focus of

242、 monetary policy will be on reducing balance sheets.Global liquidity remains very high,but is expected to be reduced,with this forecast seeing a gradual and transitory dynamic in the normalization of monetary policy tools.In the OECD,interest rates are expected to be lowered from 2024 onwards.As Jap

243、an has maintained a considerably more accommodative monetary policy stance in past years,expectations suggest a shift towards a tightening of its key policy rate in the upcoming years,although it is projected to stay modest,likely at around 1%until the end of the medium-term period.Interest rates in

244、 major emerging markets are expected to stay at relatively higher levels throughout the period,but in these economies,there is flexibility to lower interest rates amid an anticipated drop in inflation,or given the already very low inflationary levels,as seen in China.CHAPTER ONE30World Oil Outlook 2

245、024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesWith regards to current geopolitical developments,assumptions are challenging to make,although,in general,geopolitics are not anticipated to significantly impact growth momentum.It is,however,obvious that the resolution of conflicts could yield hig

246、her regional and global growth.In connection with inflation and interest rate trends,debt-related challenges in various economies will need to be closely monitored.While global debt levels seem to be relatively well-digested to date,expanding debt levels,in combination with the recent financial tigh

247、tening across the world,may cause challenges going forward.Global debt rose by over$15 trillion in 2023,following a decline of around$7 trillion in 2022,according to the Institute of International Finance.This development lifted global debt to a new record high of$313 trillion.Approximately 55%of th

248、is increase came from developed markets,primarily driven by the US,France and Germany,according to data from the Institute.In emerging markets,the bulk of the accumulated debt was concentrated in China,India and Brazil.Going forward,no major dislocation from this situation is assumed in the outlook,

249、but it is clear that some highly indebted economies may face potentially mounting issues,of which fiscal constraint would be only a minor one.Moreover,some countries could potentially face default in the medium term.In periods of elevated debt,various types of taxes,such as those on assets,capital g

250、ains,property,top-tier incomes and corporate earnings are often increased to pay for rising debt services and/or to mitigate debt levels.More environmental taxes are also expected to be introduced in the coming years,particularly in developed economies.Rising tax levels could also occur due to widen

251、ing income and wealth gaps,especially in advanced economies,which may lead to the introduction of further taxes geared towards the wealthier parts of society.In the medium-term outlook,however,it is assumed that potential tax hikes do not hinder the global economic dynamic as additional taxes are fo

252、reseen to be well-directed.Nonetheless,the introduction of further taxes could impact certain growth aspects,but this is expected to be on a minor scale.Additionally,the transfer of taxes from one part of the economy to another could support the growth dynamic,if not entirely used for repaying risin

253、g debt services.If taxes on consumers and middle and lower income groups increase,a more substantial inhibiting effect on GDP growth could become evident.In this context,regions or domestic inequalities within economies could be successfully managed via multilateral cooperation,redistribution effort

254、s or other policy measures.The trend of global fragmentation is expected to continue,which could lead to a gradual dampening effect.Global trade is forecast to become more regionally segmented,with a steady increase in interactions between the three main trading hubs established in recent decades.On

255、e is the US-centred trade region of the Americas,dominated by North America.Another is the European region,with its dominant forces of Germany,France and the UK,while the third is the Asian region,centred on China,India and Japan.Trading within South America is likely to increase over the medium ter

256、m too,with rising regional engagements led by Brazil and anticipated improvements in Argentina.As in the assumptions seen in previous years,it is important to note that emerging and developing economies are forecast to outgrow advanced economies in the medium term.KEY ASSUMPTIONS31World Oil Outlook

257、2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1However,some of these economies will likely see growth rates levelling off,or even gradually decelerating,amid maturing domestic economies,particularly in China.Another important element related to economic growth is productivity.In advanced econ

258、omies,in particular,productivity was in decline in the pre-pandemic years.While current forecasts anticipate productivity gains to remain low,the current severe staff shortages,in combination with the drive towards digitalization,may lead to a pick-up in productivity growth.The effective utilization

259、 of new technologies and robotics,including AI,could potentially provide a significant boost to productivity growth,particularly in industrial production and the services sector.There are also challenges associated with such potentially significant productivity improvements,such as how to best utili

260、ze human resources that could be idled,and how to best avoid social conflict.Taking into consideration the above-mentioned economic factors,GDP growth in both 2024 and 2025 is forecast at a rate of 2.9%.Thereafter,growth is anticipated to continue rising towards the medium-term growth potential of a

261、round 3.2%,supported by a gradual recovery in both the OECD and non-OECD.Emerging economies will likely experience a maturing growth trend,relative to advanced economies,and this trend is expected to continue in the long term.2023202420252026202720282029Average 20232029OECD Americas2.42.01.81.92.02.

262、02.12.0OECD Europe0.80.91.31.71.81.81.71.5OECD Asia-Pacific1.71.01.31.41.41.41.41.3OECD1.61.41.51.71.81.81.81.7Latin America1.81.22.22.32.32.42.42.1Middle East&Africa2.72.73.13.33.43.43.43.2India7.76.66.36.46.46.46.56.4China5.24.94.64.64.64.54.54.6Other Asia3.64.14.14.54.64.64.64.4OPEC2.02.82.82.93.

263、03.03.12.9Russia3.63.11.51.31.31.41.41.7Other Eurasia3.73.03.02.72.62.52.52.7Non-OECD4.34.14.04.14.24.24.24.1World3.12.92.93.13.23.23.23.1Table 1.4Mediumterm annual real GDP growth rate%p.a.Source:OPEC.Economic growth by regionDespite the rapidly rising interest rates of 2022 and 2023,OECD economies

264、,and particularly OECD Americas,with the US as the regions growth engine,are expected to do better than expected in 2024,when compared to original expexctations.However,OECD Americas growth is anticipated to slow in both 2024 and 2025,before rebounding towards the end of the CHAPTER ONE32World Oil O

265、utlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countriesmedium-term period.While OECD Europe is anticipated to show relatively lower growth than the other two OECD sub-regions in 2024,it is expected to see a further rebound in 2025.This will be supported by an anticipated improving global indust

266、rial sector and its positive impact on European exports.OECD Asia-Pacific is expected to witness a slowdown in 2024,followed by a stagnant growth trajectory over the medium term.The OECD is expected to see growth of 1.4%in 2024,rising to 1.5%in 2025 and then 1.8%at the end of the medium-term period

267、in 2029.While OECD Americas was supposed to be particularly impacted by the interest rate regimes of the US Fed and the central bank of Canada,the growth dynamic turned out much better than expected in 2023,with a consequent carry-over into 2024.Growth in 2024 is expected to stand at 2.0%,with only

268、a minor retraction to 1.8%in 2025.Beyond 2025,growth is expected to continue rising to 2.1%in 2029.A major positive effect from 2024 onwards is set to come from monetary easing as inflation is expected to retract significantly over the medium term.On the flip side,very high US debt levels,in combina

269、tion with any sustained high interest rate regime,could challenge the growth momentum.OECD Europes growth is expected to be impacted by continued high interest rates,although inflation has been retracting since 2023 and a more accommodative monetary policy is anticipated in 2024.In addition,the conf

270、lict in Eastern Europe and its outcome,as well as its ripple effect on both Europes energy supplies and energy prices,has continued to impair economic developments.This is anticipated to impact the growth trajectory,at least at the beginning of the medium-term period.Moreover,debt-related issues in

271、some EU economies,particularly those in Southern Europe,may re-emerge at a time of continued high interest rates and low GDP growth.Positively,however,interest rates are anticipated to be lowered by the ECB over the medium-term period,given that inflation is expected to recede from 2024 onwards.This

272、 dynamic is set to result in growth rebounding from 0.9%in 2024 to 1.3%in 2025 and 1.7%in 2029.In OECD Asia-Pacific,Japan is expected to witness a relatively stagnant medium-term growth dynamic.The regions major trading partner,China,also provides helpful guidance for future growth,given its importa

273、nce as a customer for input goods from OECD Asia-Pacific economies.China is set to see a trend of slowing growth,while OECD Asia-Pacifics other important group of trading partners,the G7 economies,are expected to accelerate.Monetary stimulus is anticipated to taper off in most OECD Asia-Pacific econ

274、omies,but the Bank of Japans monetary policy is expected to remain relatively more accommodative,particularly when compared to its G4 central bank peers in the US,Eurozone and the UK.For OECD Asia-Pacific,growth is set to stand at 1.0%in 2024 and 1.3%in 2025.A growth level of 1.4%is then set to be m

275、aintained up to the end of the medium-term period in 2029.Medium-term growth in non-OECD countries remains relatively strong,with a diverse growth trend.While non-OECD in total is somewhat plateauing,the growth trend is very much impacted by slowing growth in China,while most other economies are at

276、least seeing gradual medium-term expansion.India is anticipated to see a gradual rise in GDP growth from 2025 onwards and is set to keep a steady and high growth dynamic.Moreover,other Asian regions,as well as Latin America and the Middle East&Africa,are expected to see GDP levels expand over the pe

277、riod.This is driven more by the anticipation of improving domestic activity in these economies than by external factors.In this respect,high population growth will play a pivotal role,an aspect KEY ASSUMPTIONS33World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1that will be espe

278、cially relevant in the longer term.The non-OECD is expected to see growth of 4.1%in 2024,declining slightly to 4.0%in 2025,before climbing to 4.2%at the end of the medium-term period.In Latin America,the two major economies,Brazil and Argentina,will likely shape the growth pattern.Brazil is expected

279、 to continue to benefit from fiscal reform and selective governmental support measures.With inflation set to decelerate further,the impact of a more accommodative monetary policy should provide additional support to medium-term growth.Argentina still has to deal with a number of fiscal challenges,at

280、 least at the beginning of the medium term,but the introduction of a number of policies by the new administration may accelerate the recovery.However,considering the countrys high debt levels,Argentina has limited fiscal space in which to manoeuvre.Growth in Latin America is expected at 1.2%in 2024,

281、2.2%in 2025 and 2.4%at the end of the medium-term period.In the Middle East&Africa,medium-term growth is expected to rise from 2024 onwards.This is supported by the anticipation of ongoing steady commodity demand,growing regional trade,a rise in domestic demand and an expansion in the middle class.A

282、dditionally,the continued expansion in global growth is expected to increase foreign investment into the region.Growth in the Middle East and Africa is expected at 2.7%in 2024 and 3.4%in 2029.China is expected to witness a slightly decelerating growth rate of 4.9%in 2024 and 4.6%in 2025.The economys

283、 growth is expected to remain relatively stable over the course of the medium-term.While challenges in external trade are expected to remain in the medium-term,domestic demand is set to gradually pick up.Furthermore,the central government is anticipated to counterbalance any deviation from the gover

284、nments growth target.Growth is expected to retract slightly to stand at 4.5%in 2029 at the end of the medium-term.Indias growth is forecast to see some acceleration from 2025 onwards.The economy is set to benefit from the countrys population growth,a rising middle-class and major infrastructure proj

285、ects over the medium-term.An ongoing deceleration of inflation and the expectation of a consequent accommodative monetary policy is set to provide further support to medium-term growth.Indias growth is expected to stand at 6.6%in 2024,6.3%in 2025 and 6.5%in 2029.Other Asia is expected to see relativ

286、ely robust medium-term growth.In 2024 and 2025,growth is expected at 4.1%.Growth is then set to accelerate and by the end of the medium-term period it stands at 4.6%.The OPEC region is supported by continued diversification efforts,an expanding and relatively young population,rising domestic economi

287、c activity and steady commodity market growth momentum.Growth is expected to stand at 2.8%in both 2024 and 2025 before reaching a level of 3.1%in 2029.In Eurasia,Russia constitutes the most important economy,where growth has been impacted by geopolitical issues,including the associated effects of sa

288、nctions.However,Russia has overcome these external challenges much better than originally expected by most observers,and a steady growth trend with likely further structural changes may continue to positively impact the economy.Russias growth is expected to decelerate from an exceptionally high 3.1%

289、in 2024 to stand at 1.5%in 2025.However,it will continue to witness a steady growth dynamic,thereafter,with a rate of 1.4%expected in 2029.CHAPTER ONE34World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesOther Eurasia is set to see a decelerated growth rate over the medium term.Gr

290、owth is set to stand at 3.0%in 2024 and 2025,and be at a level if 2.5%in 2029.1.2.3 Long-term economic growthThis years WOO embraces a traditional approach to economic growth modeling,centered on robust analysis of current global economic fundamentals and drivers.Yet,it also takes into consideration

291、 the unfolding chain of global events and their potential to impact the global economy and energy industry,potentially even resulting in transformative shifts.With the fragmentation of the global economy into regionally powerful blocs,a pattern of decentralized economic centres of gravity is emergin

292、g.This shift does not imply a collapse of the existing system,but rather a reorientation of the global economy towards a multipolar system.This multipolar world order is emerging along with changing dynamics in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization(WTO).Additionally,bilate

293、ral and regional free trade agreements are proliferating,which is strengthening regional economic integration.Examples include Mercosur in Latin America,the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC),the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP).Moreov

294、er,the ascent of BRICS nations further underlines the diversification of global economic power centres.In this context,it is assumed that there will be no further escalation of the conflict in Eastern Europe,nor any spillover into neighbouring economies.It is further presumed that the geopolitical f

295、lashpoints witnessed in 2023 and 2024,including those in the Middle East and Latin America,will be effectively contained.Moreover,there is an assumption that no new geopolitical conflicts will emerge,especially involving major global economies,which could have significant and far-reaching impacts on

296、 the global economy and energy markets.Among other developments that may affect the long-term trajectory of the global economy,the US-dollar is poised to remain the primary global reserve currency,but more transactions are likely to occur outside the US-dollar system.This trend will gradually open s

297、pace for alternative currencies to take on larger roles in global trade.Countries closely tied to China may increasingly adopt transactions in Renminbi,as China seeks to globalize its currency.The Euro is expected to maintain its significance as an alternative reserve currency too.However,the develo

298、pment of projects that aim to create regional cross-border unified currencies may face obstacles as the global economy becomes more competitive.Additionally,technological advancements are poised to impact labour productivity,which is a vital component of economic growth(Figure 1.4).AI,in particular,

299、represents a new wave of productivity.AI represents a new wave of productivity enhancement akin to previous technological advancements,such as robotics,automation and semiconductors.Its implementation is expected to enhance workforce capacity and efficiency.This is particularly important in economie

300、s where the additions of labour productivity are plateauing with the high levels of technological penetration in workplaces.AI will likely provide new room for expanding labour productivity with additional technological capabilities.While technological advancements,such as AI and automation,can lead

301、 to an increase in labour productivity,they also generate labour market challenges.These could include rising societal upheaval due to heightened inequality,social unrest and high levels of KEY ASSUMPTIONS35World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1Figure 1.4Longterm GD

302、P growth rates by components,20232050Source:OPEC.101234Non-OECDOECDWorld%p.a.Labour productivityParticipation rateWorking-age populationGDP growthEmployment ratetransitional unemployment as seen historically in the transition from agricultural to industrial economies.The AI revolution is expected to

303、 contain some elements of this kind of transition.Many service sector roles are threatened by the widespread usage of AI in diverse fields such as medical imaging,video editing and tax accounting.The concern lies not in the complete elimination of jobs within these sectors,but rather in the diminish

304、ing requirement for human labour to meet demand.Similarly,in agriculture and manufacturing,technological innovations have significantly reduced the need for human employment relative to output demand.While the first wave of computing penetration in the workplace threatened standardized and repetitiv

305、e tasks,the widespread adoption of AI could soon threaten jobs previously considered too creative to be performed by machines.This significantly widens the scope of tasks and jobs that can be replaced by AI and magnifies the impact on productivity and labour markets.Simultaneously,many service jobs

306、remain relatively insulated from AI disruption due to hardware limitations.Despite the long-standing technological capability to automate service processes,such as restaurant operations,the widespread adoption of fully automated models has been hindered by prohibitive costs associated with equipment

307、 installation and maintenance.Consequently,many service jobs are unlikely to face an imminent threat from AI-driven automation.This is primarily due to the economic inefficiency of investing in mass-produced machinery,particularly in resource-constrained environments where human labour remains cost-

308、effective and adaptable to diverse tasks.At the same time,highly skilled jobs will likely leverage AI to augment productivity,while occupations in the trades and creative industries may remain resilient.This trend exacerbates income polarization and inequality,with supervisors experiencing upward mo

309、bility,while displaced workers are pushed downward.CHAPTER ONE36World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesDespite the challenges,AI adoption promises quality of life improvements by reducing the necessity for human labour to achieve high growth and productivity.This alle

310、viates pressure on increasing retirement ages,a necessity in ageing populations,particularly in the developed world and China.Globally,the gap between advanced and developing economies is expected to persist,driven by varying growth rates and demographic shifts.Rising inequality is particularly evid

311、ent in major economies fostering discontent with political systems.Increased polarization within countries can lead to large swings in trade barriers as different administrations adopt opposing policies.This further reinforces protectionism and economic fragmentation.As national barriers rise and re

312、gional hubs grow,migration will be an issue that many countries face.Causes ranging from food insecurity,weather-related crises and regional conflicts that could trigger mass migration and generate cross-border political tensions(see section 1.1.3).Similarly,the potential transformations in energy s

313、ystems could have profound implications for economies worldwide.While the move towards alternative energy gains momentum,particularly renewables,a pivotal and growing discourse centres around the role of fossil fuels in a sustainable energy framework.This discourse is fueled by heightened concerns o

314、ver energy security and the stark disparities in economic development,especially among emerging economies.This evolving narrative underscores the urgent need to strike a delicate balance between environmental imperatives and the economic realities of energy security,energy availability and economic

315、development.It calls for innovative,sustainable solutions that cater to the needs of all stakeholders.One possible significant consequence of these economic and technological shifts is the likelihood of prolonged higher inflation.The low inflation rates witnessed since 2000,attributable to advanceme

316、nts in global supply chains and technological improvements,may give way to increased prices as countries prioritize security over efficiency.Supply chain vulnerabilities may prompt countries to consider localized production,redundancies and reshoring,thereby raising costs.Higher rates of inflation w

317、ill,in turn,likely spur an era of higher interest rates as the norm.As the factors that held inflation down,namely globalization,fade out,an era of higher interest rates will ensue.Moreover,the slowing transfer of knowledge due to the retreat from globalization could impede economic growth,particula

318、rly in emerging economies reliant on knowledge transfer from advanced economies.The high level of uncertainty in long-term forecasts comes not only from technological variables,but also from policies adopted by government leaders.Adopting different responses to rising inequality gaps,for example,wit

319、h generous redistributive policies,could result in higher social cohesion and less economic uncertainty,but potentially at the expense of a less dynamic entrepreneurial class.More robust support for international frameworks and more inclusion of underrepresented rising economies could re-energize in

320、ternational institutions.This could provide new avenues for cooperation and sustain strong levels of global trade.Global GDP between 2023 and 2050 is expected to remain strong and increase at an average rate of 2.9%p.a.As with previous editions of the WOO,this view takes into account the KEY ASSUMPT

321、IONS37World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries1increasing economic risks,uncertainty around inflation and interest rates,high debt levels and geopolitical tensions.Non-OECD countries dominate the growth forecast through 2050 where growth is forecast at 3.7%p.a.This is

322、due to improving labour productivity,a growing working-age population and further technological penetration.OECD countries are expected to grow at a slower rate of 1.6%p.a.Figure 1.5 shows the size of regional economies in absolute terms.Overall,the global economy is expected to more than double in

323、size in absolute terms from$165 trillion in 2023 to$358 trillion in 2050(in 2021 PPP).Source:OPEC.Figure 1.5Size of major economies,2020205001020304050607080902020202520302035204020452050$(2021 PPP)trillionOECD EuropeOECD AmericasIndiaOECD Asia-PacificChinaOther AsiaOPECRest of the WorldOECD America

324、s is the fastest growing region within the OECD at a rate of 2.0%p.a.from 2023 to 2050 as shown in Table 1.5.This takes into account the effects of potentially higher inflation rates and higher interest rates at the beginning of the period.However,after strong growth rates seen in the US in the shor

325、t term,there are signs of continued robust growth.Immigration is set to support expansion in the working-age population,and AI will likely provide a new wave of labour productivity growth.OECD Europe is expected to experience a slowdown in growth from 1.5%p.a.from 2023 through 2029,to 1.4%p.a.from 2

326、029 through 2040,and then 1.0%from 2040 through 2050.The decline in the labour force is the strongest contributor to this trend.The overall slowdown within the economy is due to high inflation and interest rates,as well as increased competition from other regions in the world.OECD Asia-Pacific is ex

327、pected to follow a similar pattern with a momentum slowdown.China,the regions largest trading partner,plays a major role in this process.A declining labour force due to an ageing population and a continued maturation of the economy will further this trend.However,labour productivity is expected to i

328、ncrease and sustain growth rates of 1.2%p.a.from 20292040 and 1.0%p.a.from 20402050.CHAPTER ONE38World Oil Outlook 2024Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesLatin America is expected to grow at 2.2%p.a.between 2029 and 2040,lifted by expanding commodity and agricultural sectors,and by inc

329、reased workforce participation.Brazils long-term growth will likely be constrained by ongoing elevated debt levels and insufficient savings.However,tax system reforms and a robust and dynamic energy sector in Brazil is set to help boost growth,and medium-term structural reforms are expected to be a

330、major factor for growth in the latter years of the long term.In the last decade of this analysis,a shrinking working-age population is expected to slow growth potential.In the Middle East&Africa,growth is estimated to average 4.2%p.a.from 2023 to 2050.A large working-age population and rising income

331、 levels are set to help boost consumption rates.Growth outside of the region is expected to increase demand for commodities,providing stable support for growth.The main challenge will be diversification and enhancing the non-commodity sector.This will require more investments and government spending

332、 on infrastructure and education.The regions demographics will support the establishment of manufacturing hubs and further industrial expansion.However,rising debt levels and volatile inflation pose a downside risk.Growth in China is expected to gradually decelerate through 2050,averaging 3.4%p.a.ov

333、er the outlook period.Government support for the economy is expected to transition from infrastructure-heavy spending to boosting middle class income to sustaining a consumption-based growth model.This transition will potentially be limited by declining demographics.The main challenge is the high household savings rate,which is currently at around 35%and does not support strong consumption.Lowerin