1、Net Zero Economy Index 2024Incremental progress made,exponential change requiredContents132 Executive summary 2024 analysis Metrics and methodologyContentsPrevious pageExecutive summaryReduction in carbon intensity stalls to lowest level in over a decadeA global decarbonisation rate of just 1.02%in

2、2023 refmects a troubling stall in the progress we have made in decoupling economic growth from emissions.This latest fjnding from our Net Zero Economy Index shows the smallest decrease in carbon intensity since 2011.Sluggish progress comes as global temperatures edge dangerously close to the 1.5C t

3、hreshold,with temperatures in 2023 averaging 1.43C above pre-industrial levels.The fjndings suggest the decarbonisation rate required to keep global warming within 1.5C has surged to 20.4%per year.For context,the largest annual rate of decarbonisation achieved by any G20 country in the history of ou

4、r analysis is 11.08%,by France in 2014.Theres a growing consensus:overshooting 1.5C is a likely reality1.Limiting warming to 2C-the lowest end of the Paris Agreements ambition-would also require a step change from the incremental annual progress we are seeing,with an annual decarbonisation rate of 6

5、.9%needed.1 IEA(2023),Credible pathways to 1.5C;UNEP(2022),Emissions Gap Report 2022;IPCC(2021),Sixth Assessment Report;WBCSD insights(2023),Carbon removals:why a portfolio approach is key to achieving climate goals.2 Eurostat(2022),Climate related economic losses-EU Losses from climate change betwe

6、en 2013-2017 were$95 billion(Conversion 1=$1.11);UNEP(2023),About Loss and damage3 IPCC(2019),Global warming of 1.5C-Avoided damages includes costs related to both direct economic impacts and the need for adaptation4 Science(2022),Exceeding 1.5C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping

7、pointsConsequences of collective inertiaThe consequences of overshooting 1.5C are not abstract.They translate into real losses:of lives,property,and livelihoods.In the fjve years to 2022,climate-related events such as heat waves,fmoods and storms,caused over$192 billion in economic losses in the EU

8、alone,over twice as much as the previous fjve year period from 2013 to 20172.The greater we overshoot 1.5C by,the more severe the likely impact.Limiting global warming to 1.5C instead of 2C by mid-century is projected to save$8.111.6 trillion in avoided damages3.Any overshoot heightens the risk of t

9、riggering climate tipping points.These critical thresholds,once crossed,can cause signifjcant and irreversible damage.Between the range of 1.5C to 2C,estimates show six climate tipping points become likely.These include the collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets,die-off of low latit

10、ude coral reefs,and widespread abrupt permafrost thaw4.The exact point at which these tipping points will be triggered is uncertain,underscoring the urgency of limiting global warming as close to 1.5C as possible.1PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|3ContentsPrevious pageNext pageRenewable

11、 energy capacity up,but fossil fuels still dominantCOP28 resulted in an agreement to triple global renewable energy generation capacity to at least 11,000 GW by 2030 and to double the annual rate of energy effjciency improvements from 2%to over 4%until 2030.Last year saw another record increase in r

12、enewable energy capacity with total installed capacity rising 14%from 2022 to 2023,to 3,870 gigawatts(GW)5,6.This uptake in renewable energy has been driven by supportive policies and continued reductions in the cost of solar and wind technologies.Sustained momentum could see renewable energy capaci

13、ty nearly double in the next fjve years and surpass coal as the largest source of electricity globally by 20257.Despite this progress,fossil fuels remain the dominant source of energy,with consumption growing by 1.5%last year to 16,007 GW8.This trend is refmected in our fjndings that the global fuel

14、 factor-the emissions released per unit of energy consumed-also increased slightly by 0.07%in 2023,indicating a small rise in the proportion of fossil fuels relative to renewables in the energy mix.5 IEA(2024),Massive expansion of renewable power opens door to achieve global tripling goal set at COP

15、286 IRENA(2024),Renewable Energy Capacity Tracker7 IEA(2023),World Energy Outlook 2023,IEA,Paris8 Energy Institute(2024),Statistical Review of World Energy9 World Economic Forum&PwC(2024),Transforming Energy Demand10 Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs)are commitments made by countries under th

16、e Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change impacts,refmecting each countrys specifjc circumstances and capabilities.11 G7 countries include Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,the United Kingdom,and the United States.The E7 country group refers to Brazil,China,Ind

17、ia,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia and Turkey.12 UNFCCC(2015),Paris AgreementSurging energy demand risks undermining gains from growth in renewables Growth in energy demand continues to outpace the adoption of renewables,leading to a persistent increase in fossil fuel consumption.Economic challenges such as

18、 infmation,geopolitical tensions,and rising interest rates further complicate the shift away from fossil fuels.Urgent action is needed in energy effjciency and demand management,alongside energy supply improvements,to ensure sustained progress in global decarbonisation.Despite electrifjcation and di

19、gitisation generally being less energy-intensive,escalating energy requirements for emerging economies,transport systems,artifjcial intelligence(AI),data centres,and climate adaptation efforts,such as increased cooling and water desalination,are driving higher energy demands.Public-private partnersh

20、ips offer a powerful tool for effectively managing energy demand.The private sector can lead in deploying energy effjciency technologies,adopting circular business models,and implementing advanced manufacturing processes,potentially unlocking$2 trillion in annual savings by 20309.Governments can enh

21、ance this effort by focusing on energy demand reduction in revised Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs)10 and investing in critical sectors like the built environment,industry,and transport.Public investments,tax incentives,and dynamic electricity pricing can stimulate private sector investment

22、s in energy effjciency.Strengthening building standards,incentivising retrofjtting and electrifjcation,and supporting transport electrifjcation through shared infrastructure are crucial public initiatives.Aligning public policy with private innovation is essential for a secure and sustainable energy

23、 future.Financial and technological support are essential for a just transition The disparity in decarbonisation rates between developed and developing nations highlights the challenges of achieving a just transition.In 2023,G7 countries managed a 5.31%reduction in carbon intensity,while the E7 saw

24、an increase of 0.04%11.Fossil-fuel-intensive,highly industrialised,or quickly urbanising countries face signifjcant challenges in balancing emissions reductions with economic growth and climate adaptation.The Paris Agreement enshrines the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibil

25、ities and respective capabilities,in the light of different national circumstances12.Developed countries must lead in reducing emissions and provide fjnancial and technological support to help developing nations transition away from fossil fuels.COP29 will be crucial in fjnalising the New Collective

26、 Quantifjed Goal(NCQG)on Finance,setting fjnancial targets for developed countries to aid developing nations in their climate action.Ambitious fjnancial commitments are essential for empowering these nations to enhance their climate strategies.The window for action is closing.Immediate and sustained

27、 efforts are crucial to turn the incremental progress made to date into exponential change and ensure a sustainable and resilient future for all.Its time to act.PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|4ContentsPrevious pageNext pageOur 2024 analysisOur metricsThe table below sets out key metri

28、cs used in this report.For further details,see our metrics and methodology section.Carbon intensityThe primary purpose of the Net Zero Economy Index is to calculate national and global carbon intensity(CO2e/GDP),and track the rate of change needed by 2050 to limit average global warming to 1.5C.To d

29、o this,we use the IPCC carbon budget to calculate how much emissions need to be reduced in the future,and divide this by the projected increase in GDP.This allows us to see the amount emissions must reduce to maintain projected GDP growth,providing insight to the scale of efforts required to decoupl

30、e emissions from economic growth.Fuel factorThe fuel factor(CO2e/energy)measures how much CO2e is emitted per unit of energy consumed.Put simply,how green the energy consumption is.It indicates a countrys shift in energy mix towards renewable energy sources and can refmect movements away from the mo

31、st highly emitting fossil fuels(such as coal).For each fossil fuel type,a differing amount of CO2 will be released per unit of energy consumed.For each unit of energy consumed from a renewable source,emissions will be reduced to negligible,or zero,therefore reducing the fuel factor towards zero.Ener

32、gy intensityEnergy intensity(energy/GDP)measures the energy consumed per unit of GDP generated.It shows how much energy is needed to generate a given amount of GDP.Energy intensity is impacted by factors including:energy effjciency,in the form of energy effjciency policies or technological advances

33、enabling effjciency;energy pricing mechanisms;shifts in regional population and demographics;changes in the composition of an economic sectors output;maximising economic output per unit spend on energy usage;investment in new,more effjcient technology and infrastructure;and climatic infmuences on en

34、ergy usage.2PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|5ContentsPrevious pageNext pageDecoupling economic growth from emissions remains a signifjcant challengeNo country is moving quickly enough to decouple economic growth from carbon emissions13.In 2023,the world managed only a 1.02%reduction in

35、 carbon intensity,down from 2.5%in 2022,and the smallest decrease in carbon intensity since 2011.To limit global warming to 1.5C by 2100,an average year-on-year global decarbonisation rate of 20.4%is required,up from 17.2%last year.This also falls short of the 2C threshold-the lowest end of the Pari

36、s Agreements ambition-which requires a decarbonisation rate of 6.9%.Required decarbonisation rates are informed by the concept of a carbon budget(see Figure 1).Keeping within the critical thresholds of 1.5C or 2C of warming means we cannot exceed certain levels of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions

37、,outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC).However,recent research suggests that if we keep to current decarbonisation rates,we are now just fjve years away from exhausting the carbon budget for 1.5C14.13 United Nations Environment Programme(2023),Nations must go further than c

38、urrent Paris pledges or face global warming of 2.5-2.9C.14 Carbon Brief(2024),Tracking the unprecedented impact of humans on climate change15 IPCC(2022),Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5C in the Context of Sustainable Development What is the carbon budget?The carbon budget is the maximum cumul

39、ative greenhouse gas emissions allowed for a given chance(33%,50%or 67%)of staying beneath a certain level of global temperature rise by 210015.For a 67%chance of staying beneath 1.5oC,the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)gives a carbon budget of 420 GtCO2 from 2018 up until 2100.To st

40、ay under 2C,the carbon budget is 1170 GtCO2.As set out in more detail in the methodology,our analysis focuses on the more ambitious 67%chance,and specifjcally on the decarbonisation required from fossil fuels and industry.Carbon intensity:At 1.02%,we have stalled to the lowest reduction in over a de

41、cade195 GtCO420 GtCO1,170 GtCO2oC carbon budget1.5oC carbon budgetEmissions from 20182023Figure 1:Representative sizes of 1.5oC and 2oC carbon budgets PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|6ContentsPrevious pageNext page050100150200250300350200020102020203020402050Carbon intensity(tCO2/$mGDP

42、 2021)1.4%a yearGlobal carbon intensity fell by an verage of 1.4%per year from 2000 to 20236.9%a year2C decarbonisation rate-6.9%every year20.4%a year1.5oC decarbonisation rate-20.4%every year1%Global carbon intensity fell by 1%in 2023Figure 2:Net Zero Economy Index 2024:Global decarbonisation rates

43、 required for 1.5C and 2C levels of warming*Global carbon budgets refer to the global estimated budget of fossil fuel emissions taken from the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C.A series of assumptions underpin these carbon budgets,including the likelihood and uncertainties of staying wit

44、hin the temperature limits,and the use of carbon dioxide removal(CDR)technologies.Sources bp,World Bank,OECD,IPCC,National Government Agencies,PwC data and analyticsNotes GDP is measured on a purchasing power parity(PPP)basis.The NDC pathway is an estimate of the decarbonisation rate needed to achie

45、ve the targets released by G20 countries.NDCs only cover the period to 2030,we extrapolate the trend in decarbonisation needed to meet the targets to 2050 for comparison.PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|7ContentsPrevious pageNext pageDecarbonisation takes a backseat as geopolitics and m

46、acroeconomic factors gain focusWider geopolitical and macroeconomic factors have combined to create a challenging environment for sustained decarbonisation.G7 countries16,while leading the charge,still have a long way to go to close the emissions gap.Over the last fjve years,these nations have manag

47、ed a decarbonisation rate of just 3.45%.The period is marked by considerable volatility in the metric which refmects the broader external circumstances infmuencing global energy dynamics.The COVID-19 pandemic initially led to a temporary reduction in emissions but this was followed by a rebound as e

48、conomies reopened.Subsequently,the geopolitical upheaval caused by the confmict between Russia and Ukraine spurred an increased reliance on fossil fuels in many regions in 2022,with 11 of the G20 countries experiencing a deterioration of their fuel factor.2023 saw a greater push towards lower carbon

49、 energy,as carbon intensity across G7 countries fell by 5.31%,the greatest single year decrease since the aftermath of COVID-19 in 2020(6.51%).Further advancements in the push for energy security through scaling and facilitating rapid rollout of renewable energy would allow nations to sustain and en

50、hance their climate ambitions,ensuring long-term resilience and deeper emissions reductions17.Balancing emissions reduction and responding to climate risks poses a unique challenge to energy security,particularly in developing economies.As decarbonising economies look to transition from fossil fuel

51、to renewables,they also face energy security challenges when the rain doesnt fall,the sun doesnt shine and the wind doesnt blow.In 2023,drought in many parts of Asia has signifjcantly reduced hydropower outputs,notably in both China and India.16 G7 countries include Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan

52、,the United Kingdom,and the United States.The E7 country group refers to Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia and Turkey.17 IEA(2024)G7 ministers draw on wide range of IEA recommendations to strengthen energy security and accelerate clean energy transitionsPwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024Septem

53、ber 2024|8ContentsPrevious pageNext page Despite exceptional growth in renewables like wind and solar,falling hydropower outputs led to an increased use of coal in 2023,leading to a 4.7%rise in carbon emissions in China.At the time of writing in 2024,heavy rainfall in China has replenished their dam

54、s,and power generation from coal will likely drop in 2024 when we rerun the Net Zero Economy Index18.Similarly in India,despite growth in wind and solar,changing weather conditions required greater dependence on fossil fuels which contributed nearly 60%of the increase in the countrys electricity sec

55、tor emissions.A weak monsoon season resulted in signifjcant loss of hydropower resources and a four-fold increase in electricity demand for agriculture and cooling,compared to non-monsoon months19.The impacts of climate change are now also affecting our ability to decarbonise and its impacts vary ar

56、ound the world,making it more diffjcult for developing economies to fully decouple from coal and other fossil fuels as they remain a key lever to maintain overall energy security.Ambitious climate policy and fjnancial support pave the way forwardThe collective effort to combat climate change can be

57、accelerated if underpinned by more ambitious and targeted policy intervention.While the G7 nations have taken steps forward,their current policies fall short of the signifjcant reduction needed to keep global warming below 1.5oC.Currently,G7 emissions are projected to decrease by 19-33%by 2030 compa

58、red to 2019 levels,far below the required 58%reduction to align with the Paris Agreement targets.To close this gap,the G7 could accelerate the phase-out of coal by 2030,end fossil fuel subsidies and scale up investments in renewable energy and energy effjciency20.18 Reuters(2024),Chinas hydropower g

59、eneration surges and coal ebbs19 IEA(2023),CO2 emissions in 202320 Climate Analytics(2024),What good looks like:G7 climate policy 2024 update21 UN(2023),Global Stocktake reports highlight urgent need for accelerated action to reach climate goals In addition to bolder policy initiatives,the complexit

60、y of the task for E7 countries requires robust international cooperation and targeted fjnancial support.Initiatives such as the Just Energy Transition Partnerships(JET-P),which aim to support an increasing number of emerging economies-including South Africa,Indonesia,Vietnam and Senegal-to transitio

61、n away from fossil fuels,suggest that international collaboration may be able to drive meaningful change.COP29 presents a crucial opportunity to enhance countries Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs).NDCs are essentially national climate strategies as they are commitments made by countries unde

62、r the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change impacts.Countries are due to submit more ambitious NDCs by early 2025 that account for the recommendations from the fjrst Global Stocktake at COP28-which highlighted the critical role of fjnance,technology and capac

63、ity-building in enabling effective climate action globally21.COP29s success will in particular be judged on the outcomes of negotiations regarding the New Collective Quantifjed Goal(NCQG)on Finance.This mechanism,which succeeds the$100 billion target established in 2009 at the Copenhagen Climate Sum

64、mit,is designed to provide fjnancial support for developing countries to scale up their climate action,a key factor in achieving a just and equitable transition.Table 2:Carbon intensity comparison between G7 and E7 Change in carbon intensity in 2023Change in carbon intensity in 2022Average annual ch

65、ange in carbon intensity 2019-2023(including COVID-19 period)5.31%decrease1.3%decrease3.45%decreaseG70.04%increase1.6%decrease1.17%decreaseE7PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|9ContentsPrevious pageNext pageFuel factor and energy intensity:The drivers of carbon intensity The Net Zero Econ

66、omy Index examines two drivers of carbon intensity:Figure 3 uses the relationship between these drivers to show the decarbonisation positions of every G20 member state by revealing the variability in fuel factor and energy intensity for the G20 countries over the fjve year period since the release o

67、f the carbon budget for 1.5C in 201822.The graph shows that there has been limited consistent progress on decarbonisation,with external factors such as COVID,Russias invasion of Ukraine and other macroeconomic considerations driving countries trajectories.Over time,countries need to shift towards th

68、e bottom-left quadrant as they reduce the share of fossil fuels within their energy mix(decreasing along the x-axis)and reduce the energy intensity of their economies(decreasing on the y-axis).Countries already in this quadrant are those with the lowest carbon intensities in our index-but even they

69、have a long way to go in reducing their fossil fuel dependence.Countries in the top right quadrant are those with the highest carbon intensities in our index.22 IPCC(2018),Special report:Global Warming of 1.5CFigure 3:Change in fuel factor and energy intensity between 2019 and 2023(raw values)Canada

70、,2019Saudi Arabia,2019Russia,2019E7,2023EU,2023UK,2023UK,2019Italy,2023Italy,2019EU,2019Germany,2023Germany,2019World,2023World,2019Japan,2019Japan,2023Australia,2019India,2019Mexico,2019Turkey,2019Turkey,2023Mexico,2023Argentina,2023Argentina,2019Indonesia,2019Indonesia,2023India,2023Australia,2023

71、E7,2019China,2019South Africa,2019South Africa,2023China,2023Russia,2023Saudi Arabia,2023Korea,2019USA,2019USA,2023G7,2023G7,2019Canada,2023Korea,2023Brazil,2019Brazil,2023France,2023France,201976543212535455565758595Energy intensity(TJ/$m GDP)Fuel factor(tCO2e/TJ)The amount of energy consumed per u

72、nit of economic output(energy intensity:energy/GDP).The carbon content of the national energy mix(fuel factor:CO2e/energy).12PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|10ContentsPrevious pageNext pageFossil fuels still dominate despite renewable energy surge2023 experienced the highest uptake of

73、renewable energy to date,surpassing the previous record set in 2022.Global renewable capacity additions achieved its fastest growth rate for the past two decades,having increased by almost 50%to nearly 510 GW in 202323.Three quarters of this growth was achieved by solar PV24,however,the majority of

74、renewable energy is still attributed to hydroelectricity(35%)25.The signifjcant growth of renewables is primarily concentrated in specifjc countries and regions,especially the APAC region as well as USA,Europe,Brazil and in particular China which accounted for almost 60%of new renewable energy capac

75、ity installed in 202326.This uptake in renewable energy has been driven by supportive policies and signifjcant reductions in the cost of solar and wind technologies.The IEA expects this annual trend to continue,with 2025 estimated as the year renewables surpass coal to become the largest source of e

76、lectricity generation27.23 International Energy Agency(2023),Renewables 2023 24 International Energy Agency(2023),Renewables 2023 25 PwC analysis of Energy Institutes Statistical Review of World Energy(2024),Renewable energy mix:biofuels(4%),geothermal,biomass and other(8%),hydroelectricity(35%),nuc

77、lear(21%),solar(13%),and wind(19%).26 International Energy Agency(2023),Renewables 2023.27 International Energy Agency(2023),Renewables 2023 28 EU council(2024),Where does EUs gas come from?29 IRENA(2023),World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023:1.5C Pathway,30 UNFCCC(2023),Outcome of the fjrst global

78、stocktake.France(10.55%)and Italy(3.47%)saw the largest reduction in 2023 fuel factors among the G20,with the EU as a whole seeing a 4.18%reduction.This follows an increase in their fuel factors in 2022,partially driven by the supply shock resulting from Russias invasion of Ukraine28.This demonstrat

79、es how geopolitical tensions and associated international fuel shortages can encourage a shift towards renewable energy to provide energy supply security.The EU Green Deal,the REPowerEU Plan and a series of emergency legislative measures ensured that the EU avoided energy supply disruptions,eased pr

80、essure on energy markets,prices and consumers;and pursued structural reform to energy systems29.Despite these trends,fossil fuels still continue to dominate the energy mix-as highlighted in Figure 4.The global fuel factor increased by 0.07%in 2023;within this the fuel factor among the G7 decreased b

81、y 1.84%,whereas the E7 countries saw an increase of 0.02%.In the G7,oil and gas now account for 37%and 30%of the energy mix respectively,while coal leads in the E7 countries(46%).Despite agreement at COP28 for countries to transition away from fossil fuels in the energy system,in a just,orderly,and

82、equitable manner,accelerating action in this critical decade,the world continues to rely heavily on fossil fuels30.Fuel factorThe fuel factor metric calculates the emissions released per unit of energy consumed.It refmects the carbon intensity of energy consumption by assessing the balance of fossil

83、 fuels and renewables in the energy mix.Last years fuel factor was 65.23 tCO2e/TJ,representing a reduction of just 2.76%since 2000.Since the Net Zero Economy Indexs fjrst year of data in 2000,there has only been one year where the reduction of the global fuel factor was greater than 1%(1.53%in 2020)

84、.While there has been signifjcant expansion in renewable energy capacity,the progress is far from keeping up with demand,with the impact on the energy mix being offset by rising energy demand and fossil fuel consumption.Table 3:Fuel factor comparison between G7 and E7 Figure 4:Global energy consumpt

85、ion(in EJ)by fuel type(%)in 2023 Change in carbon intensity in 2023Change in carbon intensity in 2022Average annual change in carbon intensity 2019-2023(including COVID-19 period)1.84%decrease0.56%increase1%decreaseG70.02%increase1.32%decrease0.77%decreaseE7Oil 32%Renewables19%Coal26%Gas23%Nuclear4%

86、Hydroelectricity 6%Wind4%Biofuels1%Geothermal,biomass and other 1%Solar2%PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|11ContentsPrevious pageNext pageRapid and sustained action is needed to meet energy effjciency targets set at COP28Last year,global energy intensity decreased by only 1.09%.This red

87、uction is well below the levels needed to align with the IEA Net Zero by 2050 scenario,which suggests a 4.2%annual reduction in energy intensity is needed through to 203031.In positive news,the G7 countries saw a signifjcant improvement in energy intensity,with a decrease of 3.53%.This reduction ref

88、mects ongoing efforts to enhance energy effjciency through greater capital allocation,policy measures and technological advancements.E7 nations,however,saw a slight increase in energy intensity by 0.01%in 2023,underscoring the diffjculties with improving energy effjciency while balancing industriali

89、sation and urbanisation.31 International Energy Agency(2021),Net Zero by 2050:A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector32 IEA(2023),What does doubling global progress on energy effjciency entail?33 IEA(2023),Energy Effjciency 34 IEA(2023),Energy Effjciency 202335 IEA(2023),World Energy Investment 2023

90、The trend of increased energy intensity in several key economies-such as China and Saudi Arabia-coupled with a slower rate of global improvement,highlights the need for more ambitious energy effjciency measures and greater coordination between countries to facilitate the fmow of technical and fjnanc

91、ial support.At COP28,global leaders committed to doubling the average annual rate of energy effjciency improvements from 2%to 4%by 2030,aligning with the IEAs Net Zero pathway.G20 nations have made signifjcant steps towards improving energy effjciency,with 75%of countries having exceeded or come clo

92、se to the 4%target at least once within the period of 2012 to 2021.Notably,China,France,Indonesia and the United Kingdom have sustained an average improvement of 4%or more over a continuous fjve-year period in recent years32.However,no major economy has been able to achieve such improvements over an

93、 entire decade,indicating that while short-term gains are achievable,maintaining momentum needs to be a priority.The disparity in energy intensity among E7 and G7 countries can be attributed to several factors.Economic structures,levels of electrifjcation and the prevalence of energy effjciency poli

94、cies and technologies play signifjcant roles.Notably,countries with strong regulatory frameworks and technological innovation,such as the European Unions Energy Effjciency Directive,show more consistent progress.Leadership and prioritisation of energy effjciency are also critical.For instance,China

95、has demonstrated strong leadership through national and sectoral target setting,allowing for observed improvements in previous years.Additionally,the degree of de-industrialisation signifjcantly affects the energy intensity metric.Developing economies face the challenge of balancing growth and effjc

96、iency while struggling to secure international fjnance.Investment and fjnancial support is gaining momentum.Global investment in energy effjciency has surged since 2020,with a 45%increase driven by growth in sectors like electric vehicles and heat pumps.Nearly$700 billion has been invested in energy

97、 effjciency initiatives globally,with the majority concentrated in the United States,Italy,Germany,Norway and France33.The U.S.Infmation Reduction Act of 2022 alone earmarked$86 billion for energy effjciency measures,underlying the scale of the commitment required34.While these show a positive uptic

98、k in capital for energy effjciency,it is unlikely that the full extent of these investments will be refmected in the 2023 data due to time lags in policy implementation and market take up.While investment has increased,the IEA estimates overall energy effjciency investment would need to triple by 20

99、30 to keep in line with a 1.5C scenario35.Energy intensityThe energy intensity metric provides a high level view of the energy requirements for economic output.A lower energy intensity indicates an economy is using energy more effjciently due to advances in technology,energy effjciency policies or u

100、nderlying economic structures-for example,economies which are more reliant on the services sector tend to have a lower energy intensity.Higher energy intensities are indicative of ineffjcient systems,limited policies focused on energy effjciency or a high reliance on energy-intensive processes such

101、as metal production,manufacturing and other similar industries.Table 4:Energy intensity comparison between G7 and E7 Change in carbon intensity in 2023Change in carbon intensity in 2022Average annual change in carbon intensity 2019-2023(including COVID-19 period)3.53%decrease1.82%increase2.50%decrea

102、seG70.01%increase0.31%decrease0.40%decreaseE7PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|12ContentsPrevious pageNext pageEnergy demand and consumptionRisk of complacent consumption threatens progressIn 2023 global energy consumption rose by 2.02%,continuing the rebound in energy demand post-pandem

103、ic.With the focus of the energy transition largely on the supply side issue,efforts towards reducing energy intensity have been more limited36.For example,some countries(four of the G20)showing a decrease in fuel factor have simultaneously seen an increase in energy consumption.This,coupled with the

104、 rebound effect37-a phenomenon which suggests that effjciency gains from modern technology could lead to increased energy use in other areas-has the potential to erode the benefjts of renewable energy expansion.By 2050,GDP is expected to double and the global population is forecast to reach 9.7 bill

105、ion,with most of this growth anticipated in emerging economies.This will result in even greater pressures on energy supply38,39,as countries face the challenge of meeting the energy requirements of an expanded population,along with their decarbonisation commitments.Emerging economies will need low c

106、ost,low carbon and abundant energy to grow sustainably.36 IRENA(2023),Investment Needs of USD 35 trillion by 2030 or successful energy transition37 University of Strathclyde Glasgow(2021),Energy Savings and the ups and downs of rebound38 World Economic Forum&PwC(2024),Transforming Energy Demand39 Th

107、e United Nations,Population PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|13ContentsPrevious pageNext pageLow cost solutions that optimise energy supply and demand systems are poised to attract foreign investment,reduce carbon intensity and boost productivity,while simultaneously improving energy se

108、curity40.Emerging economies also have the potential to leapfrog ineffjcient systems that are deeply embedded in developed countries.For instance,India has launched a series of preemptive policies and projects to address anticipated increases in energy demand for cooling.The Gujarat International Fin

109、ance Tech(GIFT)City is Indias fjrst district cooling system designed to eliminate the need for individual air conditioning units by using a centralised plant for residential,public and commercial buildings41.Modern technology,in particular AI,can unlock energy effjciency and emission reductions when

110、 integrated with effjcient and greener energy systems Technology is reshaping how we produce and consume energy;through innovations like smart grids,advanced solar and wind power,electric motors and AI-driven energy management systems.High-effjciency electric motors with International Effjciency rat

111、ings(IE3 and above42),which are increasingly required by regulators,have the potential to reduce energy intensity by up to 90%in an industrial process,or 29%if implemented widely across industries43.40 LSE,Grantham Research Institute on climate change and the environment(2022),Financing a big invest

112、ment push in emerging markets and developing countries for sustainable,resilient and inclusive recovery and growth41 IEA(2023),Energy Effjciency42 Electric motors are classifjed into effjciency standards,ranging from IE1(lowest effjciency)to IE4(highest effjciency)43 World Economic Forum&PwC(2024),T

113、ransforming Energy Demand44 Google&BCG(2023),Accelerating Climate Action with AI45 Google&BCG(2023),Accelerating Climate Action with AI46 Google(2023),New ways were helping reduce transportation and energy emissionsArtifjcial Intelligence(AI)is emerging as another transformative force when faced wit

114、h the challenges of net zero.By using the advanced analytics capabilities of AI,better insights can be gathered across organisations and grid components to both optimise electric grid performance and inform grid planning44.Through machine learning,AI can also improve electricity supply and demand fo

115、recasts,minimising the reliance on battery storage and standby power and facilitating real-time balancing of electricity grids45.In transport,AI supports fuel-effjcient routing processes by examining real-time traffjc data and optimising route recommendations to minimise idle time and detours.Google

116、 has included AI features in Google Maps to suggest routes with lower emissions,such as fewer hills,less traffjc,and constant speed with the same or similar ETA for drivers.The company estimated that between October 2021 and September 2023,more than 2.4 million metric tons of CO2e emissions have bee

117、n avoided46.However,it is also important to note that AI uses signifjcantly more energy than other forms of computing.The IEA estimates that the electricity consumed by data centres,AI and the cryptocurrency sector is set to double by 2026 to more than 1,000 TWh,roughly equivalent to the electricity

118、 consumption of Japan.While AI is undoubtedly poised to be pivotal in mitigating climate change through improving the effjciencies of systems worldwide,it will also require a more effjcient and greener energy system to run on to prevent its own energy use from exacerbating the problem.PwC|Net Zero E

119、conomy Index 2024September 2024|14ContentsPrevious pageNext pageClimate adaptation can lead to higher energy consumptionThere is a risk that our efforts to adapt to the changing climate will escalate energy demand,due to energy-intensive solutions.For example,desalination processes that remove salt

120、and other minerals from seawater to produce freshwater require signifjcant energy.This can further exacerbate emissions if connected to a fossil fuel-powered grid47.As global temperatures rise,electricity consumption for space cooling in residential,commercial and industrial spaces has also increase

121、d.While space cooling is an adaptation strategy for rising temperatures,it already accounts for almost 20%of the electricity used in buildings,and is the fastest-growing source of energy demand in buildings globally,with projections indicating a threefold increase by 205048.Countries should therefor

122、e also focus on reducing the energy intensity of solutions,through policies which stipulate the procurement of the most effjcient products or innovations in adaptive responses,to avoid maladaptation and increased exposure to climate risks in the long term.47 CObalance(2022),Adapting to Water Stress

123、Through Desalination48 UNEP(2023),Air conditioners fuel the climate crisis.Can nature help?49 World Economic Forum&PwC(2024),Transforming Energy Demand Demand transformation:A signifjcant opportunity for business In a recent collaboration with the World Economic Forum,we found that tackling global e

124、nergy demand could result in a 31%reduction in energy intensity and$2 trillion in annual savings if actions are implemented before 203049.However,we can only realise this potential through a combined effort,with interventions from both the public and private sector.Companies should not only adopt en

125、ergy effjciency measures,but also engage in broader collaborations that span industries,supply chains,and the public sector,to raise awareness and promote the need for policies that incentivise energy intensity reduction.The International Business Council(IBC),a group that together represents 3%of g

126、lobal energy use,fjnds that collaborative initiatives with key stakeholders are essential for sustainably and effjciently managing energy demand.This needs to be both inside an organisation,and out.Collaboration across functions-from fjnance to technology-to gather data and insights can unlock much

127、needed change.Outwardly looking,organisations can participate in industrial clusters to adopt circular business models or advocate for energy companies to lower their energy and emission intensities.Enhanced value chain collaboration and initiatives such as demand substitution,demand consolidation a

128、nd fmexible demand response have the potential to signifjcantly reduce energy intensity in the long run.Companies can also work with smaller enterprises in their supply chains to reduce energy consumption and emissions,as they often lack the resources and technologies needed to develop and execute s

129、ustainability initiatives.Strong signals such as these,can inform policymakers on critical areas for support-leading to reduced barriers to participation,more competitive markets,greater incentives and tax reliefs.These initiatives have the potential to signifjcantly reduce operating costs and enhan

130、ce productivity:creating a win-win situation for people and the planet.If we dont take bold action,we risk exceeding 1.5C of warming and the greater the overshoot,the more severe the impact.Despite these warnings,the gap between goals and actions is growing.Without global cooperation,the possibility

131、 of keeping warming within safe limits will disappear.To achieve the necessary changes,we must expand the use of renewable energy,manage energy demand better,and increase fjnancial and technical support for a fair transition.Emma Cox Partner,Global Climate Leader,PwC UK“More progress needed in the d

132、ecisive decadePwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|15ContentsPrevious pageNext pageOur metrics and methodologyThe Net Zero Economy Index tracks the decarbonisation of energy-related CO emissions worldwide The analysis is underpinned by the Energy Institutes Statistical Review of World Energ

133、y,which refmects energy consumption per fuel type per country and CO2e emissions based on the consumption of oil,gas and coal.Emissions are calculated by using consumption data and applying Default CO2 Emission Factors for Combustion from the list of IPCC emission factors.Non-combustion activities,s

134、uch as the use of oil products and natural gas in the petrochemicals industry,or oil used in the production of bitumen for road construction,are not included in the analysis.Estimates of the proportion of non-combusted fossil fuels are subtracted from the total consumption of fossil fuels before app

135、lying the relevant emission factors.The analysis does not consider emissions from other sectors(e.g.Agriculture,Forestry and Other Land Use).Data for methane emissions associated with fossil fuel production,transportation and distribution from the IEA are included in the Energy Institutes Statistica

136、l Review of World Energy and in our analysis.Carbon emissions are included from natural gas fmaring and from industrial processes(which refer only to non-energy CO2 emissions from cement production).No carbon sequestration is accounted for in the Net Zero Economy Index analysis.As a result,this data

137、 cannot be compared directly with national emissions inventories.We use the IPCC global estimated carbon budget data on fossil fuel emissions taken from the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C(SR15),to estimate the energy-related CO2 emissions associated with limiting warming to 1.5C and 2

138、C by 2100.We have elected to not use the updated global carbon budget from the IPCCs Sixth Assessment Report(AR6),as it is similar to the total budget attained from SR15 and AR6 does not provide interim emissions targets for specifjc years between the present-day and 2100,which are used in the model

139、 underpinning this analysis.For GDP data,our analysis draws on the World Bank historical data.The GDP PPP dataset from the World Bank was updated in 2024 from constant 2017 international$to constant 2021 international$,which results in slight variations in our calculated real GDP fjgures compared to

140、 fjgures stated in previous Net Zero Economy Indexes.For long-term GDP projections,our analysis draws on two different banks of OECD forecast data.The fjrst dataset assesses 2022 and 2023,accounting for the impacts of current world events such as COVID-19,which was updated in June 2022.The second da

141、taset consists of 2024-2060 forecast data,updated in October 2021.World GDP projections for 2061-2100 have been updated based on PwC analysis(decreasing by 0.1%from last years forecast growth rate).3PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|16ContentsPrevious pageNext pageThe countries our analy

142、sis focuses on are individual G20 economies,as well as focusing on world totals.The G20 is portioned into three blocks:G7 economies(US,Japan,Germany,UK,France,Italy,Canada),E7 economies which covers the BRICs(Brazil,Russia,India and China),and Indonesia,Mexico and Turkey and other G20(Australia,Kore

143、a,EU,South Africa,Saudi Arabia,Argentina).The primary purpose of our model is to calculate national and global carbon intensity(CO2e/GDP),and the rate of carbon intensity change needed by 2050 to limit warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.We use the IPCC carbon budget to calculate the require

144、d quantity of emissions reductions in the future,and then divide this by the projected increase in global GDP,providing us with a required rate of carbon intensity reduction to limit warming to 1.5C.This allows us to see the amount emissions must reduce to maintain projected GDP growth,providing ins

145、ight to the scale of efforts required to decouple emissions from economic growth.Carbon intensity is the product of two factors that are explored separately,allowing for greater insights in our analysis.Carbon intensityCO2GDPEnergy intensityEnergyGDPFuel factorCO2EnergyPwC|Net Zero Economy Index 202

146、4September 2024|17ContentsPrevious pageNext pageThe fuel factor(COe/energy)measures how much COe is emitted per unit of energy consumed.It serves as a performance indicator for a countrys shift in energy mix towards renewable energy sources,and can refmect movements away from the most highly emittin

147、g fossil fuels(such as coal).For a given unit of energy consumed,different fossil fuels will release differing amounts of CO emissions.For a given unit of energy consumed from a renewable source,emissions will be reduced to negligible,or zero,thus reducing the fuel factor toward zero.Energy intensit

148、y(energy/GDP)measures the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP generated.It illustrates how much energy is required to generate a given amount of GDP.Energy intensity serves as a performance indicator for a country for factors including:energy effjciency,in the form of energy effjciency policie

149、s or technological advances enabling effjciency;energy pricing mechanisms;shifts in regional population and demographics;changes in the composition of an economic sectors output;maximising economic output per unit spend on energy usage;investment in new,more effjcient technology and infrastructure;a

150、nd climatic infmuences on energy usage.To calculate the required percentage reduction in global fuel factor to maintain the worlds course for a 1.5C world,we use the IEAs values for percentage reduction of energy intensity presented in their Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario(NZE)in the IEAs World

151、Energy Outlook 2021.The scenario projects a 4.2%reduction in energy intensity year-on-year to 2030,followed by an annual reduction rate of 2.7%from 2030 to 2050.We divide the raw values of carbon intensity from our analysis by the raw values of global energy intensity we calculate using the IEAs NZE

152、 to calculate the necessary reduction in fuel factor.Using the energy consumption data provided in the Energy Institutes Statistical Review of World Energy we have compared the proportions of different energy sources in the G20s fuel mix with that of the average fuel mix of the world,and observed ho

153、w these have changed over time as the proportions of fossil fuels and renewables consumed has changed.Changes to the fuel mix affect the fuel factor,as a country increases the proportion of renewable energy in its fuel mix its fuel factor will decrease.PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|1

154、8ContentsPrevious pageNext pageCountryCarbon intensity(tCOe/$m GDP)2023Change in carbon intensity 2022-2023Annual average change in carbon intensity 2000-2023Fuel factor (tCOe/TJ)2023Change in fuel factor 2022-2023Annual average change in fuel factor 2000-2023Energy intensity(TJ/$m GDP)2023Change in

155、 energy intensity 2022-2023Annual average change in energy intensity 2000-2023Change in energy related emissions 2022-2023Real GDP growth(PPP)2022-2023World219-1.02%-1.43%65.230.07%-0.12%3.36-1.09%-1.31%2.10%3.15%G7154-5.31%-2.37%52.16-1.84%-0.51%2.96-3.53%-1.86%-3.75%1.65%E72840.04%-1.42%72.390.02%

156、-0.27%3.920.01%-1.15%5.28%5.24%China3640.71%-2.63%73.82-0.55%-0.77%4.931.27%-1.87%5.95%5.20%US187-5.07%-2.67%54.41-1.49%-0.64%3.45-3.64%-2.05%-2.66%2.54%EU98-7.03%-2.71%47.11-4.18%-0.78%2.08-2.98%-1.94%-6.61%0.45%India2151.27%-1.30%80.011.57%0.07%2.68-0.29%-1.37%8.95%7.58%Japan166-8.10%-1.57%59.73-3

157、.03%0.18%2.78-5.23%-1.75%-6.33%1.92%Germany101-8.94%-2.75%51.65-2.25%-0.72%1.95-6.85%-2.04%-9.22%-0.30%Russia337-3.01%-2.15%69.58-0.20%-0.07%4.85-2.82%-2.08%0.48%3.60%Indonesia199-3.76%-0.72%85.210.50%0.20%2.33-4.23%-0.92%1.10%5.05%Brazil1180.93%-0.48%37.840.59%-0.44%3.110.34%-0.03%3.86%2.91%France6

158、3-7.00%-2.87%30.35-10.55%-0.65%2.083.97%-2.24%-6.35%0.70%UK84-3.69%-3.80%48.710.81%-1.00%1.73-4.47%-2.83%-3.59%0.10%Italy91-8.07%-1.94%52.59-3.47%-0.59%1.72-4.77%-1.36%-7.22%0.92%Mexico1700.76%-0.41%66.220.69%-0.36%2.570.07%-0.05%4.01%3.23%Turkey121-5.73%-1.71%65.28-0.12%-0.45%1.86-5.62%-1.26%-1.47%

159、4.52%Korea213-4.89%-2.39%47.90-1.10%-0.84%4.44-3.83%-1.57%-3.60%1.36%Canada243-0.61%-1.71%42.972.97%-0.14%5.65-3.47%-1.57%0.45%1.07%Saudi Arabia3571.46%0.05%62.59-1.52%-0.55%5.713.03%0.60%0.70%-0.75%Australia239-2.31%-2.17%73.15-0.05%-0.54%3.27-2.26%-1.64%0.64%3.02%Argentina167-0.94%-0.22%62.48-1.56

160、%-0.14%2.680.62%-0.09%-2.48%-1.55%South Africa4992.94%-1.41%98.563.96%0.17%5.07-0.98%-1.57%3.56%0.60%G20 performance across our key metricsThis table presents the data underpinning our analysis and fjndingsNote that countries have been ordered in terms of percentage of global GDP,PPP(current interna

161、tional$).Numbers in the table are based on energy-related CO emissions only and do not include other greenhouse gases including non-CO energy-related emissions.At the time of publication 2020 national inventory GHG emission data is available:https:/di.unfccc.int/time_series.No carbon sequestration i

162、s accounted for in the Net Zero Economy Index analysis.As a result,this data cannot be compared directly with national emissions inventories.The changes in carbon intensity fjgures refmect the movement of both country level GDP and energy-related CO emissions.G7:Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,the

163、 United Kingdom and the United States.E7:China,India,Brazil,Mexico,Russia,Indonesia and Turkey.PwC|Net Zero Economy Index 2024September 2024|19ContentsPrevious pageNext pageContactsEmma CoxPartner,Global Climate Leader PwC UKFerdinand AguSenior Associate,Sustainability PwC UKSophie Perrett Associate

164、,Sustainability PwC UKJames KingSenior Manager,Sustainability PwC UKChristina HadjichristouSenior Associate,Sustainability PwC UKRuying WangAssociate,Sustainability PwC UKpwc.co.ukThis publication has been prepared for general guidance on matters of interest only,and does not constitute professional

165、 advice.You should not act upon the information contained in this publication without obtaining specifjc professional advice.No representation or warranty(express or implied)is given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this publication,and,to the extent permitted by la

166、w,PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,its members,employees and agents do not accept or assume any liability,responsibility or duty of care for any consequences of you or anyone else acting,or refraining to act,in reliance on the information contained in this publication or for any decision based on it.2024

167、PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.All rights reserved.In this document,“PwC”refers to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP(a limited liability partnership in the United Kingdom),which is a member fjrm of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited,each member fjrm of which is a separate legal entity.Please see for further details.RITM0106053Previous pageContents