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United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service Coffee:World Markets and Trade Approved by the World Agricultural Outlook Board/USDA For email subscription,click here to register:https:/December 2022 India:Worlds Fifth-Largest Robusta Coffee Producer Indias Robusta coffee is forecast to increase 170,000 bags(60 kilograms)to 4.9 million in 2022/23 on continued yield gains and has been the worlds fifth-largest producer for several years after Vietnam,Brazil,Indonesia,and Uganda.Indias Arabica output is expected to total just 1.3 million bags,placing it behind 11 other producers.Green coffee beans are expected to account for two-thirds of exports and soluble coffee one-third.Nearly half of total exports are destined for the European Union followed by Russia,Turkey,and Jordan.Karnataka accounts for over 50 percent of Indias coffee area,followed by Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.Collectively,these states account for 90 percent of planted area and 95 percent of production.Although total area is nearly evenly balanced between Arabica and Robusta coffee,Karnataka is tilted towards Robusta,Andhra Pradesh is primarily Arabica,and Kerala is predominantly Robusta.Total coffee area expanded 13 percent in the last 10 years to 475,000 hectares to satisfy overseas demand,with most Arabica gains occurring in Andhra Pradesh and Robusta growth in Karnataka.During this same period at the national level,Arabica yields dropped by one-third due to pest and disease issues while Robusta yields steadily grew.Coffee production in India is labor-intensive because hilly terrain limits the use of mechanical harvesters.The industry provides direct employment to over 700,000 plantation workers and an additional 1.3 million downstream workers.However,rising off-farm employment opportunities have resulted in labor shortages during the harvest.As a result,labor costs have escalated and now account for more than 60 percent of total production costs.In response,growers have reduced the number of permanent laborers and utilized seasonal workers.Grower profit margins are also under pressure from rising fertilizer,pesticide,and fuel costs.Worlds Top Robusta Producers Includes India-10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23Million 60 Kilogram Bags Other IndiaUgandaIndonesiaBrazilVietnam 2022/23 Coffee Overview World coffee production for 2022/23 is forecast to rebound 6.6 million bags from the previous year to 172.8 million due primarily to Brazils Arabica crop entering the on-year of the biennial production cycle.Global consumption is expected to rise 800,000 bags to 167.9 million,with the largest gains in the European Union,the United States,and Brazil.World coffee bean exports are forecast 3.0 million bags lower to 116.1 million as losses in Brazil,Vietnam,and India more than offset gains in Honduras and Colombia.Ending stocks are expected 1.5 million bags higher to 34.1 million.Against this backdrop of an improving supply situation,coffee prices as measured by the International Coffee Organization(ICO)monthly composite price index have dropped over 25 percent since February 2022.http:/www.ico.org/coffee_prices.asp Vietnam production is forecast at 30.2 million bags,down 1.4 million from last years record harvest due to reduced yields.Cultivated area is forecast unchanged from last year,with over 95 percent of total output remaining as Robusta.The rainy season started earlier than previous years which supported good flowering and cherry development.Wetter-than-normal conditions reduced irrigation needs and costs.However,fertilizer prices skyrocketed as much as 70 percent in the last year.Farmers responded by reducing fertilizer use which is expected to lower yields and output from the previous year.Bean exports are forecast to decline 1.5 million bags to 24.5 million on lower available supplies,and ending stocks are expected to slip 200,000 bags to 3.1 million bags.-20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 1802016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/23Million 60 Kilogram BagsWorld Production Gains Driven by BrazilOtherBrazil-5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 452016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/23Million 60 Kilogram BagsCausing World Ending Stocks to RiseEnding StocksForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 2 December 2022Global Market Analysis Brazil Arabica output is forecast to rebound 3.4 million bags to 39.8 million.The majority of producing areas are in the on-year of the biennial production cycle,resulting in higher production potential for the upcoming crop;however,this quantity is well below recent on-year crops that peaked at nearly 50 million bags.Arabica trees in many growing regions continued to recover from severe frosts in June and July 2021 as well as high temperatures and below-average rainfall that prevailed until September 2021.The Robusta harvest is forecast to continue expanding to reach a record 22.8 million bags,up 1.1 million,as favorable weather conditions and good crop management aided fruit settings and development in the main growing region of Espirito Santo.A marginal increase in harvested area also supports the expected gains.The combined Arabica and Robusta harvest is forecast up 4.5 million bags to 62.6 million.Output gains are expected to rebuild stocks,resulting in bean exports dropping 2.6 million bags to 33.0 million.Colombia Arabica coffee production is forecast up 800,000 bags to 12.6 million bags on improving growing conditions.Last years output was hampered by excessive rains and cloud cover that disrupted the flowering process.Bean exports,mostly to the United States and European Union,are forecast 500,000 bags higher to 11.5 million bags on increased supplies.Indonesia production is forecast to rise nearly 800,000 bags to 11.4 million.Robusta output is expected to reach 10.0 million bags on favorable growing conditions in the lowland areas of Southern Sumatra and Java where approximately 75 percent is grown.The main harvest season in southern Sumatra began on time in March and ended in July 2022.Arabica production is also expected to rise slightly to 1.4 million bags.Bean exports are forecast to gain 300,000 bags to 6.6 million on increased supplies.European Union imports are forecast down 2.1 million bags to 44.5 million and account for 40 percent of the worlds coffee bean imports.Top suppliers include Brazil(40 percent),Vietnam(20 percent),Uganda(8 percent),and Honduras(7 percent).Ending stocks are expected to drop 1.0 million bags to 13.0 million to support a modest increase in consumption.The United States imports the second-largest amount of coffee beans and is forecast down 500,000 bags to 24.8 million.Top suppliers include Brazil(30 percent),Colombia(19 percent),Vietnam(10 percent),and Honduras(7 percent).Ending stocks are forecast down slightly to 6.1 million bags.Brazils On-Year Arabica Output Gains Forecast Below Recent Peaks,Robusta to Reach Record0510152025303540455055 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23Million 60 Kilogram Bags Arabica RobustaOn-YearOn-YearOn-YearOn-YearForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 3 December 2022Global Market Analysis Revised 2021/22 World production is lowered 1.0 million bags from the June 2022 estimate to 166.2 million.Colombia is 1.2 million bags lower to 11.8 million due to excessive rain and cloud cover which lowered yields.Honduras is revised 600,000 bags lower to 4.8 million as leaf rust lowered yields more than expected.India is raised 400,000 bags to 5.9 million due to greater area harvested.Cote dIvoire is up 300,000 bags to 1.1 million bags due to higher yields.World bean exports are revised up 1.8 million bags to 119.1 million.Brazil is up 1.6 million bags to 35.6 million as logistical bottlenecks slowed trade less than was previously expected.India is raised 1.1 million bags to 4.9 million on higher-than-anticipated stocks drawdown as well as improved output.Honduras is lowered 600,000 bags to 4.6 million on reduced exportable supplies.Colombia is down 800,000 bags to 11.0 million on reduced exportable supplies.World bean imports are revised up 4.3 million bags to 117.0 million.European Union is raised 1.6 million bags to 46.6 million on a higher build-up of stocks.China is up 400,000 bags to 1.7 million bags on rising consumption.Colombia is 400,000 bags higher to 2.0 million on stronger shipments from Peru and Honduras.World ending stocks are revised down 100,000 bags to 32.6 million.European Union is up 1.2 million bags to 14.0 million.The United States is up 200,000 bags to 6.4 million bags.Brazil is down 1.7 million bags to 500,000.The next release of this publication will be on June 22,2023.For additional information,please contact Tony Halstead(202-720-4620,Tony.Halsteadusda.gov).The Coffee:World Markets and Trade circular is based on reports from FAS Overseas Posts and on available secondary information.The individual country reports can be obtained on FAS Online at:https:/gain.fas.usda.gov/Pages/Default.aspx.Please visit https:/www.fas.usda.gov/data/coffee-world-markets-and-trade to view archived reports.PSD Online The entire USDA PSD database is available online at:https:/www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline.Additional Resources Please refer to the USDA-FAS Coffee website at:https:/www.fas.usda.gov/commodities/coffee for additional data and analysis.Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 4 December 2022Global Market AnalysisApril-MarchJuly-JuneOctober-SeptemberAngolaBrazilCameroonBoliviaCubaCentral African RepublicBurundiDominican RepublicColombiaEcuadorHaitiCongo(Kinshasa)IndonesiaPhilippinesCosta RicaMadagascarTanzaniaCote dIvoirePapua New GuineaEl SalvadorPeruEthiopiaRwandaGhanaGuatemalaGuineaHondurasIndiaJamaicaKenyaLaosLiberiaMalawiMalaysiaMexicoNicaraguaNigeriaPanamaSierra LeoneThailandTogoUgandaUnited StatesVenezuelaVietnamYemenNon-producing countries are on an October-September marketing year.Marketing Years for Producing CountriesForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 5 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCoffee SummaryThousand 60-Kilogram Bags2018/192019/202020/212021/22Jun2022/23Dec2022/23 Arabica Productionnone49,700 Brazil42,00049,70036,40041,50039,80013,870 Colombia14,10013,40011,80013,00012,6007,350 Ethiopia7,4757,6008,1508,2508,2507,100 Honduras5,2006,5004,8006,0006,0004,390 Peru3,9253,3694,2004,2004,2003,520 Guatemala3,5153,8103,7003,6003,6003,100 Mexico3,1503,0003,6503,3003,3002,900 Nicaragua2,6752,5502,6802,6802,6801,925 China2,0001,8001,7002,0001,8001,250 Costa Rica1,4661,4721,2751,3651,3651,200 Indonesia1,2501,3001,2801,3501,3501,583 India1,4501,6501,1701,3201,3201,064 Vietnam1,1009501,1001,1001,0201,050 Uganda1,025730950900900850 Kenya7506508507008004,124 Other3,8653,5963,6993,7393,689104,976 Total94,946102,07787,40495,00492,674Robusta Productionnone29,336 Vietnam30,20028,05030,48029,80029,20016,800 Brazil18,50020,20021,70022,80022,8009,400 Indonesia9,4509,4009,30010,00010,0003,600 Uganda4,4505,9005,3005,7505,7503,742 India3,5173,9174,7504,4204,9202,100 Malaysia1,9002,0002,0002,0002,0002,000 Cote dIvoire1,7759101,1258001,050650 Thailand700600650700700450 Mexico550530540545545600 Tanzania6006505505255252,302 Other2,4922,4072,3752,6062,58670,980 Total74,13474,56478,77079,94680,076Productionnone66,500 Brazil60,50069,90058,10064,30062,60030,400 Vietnam31,30029,00031,58030,90030,22013,870 Colombia14,10013,40011,80013,00012,60010,600 Indonesia10,70010,70010,58011,35011,3507,350 Ethiopia7,4757,6008,1508,2508,2504,650 Uganda5,4756,6306,2506,6506,6505,325 India4,9675,5675,9205,7406,2407,100 Honduras5,2006,5004,8006,0006,0004,390 Peru3,9253,3694,2004,2004,2003,550 Mexico3,7003,5304,1903,8453,8453,770 Guatemala3,6453,9303,8303,7303,7302,950 Nicaragua2,7552,6502,7802,8002,7802,100 Malaysia1,9002,0002,0002,0002,0001,925 China2,0001,8001,7002,0001,8001,250 Costa Rica1,4661,4721,2751,3651,3651,300 Tanzania1,2501,3501,2001,1501,1502,000 Cote dIvoire1,7759101,1258001,050850 Kenya750650850700800965 Papua New Guinea825700750800750650 Thailand700600650700700654 El Salvador510540605575575585 Venezuela550480500500500375 Laos440485465485485425 Philippines450425450475475450 Cameroon4754003754504501,972 Other2,2472,0532,0492,1852,185175,956 Total169,080176,641166,174174,950172,750Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins either in October(Colombia),April(Indonesia)or July(Brazil),as examples.Coffee marketing year for non-producer countries begins in October.To access a complete dataset for each country,please visit:http:/apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdQuery.aspxForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 6 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCoffee Summary,ContinuedThousand 60-Kilogram Bags2018/192019/202020/212021/22Jun2022/23Dec2022/23 Bean Exportsnone37,379 Brazil36,19041,68935,57635,00033,00025,618 Vietnam24,52622,45026,00025,00024,50012,400 Colombia11,77011,50011,00011,80011,5004,907 Indonesia6,0966,4666,3196,5006,6004,450 Uganda5,3506,5146,1206,5206,5206,910 Honduras4,9006,0104,6005,6005,6004,174 Ethiopia4,1354,6754,8004,7254,7253,936 India3,3993,8184,9203,9204,1704,293 Peru3,7203,3264,0654,1004,1003,600 Guatemala3,2113,6753,4003,4003,40013,606 Other13,08811,00812,30211,64511,945121,273 Total116,385121,131119,102118,210116,060Roast and Ground Exportsnone1,806 European Union2,2752,4002,5902,0002,0001,350 Switzerland1,5601,8701,8601,8001,800550 Vietnam550550600600650315 Colombia210245265200250222 Mexico20625216823023025 China152560255043 Indonesia565643505024 Brazil263254454540 Panama40303030305 Costa Rica101010101010 Other19172022174,390 Total4,9675,4875,7005,0125,132Soluble Exportsnone4,023 Brazil4,0403,9544,0554,0003,6003,125 Malaysia3,0002,7802,9753,0003,0002,150 Vietnam2,2502,3002,4002,5002,5001,838 India1,7821,9702,3102,0502,0501,160 European Union1,2151,4602,0501,5001,5001,200 Indonesia1,0001,3501,0501,1001,100943 Mexico9458651,0501,1001,100900 Colombia1,0251,0101,1001,0001,000730 Thailand9058859901,0001,000410 Ecuador370475413465465748 Other68769374362775217,227 Total17,21917,74219,13618,34218,067Exportsnone41,426 Brazil40,25645,67539,68539,04536,64528,318 Vietnam27,32625,30029,00028,10027,65013,615 Colombia13,00512,75512,36513,00012,7506,150 Indonesia7,1527,8727,4127,6507,7504,450 Uganda5,3506,5146,1206,5206,5205,778 India5,1855,7947,2405,9756,2256,910 Honduras4,9006,0104,6005,6005,6004,174 Ethiopia4,1354,6754,8004,7254,7254,293 Peru3,7203,3264,0654,1004,1002,966 European Union3,4903,8604,6403,5003,50024,810 Other24,05222,57924,01123,34923,794142,890 Total138,571144,360143,938141,564139,259Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins either in October(Colombia),April(Indonesia)or July(Brazil),as examples.Coffee marketing year for non-producer countries begins in October.Roasted coffee was converted to green bean equivalent by multiplying the net weight of roasted coffee by 1.19.Soluble coffee was converted to green bean equivalent by multiplying the net weight of soluble coffee by 2.6.For each non-producing country,the trade balance between imports and exports is used in order to avoid double-counting for these figures.Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 7 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCoffee Summary,ContinuedThousand 60-Kilogram Bags2018/192019/202020/212021/22Jun2022/23Dec2022/23 Bean Importsnone45,890 European Union44,46043,87546,57546,00044,50027,150 United States23,90024,33525,22525,50024,7507,370 Japan6,5506,5206,8006,9006,5003,070 Russia3,1803,3903,4002,8003,5002,810 Switzerland3,0303,4503,4003,4003,4002,480 Korea,South2,6602,6353,0152,7503,0003,135 Canada2,8352,8602,9402,9002,8003,175 United Kingdom2,6402,2702,7252,6002,7002,300 Algeria2,0002,2002,0502,0002,000975 Colombia8451,6702,0401,7001,90018,721 Other17,48317,90218,81218,00518,835117,076 Total109,583111,107116,982114,555113,885Roast and Ground Importsnone650 United Kingdom585580580600600370 United States360605580600600350 Canada480475550500525360 Ukraine450460450300450290 Korea,South320360390350400475 Russia430460305350350250 China260309350300300165 Australia200205200200200150 Saudi Arabia190200210200200500 Vietnam300200200200200720 Other7457829637878974,280 Total4,3204,6364,7784,3874,722Soluble Importsnone5,500 Philippines5,0005,5005,7005,5005,8001,400 Canada1,5151,6601,8401,7001,8001,525 China1,7751,8202,1701,8001,800500 United States8005851,2351,0001,300983 Indonesia766751725800780860 Japan630530500700500360 South Africa3104054904754751,400 Russia1,015315350400400365 Ukraine400330425300400260 Argentina3103503603753752,942 Other3,9463,3993,9583,7163,76616,095 Total16,46715,64517,75316,76617,396Importsnone45,890 European Union44,46043,87546,57546,00044,50028,020 United States25,06025,52527,04027,10026,6508,320 Japan7,2907,1507,4157,7007,1006,100 Philippines5,6706,1806,5406,2006,5004,885 Canada4,8304,9955,3305,1005,1254,945 Russia4,6254,1654,0553,5504,2502,625 China2,9353,8044,1853,1003,8003,875 United Kingdom3,8052,9553,9853,4503,6002,770 Korea,South2,9802,9953,4053,1003,4002,810 Switzerland3,0303,4503,4003,4003,40027,211 Other25,68526,29427,58327,00827,678137,451 Total130,370131,388139,513135,708136,003Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins either in October(Colombia),April(Indonesia)or July(Brazil),as examples.Coffee marketing year for non-producer countries begins in October.Roasted coffee was converted to green bean equivalent by multiplying the net weight of roasted coffee by 1.19.Soluble coffee was converted to green bean equivalent by multiplying the net weight of soluble coffee by 2.6.For each non-producing country,the trade balance between imports and exports is used in order to avoid double-counting for these figures.Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 8 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCoffee Summary,ContinuedThousand 60-Kilogram Bags2018/192019/202020/212021/22Jun2022/23Dec2022/23 Domestic Consumptionnone42,092 European Union40,26441,28641,70242,90042,00027,162 United States26,04925,93726,72326,80026,96823,200 Brazil22,99422,28022,34022,45022,4506,125 Philippines6,1206,6057,1906,7757,0757,897 Japan7,6107,3547,2107,9337,0004,885 Canada4,8304,9955,3305,1005,1253,000 China3,6004,2004,8004,2004,8004,300 Indonesia4,9004,4504,7504,8004,7704,945 Russia4,6254,1654,0553,5504,2503,875 United Kingdom3,8052,9553,9853,4503,6003,193 Ethiopia3,1403,0003,3753,5003,5002,770 Korea,South2,9802,9953,4053,1003,4002,940 Vietnam3,1003,1003,2003,3003,3002,580 Mexico2,6202,5892,7122,7002,7002,040 Australia1,9602,0552,3052,2002,2001,925 Colombia1,7752,0802,1452,1502,1102,340 Algeria2,0402,2402,0902,0502,0501,460 Switzerland1,4701,5801,5401,6001,6001,205 Turkey1,2151,1651,2851,3001,3501,250 India1,1701,1801,2301,2351,320980 Saudi Arabia1,0401,2001,1851,3001,3001,145 Ukraine1,2701,2351,2758501,250845 Morocco710880980950950735 Argentina859789905850850800 Serbia80583573585085011,696 Other10,82510,74610,73111,14711,177165,385 Total161,776161,896167,183167,040167,945Ending Stocksnone14,332 European Union15,03813,76714,00012,36713,0007,352 United States6,4026,0236,3786,5406,1005,056 Brazil2,3734,3905405,1114,120556 Vietnam2,1303,2803,2103,5153,0553,217 Japan2,8972,6932,8982,2002,9982,419 Indonesia2,2981,6691,0721,024937552 Colombia8521,23575048559593 China2981,017987717587310 Tanzania280504480506506800 Philippines8008006005005002,436 Other2,8582,6211,6501,7391,71637,123 Total36,22637,99932,56534,70434,114Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins either in October(Colombia),April(Indonesia)or July(Brazil),as examples.Coffee marketing year for non-producer countries begins in October.Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 9 December 2022Global Market Analysis

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United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service Approved by the World Agricultural Outlook Board/USDA December 2022 Thus far in 2022 record exports-on a value basis-are being set across all dairy commodities,driven by strong international dairy product prices.Through October,dairy export values are up 25 percent,with robust growth across the major product groups including skim milk powder(NDM/SMP),whey,lactose,cheese,and butter;however,from a volume perspective,average export growth across commodities is a more modest 5 percent.Nowhere is this dichotomy more prevalent than with NDM,where export quantities have fallen 8 percent over this period while export values have increased 27 percent.For the current year,NDM exports are forecast to fall about 8 percent to 819,000 tons due to slowing shipments to China where consumption of SMP has shifted to whole milk powder(WMP)in response to higher prices and higher domestic WMP production.NDM/SMP exports are expected to rebound in 2023 to 836,000 tons as higher milk production drives production higher for a number of dairy products.Note:Given“Other”is a mix of different units of measurement,volume change is unavailable Through October,whey and cheese exports saw similar activity with volume growth of 7 percent and 13 percent,respectively,while values grew 38 percent and 26 percent,respectively.Butter was the one major dairy product where export volume growth has outpaced export value growth,reflecting significantly lower unit values to Mexico and Canada.$2,602$1,889$1,546$478$230$222$223$140$124$5370 0%Non-Fat Dry MilkCheese And CurdWheyLactoseButter And MilkfatIce CreamInfant Formula/PrepsFood PreparationsDry Whole Milk&CreamOtherComposition of U.S.Dairy Exports Jan-Oct 2022($Millions)Jan-Oct$7,99127&7!0%3%8!%-8%8C%-1%5%-2%-20%0 %Percent Change in Jan-Oct 2022 Exports vs.2021YoY Change in ValueYoY Change in Volume Dairy Production and Trade Developments FLUID MILK:Cow Milk Production Summary for Major Exporter(Million Tons)2021 2022 Forecast 2023 Forecast 2022-2023 Change Argentina 11.9 11.9 12.0 1%Australia 9.1 8.6 8.5-1%European Union 144.8 143.9 143.0-1%New Zealand 22.0 21.1 21.0 0%United States 102.6 103.0 104.1 1%Major Exporter Total 290.4 288.5 288.6 0%Note:Data is rounded.In Argentina,milk output is forecast to rebound in 2023 after dry weather conditions in the summer and a cold autumn impacted yields in 2022,which brought an end to two-2.0%-1.0%0.0%1.0%2.0%3.0%4.0%Jan_2019MarMayJulSepNovJan_2020MarMayJulSepNovJan_2021MarMayJulSepNovJan_2022MarMayJulSepPercent Change in Monthly Milk Production and 3-Month Moving Average for Major Milk ProducersNote:-Includes,Argentina,Australia,EU,New Zealand,U.S.-Adjusted for Leap Year 2020Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 2 December 2022Global Market Analysissuccessive years of higher milk production.Milk production is expected to grow by 1 percent in 2023 reflecting a return to normal weather conditions,improved availability of inputs(mainly concentrates,fertilizers and fuels for feedstuffs production),and investments in comfort-related technology and more efficient husbandry practices,which have been key to maintaining milk production growth.Milk production in Australia is expected to decline 1 percent in 2023.The overall outlook for production conditions in 2023 is favorable with record milk prices,low hay prices,and easing feed grain prices.Above average rainfalls across the major dairy farming regions have provided ample fodder and low-cost water for irrigation.Traditionally,these conditions would cause producers to boost dairy cow numbers and lead to higher milk production.However,dairy farms continue to face labor shortages which will prevent expansion in cow numbers.Furthermore,energy and fertilizer costs have soared,causing dairy farmers to scale back cow numbers and either partially or fully convert to beef cattle production.These enterprises require less labor and may be more profitable with beef prices near record highs.For 2023,there is unlikely to be any substantial price relief in imported nitrogen fertilizer prices,which have grown upwards of 3-4 times since January 2021,or electricity costs(milking parlors on dairy farms use substantial amounts of electricity).As fertilizer and energy prices are expected to remain high,there will be continued pressure on dairy farmer profitability.In China,raw milk production is expected to reach 42.1 million tons in 2023.The growth in Chinas raw milk production can be attributed to government policies supporting dairy production,large-scale investments by dairy companies,and the importation of over 1.2 million head of high-quality cattle during the last 5 years.It is estimated that approximately 80 percent of cattle imports,which have come predominantly from New Zealand and Australia,are for dairy production.Dairy processors are expected to process much of this years seasonal surplus raw milk into WMP.-10.0%-9.0%-8.0%-7.0%-6.0%-5.0%-4.0%-3.0%-2.0%-1.0%0.0%JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctYear-Over-Year Monthly Change in Australian Cow Milk Production-2022Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 3 December 2022Global Market Analysis Dairy cow numbers in the European Union(EU)are forecast to fall below 20 million head in 2023,a decline of 1.7 million head since 2016,and a decrease of 564,000 head since 2021.Despite continued year-on-year increases in milk productivity,the decline in cow numbers has eroded EU cow milk production,which is forecast for 2023 at 143.0 million tons.The planned implementation on January 1,2023,for the new Common Agricultural Policy(CAP)and the accompanying Farm to Fork Strategy(F2F),will likely add uncertainty for the dairy sector in the coming year.The EU-wide drought in 2022,which persisted all summer,hindered 2022 fodder production and has depressed milk production as higher production costs for energy,fertilizer,and feed negated higher farm-gate milk prices.Non-cow milk production,mostly concentrated in Mediterranean member states,has fared better,driven by consumer demand for dairy products like goat cheeses or mozzarella buffalo,as well as local milk production for niche products protected by a geographical indication(GI).However,farmers in France and Italy that produce milk for GI products faced shortages of fodder and halting production as they could no longer met the feeding standards for their GI production.Despite relatively high milk prices,New Zealand milk production is forecast to decline marginally in 2023 to 21.0 million due to a smaller dairy herd and slightly lower milk per cow yields.Cow yields are forecast to be impacted by a third consecutive La Nia weather pattern,as well as a smaller feed base,impacted by a cold and wet winter slowing spring pasture growth coupled with a smaller winter forage crop from prolonged dry conditions in the first half of 2022.Cow numbers are forecast to decline 0.3 percent to 4.9 million head,continuing the trend of herd contraction since peaking at 5.2 million head in 2014.-1.5%-1.0%-0.5%0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepYear-over-Year Monthly Change in EU Cow Milk Production-2022Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 4 December 2022Global Market AnalysisFor 2022,milk production in New Zealand is forecast at 21.1 million tons,down 4 percent from 2021.At the start of the 2022 year,most dairy production regions encountered a prolonged dry period,symptomatic of the La Nia weather pattern.The prolonged dryness in the first half of 2022 coincided with an upsurge in COVID-19 cases which initially had a major impact at farms.Surging cases led to a slowdown at slaughter facilities due to lack of workers and resulted in many cull dairy cows being delayed and held on farm.These cows then utilized feed that would have typically been prioritized for the milking herd.Producers were also hampered by rising input costs with a range of industry estimates putting on-farm inflation for dairy farms at 16-17 percent as of mid-2022.New Zealand dairy farms are reliant on imports for farm inputs such as agrichemicals and nitrogen fertilizer from China,which saw global supply chain disruptions from COVID-19 disruptions.In addition to feed costs,fuel and electricity prices have also been rising for dairy farms.CHEESE:Cheese Exports Summary for Major Exporters(1,000 Tons)2021 2022 Forecast 2023 Forecast 2022-2023 Change Australia 157 155 165 6larus 298 310 320 3%European Union 1,385 1,370 1,375 0%New Zealand 358 335 335 0%United States 402 451 469 4%Major Exporter Total 2,600 2,621 2,664 2%Note:Data is rounded.European Union cheese production in 2022 is expected to remain stable,despite lower milk production,due in part to industry preference for cheese production over other-9%-8%-7%-6%-5%-4%-3%-2%-1%0%JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctYear-Over-Year Monthly Change in New Zealand Cow Milk Production-2022Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 5 December 2022Global Market Analysisdairy commodities.In addition,new cheese processing plants have opened in the Netherlands,Belgium,Germany,and France,and are mostly producing industrial mozzarella for the food processing industry.EU cheese production is forecast up slightly in 2023 by one-half percent to reach 10.6 million tons,as domestic cheese demand picks up again after the relaxing of COVID-19 related restrictions.EU cheese exports are forecast to decline by 1 percent in 2022 as high prices and weaker demand in China and Ukraine hamper global demand for commodity cheeses.However,Japan,South Korea,and Saudi Arabia continue to be important markets for the EU.Exports are expected to remain relatively unchanged in 2023,forecast up less than 1 percent,with continued recovery in demand from the United Kingdom offsetting weakened demand from China.New Zealand cheese production for 2023 is forecast down 4 percent due to lower milk supply.Strong international prices have pushed a larger percentage of production toward exports,but with an increase in whole milk powder and lower milk availability,growth in exports for 2023 is limited.The forecast for 2023 cheese exports is expected to remain the same as 2022 at 335,000 tons.Demand continues to be strong in Asia for mozzarella products.The demand for soft cheeses,such as cream cheese,also continues to grow in Asia but there are constraints as manufacturing plants are already nearing full capacity.$2,000$2,500$3,000$3,500$4,000$4,500$5,000$5,500$6,000$6,500JanMaySepJanMaySepJanMaySepJanMaySepJanMaySepJanMaySep201720182019202020212022Oceania Cheese PriceSource:GDTForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 6 December 2022Global Market Analysis U.S.cheese exports in 2023 are forecast 4 percent higher to 469,000 tons on stronger demand from key markets in Japan and Canada.Shipments of cheese have been strong in 2022 and the export forecast has been revised up 3 percent to 451,000 tons.Through October,shipments to Mexico,Japan,and South Korea have grown double digits year over year and account for more than half of U.S.shipments.Other major destinations are Australia,Canada,Panama,and Guatemala that combined account for 15 percent of U.S.cheese shipments.BUTTER(Includes Butteroil/AMF):Butter Exports Summary for Major Exporters(1,000 Tons)2021 2022 Forecast 2023 Forecast 2022-2023 Change Belarus 78 78 80 3%European Union 265 260 265 2%New Zealand 436 500 450-10%United States 58 84 74-12%Major Exporter Total 837 922 869-6%Note:Data is rounded.In 2023,New Zealand butter production is forecast down 5 percent to 475,000 tons,following its downward trend in butter production after peaking in 2015.Milk production is forecast lower,and processors are shifting milk for manufacturing towards whole milk powder(WMP)production to satisfy demand from China and Indonesia.05101520253035404550Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunJulAug Sep Oct Nov DecMetric Tons of 1,000 LtrsU.S.Cheese Exports3-yr Av2022Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 7 December 2022Global Market AnalysisThrough October 2022,New Zealands butter exports have been strong,at 14 percent ahead of 2021.China was the largest market,accounting for 25 percent of shipments,followed by Australia(7 percent),Philippines(7 percent)and Saudi Arabia(6 percent).Since April,Oceania butter prices have diverged from EU prices,with EU butter trading at a premium of$2,970/ton after lower GDT auction prices in May,July,and October.Butter imports in China are forecast to shrink 3 percent in 2023 to 150,000 tons.This will largely reflect lower demand as Chinas butter production growth in 2023 is only fractional,limited by production capacity.Imports currently account for nearly 60 percent of domestic consumption.Butter consumption is expected to decline in 2023 to 259,000 tons,but it still would mark the second largest level of domestic consumption since 1970.This is driven in part by consumer popularity for bakery goods and food service products containing butter,as well as by large-scale food manufacturers.This also includes the HRI sector,an important component driving butter consumption,with a growing upper middle class in large cities,which had been affected by the uncertainty surrounding Chinas use of COVID-related lockdowns.$2,000$3,000$4,000$5,000$6,000$7,000$8,000$9,000Butter Export Prices Mid-point$/Ton FOB Oceania ButterEU ButterSource:AMSForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 8 December 2022Global Market AnalysisSKIM MILK POWDER(SMP):SMP Exports Summary for Major Exporters(1,000 Tons)2021 2022 Forecast 2023 Forecast 2022-2023 Change Australia 156 145 130-10larus 120 123 123 0%European Union 788 700 625-11%New Zealand 326 355 335-6%United States 893 825 836 1%Major Exporter Total 2,283 2,148 2,049-5%Note:Data is rounded.Australia exports of SMP are projected to decline 10 percent to 130,000 tons in 2023.The lower forecast comes as stocks have been drawn down over the last 2 years when processors took advantage of attractive world market prices and milk supplies were limited.Declining SMP production due to lower milk production and increased industry focus on cheese production,is expected to limit exportable supplies.Over the last 5 years,the composition of Australias export markets has undergone a shift,with exports to China now accounting for almost half of Australias SMP exports.2023 SMP production in the European Union is forecast to decline 5 percent.SMP production is closely tied to butter production and butter production is forecast to decline.Exports are also expected to fall 11 percent due to limited production and lower demand from China and Indonesia(which has shifted to buying from New Zealand),as well as new import controls in Algeria.China and Algeria are the EUs largest export markets for SMP,accounting for 27 percent of exports this year through September.$1,500$2,000$2,500$3,000$3,500$4,000$4,500$5,000JanMarMayJulSepNovJanMarMayJulSepNovJanMarMayJulSepNov202020212022SMP Export Prices-Per TonOceaniaEUU.S.-WestSource:AMS MidpointForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 9 December 2022Global Market Analysis U.S.SMP production is forecast to grow modestly by 1 percent in 2023,reflecting higher available milk supplies,partially recovering after an 8 percent decline in 2022.Exports in 2022 were also down in 2022 reflecting both tighter supplies and increased competition.The price gap between U.S.and EU SMP has narrowed significantly in the second half of 2022,and a strong dollar relative to the euro has created an environment that is difficult for U.S.exporters.For November,EU prices for SMP were quoted at$1.47 per pound FOB while the U.S.price for Western low-medium head NDM FOB ex-plant was$1.46 per pound.1 Exports are slated to recover modestly in 2023,up 2 percent to 836,000 tons,reflecting growth in exports to Mexico,the Philippines,and Indonesia.SMP consumption in China is forecast to decline in 2023 as domestic processors are expected to shift away from SMP in favor of WMP for snack food processing.In 2023,SMP imports are expected to decline to 320,000 tons,a year-on-year decline of 3 percent,on higher SMP global prices and increased use of WMP.Domestic production of SMP is unlikely to affect imports as domestically produced SMP is limited.New Zealand,Australia and the United States continue to dominate Chinas SMP imports,accounting for nearly 70 percent of SMP imports in the first half of 2022.WHOLE MILK POWDER(WMP):WMP Exports Summary for Major Exporters(1,000 Tons)2021 2022 Forecast 2023 Forecast 2022-2023 Change Argentina 145 165 180 9%Australia 51 55 45-18%European Union 298 250 240-4%New Zealand 1,617 1,450 1,500 3%Major Exporter Total 2,111 1,920 1,965 2%Note:Data is rounded.New Zealand 2023 WMP production will rebound,reaching 1.5 million tons,up 3 percent from 2022,but still below 2021.Despite lower total milk production,demand from key importers is expected to rebound,supporting a shift of some milk back into WMP production.With this stronger than expected demand,exports are forecast to rise slightly but remain below the 2021 record of 1.6 million tons.1 https:/www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/dymaveragesytd.pdf Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 10 December 2022Global Market Analysis WMP production in China is forecast to increase 7 percent in 2023 due to higher milk supplies.Bakeries suffered significant losses in 2022 due to prolonged COVID-19 restrictions and a slowing economy.In 2023,although demand by the baking industry may remain limited,in the food processing sector,overall demand for WMP is expected to grow as domestic production volume increases and domestic prices are favorable while global NDM prices stay relatively strong.As a result,in 2023,WMP consumption is expected to increase to 1.795 million tons.WMP imports are forecast to remain unchanged at 700,000 tons,as domestic WMP production and stocks should satisfy consumption growth in 2023.New Zealand is expected to remain the dominant supplier,followed by Uruguay and Australia.Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 11 December 2022Global Market AnalysisU.S.DAIRY EXPORT FORECASTS:EXPORTS ON A MILK EQUIVALENT BASIS THROUGH OCTOBER 2022:Additional Resources:For additional information,please contact Jeffrey Dwyer at 202-690-0755 or Jeffrey.Dwyer2usda.gov Subscription services for FAS circulars can be obtained at:https:/Individual FAS country reports covering dairy are available at:https:/gain.fas.usda.gov/#/The USDA Production,Supply and Demand database is available at:https:/apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/home A monthly“Livestock,Dairy,and Poultry Outlook”for the United States published by the Economic Research Service is available at:https:/www.ers.usda.gov/publications/U.S.trade data is available on the Global Agricultural Trade System(GATS):https:/apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx The next publication of this circular will be on July 18,2023.2023(F)FatSkims2022(F)FatSkimsNON-FAT DRY AND SKIM MILK PWDR836,000 MT0.419.5825,383 MT0.419.2MILK POWDER 1.5%MILK FAT38,500 MT0.50.636,416 MT0.50.6BUTTER/MILKFAT/SPREADS73,650 MT3.30.083,666 MT3.80.0CHEESE AND CURD469,450 MT6.83.7451,536 MT6.73.6FLUID PRODUCTS 4/192,350 Liters0.50.4201,952 Liters0.50.4DRIED WHEY PRODUCTS658,000 MT0.815.1662,204 MT0.815.3LACTOSE444,000 MT0.010.8444,501 MT0.010.8OTHER DAIRY PRODUCTS214,300 MT0.72.3230,000 MT0.72.5TOTAL-Billion Pounds13.052.313.552.4Note:1)CY 2022 includes actual exports through October 2022 2)Milk Equivalent figures are rounded and totals may not add up.3)Forecasts assume current policy 4/Includes milk based drinks,fluid whey,cream and fluid milkMilk Equivalent(Bil.Lbs.)Milk Equivalent(Bil.Lbs)U.S.Dairy Products Export Forecast-Calendar Year 2022-2023Top Dest.-M.E.Milkfat Basis(Mill.lbs)2022Top Dest.-M.E.Skim Basis(Mill.lbs)2022 MEXICO2,62823%MEXICO9,78722NADA1,82416%CHINA(MAINLAND)9,19121%SOUTH KOREA1,33612%PHILIPPINES3,4468%JAPAN7176%INDONESIA2,9207%CHINA(MAINLAND)4434%JAPAN2,0545HRAIN4024NADA1,9324%Other3,95135%Other14,81234%TOTAL11,300TOTAL44,143Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 12 December 2022Global Market AnalysisFluid Milk-Cow Numbers:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Head201820192020202120222023Dec noneCows In Milk61,00059,50058,00056,45054,60052,482 India19,95020,20020,51420,76621,02921,409 European Union17,06516,89616,64616,40016,50016,300 Brazil6,7006,6506,6006,5506,5006,550 Mexico6,6006,4006,2006,1506,1006,200 China6,3506,4306,4956,6156,7116,815 Russia4,8604,8754,9044,9224,9464,993 New Zealand1,8501,8591,8561,8671,8791,904 United Kingdom1,5301,5461,5621,6101,5981,640 Argentina1,4701,4751,4801,4851,4981,500 Belarus1,3601,4501,7221,7891,9702,078 Ukraine1,3251,3351,3651,3851,4401,525 Australia975972980972968970 Canada740737726715730731 Japan200203204202204205 Korea,South666665636262 Taiwan111211111111 Philippines132,052130,606129,330127,952126,746125,375 Subtotal9,4209,4109,4489,3929,3379,398 United States141,472140,016138,778137,344136,083134,773 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 13 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCows Milk Production and Consumption:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneCows Milk Production143,000143,900144,833145,436143,060142,258 European Union99,50097,00096,00093,80092,00089,800 India40,90039,20036,83034,40032,01230,750 China32,30032,15032,02032,01031,15430,398 Russia24,50023,66024,84524,96524,26223,745 Brazil21,00021,10021,99521,98021,89622,017 New Zealand15,00015,15515,42815,44715,42915,189 United Kingdom13,25012,98012,85012,75012,65012,368 Mexico12,00011,90011,90011,44510,64010,837 Argentina10,33010,23010,15710,0359,9039,944 Canada8,4758,5509,0679,0998,8329,451 Australia7,9807,9107,8307,7657,3947,345 Belarus7,6607,6307,5157,4387,3147,289 Japan6,9807,3008,8009,2589,64610,070 Ukraine2,0202,0402,0302,0882,0352,041 Korea,South465460450437410385 Taiwan171716171716 Philippines445,377441,182442,566438,370428,654423,903 Subtotal104,101102,967102,630101,29299,08498,688 United States549,478544,149545,196539,662527,738522,591 TotalnoneFluid Use Dom.Consum.87,45085,00083,00081,00079,00077,000 India23,65023,80023,95124,10623,37323,313 European Union16,70016,25015,59513,00013,20012,700 China10,88110,56411,12011,17010,90010,762 Brazil6,8006,9006,9907,0807,2707,318 Russia6,0006,0506,2616,3766,4046,763 United Kingdom4,1854,1664,1504,1454,1904,183 Mexico4,0704,0654,0504,0204,0003,995 Japan4,0104,1504,9605,0254,9674,862 Ukraine2,7052,7302,7512,8442,8162,832 Canada2,4202,4502,4902,5282,5362,620 Australia1,8001,8001,9001,8001,6451,771 Argentina1,5151,5301,5401,5231,5751,566 Korea,South1,0751,0801,0851,0751,0551,050 Belarus535535530525520515 New Zealand480480479475443420 Taiwan14013012411911796 Philippines174,416171,680170,976166,811164,011161,766 Subtotal20,90020,97521,00021,02721,05021,425 United States195,316192,655191,976187,838185,061183,191 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 14 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCheese Production and Consumption:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneProduction10,60010,55010,55010,36210,1559,872 European Union1,1001,0851,0751,059983970 Russia770745790790770760 Brazil540530522523515510 Canada535535530488523444 Argentina520515503488472472 United Kingdom465455448446437419 Mexico395390385379364366 Australia380370355346300275 Belarus360375380350365370 New Zealand263267296289285284 Others15,92815,81715,83415,52015,16914,742 Total Foreign6,4256,3506,2176,0055,9595,914 United States22,35322,16722,05121,52521,12820,656 TotalnoneTotal Dom.Consumption9,4159,3659,3619,1839,0198,790 European Union1,4301,3901,3631,3381,2311,200 Russia800774817817795785 Brazil745740749783790793 United Kingdom605594568549551526 Mexico585571562555539536 Canada450435457420461380 Argentina335332335335346329 Japan320320310305297293 Australia200193195188166155 Korea,South558545620550516496 Others15,44315,25915,33715,02314,71114,283 Total Foreign6,0796,0295,9395,7455,7515,675 United States21,52221,28821,27620,76820,46219,958 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 15 December 2022Global Market AnalysisCheese Trade:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneTotal Exports1,3751,3701,3851,4021,3481,279 European Union335335358327335322 New Zealand310310298275244211 Belarus180175154190206187 United Kingdom165155157153160172 Australia908578706161 Argentina454035302624 Russia363635353039 Others2,5362,5062,5002,4822,4102,295 Total Foreign469451402355357348 United States3,0052,9572,9022,8372,7672,643 TotalnoneTotal Imports405400400485524508 United Kingdom375345326311273250 Russia285280288292303286 Japan190185196223212197 European Union155155132114121123 Mexico150145176129115108 China150150157148131124 Korea,South337322339309277264 Others2,0471,9822,0142,0111,9561,860 Total Foreign153146145128139138 United States2,2002,1282,1592,1392,0951,998 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 16 December 2022Global Market AnalysisButter Production and Consumption:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneProduction6,7006,5006,3006,1005,8505,600 India2,0402,0802,1412,1732,1252,069 European Union475500470500525550 New Zealand280275270282268256 Russia245236235233231228 Mexico205205212194194140 United Kingdom125123121120116115 Belarus125120122118112116 Canada110109109108110108 China828182828585 Brazil222235254270254292 Others10,60910,46410,31610,1809,8709,559 Total Foreign975933940973905893 United States11,58411,39711,25611,15310,77510,452 TotalnoneDomestic Consumption6,6456,4566,2896,0815,8035,577 India1,8451,8901,9271,9091,9001,898 European Union400389393402384346 Russia273270256266277250 Mexico259262246230198226 China210210212203195153 United Kingdom155150147141141124 Canada929195106104117 Australia888688858991 Brazil858481798378 Japan172167178200201186 Others10,22410,0559,9129,7029,3759,046 Total Foreign985935985978940898 United States11,20910,99010,89710,68010,3159,944 TotalNote:Butter includes butter,butteroil and anhydrous milk fat on a butter equivalent basis.Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA 17 December 2022Global Market AnalysisButter Trade:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneTotal Imports15015513912391120 China12512012212811788 Russia707051527776 European Union555555747478 United Kingdom403537434042 Australia303228242522 Canada303523425933 Mexico252522222423 Taiwan101101041 Ukraine9912182516 Japan888568 Others552545507541542507 Total Foreign748169706659 United States626626576611608566 TotalnoneTotal Exports450500436471509501 New Zealand265260265316302247 European Union807878696778 Belarus554411204733 India505055657365 United Kingdom303031211511 Argentina152022161817 Australia510991629 Ukraine333323 Russia21291311 Mexico344664 Others9581,0009161,0051,068999 Total Foreign748458272649 United States1,0321,0849741,0321,0941,048 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 18 December 2022Global Market AnalysisNonfat Dry Milk Production and Consumption:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneProduction1,3751,4501,5041,5901,5561,568 European Union730700680660635600 India330350330362375410 New Zealand165160150140125120 Japan162157164161158155 Brazil145150147155150201 Australia125125122126126122 Belarus436423424432421418 Others3,4683,5153,5213,6263,5463,594 Total Foreign1,1701,1401,2381,2091,1071,067 United States4,6384,6554,7594,8354,6534,661 TotalnoneTotal Dom.Consumption790785748795835992 European Union695682653636601572 India447430382353340347 Mexico343353446355358299 China218204197196187161 Indonesia185174185204177159 Philippines184179188187183184 Brazil739712741715730779 Others3,6013,5193,5403,4413,4113,493 Total Foreign332326363384422369 United States3,9333,8453,9033,8253,8333,862 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 19 December 2022Global Market AnalysisNonfat Dry Milk Trade:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneTotal Imports400385338309361360 Mexico320330426336344280 China220205199197188162 Indonesia185180168179177159 Philippines135135138144120167 Algeria505559608895 Russia403532365646 European Union252325242323 Taiwan222224262529 Brazil202022394752 Japan595570838788 Others1,4761,4451,5011,4331,5161,461 Total Foreign111111 United States1,4771,4461,5021,4341,5171,462 TotalnoneTotal Exports625700788831945826 European Union335355326356373358 New Zealand130145156129128155 Australia123123120123124121 Belarus4532455843 India353519404766 Canada353852728260 United Kingdom252521282223 Argentina101513162023 Ukraine581000 Japan88966860 Others1,3761,4841,5501,6061,8171,735 Total Foreign836825893810701712 United States2,2122,3092,4432,4162,5182,447 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 20 December 2022Global Market AnalysisWhole Milk Powder Production And Consumption:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneProduction1,5301,4851,6001,5701,4901,450 New Zealand1,1251,0501,0109921,052965 China600620663736697684 European Union586568594590596585 Brazil255245234213188192 Argentina125124123122120119 Mexico737158737062 Chile615996858281 Indonesia605757494550 Belarus555552556556 Russia384567587798 Others4,5084,3794,5544,5434,4824,342 Total Foreign828267636465 United States4,5904,4614,6214,6064,5464,407 TotalnoneTotal Dom.Consumption1,7951,7471,8071,5851,7221,534 China660646640678657652 Brazil380390376418424381 European Union225228240256250245 Algeria165165153134135142 Indonesia112110116105106103 Mexico75788094110100 Russia707073808475 Argentina676768757166 Chile353540403335 Australia95102102114145137 Others3,6793,6383,6953,5793,7373,470 Total Foreign556134343631 United States3,7343,6993,7293,6133,7733,501 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 21 December 2022Global Market AnalysisWhole Milk Powder Trade:Summary For Selected Countries1,000 Metric Tons201820192020202120222023Dec noneTotal Imports700700849644671521 China220210221251233271 Algeria10610563515459 Indonesia808452896168 Brazil454037433728 Australia323536363234 Taiwan252528314627 Russia202011274243 European Union201519293223 Philippines757337 Mexico679111921 Others1,2611,2461,3321,2151,2301,102 Total Foreign101391397 United States1,2711,2591,3411,2281,2391,109 TotalnoneTotal Exports1,5001,4501,6171,5331,5361,369 New Zealand240250298345315346 European Union18016514514897135 Argentina455551374255 Australia403637272333 Belarus201914201723 Mexico1092244 Chile666101 Brazil532112 China221100 Russia2256104 Others2,0501,9972,1782,1212,0451,972 Total Foreign373639393948 United States2,0872,0332,2172,1602,0842,020 TotalForeign Agricultural Service/USDA 22 December 2022Global Market Analysis

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Pocket Guide to Transportation2023Free Copy-Not Meant for Salehttps:/www.bts.gov/pocketguide For additional copies of this guide or information about the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and its products and services,contact:https:/doi.org/10.21949/1527467 Product OrdersInternet:www.bts.govMail:Product Orders Bureau of Transportation Statistics ATTN:Product Orders 1200 New Jersey Avenue,SE,Room E34-457 Washington,DC 20590 Information ServicePhone:202-366-DATAEmail:btsdot.govJanuary 2023Free Copy-Not Meant for SalePocket Guide to Transportation2023Free Copy-Not Meant for SaleAcknowledgmentsU.S.Department of TransportationRobert C.Hampshire,PhDDeputy Assistant Secretary for Research and TechnologyBureau of Transportation StatisticsPatricia HuDirectorRolf SchmittDeputy DirectorProduced under the direction of:Ramond Robinson Director,Office of Transportation AnalysisSean JahanmirProject ManagerAlpha WingfieldVisual Information SpecialistMajor Contributors:Daniel Palumbo*Hoa Thai*Spatial FrontAbout the Pocket Guide to TransportationThe BTS Pocket Guide to Transportation is a quick reference guide that provides transportation statistics at your fingertips.It provides key information and highlights major trends on the U.S.transportation system.Intended as a compact reference,the Pocket Guide supports the BTS mission to create,manage,and share transportation statistical knowledge.Many of the tables and figures within this publication are derived from National Transportation Statistics available at www.bts.gov.The Pocket Guide is also available online at https:/www.bts.gov/pocketguide.ContentsMajor Trends.ivInfrastructure.1Moving People.7Moving Goods.19 Safety.27Performance.35Economy.41Environment.49Glossary.58Major Trends Moving People:January 2000July 2022NOTES:Graph scales are not comparable.Seasonally-adjusted data measure the real differences in data trends by adjusting for seasonal factors,such as the change in the number of days,weekends,holidays,or other seasonal activity in a month such as vacation travel.SOURCE:Seasonally-adjusted transportation dataU.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,available at www.bts.gov as of October 2022.ivvMajor TrendsMoving Freight:January 2000August 2022NOTES:Graph scales are not comparable.Rail freight intermodalRail inter-modal traffic includes shipping containers and truck trailers moved on rail cars.U.S.waterways freightIncludes tonnage carried on internal U.S.waterways.SOURCE:Seasonally-adjusted transportation dataU.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,available at www.bts.gov as October 2022.1Infrastructure1 InfrastructureThe U.S.transportation system consists of a network of roads,bridges,airports,railroads,transit systems,ports,waterways,and pipelines,connecting the nation to the rest of the world.1-1 Transportation Network Length milesMode20102020Highway Public roads4,067,0774,172,562 Public road lanesa8,582,2618,790,746Pipeline Gas distribution 1,229,9461,328,885 Gas transmission and gathering324,458319,224Rail Class I freight railroad95,70091,773 Amtrak21,17820,787Transit Commuter railb7,6307,930 Heavy railb1,6171,663 Light railb,c1,4972,096Water Navigable waterwaysd25,00025,000aMeasured in lane-miles.bMeasured in directional route-miles.cLight Rail was revised beginning in 2011 and includes light rail,street car rail,and hybrid rail.dEstimated length of domestic waterways.SOURCES:Highway,Pipeline,Rail,Transit,WaterAs cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,tables 1-1,1-6,and 1-10,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.2Pocket Guide to Transportation1-2 Transportation Facilities numberMode20102020Air Certificated airportsa551519 General aviation airports19,25119,395Highway Bridges604,493618,456Pipeline LNG facilities122165Rail Amtrak stations512526 Transit rail Commuter rail stations1,2251,311 Heavy rail stations1,0411,057 Light rail stationsb8481,287Water Portsc178192 Cargo handling docks8,0608,334 Lock chambers239237aCertificated airports serve air carrier operations with aircrafts seating more than nine passengers.bLight Rail was revised beginning in 2011 and includes light rail,street car rail,and hybrid rail.cPorts handling over 250,000 short tons.KEY:LNG=liquified natural gasSOURCES:Air,Highway,RailAs cited in U.S.Department of Trans-portation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,tables 1-3,1-7,and 1-28,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of August 2022.PipelineU.S.Department of Transportation,Pipe-line and Hazardous Materials Administration,available at https:/www.phmsa.dot.gov as of August 2022.TransitU.S.Department of Trans-portation,National Transit Database,available at https:/www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/as of August 2022.WaterU.S.Army Corps of Engineers,Navigation Data Center,Transportation Facts and Information,available at http:/www.navigationdatacenter.us/as of August 2022.3Infrastructure1-3 Transportation Vehicles numberMode20102020Air Air carrier aircraft7,1855,882 General aviation aircraft223,370204,980Highway Light-duty vehiclea230,444,440253,121,228 Truck10,770,05413,479,382 Motorcycle8,009,5038,317,363Rail Class I freight locomotive23,89323,544 Class I freight car397,730252,400 Amtrak locomotive282384 Amtrak car1,2741,313Transit rail Commuter railb6,7687,524 Heavy railb11,51011,064 Light railb2,0962,799Water Nonself-propelled vessel31,90634,168 Self-propelled vessel10,77510,333 Oceangoing vessel221180 Recreational boat12,438,92611,838,188aIncludes passenger cars,light trucks,vans,and sport utility vehicles.bIncludes revenue vehicles available for maximum service.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-11,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of January 2022.4Pocket Guide to Transportation1-5 National Highway System Pavement Condition percent of NHS facility milesNOTES:Pavement condition is measured by the International Roughness Index(IRI)which takes a longitudinal profile of pavement roughness based on one-way facility centerline miles.A lower IRI indicates smoother highway conditions and a higher IRI indicates rougher highway conditions.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Highway Administration,Highway Statistics,table HM-47,available at https:/www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyin-formation/statistics.cfm as of November 2022.1-4 Airport Runway Pavement Condition percent of NPIAS runwaysNOTE:National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems(NPIAS)airports include commercial service airports,reliever airports,and selected general aviation airports.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-25,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.5Infrastructure1-6 Bridge Condition by Deck Area:20122022NOTE:The deck area calculation was changed as of 2018 in accordance with 23 CFR 490.409.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Highway Administration,National Bridge Inventory,available at https:/www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/nbi.cfm as of October 2022.1-7 Condition of Highway Bridges by State:2022SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Highway Administration,National Bridge Inventory,available at https:/www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/nbi.cfm as of October 2022.7Moving People2 Moving PeopleThe U.S.transportation system makes personal mobility possible.Every day people use the transportation system to get to and from work,school,and shopping.2-1 Vehicle-Miles Traveled millionsMode20102020Air U.S.air carrier,domestica5,9764,214Highway Light-duty vehicleb2,648,4562,568,745 Motorcycle18,51317,632 Truck286,527302,141 Bus13,77015,104Passenger rail Amtrakc295185 Commuter railc342314 Heavy railc666663 Light rail c,d93120aMeasured in revenue aircraft-miles.bIncludes passenger cars,light trucks,vans,and sport utility vehicles.cMeasured in passenger car-miles.dLight rail was revised beginning in 2011 and includes light rail,street car rail,and hybrid rail.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-35,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.8Pocket Guide to Transportation2-2 Highway Travel:19702020NOTE:Data for 2007 and later years may not be comparable to previous years due to changes in methodology.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Highway Administration,Highway Statistics,available at https:/www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm as of October 2022.9Moving People2-3 Passenger-Miles Traveled millionsMode20102020Air U.S.air carrier,domestic554,711304,253Highway Light-duty vehiclea4,431,4514,304,298 Motorcycle21,48321,237 Truck286,527302,141 Bus270,344306,843Passenger rail Amtrakb6,4203,450 Commuter rail10,7746,021 Heavy rail16,4078,947 Light railc2,1731,834aIncludes passenger cars,light trucks,vans,and sport utility vehicles.bMeasured in revenue passenger-miles.cLight rail was revised beginning in 2011 and includes light rail,street car rail,and hybrid rail.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Trans-portation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-40,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.10Pocket Guide to Transportation2-4 Transit Ridership:19702021NOTE:Includes bus,commuter rail,demand response,heavy rail,light rail,trolley bus,ferry boat,aerial tramway,automated guideway,cable car,inclined plane,monorail,and other.SOURCES:1970-1989American Public Transportation Association,Public Trans-portation Fact Book,Appendix,available at https:/of March 2020.1990-2021American Public Transportation Association,Ridership Report,available at https:/of October 2022.11Moving People2-5 Daily Passenger Travel200120092017aTravel per person Daily person trips 4.13.83.4 Daily person-miles 36.936.136.1Travel per driver Daily vehicle trips3.43.02.7 Daily vehicle-miles of travel32.729.025.8Average commute Length in miles12.111.811.5 Travel time in minutes23.323.926.6Percent of work trips by usual mode Private vehicles90.889.487.5 Public transit b5.15.16.9 Walk2.82.82.9 Other c1.32.72.7aThe 2017 National Household Travel Survey includes a different methodology compared to previous years,such as an address-based sample including more urban and cell phone only households.bPublic transit includes local bus,com-muter bus,commuter train,subway,trolley,and streetcar.cOther includes travel modes not specifically cited,such as motorcycle,taxi,bike,truck,and other.NOTE:The usual mode is defined as the means of transportation usually used to go to work in the week prior to the travel day.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Highway Administration,2017 National Household Travel Survey,Summary of Travel Trends,available at https:/nhts.ornl.gov/as of October 2022.12Pocket Guide to Transportation2-6 Commute to Work Mode Share:2021 percent of workers age 16 and oldera Includes motorcycle,taxi,and other means.NOTES:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.The American Commu-nity Survey asks for the mode usually used by the respondent to get to work.For more than one mode of transportation,respondents select the mode used for most of the distance traveled.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-41,available at www.bts.gov as of October 2022.13Moving People2-7 Amtrak Ridership:FY2000FY2021SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Railroad Administra-tion,available at http:/safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/default.aspx/as of October 2022.2-8 Top 10 Amtrak Stations:FY2021 by passengersNOTE:Includes passenger boardings and alightings.SOURCE:Amtrak,National Fact Sheet and State Fact Sheet,available at as of October 2022.14Pocket Guide to Transportation2-9 U.S.Air Carrier Passenger Traffic:20032021NOTE:Includes passenger enplanements on scheduled services only(domestic and international flights).SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statis-tics,Office of Airline Information,T-100 Market data,available at www.bts.gov as of September 2022.2-10 Top 10 U.S.Airports:2021 by enplaned passengersNOTE:Includes passenger enplanements on U.S.carrier scheduled domestic and international service and foreign carrier scheduled international service to and from the United States.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-44,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.15Moving People2-11 Top 10 World Airports:2021 by enplaned,deplaned,and in-transit passengersNOTE:Preliminary data for passengers enplaned,deplaned,and passengers in transit.SOURCE:Airports Council International,available at https:/www.aci.aero/as of October 2022.16Pocket Guide to Transportation2-12 Incoming Land Border Person Crossings:19962021NOTE:Excludes drivers and passengers in commercial trucks.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Sta-tistics,Border Crossing Entry Data,available at https:/www.bts.gov/content/border-crossingentry-data/as of September 2022.17Moving People2-13 Top 5 Land Ports of Entry:2021 by incoming person crossingsNOTE:Excludes drivers and passengers in commercial trucks.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Sta-tistics,Border Crossing Entry Data,available at https:/www.bts.gov/content/border-crossingentry-data/as of September 2022.19Moving Goods3 Moving GoodsThe freight transportation network links natural resources,manufacturing facilities,labor markets,and customers across the nation and with international trading partners.3-1 Freight Shipments Within the U.S.by ModeValue of shipments(billions of constant 2017 dollars)Mode201720202050Truck13,69013,14826,023Rail5535371,026Water293242439Air and truck-air6545991,345Pipeline9469981,279Multiple modesa2,6582,4896,050Otherb451292Total18,83918,02436,254Weight of shipments(millions of tons)Mode201720202050Truck12,81012,59519,310Rail1,6241,4281,916Water9188581,240Air and truck-air6613Pipeline3,4513,5235,102Multiple modesa6896841,190Otherb311208133Total19,80919,30328,904Ton miles of shipments(billions of ton miles)Mode201720202050Truck2,3972,3583,931Rail1,0959461,230Water448424538Air and truck-air7714Pipeline8839261,357Multiple modesa5815751,022Otherb131418Total5,4285,2518,110aIncludes mail.bIncludes other,unknown,and imported crude oil with no domestic mode.NOTES:Details may not add to totals due to rounding.Includes domestic trade and the domestic portion of imports and exports.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics and Federal Highway Administration,Freight Analysis Framework,Version 5.4,available at www.bts.gov/faf as of October 2022.20Pocket Guide to Transportation3-2 U.S.Trade by Coasts and Borders:20032021NOTE:Includes U.S.international merchandise trade only.SOURCES:ValueU.S.Department of Commerce,Census Bureau,Foreign Trade Division,HS Port-Level Data(Washington,DC:annual issues)as of Octo-ber 2022.Implicit GDP DeflatorOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development,GDP Implicit Price Deflator in United States USAGDPDE-FAISMEI,retrieved from FRED,Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis;available at https:/fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USAGDPDEFAISMEI,available at www.bea.gov as of October 2022.21Moving Goods3-3 U.S.Trade with Canada and Mexico by Mode:2021a Export weights for land modes are estimated by the Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics using value-to-weight ratios derived from import data.bIncludes mail,other,unknown,and shipments through Foreign Trade Zones.NOTE:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statis-tics,North American Transborder Freight Data,special tabulation,available at https:/www.bts.gov/transborder as of March 2022.22Pocket Guide to Transportation3-4 Incoming Truck Border Crossings:19962021SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statis-tics,Border Crossing Entry Data,available at https:/data.transportation.gov/as of March 2022.23Moving Goods3-5 Top 5 Truck Ports of Entry:2021 by incoming truck crossingsNOTE:Customs and Border Patrol CBP separated the Ysleta Port of Entry from the El Paso Port of Entry beginning on March 1,2020.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statis-tics,Border Crossing Entry Data,available at https:/data.transportation.gov/as of September 2022.24Pocket Guide to Transportation3-6 Top 10 U.S.Water Ports:2020 by short tonsKEY:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent unit.NOTE:Includes domestic and foreign waterborne trade.Excludes foreign empty TEUs.SOURCE:U.S.Army Corps of Engineers,Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center,personal communication as of November 2022.by container TEUs(2019)25Moving Goods3-7 Top 10 World Container Ports:2021 TEUs,including full and empty containersKEY:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent unit.SOURCE:Lloyds List,One Hundred Ports 2022,available at https:/as of October 2022.26Pocket Guide to Transportation3-8 Top 10 U.S.International Trade Gateways:2020 by value of shipmentsKEY:=airport,=land port,=water port.NOTES:Air gateways include a low level(generally less than 3%of the total value)of freight shipped through small user-fee airports located in the same area as the gateways listed.Air gateways not identified by airport name(e.g.,Chicago,IL)include major airport(s)in the area and small regional airports.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-51,available at https:/www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.27Safety4 SafetyTransportation safety is the top priority of the U.S.Department of Transportation.4-1 Transportation Fatalities by ModeMode201020202021Air477349U U.S.air carrier20U Commuter carrier05U On-demand air taxi1721U General aviation458332UHighway32,99938,824U Passenger car occupants12,49113,472U Motorcyclists4,5185,579U Light-truck occupants9,78210,352U Heavy-truck occupants530831U Bus occupants4416U Pedestrians4,3026,516U Pedalcyclists623938U Other7091,120UPipeline221513Rail735743890 Train Accidents868 Highway-rail grade crossinga261195236 Trespassers441518614 Other252432Transitb224289322Water821838696 Freight vessel and Industrial/Other625627 Passenger vessel and Recreational boating759782669aIndividual modes dont add up to totals due to double counting in highway,rail,and transit grade crossings.bIncludes transit employee,contract worker,passenger,peo-ple waiting or leaving(revenue facility occupant),and other fatalities for all modes reported to the National Transit Database.Excludes commuter rail(reporting under FRA jurisdiction).Other transit fatalities are assumed to be counted under Highway or Rail categories.KEY:U=data are not available.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 2-1,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.28Pocket Guide to Transportation4-2 Transportation Injuries by ModeMode201020202021Air278202U U.S.air carrier178U Commuter carrier20U On-demand air taxi39U General aviation256187UHighway a2,247,9882,282,015U Passenger car occupantsa1,256,1011,221,335U Motorcyclistsa82,30082,528U Light-truck occupantsa737,152813,509U Heavy-truck occupantsa19,93744,934U Bus occupantsa17,5866,620U Pedestriansa70,26754,769U Pedalcyclistsa51,68838,886U Othera12,95619,435UPipeline1083932Rail8,3795,5515,817 Train Accidents 11072118 Highway-rail grade crossingb888697670 Trespassers390561522 Other 6,9914,2214,507Transitc23,10715,42116,549Water3,7703,5403,025 Freight vessel and Industrial/Other 407208232 Passenger vessel and Recreational boating 3,3633,3322,793a2020 and 2021 Crash Reporting Sampling System(CRSS)estimates for injuries are not comparable with 2010 and earlier NASS GES estimates because of different sampling designs.bExcludes injuries involving motor vehicles at public highway-rail grade cross-ings,which are assumed to be counted under Highway categories.cIncludes transit employee,contract worker,passenger,people waiting or leaving(revenue facility occupant),and other injuries for all modes reported to the National Transit Database.Excludes commuter rail(reporting under FRA jurisdiction).Other transit injuries are assumed to be counted under Highway or Rail categories.KEY:U=data are not available.NOTES:Highway numbers are estimates rather than actual counts.The estimates are calculated from data obtained from a nationally representative sample of crashes.NHTSA redesigned the nationally representative sample of police-reported traffic crashes,which estimates the number of police-reported injury and property-damage-only crashes in the US.The new system,CRSS,replaced the NASS GES in 2016 and has a different sample design.Thus,the 2020 and 2021 persons injured estimates are not comparable to earlier estimates.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 2-2,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of November 2022.29Safety4-3 Fatality Rates by Modecontinued on next page30Pocket Guide to Transportation4-3 Fatality Rates by Mode(continued)continued on next page31Safety4-3 Fatality Rates by Mode(continued)SOURCES:Highway,Passenger car and light-truck occupants,Highway-nonoccupants,Large-truck occupants,U.S.air carriers,General aviation,and Recreational boatingas cited in or calculated from U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,tables 2-9,2-14,2-17,2-19,2-21,2-23,2-47,and 3-10 available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.TransitU.S.Department of Transporta-tion,Federal Transit Administration,NTD Safety&Security Time Series Data,available at https:/www.transit.dot.gov/ntd as of October 2022.RailU.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Railroad Administration,table 1.12,available at https:/safetydata.fra.dot.gov/as of October 2022.32Pocket Guide to Transportation4-4 Alcohol-Impaired Driving Fatalities:19902020NOTE:Includes fatalities occurring in any crash involving a driver with a blood alcohol concentration(BAC)of 0.08 grams per deciliter or higher.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,Traffic Safety Facts:2019 Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes:Overview as of October 2022.4-5 Pedestrian and Bicyclist Fatalities:19902020NOTE:Includes pedestrians and riders of nonmotorized bicycles and other pedal-powered vehicles.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 2-1,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.33Safety4-6 Distracted Driving Fatalities and Injuries:20052020aDistracted driving fatality data for 2010 and on are not comparable with previous years due to changes in methodology.bCrash Reporting Sampling System(CRSS)estimates for injuries are not comparable with 2015 and earlier National Automotive Sampling System(NASS)General Estimates System(GES)estimates because of different sampling designs.NOTE:Distracted driving involves any activity that could divert a persons attention away from the primary task of driving,such as texting,using a cell phone,eating and drinking,grooming,using a navigation system,adjusting a radio,etc.SOURCE:FatalitiesU.S.Department of Transportation,National Center for Statistics and Analysis,Fatality and Injury Reporting System Tool(FIRST),available at www.cdan.dot.gov;Injuries-U.S.Department of Transportation,National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,Traffic Safety Facts,Research Note,Distracted Driving 2020,available at www.crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov,as of October 2022.35Performance5 PerformanceThe physical capacity of the U.S.transportation system has not kept pace with growth in travel and commerce.The resulting congestion and delays have significant impacts on passengers and freight shippers.5-1 Road Congestion:19852020NOTES:Annual hours of delay per car commuterThe extra time spent during the year traveling at congested speeds rather than free-flow speeds by private vehicle drivers and passengers who typically travel in the peak periods.The methodology to calculate congestion performance measures was updated to reflect more comprehensive data collection using INRIX data for each of the 494 U.S.urban areas.The congestion estimates for all study years are recal-culated every time the methodology is altered to provide a consistent data trend.For a detailed explanation of the updated methodology,see the Urban Mobility Report at http:/mobility.tamu.edu/ums/report/.SOURCE:Texas A&M Transportation Institute,Urban Mobility Report,available at https:/mobility.tamu.edu/umr/report/as of October 2022.36Pocket Guide to Transportation5-3 U.S.Airline On-time Performance:19952021NOTE:Flights arriving at the gate within 15 minutes of scheduled arrival time are on time.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,Airline On-Time Performance,available at www.bts.gov as of March 2022.5-2 Top 10 Metropolitan Area Congestion Rankings:2020 by calendar year,average minutes of congestionKEY:MSA=Metropolitan Statistical AreaNOTES:Minutes of congestionthe amount of time when freeways operate less than 90 percent of free-flow freeway speeds.Calculated by calendar year for an average duration of daily congestion.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Federal Highway Administration,Urban Congestion Report,personal communication,as of October 2022.37Performance5-4 U.S.Major Airport Delays by Cause:2021 percent of delayed timeaIncludes weather events that prevent flying.Other weather delays that slow operations are included under other categories.bDelay resulting from a previ-ous flight with the same aircraft arriving late.KEY:NAS=Delays attributable to the national aviation system(NAS)that refer to a broad set of conditions,such as non-extreme weather,airport operations,heavy traffic volume,and air traffic control.NOTE:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,Airline On-Time Performance,available at transtats.bts.gov as of October 2022.5-5 U.S.Major Airport Performance Rankings:2021 by percent of on-time arrivalsNOTE:Flights arriving at the gate within 15 minutes of scheduled arrival time are on time.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,Airline On-Time Performance,available at transtats.bts.gov as of October 2022.38Pocket Guide to Transportation5-6 Amtrak On-time Performance:FY1990FY2021NOTE:On-time performance is a percentage measure of train performance.A train is considered on-time if it arrives at the final destination,or end-point,within an allowed number of minutes,or tolerance,of its scheduled arrival time.Trains are allowed a certain tolerance at the end-point based on the number of miles traveled.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-73,available at transtats.bts.gov as of October 2022.Trip lengthTrain arrives at endpoint within0-250 miles10 minutes251-350 miles15 minutes351-450 miles20 minutes451-550 miles25 minutes551 miles30 minutes39Performance5-7 Amtrak Delays by Cause:FY2021 percent of delayed timeaDelays not attributable to Amtrak or other host railroads,such as customs and immigration,law enforcement action,weather,or waiting for scheduled departure time.NOTE:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 1-73,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.41Economy6 EconomyTransportation is a major sector of the U.S.economy.The transportation system moves people and goods,employs millions of workers,and consumes resources and services provided by other sectors.6-1 U.S.GDP by Spending Category:2021 percent of GDPaIncludes all other categories(e.g.,entertainment,personal care products and services,and payments to pension plans).KEY:GDP=gross domestic product.NOTE:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 3-9,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.42Pocket Guide to Transportation6-2 U.S.Transportation Spending:19952021KEY:GDP=gross domestic product.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 3-9,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.43Economy6-3 Transportation-Related Final Demand billions of chained 2012 dollarsCategory20112021Personal consumption of transportation1,1051,414 Motor vehicles and parts370614 Motor vehicle fuels,lubricants,and fluids400405 Transportation services335395Gross private domestic investment192235 Transportation structures1012 Transportation equipment182223Government transportation-related purchases317326 Federal purchases4143 State and local purchases252271 Defense-related purchases2513Exports( )303269Imports(-)396482Total transportation-related GDP1,5241,717U.S.GDP15,89219,610KEY:GDP=gross domestic productNOTES:Data may not add to totals due to rounding.Transportation-related final demand measures the size of transportation functions in relation to the Gross Domestic Product(GDP).It includes the transportation portion of the four components of the GDP:personal consumption,gross private domestic investment,government purchases,and net exports of goods and services.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 3-4,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.44Pocket Guide to Transportation6-4 Household Expenses by Category:2021 percent of average annual household expensesa Includes alcoholic beverages,cash contributions,education,entertainment,personal care products and services,reading,tobacco products and smoking supplies,and other miscellaneous items.NOTE:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics,Consumer Expenditure Survey,available at www.bls.gov/cex as of October 2022.6-5 Household Transportation Expenses:19852021SOURCE:U.S.Department of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics,Consumer Expenditure Survey,available at www.bls.gov/cex as of October 2022.45Economy6-6 Transportation Services Index(TSI):January 2000July 2022 chain-type index:2000=100,seasonally adjustedNOTES:TSI Combinedthe TSI,created by the U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,is a measure of the month-to-month changes in the output of services provided by the for-hire transportation industries.TSI data change monthly due to the use of concur-rent seasonal analysis,which results in seasonal analysis factors changing as each months data are added.TSI Freightincludes freight railroad services(including rail-based intermodal shipments,such as containers on flat cars),inland waterway traffic,pipeline movements(including principally petroleum and petroleum products and natural gas),and air freight.TSI Passengerthe passenger transportation services index consists of local mass transit,intercity passenger rail,and passenger air transportation.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statis-tics,available at www.bts.gov as of October 2022.46Pocket Guide to Transportation6-7 Employment in Transportation-Related Industries thousandsCategory20112021For-hire transportation and warehousing4,2896,092 Air457475 Rail193146 Water6156 Truck1,3011,514 Transit and ground passenger447375 Pipeline4350 Scenic and sightseeing2823 Support activities573722 Couriers and messengers5291,082 Warehousing and storage6581,648Transportation-related manufacturinga1,6851,934Other transportation-related industries4,8115,377Postal service631606Government employmentb854851Total transportation-related labor force12,27014,859U.S.labor force131,914146,124aIncludes transportation equipment;petroleum products;tires;rubber;plastics;search,detection,navigation,guidance,aeronautical,and nautical systems;and instrument manufacturing.bFiscal year data for federal,state,and local personnel.NOTES:Annual averages based on NAICS data.Details may not add to totals due to rounding.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transporta-tion Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 3-23,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of September 2022.47Economy6-8 Motor Vehicle Fuel Prices:April 1994September 2022NOTES:Retail Gasoline Prices include average nominal monthly prices of U.S.Regular All Formations retail gasoline.Diesel Retail Prices include average nominal monthly prices of U.S.No.2 Diesel Retail Prices.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Energy,Energy Information Administration,avail-able at https:/www.eia.gov/as of October 2022.49Environment7 EnvironmentThe U.S.transportation system is a major consumer of energy and has consequences for the environment.7-1 Energy Consumption by Sector:19602021KEY:Btu=British thermal unit.NOTE:Includes primary energy consumption,electricity retail sales,and electri-cal system energy losses.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Energy,U.S.Energy Information Administration,Monthly Energy Review,available at www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly,Table 2.1a as of October 2022.50Pocket Guide to Transportation7-2 Transportation Energy Consumption by Source:2021 percent of Btu consumed KEY:Btu=British thermal unit.NOTES:Includes primary energy consumed.Excludes electricity retail sales and electrical system energy losses.Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Energy,U.S.Energy Information Administration,Monthly Energy Review,available at www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly,Table 2.5,as of October 2022.51Environment7-3 Petroleum Consumption by Sector:19602021SOURCE:U.S.Department of Energy,U.S.Energy Information Administration,Monthly Energy Review,available at www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly,Tables 3.7-3.8,as of October 2022.52Pocket Guide to Transportation7-4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector:19902020KEY:Tg CO2 Eq.=teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalent.Teragram=1 million metric tons.NOTES:Electric power sector emissions are distributed across sectors.Emissions include carbon dioxide,methane,nitrous oxide,hydrofluorocarbons,perfluorochemicals,and sulfur hexafluoride.SOURCE:U.S.Environmental Protection Agency,Inventory of U.S.Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:Report Tables,https:/cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexplorer/#transportation/entiresector/allgas/category/all,as of October 2022.53Environment7-5 Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Transportation Mode:2020 Percent of Tg CO2 Eq.KEY:Tg CO2 Eq.=teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalent.Teragram=1 million metric tons.NOTES:Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.Does not include international bunker fuels.SOURCES:U.S.Environmental Protection Agency,Inventory of U.S.Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:19902020 Report Tables,available at https:/www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions,Fast Facts:U.S.Transportation Sector GHG Emissions,as of May 2022.54Pocket Guide to Transportation7-6 Highway Vehicle Air Pollutant Emissions:20022021KEY:PM=particulate matters;PM-10=airborne particulates of less than 10 microns;PM-2.5=airborne particulates of less than 2.5 microns.NOTES:Indices are calculated using data on highway vehicle emissions only.Par-ticulate matters is without condensibles.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Transportation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,tables 4-45 through 4-50,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.55Environment7-7 Fuel Economy of Light-Duty Vehicles:19902020KEY:CAFE=Corporate Average Fuel Economy;EPA=Environmental Protection Agency.NOTES:New fleet data and CAFE standards are for vehicle model years.On-road fleet data include passenger cars and light trucks and are estimated using average miles traveled per gallon of fuel consumed for each calendar year.SOURCE:As cited in U.S.Department of Transportation,Bureau of Trans-portation Statistics,National Transportation Statistics,table 4-23,available at www.bts.gov/nts as of October 2022.56Pocket Guide to Transportation7-8 Sales of Hybrid,Plug-in Hybrid,and Battery Electric Vehicles:20002021KEY:BEV=Battery electric-only vehicles,HEV=Hybrid electric vehicle,PHEV=Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle.SOURCE:Oak Ridge National Laboratory,Transportation Energy Data Book,Annual Issues,available at tedb.ornl.gov as of May 2022.57Environment7-9 Alternative Fuel Vehicles by Fuel Type,Large Trucks and Buses:20002017NOTES:aIncludes compressed natural gas(CNG)and liquified natural gas(LNG).Includes the total number of heavy duty vehicles that were manufac-tured or converted by vehicle suppliers(companies or organizations)in the associated calendar year.bFlex fuel/ethanol vehicles are capable of running on E85,unblended gasoline,or any ethanol-gasoline blends in between.cExcludes gasoline-electric and diesel-electric hybrids.SOURCE:U.S.Department of Energy,Energy Information Administration,Alternative Fuel Vehicle Data,Supplier Database,available at www.eia.gov/renewable/afv/as of October 2022.58Pocket Guide to TransportationGlossaryAir carrier:Certificated provider of scheduled and nonscheduled services.Alternative fueled vehicle:A vehicle designed to operate on an alternative fuel(e.g.,compressed natural gas,propane,electricity).The vehicle can be either a dedicated vehicle designed to operate exclusively on alternative fuel or a non-dedicated vehicle designed to operate on alternative fuel and/or traditional fuel.Chained dollars:A method of adjusting to real dollar amounts to account for both changes in price-levels and the composition of output over time.This is completed by using a chain-weighted type index,or average weights in successive time periods,to get a comparable time series of data.Class I railroad:Railroads earning adjusted annual operating revenues for three consecutive years of$250,000,000 or more,based on 1991 dollars with an adjustment factor applied to subsequent years.Commuter rail:Urban/suburban passenger train service for short-distance travel between a central city and adjacent suburbs run on tracks of a traditional railroad system.Does not include heavy or light rail transit service.Demand response transit:A nonfixed-route,nonfixed-schedule form of transportation that operates in response to calls from passengers or their agents to the transit operator or dispatcher.Directional route-miles:The sum of the mileage in each direction over which transit vehicles travel while in revenue service.Enplanements:Total number of revenue passengers boarding aircraft.For-hire:Refers to a vehicle operated on behalf of or by a company that provides services to external customers for a fee.It is distinguished from private transportation services,in which a firm transports its own freight and does not offer its transportation services to other shippers.General aviation:Civil aviation operations other than those air carriers holding a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.Types of aircraft used in general aviation range from corporate,multiengine jets piloted by a professional crew to amateur-built,single-engine,piston-driven,acrobatic planes.Gross domestic product:The total value of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States.As long as the labor and property are located in the United States,the suppliers may be either U.S.residents or residents of foreign countries.59GlossaryHeavy-rail transit:High-speed transit rail operated on rights-of-way that exclude all other vehicles and pedestrians.Hybrid electric vehicle:Hybrid electric vehicles combine features of internal combustion engines and electric motors.Unlike 100%electric vehicles,hybrid vehicles do not need to be plugged into an external source of electricity to be recharged.Most hybrid vehicles operate on gasoline.International Roughness Index(IRI):A scale for pavement roughness based on the simulated response of a generic motor vehicle to the roughness in a single wheel path of the road surface.Lane-miles:One mile of one lane of road.Light-duty vehicle:Includes passenger cars,light trucks,vans,pickup trucks,and sport/utility vehicles regardless of wheelbase.Light-rail transit:Urban transit rail operated on a reserved right-of-way that may be crossed by roads used by motor vehicles and pedestrians.Nominal dollars:A market value that does not take inflation into account and reflects prices and quantities that were current during the period being measured.Nonself-propelled vessels:Includes dry cargo,tank barges,and railroad car floats that operate in U.S.ports and waterways.Oceangoing vessels:Includes U.S.flag,privately owned merchant fleet of oceangoing,self-propelled,cargo-carrying vessels of 1,000 gross tons or greater.Particulates:Carbon particles formed by partial oxidation and reduction of hydrocarbon fuel.Also included are trace quantities of metal oxides and nitrides originating from engine wear,component degradation,and inorganic fuel additives.Passenger-mile:One passenger transported one mile.For example,1 vehicle traveling 3 miles carrying 5 passengers generates 15 passenger-miles.Personal communication:Involves contacting the source for data if not publicly available.Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles:Plug-in hybrids use the electric battery as the primary energy source by relying on battery power for propulsion for a limited range(1540 miles)before switching to internal combustion propulsion(thus reducing gasoline consumption).Reliever airports:Airports designated by the Federal Aviation Administration to relieve congestion at commercial service airports and to provide improved general aviation access to the overall community.60Pocket Guide to TransportationSeasonally adjusted:Measures the real differences in data trends by adjusting for seasonal factors,such as the change in the number of days,weekends,holidays,or other seasonal activity in a month,such as vacation travel.Self-propelled vessels:Includes dry cargo vessels,tankers,and offshore supply vessels,tugboats,pushboats,and passenger vessels,such as excursion/sightseeing boats,combination passenger and dry cargo vessels,and ferries.Short ton:A unit of weight equal to 2,000 pounds.Structurally deficient:Structural deficiencies are characterized by deteriorated conditions of significant bridge elements and reduced load-carrying capacity.Real dollars:A method of adjusting nominal dollars to account for price level changes over time.It reflects purchasing power in a given period.Tg CO2 Eq.:Teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalent,a metric measure used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases based on their global warming potential.Ton-mile:A unit of measure equal to movement of 1 ton over 1 mile.Transportation Services Index:BTS monthly measure indicating the relative change in the volume of services over time performed by the for-hire transportation sector.Change is shown relative to a base year,which is given a value of 100.The TSI covers the activities of for-hire freight carriers,for-hire passenger carriers,and a combination of the two.See www.bts.gov for a detailed explanation.Transportation Services Index Combined:The combined Transportation Services Index(TSI)includes available data on freight traffic,as well as passenger travel,that have been weighted to yield a monthly measure of transportation services output.Transportation Services Index Freight:The freight TSI measures the output of the for-hire freight transportation industry and consists of data from for-hire trucking,rail,inland waterways,pipelines,and air freight.Transportation Services Index Passenger:The passenger TSI includes local transit,intercity passenger rail,and passenger air transportation,which have been weighted to yield a monthly measure of transportation services output.Unlinked passenger trip:The number of passengers who board public transportation vehicles.Passengers are counted each time they board vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their origin to their destination.Vehicle-mile:One vehicle traveling 1 mile.Statistics published in this Pocket Guide to Transportation come from many different sources.Some statistics are based on samples and are subject to sampling variability.Statistics may also be subject to omissions and errors in reporting,recording,and processing.Photos provided by Adobe and BTS Stock PhotosPrinted on paper containing recycled post consumer waste paper.INFRASTRUCTUREMOVING PEOPLEMOVING GOODSSAFETYPERFORMANCEECONOMYENVIRONMENTGLOSSARYMAJOR TRENDS

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12023 US Private Equity OutlookPitchBook Data,Inc.John Gabbert Founder,CEONizar Tarhuni Senior Director,Institutional Research&EditorialDylan Cox,CFA Head of Private Markets ResearchInstitutional Research GroupAnalysispbinstitutionalresearch PublishingDesigned by Julia MidkiffPublished on December 19,2022Tim Clarke Senior Analyst,Private EJinny Choi Analyst,Private EAndrew Akers,CFA Senior Quantitative AKyle Walters Associate Analyst,Private ERebecca Springer,Ph.D.Senior Analyst,HPitchBook is a Morningstar company providing the most comprehensive,most accurate,and hard-to-find data for professionals doing business in the private markets.2023 outlooksp.2-3 PE-led take-privates will migrate to the middle markets.p.4-5 Aggregate PE fund returns will underperform public equity benchmarks as private market valuations continue to get marked down.p.6 Sponsor-to-sponsor exits will take up a record portion of US PE exits.p.7-8 The exit-to-investment ratio will reach a more than 15-year low.p.9-10 US PE healthcare services investment in skilled care and behavioral health providers will bounce back to a record high of more than 40 deals,excluding add-ons.p.11-12 PE will dip below its historic share of private market fundraising,driven by demand for income over growth by discretionary investors.p.13-14 Direct lenders will continue to dominate LBO debt markets,eventually giving way to a recovery in bank-led lending later in the year.2PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:PE-led take-privates will migrate to the middle markets.Rationale:Taking public companies private has been a winning PE strategy.PE firms turned to this approach almost out of necessity as funds approached$30 billion at the extreme upper end.It allowed mega-funds to quickly deploy record amounts of dry powder.Better yet,PE buyers were able to buy public companies at attractive discounts.The 75 PE-led take-privates announced in 2022 were acquired at an average discount of 6.7%to the 52-week high of the target companys shares and averaged$2.8 billion in deal size.Unsurprisingly,this strategy has become popular among PE firms.As recently as October 2022,eight new take-privates were announced for$10.1 billion in aggregate value,capping the strongest two-year run in 15 years.Things came to a screeching halt in November,however.Instead of the usual eight to nine deal announcements,not a single take-private was announced for the month,an almost unprecedented event in the last 17 years.The likely cause:Big buyouts have struggled to find financing,and it appears to have finally caught up with the$3 billion take-private strategy.The S&P 500s 10.1%rebound since mid-October also didnt help matters.Its unlikely that take-privates will stay dormant,given the strategys long,uninterrupted history,even during a credit crunch.More likely,the playbook will get tweaked.The logic of buying heavily discounted public companies remains valid,especially given the lack of leverage to augment returns.And while large company stocks may have exited a bear market,a huge swath of middle-market companies is still trapped at deeply depressed levels.The two-year take-public frenzy that ended earlier in 2022 spawned 952 new listings and$2.6 trillion in inception value,now down by 45.1%.Most of these listings are from IPOs,but a fair chunk also originated from completed SPAC deals,or de-SPACs.The vast majority of these did not start out as middle-market companies,but they are now:644 have individual market caps below$1 billion,or$164.5 billion in aggregate,down 76.5%from the aggregate inception value of$698.7 billion.Going forward,these companies will likely populate the ranks of take-privates,and the buyout pendulum will likely swing back in favor of the middle-market segment.Risks:Take-privates may stay shut across all deal sizes due to a pullback in both nonbank and bank lending for leveraged buyouts(LBOs).Additionally,many of the 664 companies in our screen are not of the seasoning or quality to which PE investors will be attractedespecially de-SPACs,which tend to be pre-revenue companies chasing large addressable markets.Furthermore,large take-privates could rebound strongly should interest rates and federal reserve policy quickly reverse course in a soft landing environment and traditional lenders return to the LBOmarket.Tim Clarke Senior Analyst,Private Equity 3PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookSource:PitchBook|Geography:North America&Europe*As of November 4,202294050100150200$0$100$200$300$40020062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*Deal value($B)Deal count75PE-led take-private deal activitySource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of December 2,2022$357.5$341.3$94.9$69.6IPOs since 2020 sub-$1BDe-SPACs since 2020 sub-$1BInception market value($B)Current market value($B)443 companies221 companies-73.4%-79.6%New public listings since 2020 now trading below$1 billion4PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:Aggregate PE fund returns will underperform public equity benchmarks as private market valuations continue to get marked down.Rationale:Aggregate PE fund performance following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has been remarkably good.After a modest decline of 7.1%in Q2 2020,our US PE fund benchmark has since posted a cumulative gain of 98.0%through Q2 2022.In comparison,the S&P 500 Index returned 51.7%during the same period,and it posted a much steeper decline of 19.6%in Q2 2020.It is well-known that private fund valuations tend to lag what is happening in the public markets,and some markdowns should be expected based on the 15%to 20clines in major US equity indexes year-to-date.However,based on our PitchBook PE Barometer,which produces an implied quarterly PE fund return from several macro and financial market factor inputs,it appears the recent outperformance has been the most extreme since at least 2000.Periods wherein PE funds have outperformed the implied return from the PE Barometer have typically been followed by periods of underperformance,and vice versa.Further,we found that PE fund performance has been driven almost entirely by net asset value(NAV)markups as opposed to realized returns via distributions.Ignoring cash flows,the average increase in aggregate PE NAV has been 7.9%per quarter over the past nine quarters.Historically,this figure has averaged just 2.5%.Given the deterioration of liquidity for exits,as well as a reset in public market valuations,we think it is unlikely these PE fund markups will ever be fully realized.Risks:For PE funds to avoid material markdowns,it will require some version of an economic soft landing in 2023 wherein the Federal Reserve is able to pivot back to easing,which will support liquidity and credit conditions.This would allow PE GPs to hold on to assets and weather the storm until the exit environment improves.However,public equities would likely rally in this scenario,so PE funds would have a high hurdle to clear in order to outperform.Andrew Akers,CFA Senior Quantitative A5PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of June 30,2022-20%-10%0 0 062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*Rolling one-year PE fund performance relative to the implied PE Barometer returnSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of June 30,2022-15%-10%-5%0%5 062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*Net cash flow yieldNAV changeTotalPE fund return attribution6PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:Sponsor-to-sponsor exits will take up a record portion of US PE exits.Rationale:In 2022,PE exit activity fell sharply below the impressive level seen in 2021,as PE firms held on to their investments rather than being forced sellers in an unattractive market environment.Public listings virtually disappeared amid market volatility and declining valuations.As for other exit routes,sales to corporates and other sponsors have remained broadly in line with historic levels.Sponsor-to-sponsor exits have steadily increased over time,accounting for a 61.8%share of all exits on a trailing six-month basis as of Q3 2022.This is a sizable uptick from the 10-year average of 53.1%.Comparing sponsor-to-sponsor exits with corporate exits,the split favors the former in 2022,which is a reversal of trends seen throughout the last 10 years.The shift in trend will likely continue,and we anticipate sponsor-to-sponsor exits to take up a record portion of US PE exit activity in 2023.The number of PE managers has steadily expanded over the years,while the number of corporate buyers has remained relatively fixed.Furthermore,PE sponsors still have plenty of dry powder to act as a reliable exit route for other GPs,with$787.5 billion on hand as of Q3.Firms will need to deploy this capital and are likely to find plenty of acquisition targets from other sponsor-backed companies.This source of liquidity will be a key support factor going into 2023 for PE-backed exits.Meanwhile,corporations may become more hesitant to make strategic acquisitions amid recessionary fears and focus instead on protecting their balance sheets,and IPOs are expected to remain stunted for some time.Risks:Although corporations are likely to be less acquisitive in turbulent markets,compelling valuations can prompt them to take up sponsor-backed companies from PE sellers.Sales to corporates remain high,at 47.6%of total US PE exit value.Corporations could also continue to seek acquisitions to position themselves for continued growth or to add recession-resilient businesses.Jinny Choi Analyst,Private ESource:PitchBook|Geography:US*Seasonally adjusted;as of September 30,20220 0Pp 0620082010201220142016201820202022*2007200920112013201520172019202161.8%Rolling six-month sponsor-backed acquisitions as a share of all PE exitsSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 30,20220 0Pp0 122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*SponsoracquisitionPublic listingCorporateacquisitionShare of PE exit value by type7PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:The exit-to-investment ratio will reach a more than 15-year low.Rationale:As of the end of Q3 2022,the exit-to-investment ratio stood at 0.38x,the lowest figure seen since the Global Financial Crisis.This ratio tracks the number of PE exits in any given period against PE investments,excluding add-ons.The exit market has been hampered by macro headwinds in 2022,which are likely to persist in 2023.On the investment side,these same factors have weighed down activity as well.However,sellers are less motivated than buyers to lock into lower prices.Meanwhile,many GPs are sitting on record levels of dry powder.As that capital must be put to work,those GPs will continue to make investments,thereby leaving investments at higher levels,causing exits to slump and lowering the exits-to-investments ratio in the new year.During episodes of price dislocation,it may take an extended period of time for seller expectations to change and align with buyers.Making matters worse,the IPO window is tightly shut,putting even more downward pressure on exits.Even if public markets were to reflate and the IPO window were to reopen,higher interest rates are likely to persist,thus weighing on both buy-side and sell-side activity due to the absence of cheap debt that prevailed in the past.Lastly,exits to corporates have become tougher,as many remain on the sidelines until the risk of a recession fades,preferring instead to shore up their balance sheets and cash reserves.As exit routes are limited,many PE firms will opt to hold on to their investments longer and grow them into their old valuations to compensate for lower deal multiples.This will stretch out the bottom of the ratios recovery cycle,even if buying volumes were to drop and align more with selling.Risks:A soft landing in 2023 with a federal funds pivot could allow market headwinds to die down.Additionally,if market dislocation dissolves and pent-up demand for IPOs is released,the flood gates for exits through public listings would likely open.A new buildup in PE dry powder could pave the way for more sponsor-to-sponsor exits.On the other hand,an intensification of market headwinds in the form of a full-blown recession could shut down buyer appetite as demand and prices lower and forced selling kicks in as a result.Kyle Walters Associate Analyst,Private E8PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 30,20220.37x0.38x2007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*0 x0.1x0.2x0.3x0.4x0.5x0.6xPE exit/investment ratio Source:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 30,20221,9751,6401,0961,5561,6971,9251,8302,2052,3752,2932,4812,7042,6432,5533,6231,9792007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*PE buyout count(excluding add-ons)Source:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 30,20228736064187868531,0539831,2221,2771,1981,2751,4031,2841,1171,7547492007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022*PE exit count 9PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:US PE investment in skilled care and behavioral health providers will bounce back to a record high of more than 40 deals,excluding add-ons.Rationale:Skilled care and behavioral health providers include home health and hospice agencies;home-based and ambulatory infusion providers;skilled nursing facilities;providers of treatment for substance use disorders(SUDs)and mental health issues;providers of applied behavioral analysis(ABA);and providers of residential,home,and community-based services for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.The segment is marked by compelling demand drivers,including an aging population;strong patient preference for in-home care;steadily increasing autism,mental illness,and SUD rates;and growing industry,payer,and patient recognition of the importance of behavioral health in overall patient outcomes and well-being.Despite economic uncertainty,we expect PE healthcare services investing to remain healthy in 2023 as firms deploy significant existing dry powder reserves and LPs look to increase their exposure to the recession-resistant industry.Despite staffing costs pressuring margins,the skilled care and behavioral health sector should continue to attract investment as pricing stabilizes after 2021s high.The segment has averaged just under 32 platform and minority equity deals per year from 2017 to 2021,reaching 40 deals in 2018 and 2021.Numerically,home health/hospice and SUD treatment/mental health deals dominate this dataset.Both categories experienced regulatory and/or reimbursement uncertainties in 2022the former because of significant rate cuts in the Centers for Medicare&Medicaid Services(CMS)initial 2023 fee proposal,and the latter due to questions about whether certain COVID-19-related waivers would survive the end of the public health emergency(PHE).We expect that a combination of pent-up demand and at least partial resolution of these questions will enable improved price finding and deal activity resumption in 2023.Many platforms created in the last“wave”of deal activity circa 2018 are due to trade hands.Additionally,the small size of most platforms should shelter the segment from headwinds in the syndicated loan market.Risks:Staffing costs represent the greatest threat to the sector.If platforms currently in PE hands cannot stabilize at sustainable margins,sponsor-to-sponsor platform trades will continue to stall.Increased macroeconomic turmoil could also slow dealmaking in general.Finally,investors interested in exposure to behavioral health may increasingly turn their attention to digital modelsalthough tele-mental health providers face their own significant regulatory and staffing headwinds.Rebecca Springer,Ph.D.Senior Analyst,H10PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 30,2022010203040201720182019202020212022*Skilled care and behavioral health2017-2021 averagePE skilled care and behavioral health platform and growth deal count 11PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:PE will dip below its historic share of private market fundraising,driven by demand for income over growth by discretionary investors.Rationale:The five largest publicly traded alternative asset managers provide useful insights into present and future fundraising trends,especially as the market becomes more top-heavy.Within private equity,for example,the top 35 funds have accounted for 70.3%of all LP capital raised in 2022,up from 40.4%in 2021.More broadly,these five firms have accounted for nearly half of all funds raised over the last 12 months across all major strategies.In 2022,PE accounted for 38.0%of all global fundraising in private markets,slightly above its 36.5%average over seven years and its 36.2%share of AUM.PE remains the largest private market strategy by a large margin.However,that margin is likely to shrink as the large PE players in particular retool their fundraising machines to focus more on income-oriented strategies and diversify away from growth and PE at least for the time being.A not-so-hidden agenda behind this shift is to attract nontraditional investors that have more discretion in their portfolio allocation process,including individual investors and family offices.The way into the wealth management market has always been to lead with higher-yielding product,and alternatives have been no exception.The big five PE fund managers set the stage for this many years ago by devising new structures for alternatives that are more retail-friendlymost notably the perpetual capital vehicle,which functions more like open-ended funds without capital calls and includes a limited redemption feature.Most of these perpetual structures wrap around income-oriented products such as real estate,real assets,and credit funds to accommodate retailparticipation.Not all capital raised for these vehicles is from retail.Approximately$100 billion of Blackstones$359 billion in perpetual capital AUM is sourced to institutional investors.Here,too,we could see an uptick in demand to compensate for lean distributions paid on legacy PE investments due to declining exit activity.Tim Clarke Senior Analyst,Private ESource:PitchBook|Geography:Global*2022 through September 3036.5%.1%9.3%9.1.5%6.4%3.1%Private equityVenture capitalReal estateReal assetsPrivate debtFoFSecondariesShare of private capital AUM by strategy*Source:PitchBook|Geography:Global*January 1,2015 to September 30,202236.2.0.4.1.2%4.3%3.8%Private equityVenture capitalReal estateReal assetsPrivate debtFoFSecondariesShare of private capital capital raised by strategy*12PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 1,2021 and September 30,2022$0$50$100$150$200$250$300$350BXKKRAPOCGARESMedianTTM Q3 2021TTM Q3 2022Public PE 2021 and 2022 trailing 12-month(TTM)gross inflows($B)by select major firmSource:PitchBook|Geography:US*As of September 30,2022-30%-20%-10%0 0P%BXKKRAPOCGARESMedianAUMFundraising(TTM)Overweight(Underweight)TTM public PE fundraising share relative to AUM share by select major firmRisks:The primary risk to our outlook is if demand for PE from traditional investors surprises on the upside due to a subsiding denominator effect and/or a return of risk-on conditions for growth investing.Additionally,should retail demand for alternative investments sour due to a significant contraction in the economy and wealth effect,this could lead to reduced inflows to financial assets in general.13PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookOutlook:Direct lenders will continue to dominate LBO debt markets,eventually giving way to a recovery in bank-led lending later in the year.Rationale:The LBO has been the main stock and trade of the private equity industry for generating outsized returns to investors.However,it was dealt a serious blow when the Federal Reserve embarked upon one of fastest tightening cycles in more than 40 years.This turned off the spigot of what had become the main vehicle for financing LBOs:the bank-led leveraged loan market.That market was on a tear in 2021,setting a 14-year high for US loan volume backing LBO deals at$146.0 billion.However,the market came to a virtual standstill in H2 2022,with just$13.2 billion in US LBO-related volume,down 80.2%YoY.Stepping in to fill the void have been nonbank“direct”lenders that have spent the last several years amassing capital in the form of business development companies and private debt funds.Many of these involve the same sponsors that are leading the charge on the equity side of the LBO capital structure.These funds have become the sole debt providers to new LBOs;meanwhile,banks are busy offloading old loans,or the so-called“hung”deals,before making any new commitments.This can be best seen in the flow of large LBOs of public companies.Of the 26 take-privates announced in the US and Europe since early June 2022,not a single one has been funded by banks;they are relying instead on private debt funds or all-equitystructures.In early 2023,private debt funds will likely continue to dominate as lenders of last resort to the LBO market.Upward of$42.0 billion from hung deals is reported to be on bank balance sheets,1 and we estimate that another$22.0 billion in old commitments remains on deals still pending.Banks will likely gradually return to underwriting new LBO loans late in 2023 as the backlog clears and the leveraged loan market becomes more liquidbut not before ceding significant share to direct lenders.Risks:If credit defaults were to significantly accelerate from their very low levels,this could keep institutional investors on the sidelines amid concerns of loose covenants,thereby resulting in a prolonged slump in bank syndicated loans.Additionally,if direct lenders were forced to take negative marks on their investment holdings due to a hard landing in the economy and/or negative credit cycle,this may curtail investor appetite and LBO lending activity as well.Tim Clarke Senior Analyst,Private E1:“Banks Stuck with$42 Billion Debt Seize Chance To Offload It,”Bloomberg,Jill R.Shah and Claire Ruckin,November 29,2022.14PitchBook Analyst Note:2023 US Private Equity OutlookCOPYRIGHT 2022 by PitchBook Data,Inc.All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any meansgraphic,electronic,or mechanical,including photocopying,recording,taping,and information storage and retrieval systemswithout the express written permission of PitchBook Data,Inc.Contents are based on information from sources believed to be reliable,but accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed.Nothing herein should be construed as investment advice,a past,current or future recommendation to buy or sell any security or an offer to sell,or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security.This material does not purport to contain all of the information that a prospective investor may wish to consider and is not to be relied upon as such or used in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment.Source:PitchBook|Geography:North America&Europe*As of November 4,2022Note:This table includes only deals of$100 million or more.“Nonbank”indicates deals using private debt or all-equity structures or those not broadly syndicated by banks.Announced public-to-private deals(June 2022 to present)*Announced date(2022)CompanyAcquirer(s)Loan typeDeal value($M)*Deal statusCountryDecember 12CoupaThoma BravoPrivate debt$6,150.4AnnouncedUSOctober 27UserTesting Sunstone Partners,Thoma BravoEquity only$1,300.0AnnouncedUSOctober 24Weber Inc.BDT&CompanyPrivate debt$222.2AnnouncedUSOctober 24AgroFresh Solutions Paine Schwartz PartnersNonbank$158.1AnnouncedUSOctober 12KnowBe4 Vista Equity PartnersPrivate debt$4,600.0AnnouncedUSOctober 11ForgeRock Thoma BravoEquity only$2,300.0AnnouncedUSSeptember 28BilltrustEQT ABPrivate debt$1,700.0AnnouncedUSSeptember 26Semcon Ratos GroupNonbank$262.4CompletedSwedenSeptember 4ChannelAdvisorCommerceHub,Insight PartnersPrivate debt$725.0CompletedUSAugust 20Computer Services Bridgeport Partners,CenterbridgeNonbank$1,594.8CompletedUSAugust 16Ted BakerAuthentic Brands,Blackstone,CVCNonbank$234.6CompletedUKAugust 8AvalaraVista Equity PartnersPrivate debt$8,400.0CompletedUSAugust 4Atlas Air WorldwideApollo Global ManagementPrivate debt$2,909.3AnnouncedUSAugust 2Ping IdentityThoma BravoPrivate debt$2,800.0CompletedUSJuly 25Bobst GroupJBF FinanceNonbank$1,330.4CompletedSwitzerlandJuly 21HangerPatient Square CapitalPrivate debt$1,250.0CompletedUSJuly 12Sharps ComplianceAurora Capital PartnersPrivate debt$170.0CompletedUSJuly 10Prima IndustrieAlpha Associates,Peninsula InvestmentsNonbank$134.9AnnouncedItalyJuly 10Oncodesign Services Edmond de Rothschild GroupNonbank$102.0CompletedFranceJune 28Cary GroupCVC,Nordic CapitalPrivate debt$824.1CompletedSwedenJune 27CareTech HoldingsDBAY AdvisorsNonbank$993.6CompletedUKJune 24ZendeskADIA,GIC,H&F,PermiraPrivate debt$10,200.0CompletedUSJune 23Radius HealthGurnet Point Capital,Patient SquarePrivate debt$890.0CompletedUSJune 20Euromoney Institutional InvestorAstorg,EpirisPrivate debt$1,990.7CompletedUKJune 20Momentum Software GroupAareon,Advent InternationalNonbank$178.2CompletedSwedenJune 13The Go-Ahead GroupKinetic Group Nonbank$751.1CompletedUK

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研究报告（2022 年 第 6 期总第 115 期）2022 年 8 月 15 日中美技术交易平台主要运营模式分析中美技术交易平台主要运营模式分析资本市场与公司金融研究中心【摘要】【摘要】在经济全球化背景下，日渐频繁的技术交易促进了技术交易平台的形成和发展。在美国，市场自发的技术交易在技术匹配、技术众包、专利拍卖和知识产权融资等方面均有探索，并积累了相对成熟的运营经验；中国的技术交易平台发展出了与社会主义市场经济体制相契合的、有中国特色的运营模式，如公开挂牌交易流程、技术资产评价评估体系、在线技术交易系统等。本文选取当前在中美两国市场上分别具有示范效应的若干技术交易平台，并通过技术的供需匹配、技术的交易流通和金融助力技术发展三个维度，对其各自的运营模式进行分析，试图发现当前中国技术市场和交易平台面临的问题与挑战，并与之提出相应发展与措施建议。目目录录一、技术交易平台发展情况概述.11.1 技术交易平台发展背景.11.2 技术交易平台当前的主要类型.21.3 技术交易平台运营模式特点.71.4 技术市场和交易平台面临的现实挑战与未来发展方向.8二、技术的供需匹配.92.1 技术搜索以 Yet2 为例.102.2 技术与服务众包以 InnoCentive、猪八戒网为例.122.3 技术拍卖以 Ocean Tomo 为例.142.4 讨论.17三、技术的交易流通.233.1 技术交易产品的标准化以 IPXI 为例.233.2 技术交易流程的标准化以上海技术交易所、科易网为例.253.3 讨论.29四、金融助力技术发展.334.1 知识产权融资与投资以 Ocean Tomo、Yet2 为例.334.2 技术评估助力传统银行科技贷款以上海技术交易所为例.344.3 讨论.36五、中国技术市场和交易平台面临的挑战与未来发展方向.405.1 中国技术市场面临的问题与挑战.405.2 对中国技术市场及交易平台建设的建议与措施.44图表目录图表目录表 1：中美技术交易平台简介及核心业务模式情况.4图 1：全国技术合同成交金额及其占 GDP 的（2014-2019 年）.2图 2：Yet2 特定技术侦查模式图.12图 3：Ocean Tomo Bid-Ask Market 知识产权拍卖模式图.15图 4：IPXI 平台知识产权使用权证券化模式图.24图 5：上海技术交易所公开挂牌交易流程图.27图 6：知识产权出售/返许可模式图.34图 7：上海技术交易所评估体系.35图 8：2020 年全国技术转移机构类型结构.411一、技术交易平台发展情况概述一、技术交易平台发展情况概述1 1.1.1 技术交易平台发展背景技术交易平台发展背景在经济全球化背景下，为实现资源优化配置，世界各国间交易要素，特别是技术要素的流动愈发加快。通常而言，一项技术问世后，需要通过技术转移和技术交易，以最终实现产业化。这其中，技术交易是技术转移和技术产业化之间的关键环节，频繁的技术交易也促进了技术交易平台的形成和发展。20 世纪 80 年代之后，随着世界两级政治分割局面趋于结束，技术交易逐渐开始在全球范围内流通。实际上，美国等西方发达国家早已开始在技术交易和相关政策方面进行战略布局和调整，积极促进提高研发工作和技术流通的针对性和有效性。1989 年，美国国会批准成立美国国家技术转移中心（NTTC），以国家技术交易平台的形式向外界提供整合性技术交易信息网站及专业咨询服务。随着技术交易市场的规模扩大和技术创新需求的日渐增长，美国市场自发的技术交易平台层出不穷。这些技术交易平台在技术匹配、技术众包、专利拍卖和知识产权融资等方面均有探索，并积累了成熟的运营经验。中国在技术交易平台的建设方面起步较晚，但仍然发展出了一批具有特色的技术交易平台。1991 年，中国的技术合同成交金额仅为 94.1 亿元；2019 年，全国共签订技术合同 48.4 万项（图 1），成交2额高达 2.2 万亿元，较 2018 年增长 26.6%，比 1991 年技术市场交易额增长超过 230 倍。在如此快速的技术交易市场规模增长背后，除了技术发展与科技体制改革的作用外，技术交易平台所做的市场化贡献不容小觑。在社会主义市场经济体制下，中国的技术交易平台发展出了一套与之相契合的运营模式，如公开挂牌交易流程、技术资产评价评估体系、在线技术交易系统等。资料来源：科技部2019 年全国技术市场统计分析图图 1 1：全国技术合同成交金额及其占：全国技术合同成交金额及其占 GDPGDP 的（的（2 2014014-20192019 年）年）1 1.2.2 技术交易平台当前的主要类型技术交易平台当前的主要类型美国的技术交易平台种类较多，具有代表性的有 Yet2、InnoCentive、Ocean Tomo 和“以专利许可使用权为标的”的 IPXI 平台等。中国的技术交易市场目前仍处在探索阶段，主要包括政府主3导建设的上海技术交易所，及市场自发建设的交易平台如科易网、猪八戒网等。这些技术交易平台均走在市场前列，均拥有不同的经营业务模式和盈利模式等（表 1），具有示范效应。其服务内容主要可以被归纳为三类，分别是技术的供需匹配、技术的交易流通和金融助力技术发展。4表表 1 1：中美技术交易平台简介及核心业务模式情况：中美技术交易平台简介及核心业务模式情况平台名称平台名称注册地注册地建设类型建设类型平台简介平台简介运营情况运营情况盈利模式盈利模式业务模式业务模式Yet2（成立于1999 年）美国市场自发为技术创新创业类用户提供客制化技术搜索匹配服务，并提供管理类咨询和辅助服务目前拥有超过 15 万名市场用户，其中不仅有财富 500 强企业，还有 1 万 6 千多家小型科技公司。该平台在美国、欧洲、亚洲均设有办事处信息发布费：主要向大企业收费；交易费：每笔交易按比例收取费用；增值服务费：咨询费、投资方案设计费等技术的供需匹配：技术的供需匹配：1.战略性咨询服务，为企业在创新过程中制定目标2.有针对性的技术搜索服务其他模式：1.为企业提供开放创新门户网站定制服务，方便企业管理创新需求的发布2.技术营销3.专利交易服务InnoCentive（成立于2001 年）美国市场自发开放式科技众包平台，通过帮助企业、政府、慈善机构等组织连接外部创新者（组织或个人），共同解决技术需求目前已拥有 50 万名解决者，提供超过2,500 项创新挑战、20万项创新成果和超过 6,000 万美元的创新奖励技术需求方支付会员费、信息发布费、服务成缴费等技术的供需匹配：技术的供需匹配：通过平台发布需求者的挑战（创新需求），接受和审核挑战解决者的解决方案其他模式：对解决者提交的方案进行知识产权保护5Ocean Tomo（成立于2003 年）美国市场自发主要提供与知识产权财务专家鉴定、估价、投资、风险管理和交易相关的金融产品和服务目前完成超过 1,000项知识产权业务，价值超过 100 亿美元，其中包括 300 多项知识产权评估与 500 多项损害赔偿专家证人证言业务，成功完成数百比知识产权销售交易，累计交易价值超过 10 亿美元知识产权业务服务费用技术的供需匹配：技术的供需匹配：专利在线拍卖市场 OTBA（Ocean TomoBid-Ask Market）金融助力技术发展：金融助力技术发展：知识产权投资业务其他模式：1.知识产权专家服务业务2.知识产权战略研究业务3.知识产权风险管理业务IPXI（成立于2013 年）美国市场自发全球首家“以专利许可使用权为标的”的交易平台，已于 2015年停运运营期间，推出多项专利许可使用权标准化产品交易过程中产生的费用：购买使用权份额费用，尽职交易调查、知识产权估价、法律交易费用、会员费、消费报告、审计、法律辩护等；会员费用技术的供需匹配：技术的供需匹配：依据市场定价和规范性条款为知识产权提供非独占性许可权授权和买卖交易上海技术交易所（于 2020 年开市）中国政府支持中国首家国家级常设技术市场自 2020 年 10 月开市至 2022 年第一季度，累计成交额已达39.2亿元人民币，累计进场科技成果项目3,398 项，进场服务机构 67 家，涉及转让方 166 家、受让方 126家技术交易服务收费；咨询服务费用、路演费用；金融撮合按比例收费；未来可能增加会员费用技术的交易流通：技术的交易流通：提供标准化技术交易流程金融助力技术发展：金融助力技术发展：金融产品服务：协助银行评估知识产权，提供科技贷款能金融服务其他模式：1.智库与数据库：提供服务咨询、数据服务62.交易服务协同网络：联合地方技术交易市场，实现技术权益登记全国联动3.科技成果孵化：参与高校、科研院所、企业的早期成果转化，并最终协助达成交易科易网（成立于2007 年）中国市场自发民营的在线技术交易平台现有全资子公司、合资公司 20 余家，员工近 300 人，旗下科易宝在线技术交易系统累计签约合同11,450份，累计签约金额超过 77 亿元人民币会员费用；交易佣金；增值服务费用技术的交易流通：技术的交易流通：创建国内首套线上技术交易系统科易宝其他模式：1.向政府提供区域网络科技服务体系的运营建设，如西安科易网、青海科易网2.向企业提供技术交易、咨询、知识产权、政策、人才技术估值等服务猪八戒网（成立于2006 年）中国市场自发民营的在线技术众包、综合性服务、交易平台旗下的八戒知识产权网目前已为 42 万家企业提供知识产权专业解决方案，累计提供商标、专利、版权等服务逾 22 万件佣金提成；平台支付费用；广告收入；其他增值服务费用技术的供需匹配：技术的供需匹配：为中小企业的服务供需双方，提供 C2C电子商务平台服务其他模式：后期服务涵盖财税、印刷、金融、知识产权、工程建筑设计等领域资料来源：根据公开数据整理7在美国，Yet2 成立时间较早，在长期的经验积累下，逐步建立了为技术创新创业类用户提供客制化技术搜索匹配服务的技术交易平台，同时为客户提供管理类咨询和辅助服务。InnoCentive 作为开放式科技众包平台，帮助企业、政府、慈善机构等组织连接外部创新者，共同解决技术需求。Ocean Tomo 打造了专利在线拍卖市场，有利于专利的公开拍卖交易流通。IPXI则是全球首家“以专利许可使用权为标的”的交易平台。在国内，在政府支持下建立的上海技术交易所，是中国首家国家级常设技术市场，为技术交易制定了标准化交易流程；此外还协助银行评估知识产权，提供科技贷款能金融服务。科易网创建国内首套线上技术交易系统，同时向政府提供区域网络科技服务体系的运营建设，及向企业提供技术交易、咨询、知识产权、政策、人才技术估值等服务。猪八戒网则是一家民营企业，旗下C2C 电子商务平台可提供在线技术众包和综合性服务。1 1.3.3 技术交易平台运营模式特点技术交易平台运营模式特点技术的供需匹配涵盖了技术搜索、技术与服务众包和技术拍卖等方面。Yet2 通过战略性咨询服务与有针对性的技术搜索匹配服务，为企业在创新过程中制定目标，解决客户的技术需求。InnoCentive 与猪八戒网均向企业客户提供众包服务，其中，InnoCentive 通过平台发布需求者的挑战（创新需求），并帮助需求者审核挑战解决者的解决方案；猪八戒网则向技术供需双方提8供 C2C 电子商务平台，以便交易双方直接对接需求与服务。OceanTomo 开创了知识产权线上公开拍卖的先河，通过公开、透明的专利拍卖模式，实现了全球专利以及专利申请权的购买或出售。技术的交易流通涉及技术交易产品的标准化和技术交易流程的标准化。IPXI 推出了以知识产权许可权使用权为标的的标准化交易产品，在专利证券化领域中作出尝试，为未来知识产权的非债权类型证券化指出了新的方向。上海技术交易所创建的交易所模式的技术交易流程，有效节省交易双方在交易过程中的沟通和时间成本，提高交易效率。科易网创建的线上技术交易系统“科易宝”以技术交易中的资金安全、技术交付安全和专业化服务为目标，促进了虚拟技术产品的在线交易与流动性。部分技术交易平台的服务内容还囊括了金融助力技术发展。如 Ocean Tomo 旗下的投资银行可通过知识产权质押融资、出售/返许可和知识产权证券化方式帮助企业进行融资。Yet2 则创建了自身的风险投资基金，以帮助企业孵化和技术成果转移。上海技术交易所则利用其拥有的交易数据建立评价模型，协助银行等传统金融机构对科创企业及其技术资产进行评估，帮助科创企业通过知识产权质押融资或信贷融资等方式释放资金压力。1 1.4.4 技术市场和交易平台面临的现实挑战与未来发展方向技术市场和交易平台面临的现实挑战与未来发展方向这些技术交易平台的运营模式可有效节省交易成本，促进技术市场的流通，提高技术交易效率，对中国技术交易平台的发展9建设提供了许多可借鉴的经验，但同时仍然具有一些局限性。技术交易平台在如何满足多样化的市场需求，如何避免交易中的信任风险、专利蟑螂现象、信息不对称等带来的消极影响，以及如何协助企业通过技术资产进行融资等方面，仍然面临着许多问题与挑战。而解决相关问题的大前提则是技术市场的全面建设与完善。技术交易平台的发展有赖于健全的技术交易环境。中国的技术交易平台仍然有许多发展空间，因此技术市场环境的建设十分重要。目前中国技术市场仍存在一些问题，如技术市场规模较小，整体布局不均，导致一些潜在的创新需求无法得到充分满足；国家层面关于技术市场的政策法规和监管体系仍不完善，整体配套实施细则缺失，造成技术市场评估机制与定价机制存在漏洞；由于与资本市场对接不畅，技术市场无法的到有效的支持，发展缓慢等。针对这些问题与挑战，中国在未来发展技术市场与交易平台的过程中可通过多方面进行调整。政府有必要出台统一的、针对技术市场的法律法规，加强市场监督管理体系建设，提高知识产权保护力度；与技术交易平台共同完善技术市场评估、定价机制；激发技术市场主体积极性，加强技术交易流通；建立有效的信息披露制度，降低技术市场中存在的信息不对称、价格操纵等风险；引导资金流入技术市场，加快技术市场发展步伐，等等。二、技术的供需匹配二、技术的供需匹配10技术交易平台可通过技术搜索、技术与服务众包或者技术拍卖等方式向技术交易双方提供技术的供需匹配服务。Yet2、InnoCentive、猪八戒网和 Ocean Tomo 在这些领域已展开了深入探索，并建立了相对成熟的运营模式。下文将以这些技术交易平台为例，详细分析其各自的运营模式，并讨论该模式的优势及局限性。2.2.1 1 技术搜索技术搜索以以 YetYet2 2 为例为例技术交易平台通过创建技术数据库、技术筛查模型及程序等方式组建“技术搜索引擎”，以帮助技术需求方有针对性地进行搜索与筛查。当客户提出技术需求后，技术交易平台通过了解、定义该技术需求，逐渐缩小搜索范围，以寻找合适的解决方案。Yet2 成立于 1999 年，最初由西门子、拜耳、卡特彼勒、霍尼韦尔等企业共同出资筹建。目前 Yet2 拥有超过 150,000 名市场用户，其中不仅有财富 500 强企业，还包括 16,000 多家小型科技公司。该平台在美国、欧洲、亚洲均设有办事处。Yet2 以其特有的“战略性咨询”服务和特定技术侦查服务为客户确定创新目标以及创新需求，并提供具体的解决方案。Yet2 利用自身在技术侦察、知识产权、业务发展和风险投资方面所积累的经验，定期将所侦查到的技术趋势和新兴市场机会以简报形式发送至客户，并向有技术需求的高级会员客户提供“战略性咨询（Strategic Dealflow）”服务，以帮助客户确定其11自身在开放创新过程中所处的位置，以及业务增长目标。客户可通过该服务与全球范围内提供某种特定类型技术的创新公司和技术本身进行接触，并与这些创新公司和技术团队进行点对点接触和讨论。此外，Yet2 每年还按照客户需求，预筛选逾 800 个项目，以月度会议形式直接向客户介绍，并通过“高级机会过滤”和技术审查程序，为客户提供具体的发展计划咨询服务；客户同时会被介绍给 Yet2 的全球合作伙伴，以帮助其获得更大发展。另一方面，Yet2 通过“确定需求技术侦查筛选互动”的特定技术侦查模式（图 2），满足客户所要求的明确技术需求。具体而言，客户提出需求后，Yet2 首先深入了解客户的短期或长期创新目标（了解需求）；其次明确项目数量和时间限制（定义需求）；之后在其自身建立的全球技术联盟网络和数据库中进行筛选，精确或广泛的寻找 IP 解决方案或专利（技术侦查）；接下来与客户进行交流沟通，根据客户的技术或商业标准调整筛选方向（技术筛选）；最后将方案提供给客户，安排客户与技术解决方会晤（互动），并最终协助客户进行谈判与交易。12资料来源：根据公开资料整理图图 2 2：YetYet2 2 特定技术侦查模式图特定技术侦查模式图2 2.2.2 技术与服务众包技术与服务众包以以 InnoCentiveInnoCentive、猪八戒网为例、猪八戒网为例技术与服务众包是指企业、政府或非盈利机构通过向外界进行众包的形式发布技术与服务需求，从众多解决方案中寻找最优方案，以达到化解技术难题的目的。InnoCentive 帮助技术需求者发布技术挑战，并协助审核、评估解决方案，以技术需求拉动技术供给。猪八戒网众包服务业务的特点是覆盖企业生长全周期，为技术服务供需双方提供便利。2 2.2.1.2.1 技术需求拉动技术供给技术需求拉动技术供给InnoCentiveInnoCentive2001 年以来，Innocentive 作为科技众包平台，帮助企业、政府、慈善机构等组织连接外部创新者（组织或个人），共同解决技术需求。在 InnoCentive 网站平台发布“技术挑战（Challenge）”需求的公司或机构被称之为“寻求者（Seeker）”；解决技术挑战13的科学家、团队则被称之为“解决者（Solver）”。从促进家庭获得清洁水源，到旨在吸引和杀死携带疟疾的蚊子的被动太阳能设备，InnoCentive 已利用“群众的力量”帮助寻求者解决了多项技术挑战，实现了以技术需求拉动技术供给的良性循环。InnoCentive 的业务核心是帮助寻求者发布需求，同时帮助解决者评估其方案，主要发挥把关和经纪、评价和评估、鉴定和标准、管制和仲裁等功能。寻求者在网站注册后发布技术挑战，解决者以竞赛方式参与挑战，提交解决方案。InnoCentive 对解决者提供的众多解决方案进行审核和评估，将不符合挑战标准的创意进行剔除。寻求者根据挑战的复杂程度、解决问题所需要的资源以及未来价值等，确定适合的奖金额度（如过低则 InnoCentive有权拒绝）。为保护解决者的利益不被侵害，InnoCentive 建立了知识产权审核与保障措施。寻求者一旦采用了解决者的知识产权，则必须履行奖励义务；若不履行则无法使用。InnoCentive 会对已被完美解决的挑战任务形成专题报告，介绍解决者获得的成就。2 2.2.2.2.2 服务企业生命全周期服务企业生命全周期猪八戒网猪八戒网猪八戒网创建于 2006 年，最初为中小企业提供单一的商标设计服务，后逐步发展为服务型交易撮合平台。其众包服务业务囊括品牌设计、工商财税、营销推广、IT 服务、知识产权服务等超过 1,000 种服务类项目，可覆盖企业生长全周期，即从最初的公司注册、Logo 设计，到运营期间的财务运营、业务推广和14知识产权保护，均可以在猪八戒网找到相应的众包服务。猪八戒网为大量中小企业的服务供需双方，提供了 C2C 电子商务平台。买家在网站上发布需求并明示佣金额度；同时也可与猪八戒网团队直接合作，通过精准匹配服务商、全国征集创意方案或者直接雇佣服务商等方式解决服务需求。卖家则可在网站上展示自己的服务内容，明码标价，以供买家选择。该平台为服务供需双方提供通道，打破服务交易的时间与空间限制，实现服务能力的在线交易。目前猪八戒网在大部分业务上实行零佣金制度，进而促进市场竞争，以增加市场活跃度。这不仅可提高平台上供需双方企业的数量，也为猪八戒网提供大量交易数据。猪八戒网通过其收集的用户数据与交易数据，进一步发掘可为中小企业客户提供二次服务的空间。例如，当猪八戒网为一家初创公司完成了公司注册、商标 Logo 的设计等服务内容后，平台可随即通过“八戒知识产权”向其提供知识产权保护，如商标注册代理和版权登记等服务，而初创公司亦可在“八戒财税”选择财务运营，税务咨询、申报等服务内容。2.32.3 技术拍卖技术拍卖以以 OceanOcean TomoTomo 为例为例技术拍卖为技术市场提供了新的技术交易和转移模式，通过公开竞价，第三方尽职调查等方式建立了公开透明的交易市场。而拍卖形式本身，也简化了技术交易的过程，加快技术市场的流15通。美国的知识产权资本化综合性服务集团 Ocean Tomo 公司建立的全球专利在线竞价交易市场（Ocean Tomo Bid-Ask Market），于 2006 年举办了“世界历史上第一次现场专利拍卖会”，开创了知识产权线上公开拍卖的先河（图 3）。买卖双方通过 OTBA 平台实现全球专利以及专利申请权的购买或出售，Ocean Tomo 交易团队和旗下全球经纪人则提供线下服务支持，活跃买卖双方。资料来源：根据文献数据整理图图 3 3：OceanOcean TomoTomo Bid-AskBid-Ask MarketMarket 知识产权拍卖模式图知识产权拍卖模式图OTBA 平台为卖家减少交易成本、找到可靠买家。所有由卖家提交的知识产权经 Ocean Tomo 的评分系统、交易专家团队筛和评审后，确定其可拍卖性。竞买人只有在经 Ocean Tomo 对其16进行信用审核，并签订竞价协议后才能参与竞价，且所有竞价活动均受协议约束。随后，被拍卖的知识产权和竞拍人信息均被纳入在线信息数据库。之后，Ocean Tomo 对通过审核的知识产权卖家进行尽职调查。拍卖通常将持续数天，交易时，卖家持唯一的交易序列号，买家持相应的虚拟竞买号牌，以避免混淆交易标的。如遇流拍情况，Ocean Tomo 则鼓励买卖双方私下协商，通过降低初始保留价格等方式达成交易。同时，OTBA 平台对专利信息及相关数据进行披露，提高交易透明度。在价格方面，平台通过系统地对有可比性的专利历史成交数据进行回顾，以完成价格披露，所有买家可以在线看到单个专利、专利族、国外专利、申请中专利以及相似专利的交易活跃度和竞标价差，让买家通过对相似专利资产的公开竞标价和要价来评估其意向专利的价值。举例而言，2017 年，惠普公司通过 OTBA 拍卖专利，其 1,070件专利被切分为 45 个拍卖品，每个拍品平均有 24 件专利，覆盖包括打印、计算机系统、图像成型、网络、个人系统、生命科学与微流体、移动手机与平板、通信、投影仪、传感器与射频识别、光伏基板及游戏等 12 个领域。这些专利的拍卖工作由 OTBA 专业人员在中美两地完成，以当地时间、语言、货币同时为买家服务。172.2.4 4 讨论讨论技术交易平台通过技术搜索模式，以有针对性的技术侦查，为技术需求方有效节约搜索时间，提高了技术匹配成功率；而技术与服务众包平台则联结技术供需两端，为企业创新寻找有效解决方案；公开的在线专利拍卖平台为买家解决了信息不透明、价格不公正等问题。但同时，各个运营模式仍具有一些局限性，如较高的会员服务费向中小企业设置了消费门槛；服务能力的交易给技术交易平台带来信任风险；专利拍卖可能滋生专利蟑螂现象等。2.2.4 4.1.1 技术的供需匹配模式的优势技术的供需匹配模式的优势通过有针对性的技术搜索与匹配方式，技术交易平台可以帮助客户节约寻找和筛查技术解决方案的时间，提升技术匹配效率。作为代表的 Yet2 通过多年运营，建立了技术数据库与技术匹配模型算法，提高了技术匹配成功率；同时通过保持与客户在整个交易流程中的互动，确保技术匹配精准度，协助客户进行谈判与交易，以高质量服务提高客户粘性。一家全球 B2C 公司，其寻找的标的技术为“立即永久密封加压弹性体和橡胶气囊中的穿孔”。Yet2 通过上述模式为该客户找到了 30 个解决方案，随后协助客户通过两轮技术电话会议，将入围的技术提供方缩减至 2 个。最终这家 B2C 公司采用了该标的技术，并决定进行项目开发。InnoCentive 和猪八戒网分别以不同的技术与服务众包形式，联结技术需求端与供给端，为双方提供交易服务，且均为企业创18新提供有效解决方案。InnoCentive 帮助技术寻求者审核技术解决方案，避免或减少无效信息干扰，提高合作效力，同时以有效的知识产权保护机制、激励机制和公布解决者的成就等措施，进一步保护解决者利益，提升其荣誉感、促进其积极性。美国国家航空航天局（NASA）已与 InnoCentive 合作进行了 7 项涵盖不同领域的挑战，吸引了来自众多国家或地区的挑战解决者。经过InnoCentive 协助审核与评估，所有挑战最终都获得了解决。NASA挑战的寻求者、执行赞助商和挑战解决者（冠军）均认为通过使用 InnoCentive 市场平台服务，可以促进现有资源有效利用、扩展创新思维多样性、提高知识产权转化效率、培育更具创新性的文化等。同时，解决者们直接与 InnoCentive 签订知识产权保护方面的合同与协议，无需 NASA 再额外提供法律资源，这也为NASA 节省了大量成本。猪八戒网更多时候以“自由市场”形式提供服务，供需双方可在平台发布自己的需求和服务并自主选择合作方，在节省搜索时间的同时，通过在线交流沟通、进行服务交易，亦节省了线下商讨的空间与时间成本；同时，“八戒知识产权”、“八戒财税”等猪八戒网自主经营的延伸业务，为初创公司提供了一站式服务体验，进一步提升客户依赖性。譬如云南某火腿集团经改制重组后，为保护自身品牌、重塑“中华老字号”魅力，与猪八戒网签约，借助后者旗下的“八戒知识产权”服务，对该火腿集团品牌进行商标注册，做好品牌保护。目前，猪八戒网已经为该品牌火19腿进行 37 类商标注册和全新品牌升级，提升了品牌形象。另外，四川凉山彝族自治州为提升辖内大凉山核桃产业园知名度，与猪八戒网合作，将凉山与核桃相结合后融入彝族人民鲜明的民族文化风俗与服装特点，设计出了具有凉山特色的品牌 Logo，获得了积极的市场反响。传统的专利权交易、转移模式，可能受信息不透明、交易价格不公平反应市场价值等问题限制，而 OTBA 平台则公开竞价、要价和成交价，提高了行业内交易透明度。OTBA 团队整理并公开专利交易价格数据，为买家提供定价参考，有助于买家作出合理判断。鉴于专利交易市场的情报具有竞争性，部分专利购买人通常希望以匿名状态参加交易，以保护其身份、隐私和信息渠道不被泄露，从而避免竞买人可能暴露其在个别专利组合竞争力上的短板和缺陷，因此 Ocean Tomo 通过远程竞标、由其职员代理竞标等方式，为竞买人解决匿名性和保密性等问题。对卖家而言，由于买家均经 OTBA 平台进行信用审核且被相关协议约束，交易安全性和稳定性得到了保障。2.2.4 4.2.2 技术的供需匹配模式的局限性技术的供需匹配模式的局限性在 Yet2，技术匹配服务是高级会员服务，需支付昂贵的会员费用后方可使用，这可能导致一些受资金限制的中小企业无法享受该服务；而囿于技术匹配算法的限制，一些最新技术可能在筛选过程中被遗漏，于平台而言则会造成一些市场机会流失。技术众包或服务众包交易平台通过整合、利用群体知识促进20企业创新的同时，其信任风险控制能力和管理水平亦面临更多挑战。在实物电子平台上交易场景下，如买家反馈商品质量差，卖家可通过道歉、退换或者折扣等方式快速挽回买家信任。而服务众包平台的交易标的与实物不同，其普遍具有个性化、非标准化和不可撤销等特点，买家可能会因为服务质量低，被迫接受项目延期，或选择次优方案；也可能遭遇被加价，甚至收到存在抄袭嫌疑的服务方案等问题。卖家则可能面临支付延期、中途被临时更换导致利益受损等情况。对于客户而言，上述需额外付出大量时间和沟通成本的情况可能导致其降低对平台的信任度，从而加剧交易成本上升，甚至最终引发平台被使用率的下降。当信任关系遭受破坏且需要修复时，平台须通过对客户进行安抚和补偿、出面调解交易纠纷、对破坏交易信任的一方进行调查与惩罚、雇佣第三方机构进行监督等方式，保证交易流程的公平性、公正性和有效性，及时提高用户体验及满意度。但上述举措势必造成平台经营成本和管理成本的增加，因此为避免对自身声誉造成消极影响，平台的信任风险控制和管理能力显得尤为重要。2016 年，猪八戒网被涉及一桩侵犯著作权纠纷案。该案件原告人的原创作品遭被告人剽窃并在猪八戒网平台上进行投标贩卖，故原告人将被告人与猪八戒网一同诉至法院。法院经审理认定猪八戒网在该案中承担连带侵权责任，并判决其在公开网络平台及其自身的网络平台对原告进行赔礼道歉。专利拍卖作为一种新兴的市场化技术转移模式，亦存在一21些问题。例如，专利拍卖如何能够真正体现专利的价值专利价值的评估涉及技术、法律和市场三个维度，只有成熟专业的评估机构才能作出更符合实际情况、更专业的判断。虽然 OTBA团队向买家提供了相似专利资产的公开竞标价和要价，但仅可提供部分参考依据，最终的交易实施仍需买家自行判断，依然对买家在专利评估方面的能力提出考验。专利拍卖提供的开放式交易平台和较低的最终成交价格，可能会滋生“Patent troll”现象。二十世纪中后期，随着技术创新的不断发展，新兴科创企业纷纷涌现，所拥有的专利和知识产权逐渐成为许多企业的核心竞争力。而专利和知识产权也成为了决定商品价值的主要因素，同时使得生产和经营成本在商品价值中所占的比例逐渐下降。“Patent troll”现象缘起于二十世纪九十年代在美国发生的多起专利侵权纠纷案件。2001 年，英特尔与另外一家同行业公司发生商业纠纷，英特尔方的法务高管在法庭上称对方公司及律师为“Patent Troll”，该词可被译为专利钓饵、专利海盗、专利蟑螂等，后广泛指自身不从事发明或生产，专以专利诉讼而牟利的公司或团体。随着专利技术逐步成为市场的核心资源之一，大量专利的申请和授权引发了专利保护范围的不断扩张，再加上市场对专利中介的需求增大，以及专利技术资本化等因素，使得市场上的专利蟑螂现象愈发严重。专利蟑螂通过投资和收购大量专利，打造专利库；或者一些掌握大量专利和技术信息的专利中介转化为专利22蟑螂，主动向可能存在侵权嫌疑的企业发起诉讼，以胁迫企业接受技术许可。同时由于美国各地法院对侵权行为的认定存在不一致，被专利蟑螂加以利用，从而增加诉讼成功的几率。随着专利投资市场的出现，许多风险投资基金对具有市场潜力的专利进行投资，或购买大量现有专利。而漫长的商品化、市场化周期可能无法满足投资者的期待，为尽快收回投资，雇佣专利蟑螂进行诉讼便成为了上述投资者的最佳选择之一。专利蟑螂的目标并不在于技术的流动和转让，而是利用专利诉讼牟利，这对市场竞争和创新带来消极影响。一旦陷入应对专利蟑螂的诉讼，企业大量的资金或被消耗，进而对其正常的研发和生产经营活动产生不良影响。当年英特尔的专利侵权诉讼案件即便胜诉，花费也将在 100 万美元以上，如此高额的诉讼费用可能会导致中小企业直接陷入经营困境。同时专利诉讼也是限制竞争对手发展的手段之一，专利蟑螂可借此机会向诉讼双方提供专利，导致诉讼规模进一步扩大；一些大型企业希望利用专利蟑螂削弱竞争对手的市场地位，但自身同时也面临承担巨额诉讼费用的风险。由于起诉成本低而应诉成本高，许多被诉企业因不愿承担长时间的专利诉讼压力，往往选择在支付一定费用后与原告方和解。2006 年，加拿大黑莓手机制造商 RIM 公司和加州专利公司 NTP 长达六年的诉讼最终以黑莓向 NTP 公司支付 6 亿美元为标志达成和解。当时如日中天的黑莓公司面临旷日持久的专利诉讼尚且如此，处于初创期的中小企业则更可能面临毁灭性打击。23专利蟑螂的存在将挫伤企业创新积极性，甚至导致科技创新企业数量下降。三、技术的交易流通三、技术的交易流通通常情况下，标准化的产品和交易流程能够有效保证交易市场的公平公正、有效合规，以及交易产品的快速流通，这也同样适用于技术产品交易市场。IPXI 在知识产权证券化领域做出了新的探索，组建了“以专利许可权使用权为标的”的产品构架；上海技术交易所建立了交易所式的标准化技术交易流程；而科易网创建了国内首套科技服务交易系统“科易宝”。3.3.1 1 技术交易产品的标准化技术交易产品的标准化以以 IPXIIPXI 为例为例标准化的融资产品具有公开发行、流通性高、安全等级高等特点，通常包括公开发行流通的股票、债券等，而知识产权相关的标准化产品则十分少见。IPXI 平台在知识产权产品标准化方面先行一步，建立了可以公开发行，具有流通性的专利许可权使用权标准化产品。2013 年，IPXI（Intellectual Property Exchange International Inc.,国际知识产权交易所公司）在美国芝加哥展开运营，是全球首家“以专利许可使用权为标的”的知识产权证券化交易平台。其运营模式（图 4）为：专利权人向 IPXI 提交 UOS 标准化专利审查文件（Unit Offering Scenarios，单位许可权合同）进行专利挂牌申请，平台进行专利材料审查后，专利权人通过 ULR 合同（Unit24Licenses Right Contract，单位许可权合同）的独占许可方式，将专利权许可给 IPXI 所设立的 SPV（特殊目的机构），最后由 SPV对外发售在 ULR 合同中约定的专利权非独占许可份额。一级市场购买者可以通过 ULR 合同直接使用该专利，或者继续出售该非独占许可至二级流通市场获益。ULR 合同中约定专利权非独占许可的份数、发行费率等条款。专利权人对于专利的许可收益是80%的 ULR 合同收入。资料来源：根据文献数据整理图图 4 4：IPXIIPXI 平台知识产权使用权证券化模式图平台知识产权使用权证券化模式图IPXI 会公开专利授权过程及交易活动价格。当专利权人提交审查文件后，IPXI 会进行法律分析，并就这些专利是否可发行交易进行审查，有关调查文件及结果均在平台上公布。IPXI同时要求购买者定期递交使用报告，汇总使用情况，再根据这些使用数据衡量被许可专利的市场接受度。经授权的市场参与者，可以通过 IPXI 平台看到最近的交易活动价格。尽管 IPXI 由于股东意见不一、许可环境不尽完善等因素，于 2015 年停止运营，但其在专利证券化领域中的新尝试，仍为25未来知识产权的非债权类型证券化指出了新的方向。3.3.2 2 技术交易流程的标准化技术交易流程的标准化以上海技术交易所以上海技术交易所、科易网为例科易网为例由于早期的技术交易双方掌握的信息资源有限，不易广泛获得有意向进行交易技术产品的信息，缺少市场价格参照的交易价格亦难以充分体现技术产品的公允价值，而且交易时的资金交付环节可能存在风险。上海技术交易所建立的标准化交易流程可保证技术交易流程规范与信息透明；科易网首创的线上技术交易流程，方便交易双方在线上进行合同草拟定稿的同时，可有效提升技术产品交付安全性。3.2.13.2.1 交易所模式的技术交易流程交易所模式的技术交易流程上海技术交易所上海技术交易所上海技术交易所（以下简称“上技所”）于 2020 年 10 月 28日正式开市，是中国首家国家级常设技术市场和国家技术转移示范机构。自开市至 2022 年第一季度，上技所累计成交额已达 39.2亿元，累计进场科技成果项目 3,398 项，进场服务机构 67 家，涉及转让方 166 家、受让方 126 家。上技所为保证技术产品的交易规范，设计了包括受理交易申请、发布交易信息、登记受让意向、组织交易签约、结算交易资金、出具交易凭证等程序在内的标准化交易流程，以及一系列配套交易规则与操作细则。其交易方式主要可分为公开挂牌交易和非公开协议交易。在公开挂牌交易方式（图 5）下，技术转让方通过上技所发26布交易信息，公开征集意向受让方。当存在 2 个以上意向受让方时，上技所通过在线竞价交易系统组织公开竞价，以确定最终受让方。竞价方式包括但不限于网络竞价、拍卖、招投标等。交易双方均需与在上技所完成注册的交易服务机构形成代理关系，并委托后者为其准备和递交相关交易材料；在交易过程中后者还可对其提供咨询、培训等辅助性服务。27资料来源：根据上海技术交易所官方网站资料整理图图 5 5：上海技术交易所公开挂牌交易流程图：上海技术交易所公开挂牌交易流程图非公开协议交易方式则省去了公开征集意向受让方的步骤。28转让方与受让方在交易前签订交易文件，并委托交易服务机构代其向上技所提出交易申请。两种交易方式下，交易价款结算完成后，上技所均将向交易双方出具交易凭证。为规避交易资金结算环节中可能存在的支付违约、程序不规范等风险，当交易合同签订后，交易双方可选择在上技所以场内资金结算的方式进行资金交付。上技所对各类交易的资金进行独立管理、结算交付，开设独立的结算账户，并保证账户中交易资金的安全，不得挪作他用。此外，成果转化公示亦是上技所作为具有公信力的国家级技术交易市场的重要职能之一。国家设立的研究开发机构、高等院校持有的科技成果通过协议定价的，可通过上技所进行价格公示，并出具结果公示证明。3.2.23.2.2 线上技术交易全流程线上技术交易全流程科易网科易网科易网成立于 2007 年，是一家市场自发的在线技术交易平台。科易网将电子商务手段运用于技术交易，并在 2013 年创建了国内首套科技服务交易系统“科易宝”。该系统以技术交易中的资金安全、技术交付安全和专业化服务为目标，促进了虚拟技术产品的在线交易与流动性。目前累计签约合同 11,450 份，累计签约金额超过 77 亿元人民币。技术交易双方可在科易宝上实现从签约、支付、交付到项目验收的全程技术交易管理。交易双方的任意一方确定交易意向后，可在线上签约中心创建交易合同，并邀请签约对象，进行合同草29拟与沟通定稿。完成签约后，买方先将资金支付到由银行监管的第三方账户，待卖方提供相应的技术服务后，买方再确认付款。之后款项由担保账户转至卖方。科易宝对交付中的技术产品进行加密传输，保证资料转移的安全性、隐私性和接收方查看资料的不可抵赖性。技术经纪人及中介机构也可以签约入驻科易宝，进行宣传展示和洽谈对接，促成交易。科易宝还可为交易方提供鉴证服务，如交易合同的认定，成果转化公示等。3.33.3 讨论讨论技术交易产品的标准化提高了技术市场的流通性，降低买卖双方交易成本。技术交易流程的标准化则有效提高买卖双方的交易效率，规避资金风险，免除决策者责任等。但标准化的技术交易产品在审核过程中仍可能存在操纵价格、信息投机风险、专利权滥用和垄断风险等，同时对于中小科创企业而言，进入知识产权使用权许可权证券化交易的门槛较高。而标准化的交易流程主要适用于前期已有交易意向的技术项目，因此其对于项目前期的实质性帮助较少。3 3.3.3.1.1 技术的交易流通模式的优势技术的交易流通模式的优势标准化的技术交易产品可以帮助专利权人缓解融资压力，同时为专利交易市场提供规范化的产品流通标准，加速专利流通，推动专利权的使用价值产业化，降低买卖双方交易成本。拥有专利的科创企业可通过将专利许可使用权以独占许可方式许可给30IPXI，再由 IPXI 将其拆分为非独占许可权对外发售，这种类似于企业借助 IPO 获得融资的方式，能够有效缓解专利权人的融资压力。通过一级市场与二级市场之间的互动，还可以提高专利使用权价值的流通。并且投资人购买专利许可使用权后，仍需要将其投入产业运用才能获益，因此除融资功能外，这一模式也可推动专利技术在产业中的运用。标准化的技术交易产品的审核流程可做到公开透明，从而提高投资者对相关专利许可使用权的信任度，有效减少投资者前期用于判断和审查所消耗的精力和时间。IPXI 就可出售的专利许可使用权采取市场化定价，在 URL 合同中制定规范条款，并通过购买者的试用报告定期发布交易价格，以供所有潜在购买者参考。2013 年 6 月 5 日，IPXI 推出其第一个 ULR 合同产品由飞利浦独家授权给 IPXI 的、包含 600 多项专利的专利组合，其中 225 项系关于有机发光二极管技术（OLED)显示屏应用的 PCT专利。通过两次网络公开演示，此次交易共吸引了 250 名来自企业和金融机构投资者的参与。上海技术交易所制定了标准化的技术交易流程以及一系列操作规则，可节省交易双方在交易过程中的沟通和时间成本，提高交易效率；第三方资金结算功能则有效降低了资金风险。根据国务院发布的实施若干规定的相关要求，成果转化公示免除了转让方决策者因转让后的成果后续价值变化等因素而产生的决策责任，对于高校院所31及科研机构来说具有重要意义。此前，中国科学院上海光学精密器械研究所转让的“磁控溅射倾斜沉积镀膜装置”等 11 项专利，拟通过协议定价形式作价转让给浙江某单位。上技所为该项目提供了成果转化公示服务，公示信息包括转让方信息、受让方信息、转让专利信息及拟交易价格等。公示无异议后，上技所出具了 公示无异议证明，作为本次转让行为的见证。在此过程中，上技所作为该项目中除交易双方之外的第三方，见证了此次科技成果转化，帮助高校院所决策者免除了科研成果转化中国有资产流失等问题的责任。科易宝除了网上支付及清算功能之外还包括电子合同签约、技术资料交付、技术合同与技术资料的存证和取证等服务内容，具有更高的市场灵活性。依托上述功能，科易网将技术交易专业服务和技术经纪服务网络加以结合，构建起系统、服务、经纪三位一体的保障体系。北京大学工学院厦门创新创业中心与科易网开展了产学研服务的深度合作，科易网为北大工学院提供宣传展示、供需对接及交易落地的服务保障，同时北大工学院指定科易宝作为其在福建地区技术交易的结算通道。厦门大学和福建师范大学也分别与科易宝签订了技术经济挂靠协议，为技术经纪人提供活动场地，定期展开技术交流，洽谈活动能产学研活动。3 3.3.2.3.2 技术的交易流通模式的局限性技术的交易流通模式的局限性标准化的技术交易产品在其审核和发行过程中也面临一些不利因素，如操纵价格和信息投机风险、专利权滥用和垄断风险32等。IPXI 筛选委员会的成员负责审核 UOS 文件，但同时也可以作为投资者或专利权人的利益方，这可能造成操纵价格和利用相关信息投机的风险。一些专利权人基于利益最大化的目的，在提供专利组合时，可能存在搭售或者垄断的可能性，而筛选委员会在对 UOS 文件进行审查时可能无法有效地对专利权滥用和垄断作出明确、合理的判断。这些风险均会引起专利技术交易市场的不公平现象，导致秩序混乱。而专利蟑螂也可能趁虚而入，在二级市场大量收购专利许可使用权，进行恶意诉讼等，扰乱市场。对于中小科创企业而言，进入知识产权使用权许可权证券化交易的门槛较高。若想成为 URL 合同产品候选人，其提交专利除要向 IPXI 进行独占许可、具有未来前景及潜在客户、能够授权多领域或应用外，也被要求可以和其他专利捆绑。中小企业自身可能无法拥有足够数量且价值高的专利组合，或者由于自身规模限制而无法收购其他专利进行组合，导致其若想通过 URL 合同产品进行融资，则必需在 IPXI 平台的待挂牌专利池中选择合适专利进行捆绑，或者事先与其他企业合作捆绑专利组合。专利组合的形成需要各专利权人事先分别约定各自的责任与利益分配方式，然而，这可能与之后的 URL 合同的约定有所不同，当进入挂牌交易环节后，可能导致专利权人之间的纠纷。标准化的交易流程主要适用于前期已有交易意向的技术项目，因此其对于项目前期的交易撮合、技术评估、谈判等阶段的实质性帮助较少，更多是为交易双方的合作起到“锦上添花”的33作用，而且技术交易是否成功，最终还要看交易双方的意愿。四、金融助力技术发展四、金融助力技术发展科技创新能力已经逐渐成为企业的核心竞争力之一。科创企业拥有大量专利、知识产权，相较于传统资产而言，以知识产权等无形资产进行融资的方式仍然处于发展阶段。Ocean Tomo 旗下的投资银行可以通过知识产权质押、出售/返许可和知识产权证券化方式帮助企业进行融资，而 Yet2 也建立了投资基金，用于帮助小企业孵化成长。同时，面对知识产权评估难的痛点，上海技术交易所建立了一套知识产权评估系统，协助银行等传统投资机构展开针对科创企业的信贷融资业务。4.4.1 1 知识产权融资与投资知识产权融资与投资以以 OceanOcean TomoTomo、YetYet2 2 为例为例目前以知识产权为融资标的的金融工具较少，Ocean Tomo的投资银行（OTIB）可通过知识产权质押、出售/返许可和知识产权证券化方式帮助企业进行融资，也可向客户提供知识产权交易、并购、知识产权组合优化与合理化方面的咨询服务。其中，出售/返许可（SLB）结构（图 6）可以帮助企业在不中断相关业务的情况下，以其拥有的知识产权进行融资。通过 SLB 结构，OTIB 可协助客户买卖其所持有的技术专利和相关知识产权。买卖双方签署一份基于特定使用领域的非排他许可协议，在固定期限内，以固定金额将这些专利返许可给需要实施专利的原专利权所有人。在某些情况下，买方可将该专利许可给其他的需求者以34获得许可费用，出售专利的所有权人可以参与分配买方的额外知识产权许可收益，从而进一步为卖方带来经济收益。资料来源：根据公开数据整理图图 6 6：知识产权出售：知识产权出售/返许可模式图返许可模式图Yet2 则通过建立投资基金的方式，对企业进行投资与孵化。2010 年，Yet2 成立 Yet2Ventures 投资基金，用于帮助小企业孵化成长，并对其进行后续投资。2015 年，该基金的资产管理规模超过 5,000 万美元。4.4.2 2 技术评估助力传统银行科技贷款技术评估助力传统银行科技贷款以上海技术交易所为以上海技术交易所为例例上技所建立了一套基于交易所核心功能的多元化科技成果市场化评价、交易定价方法，通过模型评价、专家询价和市场确价流程给予被评估技术资产相对合理的市场价格（图 7）。首先，上技所利用大数据、云计算等技术手段建立技术热点、价格预测和技术流向等模型，同时根据第三方科技评价机构的技术资产价值评估报告，对被评价技术的先进性、市场前景、资本经营、技术成熟度、法律状态、垄断程度等维度进行模型评价；其次，根35据市场和客户的特定需求，上技所向技术潜在使用方的市场主体与行业专家征询该项技术的价值，并在上技所已有的专家智库中随机抽选来自企业、金融机构、高校院所等单位的专家，成立询价小组，出具成果询价报告，给出建议交易价格区间，为技术交易协议与挂牌底价的形成提供辅助依据；最后，上技所已基于模型评价和专家询价形成了交易技术的挂牌底价，并通过公开挂牌交易的形式，以协议、拍卖或竞价的方式确定市场价格。资料来源：根据上海技术交易所提供资料整理图图 7 7：上海技术交易所评估体系：上海技术交易所评估体系上技所与多家商业银行合作，打造了以技术专利为核心的技术资产质押融资产品。上技所基于过往交易数据所创建的评价系统可将企业、专利等技术资产进行评价和分级。当一个企业或技术资产需要被评估时，银行可依据该系统对企业或技术资产出具36的预评估报告进行尽职调查，再根据上技所出具的交易登记凭证和技术专利评估报告综合审核对企业的授信额度。此外，上技所还配合银行设计了针对科创企业的融资授信产品。当企业申请授信额度时，银行通常前期需先对企业进行信用评级。而针对部分规模较小、信用评级未达标的科创企业，其可通过科创企业上市培育库网站注册入库，完成科创属性评测，再由上技所审核技术合同、评估企业科创属性。之后，银行会根据上技所对该企业的科创属性评估分数及认定的技术合同额，核定该企业最低融资额度和初审通过率。4.34.3 讨论讨论在协助企业以专利、知识产权等进行融资方面，大型技术交易平台可依靠其市场地位及掌握的用户数据对企业提供帮助。银行等传统投资机构可依据技术交易平台的评估报告对企业的评级、技术资产的价值等作出合理判断。但用于知识产权融资的底层资产相对特殊，个性化特征较强；同时，融资双方均可能面临着信息不对称带来的相关风险。4.4.3 3.1.1 金融助力技术发展模式的优势金融助力技术发展模式的优势大型技术交易平台掌握着丰富资源，这为其完成除匹配技术供需之外的工作提供了可能。一方面，大型技术交易平台作为专业机构，拥有更为广泛的社会影响力，同政府有关部门、金融机构、行业协会等存在更多联系机会和渠道，在掌握信息的同时，37也更加了解市场上主流的为企业技术发展提供支持的路径；另一方面其通过与平台客户保持良好、稳定的合作关系，能够充分了解客户企业的经营情况、深入挖掘其金融需求和可被市场认可的融资方式，引导客户企业整合优势资源，通过例如知识产权融资工具，或者投资基金等方式，帮助企业进行知识产权价值挖掘、知识产权货币化和利润最大化，同时也提高了企业孵化、成果转化成功率。知识产权融资在中国目前仍处于探索阶段，当前面临的主要问题之一即知识产权价值评估难。由于知识产权的特性，其盈利生存时间以及相关风险都难以被在短时间内作出客观判断，因此市场对于知识产权的现实价值和未来发展价值都难以给出准确计量。同时，中国对于知识产权的评估方法当前尚无规范化的实施细则以及量化标准，进一步导致了实践进展的缓慢。一些技术交易平台，如上海技术交易所，利用自身数据资源优势建立了一套针对企业和技术资产的评价方法与评价系统，通过多维度模块化的科技成果评价模型和一站式的价值评估、专家询价以及市场确价流程，在一定程度上帮助银行等传统金融机构缓解了在知识产权价值评估方面的弱势处境，帮助科创企业通过知识产权质押融资或信贷融资等方式释放资金压力。上海某网络科技股份有限公司，是一家提供智能机器人服务、智能营销解决方案和智能设备集成方案的高新企业。经过系统评估，上技所初步认定该企业提供的四项发明专利最高转让价值合计为 8,696 万元，折扣后可38作价 3,000 万元进行质押。由于企业经营情况良好，持续盈利能力强，银行经过详尽的风控调查审核，结合企业需求决定向企业授信 5,000 万元。4.4.3 3.2.2 金融助力技术发展模式的局限性金融助力技术发展模式的局限性相比其他以实物类产品作为底层资产的融资方式，知识产权融资基于底层资产较为特殊，具有未来不可预测性和市场竞争带来的高风险性等特征。2000 年，Royalty Pharma 公司开启了美国首例专利资产证券化案例。该公司对其购买的美国耶鲁大学持有的某一项药品的专利许可收费权进行证券化融资。在实现证券化不久之后，由于该药品的用户变动导致其市场份额和价格下降，加之其它三种新药的出现，造成该药品专利许可费急剧下降。因此该证券化产品在 2001 年连续三个季度无法按照合同约定支付利息，并于 2002 年 11 月底提前进入清偿程序，美国首例专利资产证券化产品黯然退出舞台。发行人 Royalty Pharma 公司将该产品失败的原因归咎于单一专利资产证券化风险过高。由此可见，相较于单一专利而言，具有较好市场前景和较高市场竞争力的专利组合更容易被投资者所接受。而如前文所述，专利组合对于中小型科创企业来说挑战较大，因此可能限制了此类证券化产品规模的扩大。知识产权融资要求投资人与银行等金融机构拥有更加精准、专业的知识产权评估能力。目前中国对于知识产权的评估实施细则和标准尚未出台，而银行等传统金融机构从业人员受限于自身39知识结构和项目经验，对知识产权制度的了解缺乏一定深入性，从而导致其对知识产权融资的风险把控、资产处置难度等暂无统一的规范认识。中国首单知识产权证券化产品发行于 2015 年 12月；截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日，中国发行知识产权证券化产品共66 单，累计发行规模 182 亿元，相较于债券、股票市场动辄数十乃至上百万亿规模而言，微乎其微。1在该类型融资市场规模尚未壮大之时，吸引投资和金融机构加大投入、扩充专业团队和力量十分困难，进而导致负面循环的发生。此外，企业进行知识产权融资时面临着信息不对称带来的消极影响。由于科创企业更多拥有的是无形资产，如专利、商标等知识产权，可抵押性较低，科创企业与外部投资者间存在的信息不对称问题，相较于其他传统实业企业不尽相同。科创企业在获取融资时，出于对其具备的高新技术、知识产权、商业秘密等重要资源的保密性、安全性和市场竞争性等考虑，不愿将相关信息及研发进度等情况披露给外部投资者，从而造成严重的信息不对称。当外部投资者无法掌握真实的技术情况和项目研发情况时，可能会选择谨慎投资或者拒绝投资，从而影响企业的融资进程。而在信息不对称问题的影响下，特别是针对中小企业，可能进一步造成投资机构的逆向选择，例如商业银行向研发能力较低但财务数据较好的企业提供资金，而拒绝向暂时经营困难但研发产品具有潜在市场的企业提供资金。信息不对称也可能引发道德1数据来源：北京智慧财富知识产权金融研究院全国知识产权证券化项目发行情况报告（2021）40风险，例如中小企业的为获得融资向银行等机构提供虚假财务报表，或者中小企业本身缺乏对融资信用的重视，未按预期还贷等。五、中国技术市场和交易平台面临的挑战与未来发展方向五、中国技术市场和交易平台面临的挑战与未来发展方向健全的技术市场环境是技术交易平台发展的基础。中国的技术交易平台未来前景广阔，美好蓝图的实现有赖于技术市场的发展仍应看到，目前中国技术市场面临着一些亟待解决的问题。当前中国技术市场主要集中在东部发达地区，中西部经济相对滞后的地区和城市尽管存在技术交易需求，但面临的阻碍较多；相关政策法规与监管体系仍不完善，技术资产价值评估机制、定价机制有待加强规范；资本市场与技术市场对接效率过低，资金与技术协同发展、相互促进的正向循环尚未完全建立。总结发现，中国技术交易平台在发展与建设过程中，应提升市场政策与监管环境建设，完善技术技术市场价值机制，进一步激发技术市场主体参与积极性，促进技术市场与资本市场互动、提升科技成果产业化过程中的资金支持。5 5.1.1 中国技术市场面临的问题与挑战中国技术市场面临的问题与挑战目前中国技术市场存在规模较小、布局不均等问题，同时由于政策法规与监管体系的不完善、技术资产价值评估机制相对欠缺、资金支持的缺乏等劣势情况同时存在，导致中国技术市场的发展受到了一定限制。5 5.1.1.1 1 技术市场发展规模较小、布局不均技术市场发展规模较小、布局不均41中国技术市场规模发展迅猛，但相较于其他要素市场仍然规模较小。2019 年，全国技术合同成交额首次超过 2 万亿元，全国技术合同项数超过 40 万项，2020 年，全国技术合同成交额 2.8万亿元，较上年增长 26.1%，技术合同项数 54.9 万项，较上年增长 13.5%，技术交易量增长劲头十足。2而与其他要素市场（如资本市场）的交易规模和市场规模相比，技术市场仍然差距较大。中国技术交易机构数量较低，无法满足当前技术交易需求。截至 2020 年底，全国共有各类技术转移机构 425 家（图 8），其中技术（产权）交易机构如中国技术交易所有限公司、上海技术交易所、北京产权交易所有限公司等，共 29 家，占总体的 6.8%，独立第三方市场化运作的机构 72 家，占总体的 16.9%。面对技术市场规模的急剧增长，目前的技术交易机构数量远不足以满足市场需求。资料来源：科技部火炬中心2021 年全国技术市场统计年报图图 8 8：2 2020020 年全国技术转移机构类型结构年全国技术转移机构类型结构2数据来源：科技部火炬中心2021 年全国技术市场统计年报42中国技术市场布局较不均。当前中国技术市场与技术转移机构主要分布于北京、上海、广东、江苏等东部经济发达省市，这些地区高等学院、科研机构较多，研发能力更强，技术交易更活跃，而中部、西部和东北地区拥有的交易机构数量则较少。对于经济欠发达、科技能力较弱的地区或城市来说，技术市场的布局不均，可能导致其技术需求被满足的可能性进一步减小，进而阻碍当地经济的发展。5 5.1.2.1.2 技术市场政策法规与监管体系不完善技术市场政策法规与监管体系不完善各级政府目前尚缺乏针对技术市场规范化运营的政策法规。中国近年来在技术转移、科技成果转化、知识产权保护等方面加强了法制法规制度建设，无论是合同法、专利法、科学技术进步法，还是最新修订的科技成果转化法，均对技术交易起到保驾护航的作用。但在国家层面，专门针对技术市场的法律法规尚未出台。法律法规的缺位一定程度上造成了技术市场在运行过程中“无法可依”、“无规可循”的混乱局面。同时，技术交易市场的监管体系尚不健全。虽然国家层面上技术市场管理办公室仍然存在，但各地方政府技术市场管理部门多被精简或合并，人员减少，且多为兼职，导致技术市场缺乏有效监督、过度自由化问题日益严重。在无统一监管、交易行为普遍不规范的状态下，技术交易双方的权益无法得到有效保护，进而增加了双方的风险成本。5 5.1.1.3 3 技术市场价值评估机制、价格机制相对欠缺技术市场价值评估机制、价格机制相对欠缺43中国技术市场中缺乏统一、规范、合理的技术评估机制和定价机制。知识产权价值评估难系世界范围内所公认，虽然近年来中国已经出台了资产评估准则无形资产和专利资产评估指导意见等文件，但仍然缺乏实施细则以及量化标准，各技术交易平台提供的技术资产评估服务虽各具特色，亦均有所不足。因此，技术市场、投资机构、技术交易平台和技术交易双方在知识产权评估与定价的实践过程中仍面临诸多问题。技术市场价格机制的不完善，直接引发技术资产与技术市场脱节、市场价格信号失灵、技术市场效率低下等问题，由此导致了国内技术资产价格远低于国外引进技术资产价格。2020 年，中国自境外地区吸纳技术合同每项平均成交金额约 5,318.8 万元，而对外输出技术合同每项平均成交金额约 3,344.7 万元，这使得境外机构可能利用中国技术市场评估机制与价格机制不完善的漏洞，大量低价收购科技成果与技术资源，造成国内技术交易卖方的经济损失，甚至威胁到国家安全。35 5.1.4.1.4 技术市场的资金支持不足技术市场的资金支持不足基于各方面考虑，中国目前尚未建立完全市场化的风险投资环境，在科技成果转化方面的风险投资主要采取政府主导的运作模式，例如由科技部、财政部设立的国家科技成果转化引导基金，中科院与广东省粤科金融集团共同建立的中科科技成果转化创业投资基金等牵头实施。这些政府引导基金按照国有企业模式运3数据来源：科技部火炬中心2021 年全国技术市场统计年报44营，虽然在科技成果转化初期起到了一定作用，但其非市场化的运作机制也制约了技术市场的发展。由于中国目前缺乏针对技术市场的多层次资本市场支持和有效鼓励风险投资的方式，技术市场与资本市场无法有效结合，初创阶段的科创型企业在与资本对接时，较长的投融资回报周期，考验投资者耐心的同时可能无法得到其充分支持，导致技术市场发展缓慢。知识产权融资工具，如知识产权证券化、专利权质押贷款等，已初步形成一定规模，但仍然存在发展局限性。商业银行等传统投资机构对于知识产权的价值评估认定、风险把控、资产处置等方面认知仍有欠缺，对该类型产品的投资持谨慎态度。在知识产权评估相关标准、规则未规范化之前，可能都难以推动知识产权融资的大规模发展。5 5.2.2 对中国技术市场及交易平台建设的建议与措施对中国技术市场及交易平台建设的建议与措施各级政府有必要建立合理的技术市场法律法规体系，加强市场监管，打击违法违规行为，提高保护知识产权力度；完善技术市场评价机制，给出具有参考性、可靠性的市场价值参考，与技术交易平台携手，共同稳定技术市场定价；激发技术市场主体参与技术交易积极性，加强市场流通，形成统一、协调的市场氛围；促进技术市场与资本市场互动，引导资金流入技术市场，激励处在创业期的科创企业内在创新动力；建立并执行信息披露制度，建立公开、透明的技术交易制度，降低信息不对称、价格操纵等45风险。5.2.5.2.1 1 提升技术市场政策与监管环境建设提升技术市场政策与监管环境建设为保证公平、公开、公正的交易原则，促进技术市场的法制化与规范化，政府需要积极发挥宏观调控、激励和保障机制，为技术市场提供必要的法律环境和政策环境。有必要建立健全的技术市场法治建设和法律法规体系。法律体系建设应从国家法律、行政法规、部门规章和地方性法规四方面入手，在坚持深入贯彻现有法律法规的前提下，积极出台有针对性的法律制度，以司法手段规范技术市场管理。同时，有必要进一步明确技术市场监管、行政管理部门职责，优化技术市场管理队伍建设，继续提升规范、严明的技术市场监管环境质量。如加大技术市场的监管力度，严厉打击违法违规行为，重点整治以非法手段侵害知识产权所有人利益和以假冒伪劣技术欺骗他人的行为。进一步加强维护技术交易当事人的合法权益，增加对技术市场中的知识产权保护力度，如完善技术合同、产权登记制度等。5 5.2.2.2.2 完善技术市场评估机制与定价机制完善技术市场评估机制与定价机制政府须出台覆盖性更强的技术评估相关法律法规，及管理、实施具体办法，通过立法形式规范市场评估行为；科技部等政府有关机构可制定科学的技术资产评估方法，以供市场主体参照执行；另外，有效的公示制度也可降低技术资产评估时可能产生的信息操纵风险，有利于健全技术市场评估机制。46针对技术与市场脱节、价格信号失灵等问题，政府要以宏观调控为基础，以市场为导向，合理安排指导价格，并出台与技术价格相关管理细则，形成有效机制，规范技术市场价格行为。在帮助企业进行知识产权融资方面，技术交易平台同样应有所作为。技术交易平台可侧重于发展对客户（企业）更有支持力度的知识产权评估能力，在帮助企业明确其拥有的技术资产价值的同时，让企业了解如何发展巩固自身技术优势，以吸引更多投资者。例如 Ocean Tomo 构建的知识产权融资体系，已发展出成熟的技术资产评估路径；科易网建立了技术交易价格评估系统，只需用户填写资料即可自动生成参考价格；上海技术交易所更是建立了科技成果评价模型，和一站式的价值评估、专家询价以及市场确价流程，通过大数据、云计算等智能评价工具协助商业银行对企业技术资产进行有效评估，推动金融助力技术发展。5 5.2.3.2.3 激发技术市场主体参与积极性激发技术市场主体参与积极性技术市场的主体具有多样性，包含科研院所、高校和企业等。近年来，创新要素向企业聚集，企业逐渐成为创新技术产业化的绝对主力。2020 年，企业输出技术合同成交额占全国总数九成以上，吸纳技术合同成交额则超过全国总数的 80%。4十四五规划中强调了提升“强化国家战略科技力量”、“企业技术创新能力”、“激发人才创新活力”、“完善科技创新体制机制”等具体举措。企业是市场竞争的直接参与者，面对市场需求，企业对新技术、4数据来源：科技部火炬中心2021 年全国技术市场统计年报47新产品的敏感度更高，可采取的对应手段也更加灵活多样。因此，政府可激发技术市场主体参与积极性，与市场主体一道建设合理的技术交易与服务体系。同时，除了与跨国集团、大型国有企业对接以外，技术交易平台也要积极地与中、小型科创企业广泛开展合作，因为后者的创新活动频繁，对技术的需求大，但与科研院所、高校、政府机关相比，中小企业的科研创新人才储备规模不大，资产和资金规模亦不具优势，可调动资源和信息获取渠道相对较少，同时对市场的依赖性较大，需要更多的渠道提出技术需求，以强化自身的市场竞争优势，实现企业的生存与发展。5 5.2.4.2.4 促进技术市场与资本市场互动促进技术市场与资本市场互动除自身建立的风险投资引导基金以外，政府有必要促进技术市场与资本市场的股东衔接，引进境外投资者和民间资本等，建立有效的技术市场监管机制，为风险资金的投入提供合理、安全的进入与退出机制。在此基础上，政府仍需加强自身风险投资引导基金的建设，强化其“引导”属性，以促进商业投资基金对企业的投入。另外，适当的财政支持，如税收优惠、财政补贴等，也是政府调动投资者积极性的有效手段。在此基础上，有必要继续丰富知识产权融资手段，积极探索新型知识产权融资产品，借鉴国际先进经验与理念和国内技术交易平台既有的评估模型与路径，引导商业银行等传统投资机构建立系统性的知识产权评估体系，提高风险把控能力，发展包括专48利权质押融资、知识产权证券化等产品市场规模，拓宽市场主体的融资渠道。5 5.2.5.2.5 加强技术交易平台供需匹配能力加强技术交易平台供需匹配能力技术交易平台既是交易场所的提供者，也是相关资源与服务的供给商。如果仅保持交易功能，各平台的可复制性和替代性将不可避免地升高。因此，提供资源匹配、技术供需对接等服务，如建立数据系统帮助技术供需双方实现精准匹配，打造自身鲜明特色，将成为技术交易平台发展的又一侧重点。如 Yet2 建立了技术数据库，通过技术侦查等方式，帮助客户找到合适的技术方案；InnoCentive 组建了专家团队，帮助需求方审核解决者提供的方案；科易网和猪八戒网均提供了技术咨询服务，针对企业需求，通过智库给以相应的指导服务。通过建立大数据库、专家团队等方式帮助解决技术供需问题，技术交易平台能够有效缓解企业创新压力，促进技术交易流通。49参考文献及资料1 李莉,闫斌,顾春霞.知识产权保护、信息不对称与高科技企业资本结构J.管理世界,2014,(11):1-9.2 李文元,向雅丽,顾桂芳.创新中介在开放式创新过程中的功能研究以 InnoCentive 为例J.科学学与科学技术管理,2012,33(04):54-59.3 姜伟,赵露泽.专利海盗现象引发的思考J.知识产权,2012,(09):69-71.4 黄图毅,李新平.信息不对称条件下中小企业融资制度缺失及对策分析J.生产力研究,2009,(15):170-172.5 李妃养,黄何,曾乐民.全球视角的技术交易平台建设经验及启示建议J.中国科技论坛,2018,(01):24-29.6 孙新波,张明超,林维新,胡梦琴.科研类众包网站“InnoCentive”协同激励机制单案例研究J.管理评论,2019,31(05):277-290.7 吕磊.论专利海盗扩张的成因与影响J.电子知识产权,2013,(08):28-33.8 冀瑜,项珍珍,魏辰雨,李旭.美国 IPXI 公司专利许可使用权证券化融资机制探析J.浙江金融,2013,(05):48-50 69.9 李筱璇.国际知识产权交易所 IPXI 停运原因探析J.生产力研究,2015,(12):78-81.10 陈婕.国际知名专利运营服务机构商业模式与思考J.中国发明与专利,2018,15(05):60-65.5011 周竺,杨芳.知识产权质押融资中的价值评估问题新探索J.中国资产评估,2018,(09):17-19 25.12 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Newzoo 2022Consumer Insights Games&EsportsGlobal coverage with Dozens of KPIs including more than 200 variables capturing surveyed on their gaming behavior and attitudes,including funnel metrics and audience profiles Easy-to-use accessJAPANMEXICOBRAZILARGENTINACHILECOLOMBIAAUSTRALIANEW ZEALANDCHINAINDIASOUTH KOREATHAILANDTAIWANINDONESIAVIETNAMMALAYSIAPHILIPPINESSINGAPOREPOLANDUNITEDSTATESCANADAUNITED KINGDOMGERMANYFRANCESPAINITALYRUSSIASOUTH AFRICANETHERLANDSBELGIUMSWEDENFINLANDTRKIYEEGYPTSAUDI ARABIAUNITED ARAB EMIRATESInterested?Email us at:Newzoo 2022 Newzoo 2022Welcome to our market insights report series!Gaming is among the worlds biggest entertainment and media platforms.An in-depth understanding of the complex gaming landscape is crucial to identify the most valuable opportunities gaming audiences have to offer.This understanding is not only important for game publishers and developers but also for any company wanting to reach and authentically engage with the broadest and most diverse subset of the worlds population.In each of these reports,we will dive into one of the markets covered in our Consumer Insights-Games&Esports research,which covers 36 diverse markets around the globe.This series of reports will include some high-level takeaways from this research along with insights taken from our Global Games Market Report and Newzoo Expert.The data contained in these reports is a snapshot of the much broader scope of data we cover on global gamers.Please contact us if you would like to learn more about Newzoo Consumer Insights Games&Esports or any of the other products covered in this report.We hope you enjoy the report!,Head of Consumer InsightsNewzooPlayers and Revenues in 2022Gaming EngagementPlaying and Viewing Behavior Gaming Persona DistributionDemographics and Motivations to PlayPlatform Play BehaviorTop Games&GenresPayers and Paying MotivationLooking for More Gamer Insights?About Newzoo78910111213141517 Newzoo 2022in the worldin the worldNewzoo Global Games Market Report|November 2022Market estimates and forecasts are included for markets/countries.Newzoo 20221 1Game Enthusiasts are consumers who engage with gaming through playing,viewing,owning,and/or social behavior.2 2Other gaming engagement includes visiting online gaming communities,discussing video games with family and friends,listening to gaming podcasts,and attending large in-person gaming conventions.Consumer Insights Games&Esports 2022Total online population aged 10-65(n=2,010)Newzoo 2022Only ViewingPlaying&ViewingConsumer Insights Games&Esports 2022Total online population aged 10-65(n=2,010)TotalPlayersTotalViewersEsportsAudienceEsportsEnthusiastsViewers are those that watch live-streamed or pre-recorded gaming video content in the past 12 months.Esports Audience are those that watch professional competitive gaming(esports)video content in the past 12 months.Esports Enthusiasts are those that watch gaming(esports)video content once a month or more.Over a third of the U.K.online population view gaming video content(36%),with 15%watching esports content.A very similar share only play video games and dont view gaming video content(36%)to those who play and view(35%).On the other hand,just viewing gaming video content is not common(1%)in this market.Only Playing Newzoo 2022Newzoos proprietary gamer segmentation wherein playing,viewing,owning,and socializing/other gaming engagement are the four main dimensions for classification.Gaming Persona Distribution in United KingdomConsumer Insights Games&Esports 2022Total online population aged 10-65(n=2,010)While all Newzoo gaming personas are represented,Time Fillers stand out as the most common persona followed by Mainstream Gamers.Being the most common persona,Time Fillers are more casually engaged with playing and less interested in viewing,while Mainstream Gamers spend a significant amount of time playing and viewing gaming video content.Newzoo 2022Consumer Insights Games&Esports 2022Those who have played video games on a PC,console,or mobile in the past 6 months(n=1,395)10-2021-3536-5051-65MaleFemaleNon-Binary/Other Newzoo 2022%Past 6 months playersTotal online population aged 10-65(n=2,010)Consumer Insights Games&Esports 202229FA%MobileConsolePCBase:Players of each platform(Past 6 months)Mobile players(n=905);Console players(n=806);PC players(n=569)5h 10mins3h 59mins5h 42minsMobileConsolePC Newzoo 2022Newzoo Expert October 2022PC,PS4,PS5,Xbox One,Xbox Series X|SWant more in-depth games data like Newzoo 2021Consumer Insights Games&Esports 2022Those who have played video games on a PC,console,or mobile in the past 6 months(n=1,395),Total payers(past 6 months)(n=883)For a sale/special offer/good pricePlay with friends or familyUnlock extra/exclusive playable contentPersonalize characters or things built in-gameAccess a subscriptionBase:Total Payers(past 6 months)Base:Players(past 6 months)Unlock the of gamers in 36 key markets.1 Payers:Past 6 months players who,on average,spendmoney on a monthly basis on games on a PC,console,ormobiledevice.Spendingmoneyincludesgifts,downloadable content,subscriptions,and other micro-transactions.is the top motivator to spend money on games in the United Kingdom.Meanwhile,over a quarter spend money on games to play with friends or family which highlights the importance of the social aspects of video games to payers in this market.Newzoo 2022Profile Gamers in your Target Markets with the Most Comprehensive Games Research Based on 75,000 ConsumersJPNLITBEAUDECAFRFIUKUSTWPLNZSESGESKRIDTHVNPHMYINZABRMXTRSAAEAREGCLCOCNRUMarketsMetrics trackedConsumers SurveyedGame Franchises CoveredA Residential Developed Approach methodology is used in AR,BR,CL,CN,CO,EG,IN,ID,MY,MX,PH,RU,SA,ZA,TH,TR,AE,and VN.The results for these markets are representative of active internet users in residential developed areas in respective countries/markets.In CN results are representative of the population in Tier 1 and 2 cities.Years of Gamer Research experienceInterested?Email us at:Newzoo 202216LimitedLimitedLimitedLimitedLimitedLimitedInterested?Email us at:Newzoo 2022 Newzoo 2021Global,regional,market key metricsMarket sizing,trends,forecastsTrends,Market Sizing,Forecast DataGames&Market Engagement Data Covers 100 metrics for Thousands of Games on PC,Console,and Mobile,including MAU,DAU,Lifetime Players,Revenues,ViewershipOver 75,000*consumers surveyed worldwideMotivations,drivers,playing behaviorPlayer Demographics&Psychographic DataEmail us at:*Based on Consumer Insights-Games&Esports 2022

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THE SKILLEDTECHNICALWORKFORCE:Crafting Americas Science&Engineering EnterpriseWhy do the National Academies expect 3.4 million unfilled skilled technical jobs by 2022?What did 139 stakeholders from across the country say the U.S.should do to improve opportunities for skilled technical workers?What 4 recommendations do we offer for building the Skilled Technical Workforce of the future?3.4M1394NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARDTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE2 Cover Photo Credit:Darryl EstrineTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE3September 2019Report#:NSB-2019-23THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE:Crafting Americas Science&Engineering EnterpriseTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE4BOARD MEMBERSJOHN L.ANDERSONPresidentNational Academy of EngineeringROGER N.BEACHYProfessor Emeritus of BiologyWashington University,St.LouisARTHUR BIENENSTOCKProfessor Emeritus of Photon ScienceStanford UniversityVICKI L.CHANDLERDean of FacultyMinerva Schools at KGIMAUREEN L.CONDICAssociate Professor of Neurobiology and AnatomyUniversity of Utah,School of MedicineW.KENT FUCHSPresidentUniversity of FloridaSURESH V.GARIMELLAPresidentUniversity of VermontROBERT M.GROVESProvost and Executive Vice President;Gerard J.Campbell,S.J.Professor in the Math and Statistics Department;Professor in the Sociology DepartmentGeorgetown UniversityDIANE L.SOUVAINE NSB ChairProfessor of Computer Science and Adjunct Professor of MathematicsTufts UniversityELLEN OCHOANSB Vice ChairDirector(retired)Lyndon B.Johnson Space CenterJAMES S.JACKSONDaniel Katz Distinguished University Professor of Psychology;Professor of Afro-American and African Studies;Research Professor,Research Center for Group Dynamics,Institute for Social ResearchUniversity of MichiganSTEVEN LEATHPresident(retired)Iowa State University and Auburn UniversityW.CARL LINEBERGERFellow of JILA and E.U.Condon Distinguished Professor of ChemistryUniversity of ColoradoVICTOR R.MCCRARYVice President for Research and Graduate Programs;Professor of ChemistryUniversity of the District of ColumbiaEMILIO F.MORANJohn A.Hannah Distinguished Professor of Global Change ScienceMichigan State UniversitySETHURAMAN PANCHANATHANExecutive Vice President and Chief Research and Innovation Officer of Knowledge Enterprise Development;Director of the Center for Cognitive Ubiquitous ComputingArizona State UniversityG.P.“BUD”PETERSONProfessorWoodruff School of Mechanical EngineeringGeorgia Institute of TechnologyJULIA M.PHILLIPSExecutive EmeritusSandia National LaboratoriesDANIEL A.REEDSenior Vice President for Academic Affairs(Provost)University of UtahGERALDINE L.RICHMONDPresidential Chair in Science and Professor of ChemistryUniversity of OregonANNEILA I.SARGENTIra S.Bowen Professor of AstronomyCalifornia Institute of TechnologyS.ALAN STERNAssociate Vice President and Special Assistant to the PresidentSouthwest Research InstituteSTEPHEN H.WILLARDCEOCellphire,Inc.MARIA T.ZUBERVice President for ResearchMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE5Dear Colleague:For many years,the National Science Board(NSB,Board)has had a keen interest in the state of the STEM-capable workforce in the United States.The health of that workforce is vital to Americas economic prosperity,our scientific and technological competitiveness,and our national security.Building on the Boards past work,this report focuses on a crucial but underappreciated part of the science and engineering enterprise:the Skilled Technical Workforce(STW),the millions of men and women with STEM skills and knowledge who do not have a bachelors degree.This report is the culmination of our 18-month effort to identify the opportunities and challenges facing students,incumbent workers,businesses,educators,and others involved with the STW.It offers recommendations for how federal policymakers and educators can work together to foster the STW,so that all Americans can participate in and benefit from advances in science and technology.The NSBs engagement with this topic is not over.The work of the Task Force will continue to influence and inform our thinking as we craft the STEM-capable workforce of the future.We welcome feedback on this report.If you have comments or questions,please contact Dr.John Veysey II,Executive Officer to the Board at(703)292-7000 or at jveyseynsf.gov.Sincerely,Diane L.SouvaineChair,NSBCHAIRS MESSAGEJOHN J.VEYSEY IIExecutive OfficerNational Science BoardNational Science FoundationFRANCE A.CRDOVADirectorNational Science FoundationMEMBERS OF THE STW TASK FORCEVictor R.McCrary,ChairVicki L.ChandlerRobert M.GrovesJames S.JacksonW.Carl LinebergerGeraldine L.RichmondTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE6EXECUTIVE SUMMARYchanges in the nature of work,education,technology,workforce demographics,and international competition have led the National Science Board(NSB,Board)to conclude that our competitiveness,security,and research enterprise require this critical,but often overlooked segment of our STEM-capable workforce.Adding to the near-term urgency,a National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicine report predicts a shortfall of nearly 3.4 million skilled technical workers by 2022.1 Expanding the diversity and inclusivity of science and engineering is vital to the future of the S&E enterprise and crucial to maintaining the broad public support for S&E that has fueled American prosperity and national security for the past 70 years.It is in the nations interest that all Americans,including the two in three U.S.adults who do not have a bachelors degree,have the opportunity to participate in and benefit from our scientific and technological progress.To achieve this,the Board believes that the United States should increase the emphasis on cultivating the STW as part of continued robust support for the education of scientists and engineers.Over the past two years,the NSB Task Force on the Skilled Technical Workforce has identified opportunities and challenges facing students,incumbent workers,businesses,educators,and others involved with the STW.2 In the course of our activities,four systemic issues surfaced that will necessitate new partnerships among various types of educational institutions,all levels of government,and industry to strengthen this critical segment of the workforce.By focusing on these areas,we seek to build on the efforts of the White House,3 Congress,and others4 to create STW opportunities for more Americans.We offer the following recommendations:o grow our nations science,technology,engineering,and mathematics(STEM)capacity and ensure that Americans nationwide can participate in a science and engineering(S&E)intensive economy,the United States must foster its Skilled Technical Workforce(STW)individuals who use S&E skills in their jobs but do not have a bachelors degree.RapidTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE7CHANGE THE MESSAGE:The NSB and the National Science Foundation(NSF),and other S&E leaders should communicate the importance of the STW to our nations S&E enterprise,individual economic prosperity,national security,and U.S.global competitiveness.Raising awareness about STW career and educational pathways can also help to address misperceptions and lack of awareness of skilled technical career opportunities among parents,educators,guidance counselors,and students.Key messages include:Skilled technical work is crucial to the nation and its S&E enterprise.The multiple educational pathways into the S&E enterprise are complementary and interdependent.Together they produce the educated,skilled,and diverse workforce the United States needs in todays knowledge-and technology-intensive world.Skilled technical work is a pathway that can lead in a variety of educational and career directions.Pursuit of skilled technical work is about personal preferences and choices.FOCUS ON THE DATA:To understand and begin to address data gaps,NSFs National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics(NCSES),with additional federal resources and collaborating with other statistical agencies,should collect nationally representative data on the education,skills,and workforce characteristics of the STW.NSF should promote partnerships between governmental and non-governmental(industry,academia)stakeholders in the STW to share data and develop tools for public use and workforce planning.LEVERAGE THE PORTFOLIO OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTS:There is an opportunity for the Federal agencies that support STW-related programs to leverage one anothers activities and maximize the nations federal investments in the STW through a holistic,coordinated approach.NSF can lead by example by conducting a full portfolio analysis that will value and categorize its STW investments across all directorates in the areas of education,research,infrastructure,data collection,and analysis.The analysis of NSFs portfolio of STW-related investments could publicize and inform stakeholders about the breadth of NSFs contributions to the STW,build awareness of funding opportunities,and help maximize and leverage the impact of these investments.BUILD PARTNERSHIPS:In strengthening educational pathways for the STW,policymakers and educational institutions should recognize that K-12 school systems,two-year colleges,four-year colleges and universities,and other post-secondary education and workforce development programs are integral,synergistic parts of a whole.These institutions should work as partners together with business and industry to grow the STEM-capable U.S.workforce via STW programs that are tailored to the needs of their local communities.Policymakers can encourage the creation of such partnerships by developing federal programs that require partnership participation from stakeholders from multiple sectors.The multiple educational pathways into the S&E enterprise are complementary and interdependent.Together they produce the educated,skilled,and diverse workforce the U.S.needs in todays knowledge-and technology-intensive world.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE8THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE9We must“step up”our game and nurture and expand our domestic talent along the entire S&E worker-value chain from the STW to the Ph.D.if our workforce is to remain competitive.101Relies on Building a STEM-Capable U.S.Workforce(2018),the Board called for including workers at all educational levels in the STEM-capable workforce,and sought to move away from an older,outdated,and narrower concept of the STEM workforce based solely on academic degrees and occupations.This report reinforces and builds on the Boards prior work by calling attention to the STWs essential role in the S&E enterprise.Since our 2015 report,the need for a STEM-capable U.S.workforce at all educational levels has become more apparent and urgent.Technologically,we are on the cusp of revolutions in data and artificial intelligence,developments that will continue to accelerate changes in the workplace and intensify our need for citizens who excel at using data,information,and technology in their work.Other nations are investing substantially in human capital.We must“step up”our game and nurture and expand our domestic talent along the entire S&E worker-value chain Our skilled workforce is foundational and essential to U.S.leadership in science and engineering(S&E)and the economic prosperity and security that flow from it.Yet on a near daily basis,headlines emphasize that we are not doing enough to develop and sustain our nations human capital.For the United States to compete and thrive in todays S&E-driven world,our country must nurture a workforce that can lead in every phase of research and development(R&D),from discovery to innovation to product realization and sustainability.A key component of this workforce is the Skilled Technical Workforce(STW),the roughly 17 million workers who use S&E expertise and technical knowledge in their jobs but who do not possess a bachelors degree.5For several years,the National Science Board(NSB,Board)has stressed the need to think differently about the science and engineering workforce.In Revisiting the STEM Workforce(2015)and Our Nations Future Competitiveness THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE11There are indications that we,as a nation,are not doing enough.makers,electricians,welders,and programmers could threaten our ability to maintain unique facilities for basic research,sophisticated military assets(e.g.materials for nuclear submarines and hypersonic weapons systems utilizing artificial intelligence),and the future of the nations automobile industry(e.g.autonomous vehicles).At the same time,economic shifts toward jobs that put a premium in many lines of work on S&E knowledge and skills are leaving behind too many of our fellow Americans.Given the prominent role of S&E as a driver of 21st century economic activity,our nation must do a better job of growing our STEM-capacity and ensuring that millions of hardworking Americans at all educational levels and in all regions of the country have the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from todays and tomorrows S&E-intensive workplaces.This is not merely the right thing to do;it is necessary for the future of our economy,national security,the health of our S&E enterprise,and to ensure the broad public support for S&E that has fueled American security and prosperity for the past 70 years.from the STW to the Ph.D.if our workforce is to remain competitive.As the Administrations STEM Education Strategic Plan states,“the country must prepare the STEM Workforce for the future both college-educated STEM practitioners and those working in skilled trades that do not require a four-year degree A diverse talent pool of STEM-literate Americans prepared for the jobs of the future will be essential for maintaining the national innovation base that supports key sectors of the economy and for making the scientific discoveries and creating the technologies of the future.”6Yet,there are indications that we,as a nation,are not doing enough.According to a 2017 National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicine(NASEM)report,by 2022,“the percentage of skilled technical job openings is likely to exceed the percentage of skilled technical workers in the labor force by 1.3 percentage points or about 3.4 million skilled technical jobs.”7 Due to the continuing retirement of the Baby Boomers and the tendency of job skill requirements to increase over time,NASEM believes that the number of skilled technical workers will likely fall short of demand,even when accounting for how technological innovation may change workforce needs.8 Shortages of highly skilled tool and die THE WORKFORCE THAT ACTUALLY BUILT THE SPACE SHUTTLE WERE NOT FOUR-YEAR DEGREE ENGINEERS,THEY WERE SKILLED TECHNICIANS.WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THOSE JOBS ARE REPRESENTED.DR.MAE JEMISON,PRINCIPAL,100 YEAR STARSHIP;NASA ASTRONAUT(RETIRED)THE WORKFORCE THAT ACTUALLY BUILT THE SPACE SHUTTLE WERE NOT FOUR-YEAR DEGREE ENGINEERS,THEY WERE SKILLED TECHNICIANS.WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THOSE JOBS ARE REPRESENTED.DR.MAE JEMISON,PRINCIPAL,100 YEAR STARSHIP;NASA ASTRONAUT(RETIRED)THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE14WECAN&MUST DOBETTERR&D enterprise,accounting for more than half of all workers in many of Americas“advanced industries.”10 These“R&D-intensive”industries,which include advanced manufacturing,pharmaceuticals,motor vehicles,and aerospace,energy-providing industries such as oil and gas extraction and power generation,and critical service activities such as telecommunications and software design,account for 17 percent of U.S.Gross Domestic Product.11 All told,these industries generate$2.7 trillion in output annually,outpacing any other sector.12 A growing number of jobs critical to our national security,in such areas as cybersecurity and defense-related technologies,require both S&E skills and U.S.citizenship.In addition,many of our national research facilitiesincluding those funded by NSF,the Department of Energy(DOE),the Department One way to prepare more of our citizens for the high-tech jobs of today and tomorrow,live up to the ideal that America is a land of opportunity for all,connect more Americans with the S&E enterprise,and help secure our nations future S&E leadership is to strengthen the Skilled Technical Workforcea crucial,but often overlooked,segment of our STEM-capable workforce.Representing 13 percent of the U.S.workforce age 25 and older,skilled technical workers contribute to all parts of the economy and the S&E enterprise.9 They bring critical thinking,design,digital,math,and coding skills to work as auto mechanics,health care technicians,electricians,welders,computer systems analysts and administrators,and operators of“smart”infrastructure.They also make crucial contributions to the nations THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE15of Defense(DOD),and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA)as well as research laboratories at colleges and universities rely on skilled technical workers to help advance the frontiers of basic science and engineering.13 With fewer barriers to entry than jobs requiring a bachelors degree,skilled technical work offers a pathway into S&E for the approximately two in three U.S.adults who have some education beyond high school and less than a bachelorsdegree.14 As such,the STW has the potential to connect millions more Americans to the S&E enterprise.Employment in skilled technical jobs also offers millions of Americans competitivesalaries,benefits,and a discernible career path.15 These jobs tend to be higher paying and have lower unemployment rates relative to other jobs at a comparable education level.16 Compared to those S&E jobs which require at least a bachelors degree,STW occupations tend to be more widely distributed geographically.17In todays environment where post-secondary work and educational pathways are less linear than they were several decades ago and whereoptions for post-secondary education and career preparation have proliferated,skilled technical education and employment are important ends in themselves as well as a launching pad for further STEM study.In the listening sessions thatthe NSB conducted around the country,we heard from students and workers about the paths that led them to STW education and skill development programs and about how they moved between such programs and work THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE16environments.A common theme was that the experiential learning associated with many STW education and skill development programs and their shorter duration relative to a bachelors degree make Career and Technical Education(CTE)programs(including CTE schools,coding boot camps,apprenticeship programs,and associate degree programs)appealing avenues for exploring interests,developing STEM skills,and preparing for employment.Many individuals with whom the Board spoke found their“STEM spark”through STW education and employment,and some subsequently obtained a bachelors degree or higher in a STEM field.Expanding the STW also provides an opportunity to build a STEM-capable workforce that reflects our countrys people.As the 2019 National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicine report on the critical role of Minority Serving Institutions in advancing the Nations STEM workforce notes,demographic trends suggests that overall STEM readiness of students of color will have a significant impact on Americas economic growth,security,and global prosperity.18 Federal data show that the STW is the most diverse segment of the STEM-capable workforce;its racial and ethnic composition is similar to the overall U.S.workforce age 25 and older.19 In contrast,there is work to be done to increase womens participation in the STW,which in most occupations remains predominantly maleless than 28%of STW workers overall are female.20 The exception to this is in healthcare occupations,in which women have a high rate of participation.Gender disparity is not specific to the STW;women compose 29%of the S&E workforce,making them underrepresented in the STEM-capable workforce at all levels.21National Science Board,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science and Engineering Indicators 2020(forthcoming).Data source:Census Bureau,American Community Survey 2017,public use microdataTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE17Community colleges welcome all students and are an important educational pathway into many parts of the STEM-capable workforce.In addition to educating the STW,community colleges prepare students to pursue bachelors and advanced degrees.Between 2010 and 2017,18%of those earning bachelors degrees in STEM fields also earned associates degrees.During that same period,47%of STEM bachelors degree earners reported doing some coursework at a community college.At the doctoral level,20%of the U.S.citizens and permanent residents who received S&E doctoral degrees in 2017 reported having attended a community college at some point in their educational careers,and 6rned an associates degree along the way.As a critical access point for groups historically underrepresented in STEM,community colleges also play an important role in broadening participation.In particular:50%of all Hispanic undergraduates are enrolled in community colleges.11%of Black and 8%of Hispanic or Latino S&E doctoral degree recipients in 2017 had previously earned an associates degree.In comparison,only 6%of whites and 3%of Asians who earned doctoral degrees in S&E fields in 2017 had previously earned an associates degree.29%of community college students are first generation college students.In 2015,55%of Minority Serving Institutions(MSIs)were community colleges.MSIs,which are defined by legislation or enrollment,include Historically Black Colleges and Universities(HBCUs),Hispanic Serving Institutions(HSIs),and Tribal Colleges and Universities(TCUs).These data highlight the importance of MSIs and community colleges for engaging groups historically underrepresented in STEM and building a STEM-capable workforce that reflects Americas diversity.COMMUNITY COLLEGE AS A PATHWAY INTO THE STEM-CAPABLE WORKFORCEGiven the importance of STW education and skill development as on-ramps to job opportunities,further STEM education,and to building a workforce that reflects the nations diversity,it is essential that S&E leaders and policymakers step up and do more to support the STW and integrate it within a framework of S&E education and workforce development that spans from primary and secondary school through post-secondary education and beyond.Bridging the dividebetween skilled technical and other S&E pathways matters not just for the progress of science,and for developing the robust,technologically-savvyworkforce of the future,but also for ensuring that S&E is an inclusive enterprise that actively welcomes all Americans and benefits from their participation and perspectives.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE18One of the greatest scientific achievements of the 21st centurythe detection of gravitational waves at the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory(LIGO)would not have been possible without the skill and dedication of hundreds of scientists,engineers,and skilled technical workers.The National Science Board appreciated this firsthand at LIGOs Livingston,Louisiana site.There,the Board met David Barker,who describes himself as a skilled technical worker.David works side-by-side with a team of operators and scientists to monitor and maintain the temperature in the 19,000 square foot laser vacuum equipment area within 2/10ths of a degree.A temperature change of one-degree Fahrenheit would cause the laser to lose lock,forcing a shutdown and halting data collection.David playfully notes that he tells people that he is“a famous air conditioning man.”Without experienced and dedicated skilled technical workers like David,fundamental scientific breakthroughs that require complex technologies and facilities would not be possible.THE STW AND BREAKTHROUGH SCIENCETHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE19THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE20DEVELOPING THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE THAT OUR NATION NEEDSTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE21Over the past two years,the NSBs Task Force on the Skilled Technical Workforce heard from numerous stakeholders about the challenges the nation faces as it seeks to strengthen the STW.In this section,we highlight four systemic challenges and opportunities to create the vibrant skilled technical workforce that the United States needs:1.Designing STW education and preparation to meet the needs of individuals;2.Building partnerships among education,industry,non-profit,and government sectors to leverage resources and knowledge,and meet the needs and circumstances of local communities;3.Conveying accurate information about employment and career opportunities in the STW;4.Addressing data gaps and data silos so that government,industry,and educational institutions can maximize the effectiveness of programs and initiatives.By focusing on these issues,we seek to build on and encourage others efforts to create STW opportunities for more Americans.Policymakers are already making progress on these issues.In 2018,the White House issued an executive order establishing the Presidents National Council for the American Worker and released a five-year strategic plan for STEM education,Charting a Course for Success:Americas Strategy for STEM Education,which includes a focus on the STW.Congress also passed STW-related legislation,including the Strengthening Career and Technical Education for the 21st Century Act of 2018(Pub.Law.115-224)and the Innovations in Mentoring,Training,and Apprenticeships Act of 2018(Pub.Law.115-402).2018 was also an active year at the state level,with legislation in various states related to data collection,funding of workforce development programs,and creating infrastructure for state-level coordination of education and workforce efforts.22 THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE22To develop the skilled technical workforce that our country needs,we must do more to address the barriers that prevent individuals from embarking on and/or completing skilled technical education.In conversations with stakeholders,the Task Force heard repeatedly about these barriers and how approaches that“meet students where they are”can make a difference in persistence,program completion,and pursuit of additional STW-pathways.We frequently heard about the importance of centering programs around studentsnot institutions,educators,and employers.This student-centric approach starts with the competencies and skills that students need.Are curricula pitched at a level consistent with students math skills?Do they teach STEM knowledge and concepts in the context of their application?Are they focused on the skills that students will need to secure employment?Has a close look been taken at the full curriculum to minimize the need for pre-requisites/other coursework that could create a barrier to entry?One example of this“student-centered”approach comes from the work of Dr.Kevin Cooper,Assistant Dean of Applied Technology at Indian River State College in Fort Pierce,Florida.Dr.Cooper and his team have designed a highly successful education program for skilled technical workers in the nuclear energy field.Traditionally,entry into the nuclear program required students to be college algebra ready.After observing that math was a barrier for many students,Dr.Cooper set out to learn more about the specific math skills required of workers in that industry.Following conversations with industry leaders,Dr.Cooper revamped the math curriculum for the nuclear technology program,targeting the algebra,trigonometry,and statistics skills necessary to work safely and successfully at a nuclear energy plant.As part of his effort to teach math skills in a practical and applied way,he invites industry representatives to his class to demonstrate how the inverse square laws and exponential decay matter to workplace safety.With a 90%math course success rate,the new curriculum has successfully eliminated pre-existing math barriers while maintaining high educational standards that prepare students for success in the workforce.Dr.Cooper is hoping that this pilot program will become a permanent program and that other faculty will focus on what students“need”to get out of their math courses to be successful in the workplace and redesign their curricula accordingly.We also heard about the need for education and skill development programs to work with the constraints on students lives.With an average age of 28,community college students often have bills to pay,children to raise,and,in some cases,parents who rely on them for support.23 For many of the students with whom we met,leaving the workforce for one to two yearsor even a few monthsto complete a degree or participate in a research opportunity or internship was a nonstarter.Both students and faculty stressed the importance of designing programs with flexible schedules and providing students opportunities to“earn while you learn”through apprenticeships and other work-based learning programs.We also heard about the need for“wrap-around services”including transportation and affordable and high-quality childcare either on campus or nearby.Such services made the difference between students staying in or leaving the program.A student who participated in our Community College Innovation Challenge(CCIC)Listeningsession attributed his ability to return to collegeto flexible scheduling at his local community college.After having been forced to leave a four-year college following his parents bankruptcy,he worked as a teachers aide in K-12 STEM classes.This work experience continued to fuel his passion for STEM.After several years in the workforce,MEETING STUDENTS WHERE THEY ARE IS CRUCIAL TO DEVELOPING THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCETHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE23“It is not about having a college degree.It is about learning the specific skills of being a tech support person.”Lisa Gevelber,Vice President of Global Marketing,Google“There are so many possibilities still in the future.There are jobs that havent even been labeled yet.You can create your own job in this field and that is what I love about it.”Erika Bim,Student,Oakton Community CollegeTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE24THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE25he began studying at a local community college so that he could transition into a career in the aerospace industry.By this time,he also had a family of his own.He credits the structures at his community college for the ability to pursue his studies,participate in extracurricular programs,and connect with industry.Employers play an important role in meeting students and workers where they are.We heard from students and employers that human resource departments often require a bachelors degree for work that can be done by someone without a bachelors degree.A few years ago,Google re-examined how it defines“qualified candidates.”For Google,qualified does not always mean having a college degree;it means having the specific skills necessary to do the job.Like Google,other employers have started to re-examine their hiring practices and focus on skills rather than degrees.The importance of meeting people where they are continues even after a worker lands his or her first skilled technical job.Lifelong learning is the new standard;this is particularly crucial in the STW fields where technology changes rapidly.As Mike Reichenbach,president of Mike Reichenbach Ford,Lincoln,VW,and Chevrolet of Florence,South Carolina,said,“the type of worker who is successful in the skilled technical workforce is that individual who understands that the status quo isnt able to be maintained for very long.Either you are moving forward and embrace that change or you find yourself left behind.”24 As the National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicine have noted,skilled technical workforce development in the United States is decentralized and consists of“many,often competing sources of authority in government,business,civil society,and private life.”25 Students;workers;labor unions and other worker associations;families;educators;industry associations;employers;as well as government at all levels play a role in educating and preparing the STW.26 Funding for STW education and preparation is equally varied and can include user fees,state and local government resources,philanthropic contributions,and grants.At the federal level alone,STW education and preparation is administered by 43 different government programs across nine different federal agencies,including NSF.27 Greater coordination and partnerships among government,industry,and educational institutions will be crucial to strengthening the STW.As the Board heard from listening session participants,coordination and partnerships take many forms.Many successful partnerships avoid“one size fits all approaches”and respond to the workforce needs in a specific region or industry.At various listening sessions,the Board learned about a number of thriving partnerships among community colleges,industry,and four-year colleges and universities.COORDINATION ANDPARTNERSHIPS AMONG STWSTAKEHOLDERS ARE ESSENTIALTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE26After spending several years in industry as an engineer,Dr.Kevin Cooper,Assistant Dean of Applied Technology at Indian River State College,saw an opportunity to meet the nuclear industrys workforce needs by developing a standardized curriculum.To develop this curriculum,Dr.Cooper forged partnerships within his institution,and with industry,labor unions,and other community colleges offering similar programs.After a startup period of about five years,the NSF-funded Regional Center for Nuclear Education and Training(RCNET)was educating and delivering technicians into well-paying jobs in nuclear technology.Dr.Cooper subsequently worked with industry to establish the Nuclear Uniform Curriculum Program(NUCP)certificate.Students who graduate from a program that offers the NUCP certificate do so with a nationally recognized credential that gives them access to jobs that can start at$40/hour.Dr.Cooper stresses that forming these partnerships took time,persistence,a willingness to learn from failure,and a commitment to talking with students,workers,and industry to design a program that truly meets their needs.THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS:STANDARDIZED CURRICULATHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE27Partnerships between bachelors and graduate degree granting universities and community and technical colleges can improve diversity,broaden pathways into higher education,support regional workforce development,and help accelerate the translation of research conducted at universities to market.As Dr.Anand Gramopadhye,Professor and Dean of the College of Engineering,Computing and Applied Sciences at Clemson University,notes,“partnerships provide opportunities for all while making sure our students and workforce are set for success in todays technologically changing landscape.”As a Principal Investigator on an NSF Advanced Technological Education grant that supports the Center for Aviation and Automotive Technological Education Using Virtual E-Schools(CA2VES),Dr.Gramopadhye and his team have cultivated a community of practice that includes numerous community colleges in South Carolina,automotive and aviation industry leaders,and four-year colleges and universities.The state of South Carolina is an important partner in these efforts.In 2015,the state created theCoordinating Council for Workforce Development.Comprised of members from South Carolinas Department of Commerce,Commission on Higher Education,presidents of research universities and community colleges,school superintendents,and members of the business community,the Council was charged with coordinating workforce development efforts throughout the state.In addition,South Carolina has appropriated resources to support education and training for in-demand industries and to spread the message about STW pathways.At Clemson,fostering partnerships and connections with industry,technical colleges,and community colleges has proven to be a way to pursue world class research,workforce development,and education while furthering the core mission of this modern,public,research,land-grant university.THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS:UNIVERSITIES AND COMMUNITY/TECHNICAL COLLEGESThese partnerships shared the following key ingredients:leveraged familiarity with a region and its industries;secured buy-in from all partners and cultivated champions at the highest levels of the participating organizations;developed a clear sense of the value proposition for all parties involved;and committed the time and resources to see their collaborations through to fruition.For example,when visiting the Center for Advanced Automotive Technology(CAAT),an NSF-funded Advanced Technological Education Center at Macomb Community College in Warren,Michigan,the NSB learned about Macombs partnerships with major automakers to educate and prepare auto workers.Automakers play a key role in shaping Macombs programs by providing adjunct faculty for the colleges automotive education/workforce development programs and donating equipment for use in its facilities.Additionally,when Macomb created a new interdisciplinary degree program in vehicle development,it did so by bringing together THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE28content experts who understood the skills and competencies needed in the workplace and the experience of educators at the community college.Establishing the new degree program took three years and countless meetings between Macomb and industry leaders.According to Bob Feldmaier,a retired auto industry engineer and Director of CAAT,the new degree program would have been“nearly impossible without industry help.”Increasingly,four-year colleges and universities are also embracing partnerships with community colleges to help support educational and career pathways and fuel local and regional economic development.Working with industry,both two-year and four-year educational institutions are creating integrated learning environments that link education,skill development,and work.Various media and policy reports have identified the focus in recent decades on“college for all”as a barrier to encouraging STW pathways.28 All too often,“college for all”has been equated with the message that a bachelors degree is the only route to a good career.In reality,while some post-secondary education has become increasingly necessary to secure a“good job,”not every career track requires a four-year degree.29 The cultural emphasis on four-year educational pathways has created the unintended consequence of portraying two-year and four-year post-secondary educational pathways as oppositional.As post-secondary educational and workforce pathways become increasingly non-linear,it is crucial that the variety of post-secondary options be discussed,that two-and four-year paths not be placed in opposition,and that the STW be highlighted in discussions of post-secondary educational and career options.INCREASE AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING OF STW CAREERS AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIESMany students with whom the NSB spoke emphasized that lack of information and awareness about STW careers help perpetuate misperceptions and play a significant role in discouraging individuals from pursuing skilled technical education and employment.They noted that skilled technical education and pathways were not presented to them in high school as post-secondary education and career options.As a result,a number of students described finding their preferred career opportunity required technical education after having begun or completed a four-year degree.In the course of the Task Forces activities,NSB met students who were pursuing skilled technical education by choice.Many noted that they loved the hands-on work with modern technologies,the small classes,the focus on applicable skills,and the prospect that their education would lead to immediate employment.As a student in Macomb Community Colleges(MCC)Controls Technician Program explained,his familiarity with Programmer Logic Control(PLC)is widely applicable.“Everyone is switching over to robotics now.”Workers with programming skills are regularly“fixing robots,programming them,and telling them what to do.Training in PLC opens up avenues to a bunch of opportunities.Once you get into an industry you can start to move up as you know more people.”The narrative around the STW is starting to change.Work-based learning programs,including registered and non-registered apprenticeships,are growing in popularity.Organizations like the American School Counselors Association,the leading professional association for high school counselors,are speaking out about career readiness and building awareness about a range of educational and career pathways.Some high schools are re-integrating or building up CTE programs and making them part of the educational offerings for all students.Still other THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE29“You are working on very high-tech systems with excellent pay,excellent benefits,and long-term opportuni-ties.”Bob Feldmaier,Director of the Center for Advanced Automotive Technology,Macomb Community Collegehigh schools are establishing partnerships with local community colleges and industry to create viable and rewarding pathways for students seeking to enter the STW.More and more students and families are also discovering that the STW is a pathway to well-paying jobs,career opportunities in cutting edge industries,as well as an avenue that can lead to additional post-secondary STEM education.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE30In the past few years,policymakers,industry,and educational institutions have taken steps to address changing workforce needs by introducing new policies and programs geared toward the STW.Much of this activity is,however,occurring in the context of limited or siloed data.Addressing data gaps and silos will be essential if the United States is to take a strategic,systems-level approach to cultivating the STW.Relative to S&E workers who have earned a bachelors degree or more,the data portrait of the STW remains very limited.We heard from multiple stakeholders about the pressing need for policy-relevant data to address STW-related data gaps,including:How/where skilled technical workers acquire their skills and education.Which programs are most effective at preparing students for the workforce.How people use their skills once they enter the workforce.Longitudinal measurements of how people move from education and workforce preparation programs to their first job,and subsequent jobs and/or additional education.Information on the links among post-secondary credentials(degrees,certificates,certifications,badges,micro-credentials),training,and wages.Characterization of the skills that people use in a given occupation.Information on how individuals and employers are investing in STW education and skill building.INSUFFICIENT DATA AND DATA COORDINATION CONTRIBUTE TO STW-RELATED CHALLENGESThese data gaps pose a number of challenges.First,the lack of data makes it difficult to assess the supply and demand for skilled technical workers nationally and in local labor markets.This makes workforce planning and national policymaking difficult.Second,it is challenging for policymakers,employers,and educators to design programs and determine how to attract and retain skilled technical workers without information on how people enter the STW,how they maintain and update their skills,and how they advance along a career pathway.Third,limited data also affect partnership formation.Better information on skill requirements could help spur partnerships between industry and educational entities that are crucial to ensuring that students who complete programs are job ready.Fourth,the current dearth of reliable,transparent information about job preparation and educational opportunities and outcomes makes it hard for consumers to make informed choices and understand the likely return on their educational investments.The need for such information is becoming increasingly vital as post-secondary education and skill development opportunities as well as credentials and certificates proliferate.30 Collecting and disseminating robust data on the STW will be a multi-year effort.It will require the participation of industry,private sector data providers,state and local government,and coordination among federal statistical agencies including the Bureau of Labor Statistics,the Census Bureau,National Center for Education Statistics(NCES),and NSFs National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics(NCSES).THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE31The Board is also disseminating existing STW data.The 2020 edition of NSBs congressionally-mandated report,Science and Engineering Indicators,will include some data and discussion of the STW.The efforts by NSF,NSB,and federal statistical agencies to improve the data portrait of the STW can enable policymakers,consumers,industry,and other entities that work to support the STW to channel resources and energy more efficiently.In response to interest from the National Academies Committee on National Statistics,and further motivated by the establishment of theBoards Task Force and the Innovations in Mentoring,Training,and Apprenticeships Act of 2018,NSFs NCSES is working with the Census Bureau and the NCES to develop information and data analysis tools,explore survey and administrative data on the STW,and collect comprehensive information on STW employers.NCSES is also communicating with the Bureau of Labor Statistics about its data products and how the two federal statistical agencies can work together more effectively.The NSB believes that these efforts are laying the groundwork for creating a coordinated federal approach to addressing STW data gaps.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE32THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE33In July 2018,Executive Order 13845 established the Presidents National Council for the American Worker(NCAW)to“provide a coordinated process for developing a national strategy to ensure that Americas students and workers will have access to affordable,relevant,and innovative education and job training that will equip them to compete and win in the global economy.”This Executive Order also established the American Workforce Policy Advisory Board.In June 2019,the Workforce Policy Advisory Board announced four focus areas:Develop a campaign to promote multiple pathways to career success Increase data transparency to better match American workers to American jobs Modernize candidate recruitment and training practices Measure and encourage employer-led training investmentsAs NCAW tackles near-term employment and workforce development needs,it has independently identified messaging and data as areas for action.The Administrations convening and coordination power can catalyze national progress on these challenges.NCAWs deep engagement with industry stakeholders is also essential,complementing this reports focus on the role of educational institutions and government.Given that the business sector conducts most of our countrys R&D,attention to skilled technical workers in industry settings is critical.NATIONAL COUNCIL ONTHE AMERICAN WORKERTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE34CHANGE THE MESSAGEA lack of awareness among students,parents,and mentors about the nature of skilled technical work and the doors that it opens were recurring themes of Task Force listening sessions.Understanding and countering negative perceptions and raising awareness of the broad range of viable and attractive careers for STEM-capable individuals are crucial to the future of the STW and the U.S.S&E enterprise.We need individuals at all levels to be part of the STEM-capable workforce.RECOMMENDATION:The NSB and NSF,and other S&E leaders should communicate the importance of the STW to our nations S&E enterprise,individual economic prosperity,national security,and U.S.global competitiveness.Key messages include:Skilled technical work is crucial to the nation and the S&E enterprise.The multiple educational pathways into the S&E enterprise are complementary and interdependent.Together they produce the educated,skilled,and diverse workforce the United States needs in todays knowledge-and technology-intensive world.Skilled technical work is a pathway that can lead in a variety of educational and workforce directions.Pursuit of skilled technical work is about personal preferences and choices.We offer the following recommendations to policymakers and S&E leaders to strengthen the STW and the S&E enterprise.The recommendations presented here are interconnected,each addressing aspects of one or more of the big picture,systemic challenges identified in this report.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE35FOCUS ON THE DATAIt is critical that policymakers,employers,and individuals considering STW education and career pathways have high-quality data and information on the characteristics,educational needs,and career opportunities of the STW.Gathering these data will require additional federal resources,including funding and personnel,as well as coordination across federal statistical agencies and input from states and industry.These efforts will improve our understanding of STW characteristics and the design of policies,education,and skill development programs,including those developed in response to the Innovations in Mentoring,Training,and Apprenticeships Act of 2018.RECOMMENDATION:To understand and begin to address data gaps,NSFs NCSES,with additional federal resources and collaborating with other statistical agencies,should collect nationally representative data on the education,skills,and workforce characteristics of the STW.NSF should promote partnerships between governmental and non-governmental(industry,academia)stakeholders in the STW to share data and develop tools for public use and workforce planning.Given the number of federal agencies that address aspects of the STW,an opportunity exists for all federal agencies to think holistically about how to leverage resources and complement one anothers activities.To do so effectively,a full inventory and understanding of the programs and activities that relate to the STW is needed.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE36THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE37LEVERAGE THE PORTFOLIO OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTSGiven the number of federal agencies that address aspects of the STW,an opportunity exists for all federal agencies to think holistically about how to leverage resources and complement one anothers activities.To do so effectively,a full inventory and understanding of the programs and activities that relate to the STW is needed.For example,while the Advanced Technical Education(ATE)program is NSFs best known STW-related program,NSF also makes other STW research and education investments.Research on K-12 STEM education,digital literacy,the future of work,as well as research into effective pedagogy in mathematics and computer science at community colleges can all help inform preparation of the STW.A portfolio analysis of NSFs current STW-related investments across all directorates could help the Board and NSF convey to stakeholders NSFs contribution to strengthening the STW,engage in strategic discussions about how these STW investments fit with other parts of NSFs portfolio,and better communicate STW-related funding opportunities to principal investigators.RECOMMENDATION:NSF should conduct a full portfolio analysis of its STW investments.The analysis could publicize and inform stakeholders about the breadth of NSFs contributions to the STW,build awareness of funding opportunities,and maximize and leverage the impact of these investments.BUILD PARTNERSHIPSA one-size-fits-all approach to creating fruitful,sustainable partnerships does not exist.Partnerships must meet the needs of local employers and respond to the community,leveraging locally available educational resources at the high school and post-secondary level.For four-year institutions,building partnerships with other local entities(business/industry,high schools,community colleges,state and local governments)provides a way to broaden participation in higher education and the base of support for the institutional mission.Partnerships can take considerable trust,time,and resources to establish and sustain.Local and state governments,federal policymakers,and funding agencies must support and encourage partnerships formation.RECOMMENDATION:In strengthening educational pathways for the STW,policymakers and educational institutions should recognize that K-12 school systems,two-year colleges,four-year colleges and universities,and other post-secondary education and workforce development programs are integral,synergistic parts of a whole.These institutions should work as partners together with business and industry to grow the STEM-capable U.S.workforce via STW programs tailored to the needs of their local communities.Policymakers can encourage the creation of such partnerships by developing federal programs that require partnership participation from stakeholders from multiple sectors.Given the number of federal agencies that address aspects of the STW,an opportunity exists for all federal agencies to think holistically about how to leverage resources and complement one anothers activities.To do so effectively,a full inventory and understanding of the programs and activities that relate to the STW is needed.LISTENING SESSIONCommunity CollegeInnovation ChallengeAlexandria,VAJune 12,2018LISTENING SESSION Macomb Community CollegeWarren,MI April 19,20182017MARJANAPRAPRJULOCT2018FEBMAYAUGNOVJANMARJUNSEPDECFEBTIMELINEBOARD MEETINGFirst NSB discussion on the Skilled Technical Workforce ProjectFebruary 21,2017NATIONAL ACADEMIES OFSCIENCES,ENGINEERING,AND MEDICINE REPORT“Building Americas SkilledTechnical Workforce”May 18,2017NSB ACTIVITIESOTHER RELATED ACTIVITIESBOARD MEETINGTask Force on theSkilled TechnicalWorkforce Establishedand Charge ApprovedNovember 9,2017CONGRESSIONAL HEARING“Innovations in STEM Mentoring,Training,and Apprenticeships”-U.S.House of Representatives,Committee on Science,Space,and TechnologyFebruary 15,2018LISTENING SESSIONSBaton Rouge Community College Listening Session and Xavier University Listening SessionBaton Rouge and New Orleans,LAOctober 26,2017NSB POLICY STATEMENT“Our Nations Future Competitiveness Relies on Building a STEM-Capable U.S.Workforce”February 1,2018BOARD MEETING“Grow with Google”PresentationFebruary 22,2018BLUE COLLAR STEM 2017 CONFERENCEBaltimore,MDNovember 7,2017CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING“Blue Collar STEM:The Future of the U.S.Workforce”-Congressional Black Caucus BriefingNovember 7,2017BOARD MEETINGSkilled TechnicalWorkforce PanelAugust 16,2017SENATE HEARING“Closing the Skills Gap and Boosting U.S.Competitiveness”-Senate Committee on Commerce,Science,and TransportationMarch 29,2017JULYOCT2019MARMAYAUGNOVJANAPRJUNSEPDECFEBMAY JUN JUL AUG SEPLISTENING SESSIONAdvanced Technological Education ConferenceWashington,D.C.October 25,2018NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD REPORT“The Skilled Technical Workforce:Crafting Americas Science&Engineering Enterprise”September 2019EXECUTIVE ORDER“Establishing the Presidents National Council for the American Worker”July 19,2018DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTERFor NSFs Convergence Accelerator Pilot tracks:“AI and Future Jobs”and“National Talent Ecosystem”March 15,2019LISTENING SESSIONCommunity CollegeInnovation ChallengeAlexandria,VAJune 12,2018LISTENING SESSION Macomb Community CollegeWarren,MI April 19,2018LISTENING SESSIONFlorence-Darlington Technical CollegeFlorence,SCSeptember 26,2018STEM EDUCATION PLANWhite House Unveils Five-year Strategic Plan-“Charting a Course for Success:Americas Strategy for STEM Education”December 4,2018NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES,ENGINEERING,AND MEDICINE REPORT“Minority Serving Institutions:AmericasUnderutilized Resource for Strengthening theSTEM Workforce”December 13,2018H.R.5509 PASSESInnovations in Mentoring,Training,and Apprenticeships ActDecember 31,2018AMERICAN WORKFORCE POLICY ADVISORY BOARD MEETINGRelease of Working Group PrioritiesJune 18,2019BUSINESS-HIGHEREDUCATION FORUMWORKSHOPOn“Reskilling AmericasWorkforce”Alexandria,VASeptember 24-25,2018BLUE COLLAR STEM 2018 CONFERENCEBaltimore,MDNovember 5,2018THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE401THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCENSB ACTIVITIESAPPENDIX1THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE41THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE42o meet its charge,the Task Force undertook a number of activities,including:Stakeholder engagement:The Task Force met with relevant organizations in the Washington,D.C.area,including the Department of Labor,Department of Education,the American Association of Community Colleges,NCSES,the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce,and the American School Counselors Association to learn about their work and efforts to strengthen the STW.Listening Sessions:The Board held five listening sessions that included 203 participants from 65 locations dispersed throughout the United States(see Figure on Page 44).Participants shared experiences and insights about the STW in their local and regional communities.Although much of what we heard is documented in a growing body of literature,the workers,students,businesses,and educators we met with shared personal stories,providing a compelling human portrait of the challenges and opportunities facing the STW as outlined in the body of this report.More detailed information about the five listening sessions is included below:Baton Rouge Community College(BRCC):BRCC is located in Baton Rouge,Louisiana,in a region where the oil and gas industries fuel some 260,000 jobs.Like many community colleges,Baton Rouge Community College is an essential education center for students entering the skilled technical workforce.Macomb Community College(MCC):MCC is located in Warren,Michigan,in the heart of the rejuvenated automobile industry and home to the Center for Advanced Automotive Technology(CAAT),a NSF-funded Advanced Technological Education(ATE)center.CAATs mission is to meet the expanding workforce needs of the automotive industry by increasing the pool of skilled technical workers in advanced automotive technology including automated and connected vehicles,and vehicle electrification.Community College Innovation Challenge(CCIC):NSFs Community College Innovation Challenge is a two-stage competition in which students use STEM to find innovative solutions to real-world problems.NSF brings student finalists and their faculty mentors from around the country to Alexandria,Virginia,each year to participate in an Innovation Boot Camp.The Board met with these students and faculty mentors who echoed many of the themes that came to light at BRCC and MCC.Florence Darlington Technical College(FDTC):FDTC is a two-year technical college located in Florence,South Carolina,a region that is home to a variety of industry sectors including advanced manufacturing,advanced materials,aerospace,and automotive.The South Carolina Advanced Technological Education(SCATE)Center of Excellence,located at FDTC,is NSFs longest running ATE initiative.The SCATE Center offers a variety of resources supporting industrial and engineering technology programs and related STEM programs nationwide,including recommendations for faculty development best practices,strategies for recruiting and retaining students,and methods for effective instruction.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE43 Advanced Technological Education(ATE)Principal Investigators Conference:NSFs ATE program focuses on educating technicians for the high-technology fields that drive our nations economy.The annual ATE conference brings together over 800 people to focus on the critical issues related to advanced technological education.Forty-five participants joined NSBs listening session,which included community college students and faculty,and recent ATE program alums.Participants represented 30 community colleges across the country.The Task Force shared its observations with the public,scientific community,and policymakers through communication pieces,Hill testimony,panel discussions,and a resource website.NSBs activities occurred simultaneously with other federal efforts,such as the National Council for the American Worker,the release of the Administrations five-year STEM Education plan,and congressional legislation focused on the Skilled Technical Workforce.Resources developed from the activities of the NSB Task Force on the Skilled Technical Workforce are available online at https:/www.nsf.gov/nsb/NSBActivities/skilled-technical-workforce.jsp.THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE44Advanced TechnologicalEducation Conference Academia*Translucent circles represent listening session locations*Solid circles represent attendee locationsAcademiaIndustryIndustryGovernmentNon-ProfitNon-ProfitGovernmentNon-ProfitIndustryIndustryAcademiaAcademiaAcademia45552010125483114241Alexandria,Virginia56 Attendees10 Participant Locations Washington,D.C.45 Attendees31 Participant LocationsFlorence,South Carolina40 Attendees9 Participant Locations Warren,Michigan22 Attendees10 Participant Locations Baton Rouge,Louisiana21 Attendees2 Participant Locations Community CollegeInnovation ChallengeFlorence DarlingtonTechnical CollegeMacombCommunity CollegeBaton RougeCommunity CollegeTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE45NSF INVESTMENTSIN THE STWAPPENDIX2THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE48(SATA)(Pub.Law.102-476)explicitly adding support for the STW to NSFs statutory functions.This legislation directed NSF to award grants to associate-degree granting colleges in order to expand the pool of skilled technicians,increase the productivity of the nations industries,and improve U.S.competitiveness.31 Since then,NSF has helped strengthen the STW through a variety of mechanisms,including:Education and Workforce Development:The Advanced Technological Education(ATE)program,which was a direct response to the SATA legislation,educates highly qualified science and engineering technicians for advanced technology fields that drive our nations economy.ATE is NSFs single largest investment in the STW,providing approximately$60-$65 million annually in grants to public,two-year,community and technical colleges.Improving Undergraduate STEM Education(IUSE)supports a suite of investments to addressimmediate challenges and opportunities facingundergraduate education.IUSE also supports new structures(e.g.organizational changes,new methods for certification or credentialing,course re-conception,cyberlearning,etc.)and functions of undergraduate learning and teaching.Scholarships in Science,Technology,Engineering,and Mathematics(S-STEM)addresses the need for a high-quality workforce in the STEM disciplines supported by the program and for increased success of low-income,academically talented students with demonstrated financial need who are pursuing associate,baccalaureate,or graduate degrees in STEM.The program provides awards to higher education institutions for scholarships and to advance the adaptation,implementation,and study of effective evidence-based curricular and co-curricular activities.Computer Science(CS)For All aims to provide all U.S.students the opportunity to participate in CS and computational thinking at the pre-K-12 level.NSFs current solicitation focuses on researcher-practitioner partnerships that foster the research and development needed to bring CS and computational thinking to all schools.Fundamental Research:In March 2019,NSF issued a Dear Colleague Letter inviting proposals for convergent research on the topics of“Artificial Intelligence(AI)and the Future of Jobs”and a“National Talent Ecosystem.”The former will support research and development to understand and influence the impact of AI on workers and work and foster lifelong learning.The latter supports research and development of innovative approaches for employers to support workers seeking the skills for 21st century work related to AI,data science,predictive analytics,and other technologies of the future.Approaches of interest include re-envisioning the concepts,structures,and technologies needed for employers to support continuous learning for dynamic,digitally-intensive work,and providing access to skilled talent.NSF also funds research relevant to the STW such as research on math pedagogy for non-traditional students,computer science education,and barriers facing women and persons of color n important element of NSFs mission is to prepare the STEM workforce of the future,including the STW.In 1992,Congress passed the Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE49in STEM.This research is funded through NSFs Directorate on Education and Human Resources(EHR)and NSFs science directorates.Infrastructure:NSFs Science of Learning program supports basic research that expands fundamental knowledge about learning principles,processes,and constraints.See also ATE above.Data Collection and Analysis:The National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics(NCSES),a federal statistical agency housed within NSF,collects high quality data on the S&E enterprise,including statistics related to the education and career pathways of all STEM workers.New NCSES data and analysis on the STW will be included in the 2020 edition of the Boards Science and Engineering Indicators report.Community Building:NSF supports the annual Community College Innovation Challenge(CCIC),a competition in which community college teams use STEM to create solutions for real-world problems.Teams earn full travel support to attend an Innovation Boot Camp in Washington,D.C.and discover how to transform ideas into reality by learning entrepreneurship strategies,customer discovery,start-up business and product developing methodology,and design-centered thinking.NSF INVESTMENTS IN SKILLED TECHNICALWORKFORCE DEVELOPMENTResearchEducational ResearchNSF Convergence Accelerator TracksAI and the Future of JobsInfrastructureAdvanced Technological EducationScience of Learning Data and ToolsData Collection and AnalysisStakeholder Outreach to Identify Data GapsNew National Tradining Education and Private Sector Data SourcesCommunity BuildingCareer Compass ChallengeCommunity College Innovation ChallengeEducation and Workforce DevelopmentAdvanced Technological EducationS STEMCS for AllCommunityBuildingNCAWSTEM Ed Strategic PlanNSF Strategic Plan FY18-22National Science Boardworkforce reportsPolicy ContextTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE50The National Science Board wishes to thank the numerous individuals who gave their time and thoughtful input to this report.The Board thanks Victor McCrary,who chaired the Task Force on the Skilled Technical Workforce(STW),and the NSB Task Force members Vicki Chandler,Robert Groves,James Jackson,Carl Lineberger,and Geraldine Richmond who led the development of the report on the Boards behalf.The NSB would also like to acknowledge the current Chair and Vice Chair of the Board,Diane Souvaine and Ellen Ochoa,and former Board Chair Maria Zuber for their vision and leadership on this important and timely policy issue.NSF Director,France Crdova provided insights throughout the process and connected us with resources within NSF and beyond.Staff from the National Science Foundation and NSFs National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics(NCSES)graciously lent their expertise to this report.In particular,Amy Burke,Senior Analyst and author of the Science and Engineering Indicators 2020 thematic report on the“Science&Engineering Labor Force,”was instrumental in helping to define the STW and provided helpful input on S&E workforce data throughout the process.The Board also wishes to thank Emilda Rivers,Division Director for NCSES;Beethika Khan,Program Director for the Science and Engineering Indicators(SEI,Indicators)program;John Finamore,Program Director for the Human Resources Statistics program;and Carol Robbins,Senior Analyst.From the projects inception,Celeste Carter,Program Director of the Advanced Technological Education(ATE)program in NSFs Division of Undergraduate Education served as an invaluable content expert on community colleges and the skilled technical workforce.James Hamos,Senior Advisor in the Office of the Director,provided helpful guidance throughout the process and Lloyd Whitman,Assistant to the Director for Policy and Planning,lent his perspective on synergies with other government activities related to the skilled technical workforce.Karen Marrongelle,Assistant Director of the Directorate of Education and Human Resources,and Arthur Lupia,Assistant Director of the Directorate of Social and Behavioral Sciences provided insights into NSFs current investments in the STW.Their feedback on drafts was instrumental in clarifying and strengthening the message and content of this report.The Board would also like to thank the many external experts and stakeholders who spoke with the Task Force and staff:Robin E.Fernkas,Acting Deputy Administrator in the Office of Workforce Investment in the Department of Labor and her staff;Diane Auer Jones,Principal Deputy Under Secretary at the Department of Education;Mary Heiss,Senior Vice President of Academic and Student Affairs and Kent Phillipe,Associate ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE51Vice President of Research and Student Success at the American Association of Community Colleges;Stephen DeWitt,Deputy Executive Director at the Association for Career and Technical Education;Richard Wong,Executive Director at the American School Counselor Association;and Anthony Carnevale,Director and Research Professor at the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce and his staff.The Board also benefited from the insights shared by the speakers who presented at Board meetings:Lisa Gevelber,Vice President of Global Marketing at Google;Dallas Elleman,Tulsa Community College Graduate and product development engineer at XWorks;Imelda Cossette,Executive Director and Principal Investigator for the National Resource Center for Materials Technology Education and Project;and Matt Glover,Chief Technology Officer at Le-Vel.This report could not have been written without the stories and experiences of students,faculty,administrators,business leaders,and government representatives from across the country who participated in the Task Forces Listening Sessions.In particular,the Board would like to thank the faculty and staff at Listening Session host institutions,including:Baton Rouge Community College,particularly Laura Younger,Vice Chancellor for Academic and Student Affairs,Jacqueline Jones,Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Learning Resources,Toni Manogin,Vice Chancellor for Academic and Student Affairs(interim);Macomb Community College,particularly,Bob Feldmaier,Director of the Center for Advanced Automotive Technology and Joseph Petrosky,Dean of the Engineering and Advanced Technology Department;and Florence Darlington Community College,Rick Roberts,Managing Director of the South Carolina Advanced Technical Education Center of Excellence,Teressa Gardner,Associate Vice President of Southern Institute of Manufacturing Technology(SiMT),and Mike Roth,Vice President of SiMT.The Board would also like to thank the students and faculty who participated in the listening sessions held at the annual ATE Principal Investigators Conference in Washington,D.C.as well as the inspiring students and faculty who attended the Community College Innovation Challenge Listening Session in Alexandria,Virginia.In additional to Listening Sessions,the Task Force also interviewed skilled technical workers and faculty/staff who support the STW including:David Barker,Lead Systems Engineer at the LIGO Livingston Observatory;Kevin Cooper,Assistant Dean at Indian River State College;and Anand Gramopadhye,Professor and Dean of the College of Engineering at Clemson University.NSB also expresses its thanks to the National Science Board Office staff.Kim Silverman,Kathy Jacquart,DeMonica Parks,Brandon Powell,Ann Bushmiller,Turquoise Bowen,and Kyscha Slater-Williams helped organize and staff our Listening Sessions.Acacia Reed created the NSBs STW webpage.Chris Blair proofread the final draft of this report.NSBs American Association for THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE52the Advancement of Science S&T Policy Fellows Mateo Muoz and Christina Maranto supported all aspects of the Task Forces work.Reba Bandyopadhyay brought to the project her knowledge of Indicators and her skills in policy communication.Matthew Wilson played a leading role in the project from its inception until he started his detail at the Office of Science and Technology Policy.Elise Lipkowitz guided the report across the finish line with skill and dedication.Nadine Lymn and Brad Gutierrez provided their insights and editorial contributions throughout the project.Finally,we thank John Veysey for his guidance and the many roles that he has played in ensuring the Task Forces success.1 National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicine(NASEM),“Building Americas SkilledTechnical Workforce,”(Washington,D.C.:The National Academies Press,2017),26.2 Task Force on the Skilled Technical Workforce(STW),National Science Board(NSB).3 White House activities include the Presidents National Council for the American Worker and release ofa five-year strategic plan for STEM education in 2018.4 For example,the Business-Higher Education Forums 2019 report,“Reskilling Americas Workforce:Exploring the Nations Future STEM Workforce Needs.”5 National Science Board,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science&Engineering Indicators2020,(forthcoming).The definition for the STW used in the Indicators report builds on the definition introduced in Jonathan Rothwells 2015 publication“Defining Skilled Technical Work.”The National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics(NCSES)has added to Rothwells definition by adding occupations that NCSES designates as S&E and S&E-related.6 Subcommittee on Federal Coordination in STEM Education,“Charting A Course for Success:AmericasStrategy for STEM Education,”(Washington,D.C.:NSTC,2018),v.7 As both our 2015 report and the 2017 National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicinereport on“Building Americas Skilled Technical Workforce”noted,there is intense debate over the nature of labor market shortages,skills gaps,and mismatches.Labor market shortages in the STEM-capable workforce tend to be specific to field,type of work,and location.In fact,“Building Americas Skilled Technical Workforce”observed that there was not,in the aggregate,a shortage of skilled technical workers in the United States.The reports authors noted,however,that this did not preclude localized shortages in specific lines of skilled technical work or more widespread shortages in the future.NASEM,“Building Americas Skilled Technical Workforce,”(Washington,D.C.:The National Academies Press,2017),26.8 Ibid.,26.9 NSB,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science&Engineering Indicators 2020,(forthcoming).10 Mark Muro,Jonathan Rothwell,Scott Andes,Kenan Fikri,and Siddharth Kulkarini,“AmericasAdvanced Industries:What They Are and Why They Matter,”(Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution),4.11 Ibid.,4.12 Ibid.,23.13 For an overview of Federal investments in STW Education,including the role of the NationalLaboratories,see Daniel Kuehn and Diane Auer Jones,“Sub-baccalaureate STEM Education and Apprenticeship,”(Washington,D.C.:Urban Institute,2018).14 Data collected by the National Center for Education Statistics(NCES)show that in 2017,34.6%ofall persons age 25 and over had a bachelors degree.NCES,Digest of Education Statistics,Table 104.10.“Rates of high school completion and bachelors degree attainment among persons age 25 and over,by race/ethnicity and sex:Selected years,1910 through 2017.”15 NASEM,“Building Americas Skilled Technical Workforce,”8.16 In 2017,the median earnings of skilled technical workers($45,000)was significantly higher thanthe median earnings of workers with less than a bachelors degree in other occupations($29,000).The unemployment rate for skilled technical workers was 3%rather than 5%for other non-baccalaureate jobs.See NSB,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science&Engineering Indicators 2020(forthcoming).ENDNOTES17 A small number of geographic areas account for a considerable proportion of S&E jobs.Twentymetropolitan areas with the largest S&E employment account for 42%of nationwide employment in S&E jobs,compared to 31%of employment in all occupations.See NSB,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science&Engineering Indicators 2020(forthcoming).18 NASEM,“Minority Serving Institutions:Americas Underutilized Resource for Strengthening the STEMWorkforce,”(Washington,D.C.:The National Academies Press,2019),1.19 NSB,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science&Engineering Indicators 2020(forthcoming).20 Ibid.21 NCSES defines S&E occupations as occupations that require at least a bachelors level of STEM skills.See NSB,“Science and Engineering Labor Force,”Science and Engineering Indicators 2018(Alexandria,VA:National Science Board,2018),12.22 Lexi Anderson,“Priority Areas in 2018 Workforce Development Legislation,”Ed Note(blog),October15,2018.23“Fast Facts 2019,”American Association of Community Colleges,last modified March 2019.24 NSB video,2018.“Industry Perspectives,”Youtube.25 NASEM,“Building Americas Skilled Technical Workforce,”(2017),39.26 Ibid,39.27 Council of Economic Advisors,“Government Employment and Training Programs:Assessing theEvidence on their Performance,”(Washington,D.C.:CEA,2019),6.28 For a sample of recent media reports on this topic see:“Post-secondary education:And whowhowill take the road less traveled by?”Minneapolis Star Tribune,May 31,2019;“The Stigma of Choosing Trade School Over College,”The Atlantic,March 2019;“The State of American Trade Schools,”Popular Mechanics,March 2019;“High-Paying Trade Jobs Sit Empty,While High School Grads Line Up for University,”NPR,April 25,2018;“Spotlight on Vocational Training,”Inside Higher Education,April 25,2017.The National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicines report,“Building the Skilled Technical Workforce”(2017)also notes this issue on pages 102-103.29 Anthony P.Carnevale,Jeff Strohl,Neil Ridley,and Artem Gulish,“Three Educational Pathways toGood Jobs:High School,Middle Skills,and Bachelors Degree,”(Washington,D.C.:Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce,2018).30 Anthony P.Carnevale,Stephen J.Rose,and Andrew R.Hanson,“Certificates:Gateway to GainfulEmployment and College Degrees,”(Washington,D.C.:Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce,2012).With funding from the Lumina Foundation,JP Morgan Chase and other major businesses,Credential Engine is tracking the growing landscape of post-secondary credentials.31 Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act of 1992.ENDNOTESNOTESNOTESTHE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE57Photo credits:National Science BoardNSF photos from Advanced Technological Education Impacts 2018-2019 https:/photo:Matt Heintze/Caltech/MIT/LIGO To download this report,go to:https:/www.nsf.gov/nsb/NSBActivities/skilled-technical-workforce-report.pdf THE SKILLED TECHNICAL WORKFORCE582415 Eisenhower Avenue,Alexandria,VA 22314Phone:(703)292-7000NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD

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United States Travel Outlook 2022Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthFor some people the past 18-24 months has been quite the rollercoaster,but now its time to take a breath and reset because 2022 promises to be entirely different.Things wont be like they were prior to COVID-19,but neither will they be as disruptive or restrictive as 2020/21.While its not breaking news to say the travel industry will bounce back and start its recovery in earnest throughout 2022,its important for hoteliers to know exactly what to expect and how to capitalize on the opportunities that emerge.This report will provide key insights into US travel in 2022,also exploring 10 states from around the nation to give hoteliers a head start in getting back on track.Heres to a flood of fresh bookings!What youll see in this report2US travel and tourism overviewArizonaCaliforniaColoradoFloridaHawaiiIllinoisNew YorkTennesseeTexasWashingtonLearn about SiteMinder4261034184263014382246Contents3United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthUS travel and tourism overviewWith domestic and international borders open once more,one of the worlds biggest tourism nations can recover quickly.In fact,forecasts point to domestic air travel fully recovering in the US by early 2022.The way that people travel and the preferences they have for accommodation stays is likely to differ from what hotels would have expected pre-COVID-19.Some of these changes may be subtle,while others will have significant impacts on how properties run their business.Remote working is just one example.This trend has boomed across the world,with individuals and companies realizing during the pandemic that productivity doesnt hinge on being in the office.This means travelers combining work and leisure can take longer trips if their hotel has the right facilities.Hotels that dont factor this requirement in could be missing vital revenue opportunities.However lets look at the US more specifically,identifying 10 key stats*that indicate the appetite for travel,the health of hotel metrics,and tourism trends.4Lets see how these overarching trends match-up against our state-level deep dives.2022 will see a 13%increase in occupancy,6%increase in ADR,and 19.7%increase in RevPAR across the US International arrivals to the US are expected to increase by 115%from 2021 to reach 56.8 million in 2022Domestic US travel spending is forecast to hit$911B in 2022,up from$787B in 2021,with leisure travel equating for$718BInternational leisure spending will account for$96B of the$120B total spending by international travelersIn the year ahead 78%of US travelers plan to travel the same(33%),more(23%),or much more(22%)than prior to COVID-19Some luxury travelers are opting for what some people call“trip stacking,”or buying two trips over the same time period in case one of them falls throughMillennials are most likely to plan a trip involving remote work,with 24%saying theyd take a workcation in the next yearWith the majority of travel bookings proving to be domestic,some of these travelers are booking longer stays to make up for lost international tripsOther domestic travel trends include a rise in cancellation queries/rates and shorter booking lead timesRegardless of location Americans have indicated they are heading to the beach,calling it out as their top destination across all age groups.SourcesSTR|ustravel.org|SiteMinder|New York Times|travelagentcentral|netaffinity|prnewswire5United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTourism trends&hotel metrics:10 key statsTrends and opportunities6Arizona,the countrys sixth largest state,is an explorers dream destination-containing some of the US most visited attractions along with a diverse and captivating environment.With historically strong tourism figures,Arizona is one state that is primed for a huge comeback post-pandemic.Lets look at some key statistics for Arizona and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Close to 6 million people visit the Grand Canyon each year,making it the countrys second most popular national park behind the Great Smoky Mountains national park In positive signs,2021 saw increases across Arizona in all key tourism indicators including tourism taxes,airport traffic,state and national park visitation,hotel ADR and RevPAR Phoenix hotel occupancy outperformed national levels in 2021 and experts expect full recovery by summer 2022 Prior to the pandemic,2019 saw Arizona record a fourth record-breaking year in visitation(46.8 million),travel spending($25.6 billion),and active jobs(194,300)The state has set aside more than$100 million in federal funds for a new initiative to support the recovery of the states tourism industry,including$60 million in grantsSourcesDepartment of the Interior|Tourism AZ|AZ Central|ASU|AZ Big Media 7United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthArizonaThe opportunities for hotels in Arizona:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsObviously Arizona has a superpower with the Grand Canyon proving an everlasting drawcard for travelers,but this isnt all the state has to rely on.Arizona is a beautifully vast state,steeped in the history of Native Americans,famous adventurers,and diverse landscapes.Visitors will have a wealth of activities to keep them occupied,from ghost town getaways to hiking holidays,horseback adventures,spa retreats,wine experiences,and Phoenix itself.Hoteliers in Arizona should lean into the excitement surrounding the return of normality,encouraging travelers to make up for lost time with big adventures.Arizona strengths8Promote bucket-list trips to travelers who now know life can throw anything at us at any time.Given the unpredictable nature of travel,theres no better time than now to tick off bucket list items-of which Arizona has plenty!Use your social media and website blog to go hard with this message,encouraging direct bookings in the process.With a full economic recovery still to come,utilize an online booking engine to ensure youre capturing as many direct bookings as possible to lower the cost of acquisition,while also generating extra revenue from each guest via upsells and add-ons.Target potential guests strategically with paid advertising on social media or search engines to appeal to city dwellers looking to shake off the claustrophobia and explore the vast open spaces and natural attractions Arizona has to offer.Nailing down who your ideal guest is will be crucial in successfully attracting travelers.Pictures speak a thousand words and user-generated content sparks wonders.If you have any content to pull out of the vault from before the pandemic,use it to flood your marketing channels to remind people of the joy of traveling and to bring attention to the amazing experiences within your destination-including reviews and testimonials from past guests.Ensure your customer service is exemplary-guests have higher standards than ever and youll need positive feedback to build booking momentum moving forward.Personalize your guests stay wherever possible.1.2.3.4.5.9United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus pointsTrends and opportunities10With an economy bigger than most countries,California is Americas most popular travel destination.It retained this title even through the COVID-19 pandemic with hotel occupancy rising 20tween 2020 and 2021.The diversity of Californias environment combined with the countless once-in-a-lifetime experiences available to travelers means its rebound from COVID-19 will likely be stronger than most.Lets look at some key statistics for California and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Almost 265 million arrivals are forecast for 2022,an increase of 24.8%on 2021 12.1 million international travelers are expected,with a strong intake from Canada and Mexico Hotel occupancy in Los Angeles and San Diego are expected to rise by 14%and 11%respectively to hover around 70%British Airways reported a 700%increase in searches for flights to California this year Domestic searches for“hotels near me”increased 100%in 2021SourcesVisit California|HVS|CalChamber|Google Trends 11United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthCaliforniaThe opportunities for hotels in California:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsFrom the electric scene of Los Angeles to the surf bars in San Diego,to the towering Redwood forests,to the Napa and Sonoma wine valleys,to Yosemite National Park and more,there is something for every kind of traveler in California.This gives hoteliers a great advantage in marketing their destinations and winning over travelers in large numbers.By using blogs,email and social media to advertize events,attractions,and cross-promote with other local businesses that appeal to the same demographics hoteliers should not be lacking for opportunities.Hoteliers in California have the opportunity to capitalize on the fervor of returning travelers by encouraging an increase in length of stay and spending from the domestic guests who will make up the majority of arrivals.California strengths12Use your online booking engine to help you score more direct bookings but also earn more revenue per guest with extras and upsell offers.Create packages that include tickets to attractions,set-up promotions to entice an extra nights stay,and ensure the experience at your property is convenient for guests.Strive to give guests an experience that makes them feel like they are getting value for their money by personalizing your service and offering exemplary customer care.Not only will this increase the chances of them spending more during their stay,but theyll be happier to leave a positive review when you ask for feedback post-departure.Consider how you can partner with other hospitality businesses in your area to assist each other and help travelers make easier choices-such as eateries and bars,or ticket-selling locations like theaters,museums,or theme parks.1.2.3.4.5.13United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points14Being one of the largest states in the US,Colorado is a popular destination for travelers looking to explore a vivid and rugged landscape,both in summer and winter.The mountain state is famous for the Rocky Mountains of course and has had many western films shot on location,along with containing a rich history of military forts and mining ghost towns.Lets look at some key statistics for Colorado and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.The Colorado Tourism Office announced more than$710,000 in grants to help future economic growth and tourism industry recovery Mexico,the UK,Germany,Canada,and France are seen as key target markets for the states marketing efforts There is also a meeting and incentive program granting rebates for the cost of venues,food,and transportation in an attempt to revive business travel which is down 75%from pre-pandemic levels Prior to the pandemic Colorado had a record breaking year for tourism,with 86 million arrivals and$24.2 billion visitor spending in 2019 Despite the disruption of COVID,the Denver hotel market is projected to reach full recovery by 2024 with forecasted occupancy,ADR and RevPAR all surpassing the 2019 levelsSourcesCTO|CPR|Bizjournals|Denver.org|MileHigh CRE 15United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesColoradoThe opportunities for hotels in Colorado:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsNo matter the season Colorado always has something to offer,so all traveler types can find something they love.This broad appeal is highlighted by seasonal festivals,ideal skiing and snowboarding conditions in the winter,perfect hiking and biking locations,and a rich cultural heritage to explore.Hoteliers should promote valuable packages,jump on any returning business travel,and look to encourage repeat stays.Colorado strengths16With huge efforts being made to reignite the entire tourism industry in Colorado,now is the time to pivot your focus to include international and corporate guests along with your bread and butter family and adventurer markets.Given the range of activities on offer in the state,use numerous packages to add value and create convenience for your guests,while ensuring you cast a wide net for reservations.Using an online booking engine simplifies package creation and promotion,saving you time and optimizing the booking process.As the industrys recovery progresses,a return to growth and record highs looks likely.To avoid missing the next boom,connect to additional booking channels to increase your visibility and take advantage of the billboard effect.Do this with no extra effort by using a channel manager to update your channels automatically and in real-time.Evaluate your property and ensure you have the right amenities equipped to deliver exceptional guest experiences.The post-COVID traveler has higher standards and will need even more personalization to win their loyalty and return bookings,which you have a great opportunity to secure given Colorado is a great destination all year round.Take note of which international markets may be most likely to visit and do some research and segmenting around which guest types you want to attract and how to satisfy their preferences.Use your website to create amazing,informative,content and boost direct reservation conversions.If you need help creating a beautiful website easily,use a website builder to make your job simple.1.2.3.4.5.17United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points18Florida is one of the most vibrant states in the US,being the third most populous,and boasts an impressive number of attractions for visiting guests.Between the Miami metropolitan area,Orlando,Tampa Bay,and Jacksonville,travelers never want for something to do and tourism makes up one of the largest sectors in the state.Lets look at some key statistics for Florida and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.The strongest domestic markets for Florida continue to be New York,Illinois,and Alabama while Canada,the UK and Brazil are top international markets Domestically Florida has been performing even better than 2019(pre-COVID)with second quarter 2021 visitors totaling more than 30 million Orlando alone is expected to welcome 765,000 UK guests in 2022 Floridas total visitors are expected to fall just short of 131 million in 2022,with full recovery and even growth expected as soon as 2023 An occupancy gain of 8 percent is forecast in 2022,plus a 7.1%to average daily rate.The net result is a 15.6%increase in RevPARSourcesVisit Florida|MySunCoast|BizJournals|The Apopka Voice|CBRE 19United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesFloridaThe opportunities for hotels in Florida:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsFloridas beaches and amusement parks are a constant source of attention for travelers from all over,especially families and groups.Add to that the Kennedy Space Center,Universal Studios and Disney World,Florida Keys,and an abundance of national parks and youve got yourself a foolproof tourism generator.Hotels should play to their strengths and look to maximize RevPAR.Florida strengths20With so much for travelers to do,hotels in Florida should look for every opportunity to join forces with other businesses and attractions to create promotions and value-added offers on their websites,incentivizing guests to make the easy choice.Maximize the revenue you can garner from each guest by offering upsells and extras on your booking engine,as well as offers to enhance the experience while they enjoy their stay.Giving guests quality-laden convenient options will encourage them to spend more.Try to capture extended stays by setting a high customer service standard and asking guests if theyd like an extra night for a discount.You could also offer early check-in too,with both options providing further opportunities for guests to spend money on food,beverages,and other amenities.Stay on the radar of a diverse range of guests,as international travel ramps back up.Increasing your distribution network with extra third-party channel connections is an easy way to get more eyeballs on your hotel.You can keep your inventory updated and accurate at all times with a channel manager.Dont ignore the potential of changing travel habits,especially with the new normal of remote working.Many guests will want spaces and services that allow them to easily complete work while also enjoying a vacation.1.2.3.4.5.21United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points22With well over 130 volcanic islands encompassing the state,Hawaii has the fourth longest coastline in the US and is a travelers paradise.No one needs reminding of whats on offer for visitors to the main Hawaiian islands.There is something for everyone-from romantic couples to adventurers,surfers,shoppers,families,history lovers,foodies,and health and wellness enthusiasts.Lets look at some key statistics for Hawaii and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Visitor arrivals are expected to increase by 29.8%in 2022 to reach 8.8 million Visitor spending will reach$15.5 billion in 2022,up 27.1%While international travelers will be minimal,Japan and Canada will be the largest source markets The states indoor mask mandate is likely to be dropped early in 2022 76%of US travelers said they are willing to pay more for tourism experiences that are respectful of Native Hawaiian cultureSourcesDBEDT|Forbes|Skift23United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesHawaiiThe opportunities for hotels in Hawaii:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsHawaii is diverse,beautiful and situated far enough away from anything that it even feels like an international trip for US visitors.This idea of finding an escape is even stronger in the context of the pandemic and is something marketers can really play into.Hoteliers should make sure they are letting travelers know there is something for everyone,working hard to encourage increased length of stay,and prioritizing convenience.Hawaii strengths24Ensure you are aligning your marketing efforts with the attractions nearby to your hotel,and are thinking carefully about which guest segments you want to target at your property.Having a clear idea about your target audience will make it much easier to create content and curate your hotels offers.With the pandemic making international travel near impossible and Hawaiis reputation as an exotic location,you should work on convincing travelers this is the great escape they need to refresh and revitalize themselves without the added complexity of complying with international travel restrictions.Encourage increased length of stay with bundled packages or discounts,and win more revenue from other amenities.For reference the average Length of Stay(LOS)for Hawaii is around 8.5 days.With so much to see,do,and explore it can be difficult for travelers to organize themselves when vacationing in Hawaii.Make it easier on guests by personalizing their stays and making convenience a value-added feature.Think about organizing transportation,dining,and unique experiences as part of any packages you put together to sell directly on your website and booking engine.While it may be less immediate that international travel returns in force,growth is looking strong and steady with Japanese and Canadian travelers already returning.To ensure youre ready when other nations come flooding,make sure youre connected to a broad range of online travel agents which you can manage easily via a channel manager.Another way of adding convenience and personalization to your guests stay is to offer a range of upgrade and extras options via your direct booking engine.Giving travelers the freedom to choose what arrival treats they get or what features are in their room creates a nice first impression.1.2.3.4.5.25United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points26Illinois has long been known for being a microcosm of the US,with hugely diverse economic drivers that include natural resources,industrial cities,and a transportation hub.Illinois is of course home to one of Americas most famous cities in Chicago and Route 66,always a drawcard for travelers.Chicago is an especially popular destination for business meetings,with an overwhelming choice of hotels for visitors,and boasts a number of hugely popular sports franchises.Lets look at some key statistics for Illinois and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Chicago alone has more than 140 hotels and 45,000 hotel rooms,offering travelers great variety A new grant worth$10 million was announced in 2021 to encourage the development of new attractions and festivals in Illinois Cond Nast Traveler recognized Chicago as the#1 Best Big City in the US for the fifth year in a row in the results of its annual Readers Choice Awards The pace of Choose Chicagos business and convention hotel room bookings currently exceeds 100%of target to 2028,suggesting a strong pipeline of events looking to host in Chicago Short-term,hotel-based meetings currently on the books between August 2021 and December 2022 are estimated to generate 576,000 room nights and$781 million in economic impact for the citySourcesChicago Tribune|Eater|Choose Chicago27United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesIllinoisThe opportunities for hotels in Illinois:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsIf travelers arent in Chicago for business,then theres no shortage of art,culture,and natural attractions to explore around the state,including some great road trips.Hotels in Illinois have a lot to offer domestic travelers and can enjoy great success,even without the full return of international travel by offering enriched experiences.Illinois strengths28With domestic travelers keen to see more of their state and country than ever before,theyll be asking a lot of questions and looking for resources.Make sure your hotel website is packed with useful content,providing key information on your local area that will build trust with travelers and start a relationship.Keep a blog regularly updated too.Knowing that the health of meetings and events will still be assured,dont move away from this market.Continue offering incentives for corporate travelers but keep an eye on leisure travelers also visiting Chicago.Gain more control over your rates,distribution,and offers by investing in a sophisticated hotel commerce platform.Cities are increasing in preference for many North American travelers,Chicago among them.Travelers attitudes now revolve strongly around higher standards,convenience,and ticking off bucket list items.Use this knowledge to shape your marketing and in-stay efforts.Make it easy for travelers to book the perfect stay by building amazing packages and promotions within your booking engine and going the extra mile to make them feel welcome at your property.For those travelers hitting the road and trying to squeeze in as much as they can during a road trip,look to partner with surrounding local businesses to promote extended stays.Adding value and making travelers aware of all the attractions they can enjoy at a discounted price can bring revenue back to your hotel in the long run,via food and beverage expenses and return stays.The road to full recovery and reestablishing success will be nothing short of competitive.Gain advantages by mastering your presence on Google and enabling easy metasearch bookings,as well as using business intelligence software to understand competitor and market trends.1.2.3.4.5.29United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points30New York State has an unbending commitment to tourism,and has much to offer travelers even beyond the awe-inspiring New York City.With sandy beaches and mountain peaks to accompany the city lights and architecture,travelers to New York have plenty to choose from.Lets look at some key statistics for New York and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Visitors to New York City are forecast to hit 57 million in 2022(up from 2021s 38.2 million),with leisure travel accounting for 80% Lodging and food&beverage make up 50%of visitor spending in NYC$15 million has been allocated for the 2021-2022 fiscal year via Market New York Occupancy in NYC is expected to reach 76%in 2022 before passing pre-pandemic levels in 2025 at 86%Governor Hochul announced$450 million recovery package to boost tourism both at a domestic and international levelSourcesOSC|ESD|NYC&company|TheRealDeal31United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesNew YorkThe opportunities for hotels in New York:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsOutside of the obvious landmark of New York City,which is filled with shopping,theater,architecture and sports attractions;New York state is incredibly diverse and supports all kinds of visitors.The lure of NYC combined with the natural beauty of great lakes,mountain peaks,rivers,valleys,The Hamptons,and Niagara Falls make it a hugely popular destination.Destination marketing can be something hoteliers focus on to ensure travelers arent flying in and out without making the most of their trip.New York strengths32Take your content to the next level to draw visitors to your website and market your destination at the same time,enticing bookings throughout the process.Your website can be whatever you want it to be,so think about publishing SEO optimized travel guides,tips,and information sheets.Travelers think about much more than the hotel when making a booking decision so show them the true value of staying at your property.Work hard on social media to get noticed by prospective guests.Target ads to very specific audiences once you have identified your ideal market,and build a strong,positive brand in the meantime.Make sure you are posting content worth engaging with and running regular offers,competitions,and giveaways that encourage interaction and fun.Make sure you have an online booking engine integrated too so you can take bookings straight from your Facebook page.Consider the changing attitudes of travelers post-pandemic.Many are taking to working while on vacation,while others want to switch off the noise entirely after a stressful two years.Ensure your property has the necessary spaces and amenities to accommodate the needs of your guests as they stand today.Incorporate extras and packages that help guests with their trip purpose,which you can also sell easily on your booking engine.When international travel reboots in earnest,dont be left behind with poor distribution management.Casting a wide net and connecting to a broad range of third-party booking channels will allow you more chances to hit your occupancy targets.Make it easy by managing your connections automatically in real-time with a channel manager.While the industry gradually moves towards full recovery and occupancy remains lower than normal,youll need to hustle to get more revenue out of the guests you do have.Put on shows and events,or invite local artists and performers into your property to get guests frequenting the bar and dining areas of your hotel.1.2.3.4.5.33United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points34Tennessee is a state of rich history,firmly based in musical heritage and contributions to the development of popular music with Nashville and Memphis key focal points.The state also boasts the most visited national park in the US,Great Smoky Mountains national park,if travelers want to walk on the wild side.Lets look at some key statistics for Tennessee and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Throughout the pandemic,Tennessee fared 10tter in the category of tourism spending than the wider nation,with some counties even experiencing growth Nashville is in the top 30 of most desired domestic travel destinations More than two-thirds of visitors to Memphis choose to stay in hotels over other properties like B&Bs,inns,or motels Nashville ADR is set to climb by 15%in 2022,and RevPAR will see a 32%increase More than 70%of Tennessees international visitors come from Canada and Europe(UK and Germany top source markets within Europe)SourcesTenessean|Nash Today|Memphis Travel|HVS|TN vacation35United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesTennesseeThe opportunities for hotels in Tennessee:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsThe musical cities are an always-on attraction for Tennessee and need little marketing domestically,though travelers always need reminding of the great reasons to take a trip.In 2022 there are particular advantages with many anniversaries taking place in Nashville.The Ryman Auditorium will celebrate its 130th anniversary,while the Nashville Symphony is celebrating its 75th anniversary.The CMA Awards and the Country Music Hall of Fame&Museum will both celebrate their 55th anniversary.The iconic Bluebird Cafe is celebrating its 40th year in business in 2022,while the Music City Walk of Fame will celebrate its 15th year.Tennessee strengths36Partnerships are a key to driving interest and kickstarting full recovery.Look into how you can work with travel bloggers and influencers to take advantage of new audiences and ride on the back of user generated content to create excitement amongst travelers for your destination and property.Travelers in 2022 will have higher standards when it comes to their experiences and the level of personalization they receive.With this in mind its important you do some resourcing to help in this situation.Hotel management software can take a lot of time off your hands,allowing you to focus more on your customers.Prioritize your marketing and promotions to align with any key events happening in your area.With travelers likely searching for trips related to events,its the perfect opportunity to create themed packages,promotions,and extras to sell on your booking engine.Use your website to create content around the events to capture traffic from people searching on Google.M reports that 59%of website visitors are on mobile devices,which should remind you how prominent mobile bookings also are in the travel industry now.Make sure your own website is mobile optimized,your booking system is easily navigated on mobile devices,and also consider offering mobile-only promotions or last-minute deals for mobile bookers.Take note of the trends and research available on visitors to your destination so you can target more accurately with any advertising you do.For example,Nashville traditionally welcomes more travelers from Illinois and Florida than other states,while people visiting Memphis are most commonly aged 36-56(44%).With an average length of stay of 2.7 days,theres also an opportunity to devize tactics to encourage extended stays for extra revenue.1.2.3.4.5.37United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSourcesM|T SiteMinders five focus points38The second largest state in the US by area and population,Texas is a huge and diverse destination.It also boasts a robust tourism economy backed by sports,shopping,and outdoor adventures.Traveling through Texas,visitors can see deserts,grasslands,forests,swamps,beaches,and everything in between.Lets look at some key statistics for Texas and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.Pre-pandemic tourism was strong,with$83 billion spent by visitors in 2019 2021 saw Houston,one of the nations biggest cities,earn its place in Time magazine as one of the Worlds Greatest Places Other recent accolades include Travel Leisure readers ranking San Antonio as the sixth best city in the US,with Fort Worth and Austin also featuring in the top 15 Top international source markets for Texas include Canada,Mexico,UK,Germany,France,and the Netherlands 2022 marks the 100-year anniversary of the Houston Zoo,which will bring a six-year,multi-phase plan of transformative exhibitsSourcesKVUE|FoodTravelLeisure|Travel Texas|Secret Houston39United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesTexasThe opportunities for hotels in Texas:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsTexas offers great variety for travelers and is a versatile destination that is strong in both the leisure and corporate sectors.Hoteliers should target out-of-state visitors as much as possible,using strong press and reputations to drive bookings.Texas strengths40Out of state visitors tend to stay longer and spend more-with 2022 representing a return to normality make sure you are casting a wide net to bring in long-haul travelers who will give your hotel a much needed revenue boost.Utilizing a channel manager will help you connect to more OTA channels for no extra effort.Workation-its a new buzzword but for a reason.Travelers have learned being out of the office is no limitation to getting work done,so most are now fitting work time into their vacations.Make sure your hotel is set up to accommodate these new preferences and that you are communicating this with potential guests.Key events like the Houston Zoo centennial represent a chance to do combined marketing and also create compelling offers and packages for travelers to enjoy both your hotel and nearby attractions or events.Work with other local businesses to create promotions and sell them directly to guests via your website and online booking engine.Dont be afraid to use your website and social media content for some humble brags.If travelers are still making their mind up about where to travel or where to stay,they can be easily swayed by the promise of a great experience,backed by positive feedback from peers.Provide plenty of information on your blog and social media pages,keeping travelers in the know and maintaining an opportunity for direct bookings.With RevPar a key metric to build again,think about some tactics to encourage more spending from each individual guest you have.Whether its via enticing extras or upsell opportunities,initiatives that will bring them into your bar and restaurant,or ways to convince them to spend an extra night,do everything you can to maximize your returns.1.2.3.4.5.41United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus points42Washington is the second largest producer of wine in the US,and knowing that fact alone could be all it takes to get travelers returning in droves!However,the state has much to offer most travelers,with Seattle a shining gem amongst other highlights including an abundance of state parks,arts and culture experiences,and activities for the whole family.Lets look at some key statistics for Washington and assess your hotels opportunity for bookings in 2022.The tourism sector is typically strong,generating$21 billion annually outside of the pandemic Seattle is set to welcome 1.5 million visitors from Canada in 2022,85%of the way to full recovery Washington will receive a federal tourism recovery grant of almost$11 million Washington state parks receive almost 40 million visitors annually With an eye on the return of international travel its noted that London,Tokyo,and Seoul have typically been Seattle-Tacoma International Airports(SEA)largest international markets.SourcesChoose Washington State|Washington State Parks|BizJournals|Port Seattle43United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthTrends and opportunitiesWashingtonThe opportunities for hotels in Washington:Strengths and SiteMinders tipsWashington offers year-round recreation for travelers,and boasts the perfect combination of dynamic city environments and stunning natural landscapes.Hoteliers should tap into traveler motivations and come up with creative ways to push occupancy rates to their highest potential.Washington strengths44Travelers in 2022 will be looking to seize the day,eager to travel and get reacquainted with wonder of discovery.Its an energy and attitude that should be matched by your brand in all your customer facing content and communications.With so much lost time to make up for,many travelers will take to tripping with friends and family to enjoy valuable experiences.This means group rates and packages will be an important factor in winning bookings.Ensure you have offerings that will be attractive to groups and make the booking process simple with an online booking engine.Not to be negative,but general trust amongst consumers is not as high as it could be.Work on building trust with travelers with quality,useful content on your website and social media pages as well as giving customers quality assurances wherever possible.Standards will be higher than ever,so establishing positive relationships and going the extra mile is vital for ongoing success.Spending almost two years either locked down or restricted in some way has travelers yearning to do what really matters to them.This means targeting big ticket experiences and bucket list items.Experiences will win over material factors every time right now so make sure your offerings are designed to enrich the guest stay at every opportunity.Even though 2022 is set to be a big year of recovery,it wont reach pre-pandemic heights.Generally Seattle hotels would expect around 89%occupancy in the summer months so if you need a boost,get creative.Dont ignore local travel and staycations just because borders are reopening-always keep offers and promotions on hand for guests who may be right on your doorstep.1.2.3.4.5.45United States Travel Outlook 2022:Your hotels opportunities to capitalize on bookings and revenue growthSiteMinders five focus pointsTalk to an expertStart a free trialWatch DemoSiteMinder is the worlds only true open hotel commerce platform,providing everything your property needs to market,sell,manage,and grow.Using software like SiteMinder to control your business gives you more time and freedom,but also more opportunities to build your brand and boost business revenue-creating better guest experiences in the process!Whether youre looking to broaden your reach,take direct bookings,or maximize your revenue each day,features such as our channel manager and online booking engine have everything you need to meet the return of travel in the US.Learn about SiteMinder To see it for yourself or learn more about your opportunities in 2022,try SiteMinder for free or chat with one of our helpful experts.

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Mirka Martel,Ph.D.and Julie BaerJune 2022Fall 2022 SnapshotON INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ENROLLMENTMirka Martel,Ph.D.and Julie BaerNovember 2022IntroductionIntroduction The Fall 2022 Snapshot on International Student Enrollment includes the findings from a survey of 638 U.S.higher education institutions on current patterns in international student enrollment as of fall 2022.The report focuses on international students studying at U.S.higher education institutions in person or online(in the United States or from abroad).The report,conducted by the Institute of International Education(IIE)and nine partner higher education associations,complements the Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange,which IIE conducts in partnership with the U.S.Department of State and provides a comprehensive view of international students from the previous year(IIE,2022).Key Key FindingsFindings The Fall 2022 Snapshot reflects the continued rebound of international student mobility at U.S.colleges and universities amid the COVID-19 pandemic.International student numbers at U.S.colleges and universities continue to rise:The total number of international students(all enrolled and Optional Practical Training OPT)has increased by nine percent as of fall 2022.This represents continued growth from the four percent noted in 2021/22(IIE,2022).International student growth is noted across all academic levels,with continued strong growth at the graduate level.The number of international students pursuing employment opportunities following their academic studies on OPT has increased by six percent.This is likely driven by the surge in the number of graduate students reported in Open Doors 2022,many of whom may be availing themselves of the opportunity to gain work experience in the United States.New enrollments of international students at U.S.colleges and universities are up:Higher education institutions report a seven percent increase in the number of new international students enrolling for the first time at a U.S.institution,a continued increase following the 80 percent rebound in new enrollments in 2021/22(IIE,2022).Sixty-three percent of institutions report an increase in new international student enrollment,12 percent indicate the number to be the same as last year,and 24 percent report a decrease.U.S.higher education institutions are committed to international students studying in person:Ninety-nine percent of responding institutions are holding in-person classes or implementing a hybrid model.Less than one percent of institutions cite offering only online classes in fall 2022.Ninety-four percent of the reported international students are in the United States on campus.International student outreach and recruitment is a priority:U.S.institutions note prioritizing international student outreach in India,Vietnam,Brazil,and China as well as international students at U.S.high schools.For outreach and recruitment to prospective international students,responding institutions report leveraging current international students(64 percent),online recruitment events(53 percent),and international partnerships(53 percent).Eighty-seven percent of reporting institutions indicate that financial support for their international student recruitment efforts is the same or higher than in the previous year.2 MethodologyMethodology Survey Survey B Background ackground and and DataData CollectionCollection Ten partnering higher education associations distributed the Fall 2022 Snapshot on International Student Enrollment to their member institutions across the United States from September 22 to October 13,2022.IIE carries out the survey in cooperation with American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers,American Association of State Colleges and Universities,American Council on Education,Association of Public and Land-grant Universities,College Board,Community Colleges for International Development,Council of Graduate Schools,National Association for College Admission Counseling,and NAFSA:Association of International Educators.The survey captures 638 valid responses from higher education institutions.The Fall 2022 Snapshot respondents represent a subset of the almost 3,000 U.S.higher education institutions surveyed annually as part of the Open Doors International Student Census.The reporting institutions represent 52 percent of all international students in the Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange(IIE,2022).Respondent Respondent P Profilerofile Respondents to the Fall 2022 Snapshot reflect a broad range of institutional types and locations from 49 states,one U.S.territory,and Washington,D.C.Overall,the Fall 2022 Snapshot respondents profile closely mirrors the profile of the institutions that completed the Open Doors 2022 International Student Census.Similar proportions are noted among geographic regions,institutional sectors,types,and sizes.Figure 1:Fall 2022 Snapshot Institutional Representation Note:Percentages may not sum to 100%due to rounding.3 International Students at U.S.Colleges and Universities in International Students at U.S.Colleges and Universities in Fall 2022Fall 2022 The findings of the Fall 2022 Snapshot highlight the continued resilience of international educational exchange.With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic two years ago,our findings indicate a sustained rebound of student mobility to the United States.Total Total International Student International Student EnrollmentEnrollments s at U.S.Higher Education Institutionsat U.S.Higher Education Institutions In fall 2022,reporting institutions indicate a nine percent increase in total international students.This includes students studying at U.S.colleges and universities in person and online and those on Optional Practical Training(OPT).This is the second year that international student mobility has increased after two years of decline,and growth was noted across all institutional types including doctoral universities,masters colleges and universities,baccalaureate colleges,special focus institutions,and community colleges.Figure 2:International Students at U.S.Higher Education Institutions,Fall 2022 Most reporting institutions have returned to predominantly in-person modes of study,either hybrid instruction(69%)or in-person learning only(31%).Just one of the 638 participating colleges and universities indicated that its mode of study is online only in fall 2022(0.2%).We have seen a considerable shift in the mode of study in the past two years given the COVID-19 pandemic.In the fall of 2020,88 percent of institutions reported hybrid learning,and only two percent indicated that their instruction was in person(Baer&Martel,2020).Two years later,the number of institutions that offer hybrid learning has decreased,though it is still well above half.However,the percentage of institutions that offer only in-person instruction has increased significantly to 31 percent.Ninety-four percent of the international students reported in fall 2022 are studying in person on U.S.campuses.Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic,U.S.colleges and universities made extensive efforts to continue instruction amid health concerns and prioritized returning to in-person learning as quickly as possible.In Open Doors 2021,IIE reported that less than half of the international students studying at U.S.colleges and universities took in-person classes in the United States(Martel et al.,2021).In Open Doors 2022,this proportion of international students on U.S.campuses increased significantly to 90 percent(IIE,2022).This trend continues to be noted in the Fall 2022 Snapshot,with 94 percent of institutions indicating that 4 international students are in the United States and pursuing their studies in person.While institutions note that online study is an option for international students who cannot travel due to COVID-19 restrictions,the number of students in this circumstance has decreased significantly over time.Figure 3:Location of International Students by Year,2020 2022 There is also an indication that more international students are beginning their studies rather than deferring.In fall 2020,U.S.colleges and universities reported that over 47,000 international students had deferred their study to a future semester or year,in large part due to the COVID-19 pandemic(Martel et al.,2020).This number fell to approximately 16,000 international students in fall 2021 and has now declined to nearly 12,000 in fall 2022(Martel,2021).This number is approaching the level of student deferrals reported prior to the pandemic in the fall of 2019(approximately 9,000)(Martel et al.,2020).International Students by Academic LevelInternational Students by Academic Level In fall 2022,reporting institutions indicate an increase in international students across all academic levels:undergraduate,graduate,non-degree,and OPT.A comparison to Open Doors data indicates that the last time that all four academic levels increased was the 2014/15 academic year(IIE,2022).Following the decreases experienced due to the COVID-19 pandemic,students studying at all levels and on OPT this fall are in greater numbers than the previous year.Figure 4:Changes in International Student Totals by Academic Level,Fall 2022 International Enrollments.Enrolled international students include those pursuing undergraduate,graduate,or non-degree study,a subset of total international students.According to the Fall 2022 Snapshot,the total number of enrolled international students increased by 10 percent.Undergraduate student numbers have rebounded by two percent after four years of declines.According to Open Doors,the height of undergraduate enrollments was in 2017/18,when 442,746 international students studied at U.S.colleges and universities(IIE,2022).Since then,the number of undergraduate students fell and was impacted significantly by the Fall 202047%In-person studyFall 202190%In-person studyFall 202294%In-person study 5 COVID-19 pandemic as international students likely deferred,postponed their undergraduate studies,or decided to forego studying outside their home country altogether.In the 2021/22 academic year,Open Doors reported that while undergraduate enrollments continued to decline,first-year enrollment increased by 20 percent(IIE,2022).As more incoming undergraduate students are included in fall 2022,we note institutions reporting an overall increase in undergraduate students.Graduate student enrollments continue to increase significantly by 18 percent.This growth builds on the 17 percent increase already reported in the 2021/22 academic year in Open Doors(IIE,2022).Last year,graduate students surpassed undergraduate students for the first time in a decade,reaching a high of 385,097 students.This years reported increase,though a subset of the full Open Doors reporting sample,points to a potential all-time high of graduate students in the United States in the 2022/23 academic year.Finally,the total number of international students pursuing non-degree study,which includes short-term exchanges and intensive English programs,also increased by four percent.There was a significant decline in non-degree study amid the height of the COVID-19 pandemic(-64%)due to many students not pursuing shorter-term exchange programs(Martel et al.,2021).Then,in the 2021/22 academic year,non-degree totals rebounded by 61 percent(IIE,2022).Reporting institutions indicate that non-degree enrollments in fall 2022 continue to grow at four percent,building on the positive turnaround from last year.Optional Practical Training.The number of international students on OPT pursuing employment opportunities following their academic studies has increased by six percent,following two years of declines.Following the 2016 OPT extension,which allowed international students pursuing degrees in science,technology,engineering,and math(STEM)to extend their stay in the United States from 17 to 24 months,the number of OPT students in the last decade increased sharply to more than 223,000 in 2018/19(IIE,2022).The total then leveled off at higher levels in 2019/20.The declines in 2020/21 and 2021/22 were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic,when international students may have chosen to return home rather than pursue OPT,and smaller numbers of international students were entering the system,decreasing the overall pool eligible for OPT.This fall,the rebound in OPT may be in part to the greater number of graduate students in the United States eligible to pursue OPT.Last year,the number of masters students in the United States increased by 29 percent(IIE,2022).As graduate programs vary in length,these graduate students,62 percent of whom study in STEM fields,will be eligible for OPT opportunities and likely influence the overall OPT numbers.New New International Student EnrollmentsInternational Student Enrollments U.S.institutions that report to the Fall 2022 Snapshot continue to indicate a positive trend in new enrollments of international students who are studying at their institution for the first time.For the 2021/22 academic year,Open Doors reported a significant 80 percent rebound in new international student enrollments(IIE,2022).These increases were evident across all academic levels.This fall(2022),institutions continue to signal a seven percent increase in new international student enrollments.Approximately 63 percent of reporting institutions indicate that their new international enrollments are slightly or substantially higher than the previous year.This increase is noted across all institutional types,with the majority of doctoral universities(68%),masters colleges and universities(62%),liberal arts colleges(62%),and community colleges(68%)reporting growth.6 Figure 5:Changes in New International Student Enrollments,Fall 2022 The top factor colleges and universities cited for growth in 2022 is a continued rebound from the declines that many institutions faced amid the height of the COVID-19 pandemic(60%).As institutions recover from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,many colleges and universities recognize how investments in recruitment have resulted in new enrollment growth.Active recruitment efforts(54%),active outreach to admitted students(49%),and growing reputation and visibility of their institution(36%)were among the leading factors that institutions attribute to increased new enrollment.Notably,this aligns with trends reported in the fall of 2019,prior to the pandemic(Sanger&Baer,2019).Institutions also cite factors such as increased partnerships with agents(31%),improved support for enrolled students(26%),growth in institutional scholarship opportunities(22%),and the elimination of standardized test requirements(17%).Among institutions experiencing declines,87 percent note that multiple factors impact the decrease in new enrollment.Among the leading factors colleges and universities cite are visa application process challenges(73%),the cost of U.S.higher education(53%),and student decisions to stay home and enroll in their own countrys higher education institutions(41%).Much smaller proportion of institutions note declines due to institutional factors,such as lack of sufficient staff for recruitment and admission of international students(28%),lack of sufficient funding for recruitment and admission of international students(26%),and shifting institutional priorities away from international student recruitment(15%).Notably,many of the factors affecting new enrollment decreases specifically related to COVID-19 have sharply declined over the past two years.From fall 2020 to fall 2022,the proportion of institutions reporting new enrollment declines due to visa application issues associated with COVID-19 fell from 92 percent to 43 percent,concerns about physical safety related to COVID-19 declined from 78 percent to 21 percent,and those citing U.S.travel restrictions fell from 78 percent to 17 percent.In addition,when collecting data on overall new enrollment patterns in the Fall 2022 Snapshot,U.S.institutions report on increases in new enrollments for the top places of origin.This provides insight into whether the number of students from these top places of origin will increase in the 2022/23 academic year.A higher proportion of colleges and universities indicate increases in international students from India,Japan,Bangladesh,Nigeria,and South Korea.Conversely,fewer institutions report increases in new enrollments from Saudi Arabia,China,and Taiwan.7 Figure 6:Proportion of Institutions Reporting Increases in New Enrollments by Place of Origin,Fall 2021 Fall 2022 A positive trend among the top places of origin is that U.S.institutions attract a diverse pool of students from around the world.As Open Doors indicates,international students in the United States came from 219 places of origin in the 2021/22 academic year(IIE,2022).Diversity of students and perspectives enrich U.S.campuses.The Fall 2022 Snapshot indicates we will continue to see steady flows of international students from Asia,Europe,Latin America,the Middle East,and Africa in the United States.Support to International Students on U.S.Campuses in Fall 2022Support to International Students on U.S.Campuses in Fall 2022 In fall 2022,most COVID-19 health and safety precautions remain in place,but at much lower rates than in previous years.For example,throughout the past two years,we have seen a change in the mask-wearing requirements on campus.In fall 2020,96 percent of institutions required face coverings for all on campus,followed by 87 percent in fall 2021(Baer&Martel,2020;Martel,2021).This fall,only 22 percent of institutions report requiring face coverings on campus.A similar pattern emerges regarding COVID-19 vaccinations.In fall 2021,72 percent of institutions made COVID-19 vaccines available to all students,faculty,and staff(Martel,2021).Less than half(46%)indicate that vaccinations are provided this fall.Finally,colleges and universities continue lifting restrictions on campus activities and travel.Only four percent of institutions report restricting activities and events on campus,while only three percent continue to restrict student and faculty travel.This is drastically different from two years ago,when 98 percent of institutions restricted on-campus events and 84 percent restricted travel(Baer&Martel,2020).These differences point to institutions priorities to return many activities on campus,focusing on health and safety.Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic,we have asked reporting institutions about the support they provide to international students.Ninety-seven percent of institutions report providing advising and academic support to international students,and 84 percent indicate providing mental health support.There is a continued focus on health,safety,and well-being as 83 percent of institutions report providing this support.As our Spring 2022 Snapshot indicated,U.S.colleges and universities are also aware that external factors in students home countries may impact students lives,and many institutions note providing support to students from areas of conflict,such as those from Ukraine or Russia(Martel&Baer,2022).8 Figure 7:International Student Support,Fall 2022 This years Fall 2022 Snapshot added a question specifically asking about resources related to mental health.Institutions report that they predominantly offer access to licensed mental health professionals(91%),a health insurance plan(84%),and leaves of absence for physical or mental health reasons as the support they provide to international students.Mental health continues to be one of the primary concerns of advisors at the college and university level as students grapple with the realities of the COVID-19 pandemic and other pressures and conflicts in their lives.For example,an institution noted that it provides a support group,specialized for international students,guided by a licensed counselor with intercultural training,that meets twice a month in a hybrid format.Institutions note that their approach is to provide a holistic set of services to their students,acknowledging that a diverse strategy is the best way to provide support sensitively.Looking toLooking to N Next ext Y Yearear s s R Recruitment ecruitment C Cycle ycle U.S.institutions looking ahead to future semesters remain engaged to attract international students from across the world to their campuses.This section outlines the various strategies that U.S.higher education institutions use to recruit international students to the United States.F Financial Commitment to International Student Outreach and Recruitmentinancial Commitment to International Student Outreach and Recruitment Figure 8:Financial Support for Outreach and Recruitment,Fall 2022 U.S.institutions continue to invest resources in international student outreach and recruitment.The vast majority of colleges and universities(87%)report that financial support for student recruitment efforts is the same or higher than in the previous year.This represents an increase over the past two years when approximately 77 percent reported either an increase or stable level of financial support in fall 2021 and 64 percent in fall 2020(Baer&Martel,2020;Martel 2021).This high level of engagement is noted 9 across all responding institutional types,from large research institutions(90%)to community colleges(82%).This sustained financial commitment helps many U.S.colleges and universities provide resources and support services for prospective international students,retain staff,and conduct outreach initiatives to attract international students.Institutions Prioritize Overseas Outreach to AsiaInstitutions Prioritize Overseas Outreach to Asia Reporting institutions continue to conduct outreach and recruitment to students worldwide,but many colleges and universities note focusing on specific recruitment markets each year.In fall 2022,institutions continue their focus on places of origin in Asia,including India(58%),Vietnam(43%),China(32%),and South Korea(29%).According to Open Doors data,international students from Asia comprised 69 percent of all international students in 2021/22,and many institutions continue to recruit a significant number of students from the region(IIE,2022).This is the second consecutive year that colleges and universities note India as the leading recruitment destination,which is likely contributing to the strong growth in the number of Indian students reported in Open Doors( 19%).Although places of origin in Asia continue to be the national recruitment area of focus,U.S.colleges and universities also reported prioritizing outreach to over 65 other locations worldwide.As institutions plan for recruitment in the fall of 2022,colleges and universities can visit embassy or consulate websites for up-to-date information on the operating status and services offered.Figure 9:Institutional Recruitment Priorities,Fall 2022 Institutions Institutions L Leverageverage e Multiple Sources Multiple Sources to to Recruit IRecruit International nternational S Studentstudents To better analyze the recruitment of international students both in the United States and globally,the Fall 2022 Snapshot also collects data about the resources that U.S.higher education institutions leverage to recruit international students.10 Figure 10:Resources Leveraged for International Recruitment,Fall 2022 Of institutions actively recruiting international students,64 percent report proactively working with current international students for recruitment efforts.Current international students can often provide personal,authentic testimonials about how international students can succeed on their campus and in the United States.Amid the height of the COVID-19 pandemic,many institutions nimbly expanded their online recruitment offerings and connected with students they may not have otherwise been able to reach(Baer&Martel,2020).Drawing upon these lessons learned,many colleges and universities have institutionalized these best practices,with 53 percent leveraging online recruitment events to reach prospective international students and 37 percent providing virtual campus visits.Institutions also cite U.S.government resources as popular recruitment resources,with half(50%)of colleges and universities leveraging EducationUSA.EducationUSA is a U.S.Department of State network that promotes U.S.higher education to students worldwide by offering accurate,comprehensive,and current information about opportunities to study at accredited postsecondary institutions in the United States(U.S.Department of State,2022).In addition,EducationUSA provides services to the U.S.higher education community to help institutional leaders meet recruitment and campus internationalization goals by offering resources such as the Global Guide,student mobility fact sheets,recruitment fairs,and a network of more than 400 international student advising centers in more than 175 countries and territories.The U.S.Commercial Service at the U.S.Department of Commerce has education and training services industry specialists who provide resources on the global competitiveness of the U.S.education industry,expanding market access,and recommendations on digital strategies for outreach to different markets(International Trade Administration,2022a).They also convene the Study State Consortia,which bring institutions within a state together to promote that state as a study destination for international students(International Trade Administration,2022b).In line with this,the U.S.Commercial Service launched the USA:A Study Destination initiative to boost U.S.education exports by promoting the United States as a premier destination for international students.The initiative supports the state consortia and provides them with additional resources to recruit international students in line with their economic strategies.With over 80 percent of college-age students using social media,many colleges and universities continue to engage international students through social media(50%)(Pew Research Center,2021).U.S.colleges and universities run their own social media campaigns that showcase campus life,provide virtual tours,and give 11 insights into the achievements of students,faculty,and alumni.As institutions work to leverage social media effectively and authentically across platforms and languages,recent industry conferences,such as the NAFSA Conference and the EducationUSA Forum,have dedicated sessions to help international education professionals better utilize these platforms.In addition,the#YouAreWelcomeHere campaign,advanced nationally by Temple University,has continued to grow,with more than 400 higher education institutions and organizations using this hashtag to promote that all international students are welcome to study in the United States(#YouAreWelcomeHere,2022).Building upon the success of the social media campaign,more than 50 colleges and universities have committed to providing scholarships to international students through the#YouAreWelcomeHere national scholarship program.While an online presence is increasingly important,many students and parents may still value one-on-one,in-person connections.Nearly half of the reporting institutions cite using agents(49%),and an increasing number of higher education institutions are attending in-person recruitment events(46%)as travel restrictions ease.ConclusionConclusion The findings from the Fall 2022 Snapshot reflect the resilience of the U.S.higher education system and provide an understanding of the current state of U.S.higher education institutions commitment to international student mobility.With increases noted across all academic levels,the findings point to a continued rebound of international student totals in the 2022/23 academic year,with the full picture of the 2022/23 academic year available in November 2023 with the release of Open Doors 2023.Many institutions recognize the benefits of having international students in their diverse student body,with international students contributing approximately$32 billion to the U.S.economy as of 2021(U.S.Department of Commerce,2022).U.S.institutions also value the diverse perspectives and cultures international students bring to the classroom,enriching academic discussions and enhancing all students understanding of the world.The findings of the Fall 2022 Snapshot indicate several areas of focus as U.S.colleges and universities look to future academic semesters and their international student trends.Rebounds are evident across all academic levels.The findings of the Fall 2022 Snapshot confirm that across the board,international students are pursuing study in the United States at higher levels than in the previous academic year.This is the first time all academic levels have grown since 2014/15,which points to rebounds following the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.This is encouraging and provides evidence regarding the desire of international students to pursue study at U.S.institutions across different academic levels.This rebound further indicates that international students are pursuing study at a wide array of institutional types that offer excellent educational opportunities across all academic levels,from baccalaureate and associates colleges to masters colleges and universities and doctoral institutions.International student trends indicate diversity among leading places of origin.International student numbers are rebounding not only across all academic levels,but also among students from diverse leading places of origin.The findings of the Fall 2022 Snapshot indicate a large proportion of institutions reporting increases in new enrollments from Japan,India,Nigeria,and Vietnam.It is 12 encouraging to see continued strong potential growth among students from India,which will likely continue to affect the leading places of origin of international students in the coming year.Institutions remain committed to internationalization.Our findings confirm that U.S.institutions are committed to internationalization and that almost 90 percent of institutions have committed financial resources to keep international efforts a priority.Despite the COVID-19 pandemic,our findings indicate a continued commitment to international student mobility.It is notable that institutions that experienced a decline in enrollments primarily focused on issues related to visa issues,cost,and COVID-19.However,very few institutions reported that these decreases were due to a lower focus on internationalization on their campus.This speaks to the fields continued commitment to welcoming international students.As we look ahead to the coming academic year,we note that the trends will continue to evolve regarding international student numbers.We continue to see travel restrictions lifting and programs that had been paused restarting.The fall 2022 semester provides a critical perspective on the latest updates and will help researchers and practitioners map this important time and its effects on the international education field.13 References References Baer,J.,&Martel,M.(2020).Fall 2020 international student enrollment snapshot.Institute of International Education.https:/www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Publications/Fall-2020-International-Student-Enrollment-Snapshot.Institute of International Education(IIE).(2022).Open Doors report on international educational exchange.http:/www.iie.org/opendoors.International Trade Administration,U.S.Department of Commerce.(2022a).Education industry.https:/www.trade.gov/education-industry.International Trade Administration,U.S.Department of Commerce.(2022b).USA study.https:/www.trade.gov/education-state-consortia.Martel,M.(2021).Fall 2021 international student enrollment snapshot.Institute of International Education.https:/www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Insights/Publications/Fall-2021-International-Student-Enrollment-Snapshot.Martel,M.,&Baer,J.(2022).Spring 2022 snapshot on international educational exchange.Institute of International Education.Martel,M.,Baer,J.,Andrejko,N.,&Mason,L.(2020).Open Doors 2020 report on international educational exchange.Institute of International Education.Martel,M.,Mason,L.,Baer,J.,Andrejko,N.,&Nemeth,N.(2021).Open Doors 2021 report on international educational exchange.Institute of International Education.Pew Research Center.(2021).Social media fact sheet.https:/www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.Sanger,J.,&Baer,J.(2019).Fall 2019 international student enrollment snapshot.Institute of International Education.https:/www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Publications/Fall-2019-International-Student-Enrollment-Survey.U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis.(2022).Table 2.2 U.S.trade in services,by type of service and by country or affiliation.U.S.Department of Commerce.U.S.Department of State.(2022).EducationUSA.https:/educationusa.state.gov/.#YouAreWelcomeHere.(2022).Social media campaign.https:/www.youarewelcomehereusa.org/social-media.

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“State of Tobacco Control”2022:20 Years of“State of Tobacco Control”Celebrating the Progress Made and Recognizing the Work that Remains to be Done Executive SummaryThe American Lung Associations annual“State of Tobacco Control”report evaluates states and the federal government on actions taken to eliminate the nations leading cause of preventable deathtobacco useand save lives with proven-effective and urgently needed tobacco control laws and policies.The Lung Association proudly marks the 20th anniversary of releasing its“State of Tobacco Control”report in 2022 by reflecting on the progress made over the past 20 years and looking ahead to the significant amount of work that remains to be done to end tobacco-caused death and disease in this country.A new generation of tobacco products,including e-cigarettes,threatens the progress made,as more than two million middle and high school students reported using e-cigarettes in 2021.1 In response to the youth vaping epidemic,new public policies,including ending the sale of all flavored tobacco products,have risen in importance as well.Key themes in“State of Tobacco Control”this year include:FDA Opportunities in 2021 to Reduce Tobacco Use:The U.S.Food and Drug Administration(FDA)took several actions in 2021 that could signal a beginning to meaningful action in its oversight of tobacco products.On April 29,2021,FDA made an important announcement indicating its intention to issue proposed rules no later than April 2022 to remove menthol cigarettes and most flavored cigars from the marketplace.If FDA follows through on its commitment,it will be an historic achievement for public health in the U.S.given the disproportionate impact menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars have on many different communities and populations,especially Black Americans.FDA had an opportunity to remove e-cigarettes and other tobacco products from the market that did not meet its public health standard through its pre-market tobacco authorization(PMTA)authority under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.FDA was under a court-ordered deadline of September 9,2021,to review millions of PMTAs submitted by e-cigarettes and other tobacco product companies in 2020.Unfortunately,as of the end of 2021,FDA had not acted on the products most responsible for the youth e-cigarette epidemic such as JUUL,leaving them on the market.Health Disparities Related to Tobacco Use:An unfortunate constant over the past 20 years is the unequal burden of tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke on some communities and populations.The overall adult smoking rate has declined significantly from 21.6%in 2003 to 14.0%in 2019,a 35cline.2 However,this overall rate masks significant disparities among races/ethnicities and due to socio-economic factors.Smoking remains particularly high among Native Americans and Alaskan Natives at 20.9%and Lesbian,Gay and Bisexual adults at 19.2%.3 Smoking among persons with lower incomes and lower levels of education also 2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20222 Lung.orgremains high.4 Certain populations are also disproportionately exposed to secondhand smoke,including:children ages 3-11,Black Americans,persons living in poverty and people with a high school education or less.5 Parts of the country,especially many Southern and Appalachian states remain unprotected from secondhand smoke in public places and workplaces as well.State Progress to Reduce Tobacco Use:The country has made substantial progress on several of the state public policies measured in“State of Tobacco Control”over the past 20 years.These include:Progressing from 2 to 28 smokefree states;Increasing the average state cigarette tax from$0.62 in January 2003 to$1.91 in January 2022;and Improving state Medicaid program coverage of quit smoking treatments since“State of Tobacco Control”first began tracking these data in 2008.In 2021,the tobacco industry brought back to the forefront an old roadblock it has used for more than 30 years:preemption,or lobbying state legislatures to pass laws that prevent local communities from passing tobacco control policies stronger than state law.This severely hampers the ability of local communities to prevent and reduce tobacco use.Unfortunately,the tobacco industry was successful in instituting new preemptive state laws on sales of tobacco products in Florida and Montana in 2021.The COVID-19 pandemics impact on tobacco use is still being assessed.According to a Federal Trade Commission report in 2020,cigarette sales increased for the first time in 20 years.6 It is unclear if this signals higher adult smoking rates,or existing smokers smoking more cigarettes.In addition,the rate of youth vaping in the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions 2021 National Youth Tobacco Survey varied significantly if a student took the survey at home or in a school building.7 Therefore,it is unclear if the level of youth vaping seen in 2021 will be a one-year blip or a durable trend.During 2020,many casinos both tribal and non-tribal re-opened smokefree after being closed initially during the COVID-19 pandemic.Unfortunately,2021 saw some backsliding in this area with smoking returning to casinos in New Jersey and Pennsylvania after emergency orders issued by governors preventing them from allowing smoking expired.Activity on tobacco tax increases ended up being much slower than expected in 2021 as well,due to many state budgets being more robust than expected.In 2022,the country needs to redouble its efforts to pass the proven policies called for in“State of Tobacco Control.”This will require an ongoing partnership at the federal,state and local levels to restart declines in adult and youth tobacco use rates and reduce the 480,000 lives lost to tobacco each year.Our elected officials must take stronger actions to put the country on a path to finally end tobacco use over the next 20 years.More About“State of Tobacco Control”“State of Tobacco Control”2022 is focused on proven policies that federal and state governments can enact to prevent and reduce tobacco use.These include:Tobacco prevention and quit smoking funding,programs and robust insurance coverage;Comprehensive smokefree laws that eliminate smoking in all public places and workplaces;Increased tobacco taxes;Eliminating the sale of all flavored tobacco products;Full implementation of the U.S.Food and Drug Administrations(FDA)Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act;andHard hitting federal media campaigns to encourage smokers to quit and prevent young people from starting to use tobacco.The report assigns grades based on laws and regulations designed to prevent and reduce tobacco use in effect as of January 2022.The federal government,all 50 state governments and the District of Columbia are graded to determine if their laws and policies are adequately protecting citizens from the enormous toll tobacco use takes on lives,health and the economy.1.Park-Lee E,Ren C,Sawdey MD,et al.Notes from the Field:E-Cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students National Youth Tobacco Survey,United States,2021.MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021;70:13871389.DOI:http:/dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7039a4.2.CDC.National Health Interview Survey.Various years.3.Cornelius ME,Wang TW,Jamal A,Loretan CG,Neff LJ.Tobacco Product Use Among Adults United States,2019.MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020;69:17361742.4.Ibid.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20223 Lung.org5.Tsai J,Homa DM,Neff LJ,Sosnoff CS,Wang L,Blount BC,Melstrom PC,King BA.Trends in Secondhand Smoke Exposure,2011-2018:Impact and Implications of Expanding Serum Cotinine Range.Am J Prev Med.2021 Sep;61(3):e109-e117.doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2021.04.004.6.Federal Trade Commission.“Cigarette Report for 2020.”Released October 2021.7.Park-Lee E,Ren C,Sawdey MD,et al.Notes from the Field:E-Cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students National Youth Tobacco Survey,United States,2021.MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021;70:13871389.DOI:http:/dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7039a4.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20224 Lung.org20th Anniversary of“State of Tobacco Control”Shows Policymakers at All Levels of Government Havent Fully Embraced Importance of Preventing and Reducing Tobacco UseSince the American Lung Association first launched its“State of Tobacco Control”report in January 2003,the country has,overall,made tremendous progress in its efforts to prevent and reduce tobacco use.Adult cigarette smoking rates have declined from 21.6%in 2003 to 14%in 2019.1 Youth cigarette smoking rates have fallen even faster among high school students from 22.5%in 2002 to 4.6%in 2020.2 At the state level,the country has seen significant progress on several tobacco control policies,including:1)smokefree workplace laws,2)tobacco taxes and 3)Medicaid coverage of tobacco cessation treatments.At the federal level:1)the U.S.Food and Drug Administration(FDA)gained comprehensive authority over the manufacture,marketing and sales of tobacco products;2)flavored cigarettes,with the glaring exception of menthol,were prohibited;and 3)the federal age of sale for tobacco products was increased to 21 nationwide.However,in other ways,federal,state and local policy makers have yet to take the steps necessary to eliminate tobacco use or protect another generation of youth from becoming addicted.Significant social,racial,geographic and sexual orientation disparities in who uses tobacco products and who is exposed to secondhand smoke in the U.S.have only become more pronounced as overall tobacco use rates have decreased.While there have been some promising announcements and actions taken by FDA in 2021,unnecessary addiction,disease and death could have been prevented by more assertive federal government action on flavored tobacco products.State progress on comprehensive smokefree workplace laws appears successful over the course of 20 years but has completely stalled since 2012.Tobacco tax increases have slowed in terms of frequency over the past few years,and only one state,Maryland,increased its tobacco taxes in 2021.The country continues to endure the most significant public health crisis of the last 100 years,COVID-19,and yet it has failed to convince officials that they must sufficiently invest in public health infrastructure and prioritize policies that will protect people during a public health epidemic.The Lung Associations“State of Tobacco Control”2022 report continues to offer a road map with solutions for many of these challenges,but the country needs federal,state and local lawmakers to implement them to further drive down smoking and tobacco use rates.FDA Crawls Forward Towards More Comprehensive Regulation of Tobacco Products;Leaves Products Most Responsible for the Youth E-Cigarette Epidemic on the MarketFacing a court-ordered deadline,in 2021,FDA finally began to implement and enforce pre-market tobacco authorization(PMTA)requirements for e-cigarettes,hookah,pipe tobacco,most cigars and other tobacco products after many years of delay.This progress was due to a court decision in a lawsuit filed by the Lung Association and several public health partners ordering tobacco product manufacturers to submit PMTA applications to FDA by September 9,2020,and for FDA to review and make decisions on those applications by September 9,2021.Tobacco remains the leading cause of preventable death and disease in America,killing 480,000 people each year.In addition,16 million Americans live with a tobacco-related disease.32022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20225 Lung.orgFDA did issue marketing denial orders for many non-menthol flavored e-cigarettes in 2021.However,when it came to the e-cigarette products with the highest market share and that are the most responsible for the youth vaping epidemic such as JUUL and Vuse,FDA delayed decision on their PMTAs for a significant period of time after the courts deadline.FDA also issued marketing orders for several high nicotine Vuse tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes and took no action on any PMTA related to menthol e-cigarettes.The Lung Association has repeatedly called for all flavored tobacco products,including e-cigarettes,to be removed from the marketplace.Flavors are a key driver of youth tobacco use,and no evidence has been presented that flavored products can meet the public health standard that the law requires.A new,potentially large loophole emerged in 2021 in the form of synthetic nicotine,as the FDAs Center for Tobacco Products asserts its authority only covers nicotine derived from tobacco.E-cigarette companies,including PuffBar,the most used e-cigarette product among teens,appear to be exploiting this legal loophole.Synthetic nicotine flavored e-cigarettes are being used to attempt to evade the Tobacco Control Act.The Lung Association has called for FDA to regulate synthetic nicotine as a drug;if it is to be regulated as a tobacco product,it will require action by Congress.In Response to Significant Disparities in Tobacco Use in U.S.,FDA Makes an Important Announcement on MentholOverall,adult cigarette smoking,and tobacco use rates remained level from the previous year in 2019,the latest year of data.As has been the case since“State of Tobacco Control”was first published 20 years ago though,the overall rates mask significant disparities among racial,ethnic,socio-economic and LGBTQ communities.Use of commercial tobacco products remains particularly high among Native Americans and Alaskan Natives at 20.9%and lesbian,gay and bisexual adults at 19.2%.4 Adults with lower incomes,lower levels of education and experiencing mental illness or substance abuse also endure significantly higher rates of smoking.While regular,national data is lacking on this topic,studies have shown that smoking and tobacco use can vary significantly amongst sub-populations of Hispanic and Asian Americans as well.In addition,the declines in cigarette smoking rates observed in recent years has been due almost entirely to non-menthol cigarettes.Menthol cigarettes are used by close to 81%of Black Americans5 and disproportionately by pregnant women,youth and LGBTQ Americans.6 In fact,a study released in 2021 found that menthol cigarettes were responsible for 1.5 million new smokers,157,000 smoking-related premature deaths and 1.5 million life years lost among African Americans from 19802018.7 These disparities in menthol cigarette use are largely the result of targeted marketing by the tobacco industry.This makes an April 2021 announcement by FDA of its intention to issue proposed rules removing menthol cigarettes and many flavored cigars from the marketplace an important development.However,FDA has said it will take until April 2022 just to propose rules.Then it may take several years to finalize the rule and defend against the inevitable industry lawsuits.This is on top of years of delay from when FDAs Tobacco Product Scientific Advisory Committee in 2011 and FDA itself in 2013 issued separate reports saying it would be beneficial to public health to remove menthol cigarettes from the market.The American Lung Association applauded this long overdue 2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20226 Lung.organnouncement and urges FDA to act with urgency on this issue in light of the years of delay and the disproportionate burden menthol cigarettes place on many communities experiencing health disparities.20 Years of Uneven Change in State Tobacco Prevention PoliciesThe past 20 years in state tobacco prevention policies can best be summarized as uneven progress with significant differences by policy,decade and geographic region.The country saw significant progress on smokefree workplace laws and tobacco taxes during the 2000s,only to see that progress stall completely during the 2010s.Certain parts of the country continue to lag significantly behind in putting in place the proven policies called for in“State of Tobacco Control,”including states in the South,Appalachia as well as parts of the Midwest and Great Plains.States where tobacco is or was previously grown and have significant tobacco industry presences,such as North Carolina and Virginia,remain particularly challenging.Increasing State Tobacco Taxes:Increasing tobacco taxes by$1.00 per pack or more is one of the most effective ways to reduce tobacco use,especially among kids.Many states have significantly increased their taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products over the past 20 years.However,this has created a wide disparity in cigarette tax rates,with the lowest state cigarette tax in Missouri at a meager 17 cents per pack and the District of Columbia the highest at$4.50 per pack.Maryland was the only state to increase its cigarette tax in 2021,to$3.75 per pack,5th highest in the country.Smokefree Public Places and Workplaces:From 2003 to 2012,there was a significant expansion of the number of states with laws prohibiting smoking in public places and workplaces,however no additional states have passed such laws since then.Some states with comprehensive smokefree laws have closed additional loopholes in their laws,including Connecticut in 2021.Ohio also added e-cigarettes to its comprehensive smokefree law in 2021.During 2020,more than 200 tribal and non-tribal casinos re-opened smokefree8 after being closed due to COVID-19.During 2021,many tribal casinos kept their smokefree policies in place but there was some backsliding among state-regulated casinos when state COVID-19 emergency orders expired.In addition,the Navajo Nation approved legislation in 2021 after a 12 plus year effort that made all public places and workplaces,including tribal casinos smokefree.Expanding Medicaid and Tobacco Cessation Coverage.Since 2009,the“State of Tobacco Control”report began reporting on states tobacco cessation coverage.Over the past 13 years,state Medicaid programs have increased the number treatments they covered,and because of provisions in the Affordable Care Act(ACA)have increased the number of people eligible for Medicaid coverage.The 2009 report showed only 20 states covering all 7 FDA-approved cessation medications.This years report shows that 43 states now provide that coverage.The report has tracked the progress states have made in providing these treatments not only to Medicaid enrollees,but also to State Employees through their health plans.The report also recognizes the importance of adequately funding state quitlines in helping smokers quit.While the last 13 years of“State of Tobacco Control”reports have shown progress in policies to access quit smoking services,there is still more work to be done.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20227 Lung.orgFunding for State Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Programs.This issue has seen the least progress among the four areas that states have been graded on longest in the“State of Tobacco Control”report.The majority of states have kept their levels of funding steady from year to year,but most states remain far short of the funding levels recommended by CDC.Properly funding state tobacco control programs can bring crucial focus and resources to alleviate disparities in who uses tobacco products and help achieve health equity in tobacco control.People from disproportionately affected communities should be empowered to lead the effort to address these disparities,including providing funding to organizations that directly serve the communities.In the current state fiscal year,fiscal year 2022,two statesAlaska and Oregon funded their state tobacco control programs at or close to the level recommended by CDC.New Tobacco Products and New Public Policies Rise to the ForefrontOver the 20 years of“State of Tobacco Control,”both new tobacco products and new public policies to prevent and reduce tobacco use have emerged.The most prominent and concerning of the new tobacco products to come onto the market have been e-cigarettes,which have been sold in the U.S.since 2007.The American Lung Association has been consistently warning of the potential dangers of these products since their debut.Our fears were unfortunately validated when youth use of e-cigarettes rose substantially from 2011 to 2015 and then to an even greater degree from 2017 to 2019.This caused the U.S.Surgeon General to declare youth vaping an epidemic in 2018.In 2021,youth vaping rates were 11.3%among high school students and 2.8%among middle school students.9 However,with some schools closed for in-person learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic,some kids had less access to e-cigarettes.Youth vaping rates in 2021 varied substantially based on whether a student took the survey at school(15.0%)or home/some other place(8.1%).10 Other new tobacco and nicotine products introduced to the U.S.market in the past few years include heated tobacco products such as Philip Morris Internationals IQOS product,and nicotine pouches,such as Velo.Youth use of these new products will need to be monitored closely and FDA must be prepared to remove these products from the marketplace.One thing is clear:kids overwhelmingly prefer flavored tobacco products.11 In the 2021 National Youth Tobacco Survey,85.8%of high school students and 79.2%of middle school students who used e-cigarettes,used flavored products.This has led to a new public policy rising in importance,prohibiting the sale of all flavored tobacco products,including menthol cigarettes,flavored cigars and flavored e-cigarettes.Starting with the“State of Tobacco Control”2021 report,states are now graded on whether they prohibit the sale of all flavored tobacco products,and the FDA removing flavored tobacco products from the marketplace has been incorporated into the federal governments grades for close to 10 years.With removal of menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars by FDA several years in the future at a minimum,it is imperative that states and localities act to end the sale of all flavored tobacco products.In 2021,the District of Columbia approved a law that would prohibit the sale of all flavored tobacco products in virtually all locations.However,funding will need to be provided in the citys budget in 2022 for the law to take effect.Implementation of Californias flavored tobacco product law was also delayed until 2022 at the earliest due to a successful ballot referendum on the measure filed by the tobacco industry.Medicaid Expansion and Tobacco CessationThe Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid coverage to individuals at 138%of the federal poverty level($30,305 per year for a family of three)or lower.In 2022,38 states and the District of Columbia have all expanded their Medicaid programs.Individuals with incomes less than$35,000 a year smoke at rate of 21.4%,higher than the general population(14%).It is not surprising that increasing access to healthcare coverage,including a comprehensive cessation benefit,results in more people making quit attempts.Research shows Medicaid quit attempts in expansion states increased by over 20%.“To help address the continuing youth e-cigarette epidemic and achieve its mission focal point of reducing youth vaping to 15%by 2025,the American Lung Association launched its End Youth Vaping initiative on September 1,2020.It is an integrated,multi-component campaign to support parents,schools and students.Major components of the campaign include our Vape-Free Schools Initiative,which helps schools navigate this public health emergency with tools to protect and support both schools and students and the“Get Your Head Out of the Cloud”youth vaping awareness campaign from the American Lung Association and the Ad Council to provide parents with a discussion guide to address the dangers of vaping with their kids,while theyre still willing to listen.”2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20228 Lung.orgOther new public policies have become more prominent at the state level in recent years,including:Increasing the Tobacco Sales Age to 21 Starting in 2015 with the state of Hawaii,close to 20 states,and then the federal government in December 2019,increased the age of sale for tobacco products,including e-cigarettes,to 21.A 2015 report from the National Academy of Medicine found that increasing the minimum sales age to 21 nationwide could prevent 223,000 deaths among people born between 2000 and 2019,including 50,000 fewer dying from lung cancer,the nations leading cancer killer.12 A handful of states continued to pass legislation in 2021,aligning their state minimum ages with the increased federal minimum age.Reducing the Availability and Accessibility of Tobacco Products.One question that urgently needs to be answered is why there are so many tobacco retailers in the United States.A study of tobacco product retailers in 30 cities,found that there are 31 times more retailers than McDonalds and 16 times more retailers than Starbucks.In addition,in most cities,tobacco product retailers were concentrated in the lowest-income neighborhoods.13 States and communities should enact legislation to reduce the number of tobacco product retailers and prohibit them from being clustered together or near youth-focused locations like schools and childcare facilities.Along these lines,at the state level,two statesMassachusetts and New Yorkhave prohibited tobacco sales in pharmacies,and Utah has prohibited new retail tobacco specialty businesses from locating in certain areas.An Old Threat to State Policies Re-Emerges in 2021In 2021,legislation was introduced in many states that would prevent local governments from passing stronger tobacco control laws,which is referred to as preemption.These types of laws are a favorite tactic of the tobacco industry and its allies as it denies local governments the ability to pass meaningful public policies to prevent and reduce tobacco use,including addressing the youth vaping epidemic.Unfortunately,legislation was approved in two statesFlorida and Montanathat prevents communities from passing almost anything stronger than state law to regulate tobacco product sales.The Lung Association expects the tobacco industry to continue its full court press on this issue in 2022.On its 20th anniversary,“State of Tobacco Control”2022 continues to provide a blueprint that states,and the federal government can follow to put in place proven policies that will have the greatest impact on reducing tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke in the U.S.The real question is:Will federal and state lawmakers put us on a path to end the death and disease caused by the tobacco use over the next 20 years?1.CDC.National Health Interview Survey for 2003 and 2019.2.CDC.National Youth Tobacco Survey for 2002 and 2020.3.U.S.Department of Health and Human Services.The Health Consequences of Smoking:50 Years of Progress.A Report of the Surgeon General.Atlanta,GA,2014.4.Cornelius ME,Wang TW,Jamal A,Loretan CG,Neff LJ.Tobacco Product Use Among Adults United States,2019.MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020;69:17361742.5.Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.National Survey on Drug Use and Health,2020.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”20229 Lung.orgAnalysis by the American Lung Association Epidemiology and Statistics Unit.6.Delnevo CD,Ganz O,Goodwin RD,Banning Menthol Cigarettes:A Social Justice Issue Long Overdue.Nicotine Tob Res,2020 Oct 8;22(10):1673-1675.https:/doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntaa1527.Mendez D,Le TTT.Consequences of a match made in hell:the harm caused by menthol smoking to the African American population over 19802018.Tob Control 2021;0:13.doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2021-056748.8.Americans for Nonsmokers Rights Foundation.“Reopening Casinos Smokefree:The New Normal.”Accessed 11/22/2020.9.Park-Lee E,Ren C,Sawdey MD,et al.Notes from the Field:E-Cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students National Youth Tobacco Survey,United States,2021.MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021;70:13871389.DOI:http:/dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7039a4.10.Ibid11.Ibid12.Institute of Medicine,Public Health Implications of Raising the Minimum Age of Legal Access to Tobacco Products,Washington,DC:The National Academies Press,2015,http:/www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2015/TobaccoMinimumAgeReport.aspx.13.ASPire Center.“Tobacco Retailers.”Available at:Tobacco Retailers-ASPiRE Center.Accessed 11/11/2021.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202210 Lung.orgTobacco Prevention and Cessation Funding Overview CDC-Percentage State Tobacco Tobacco Other Total Federal Recommended of CDC-Tobacco Settlement Tax State State Funding Total Spending Recommended Related State Name Funding Funding Funding Funding to States Funding Level Level Revenue GradeAlabama$939,631$0$798,339$1,737,970$1,682,740$3,420,710$55,900,000 6.1%$290,900,000 FAlaska$0$0$9,140,000$9,140,000$1,284,919$10,424,919$10,200,000 102.2%$81,100,000 AArizona$0$17,500,000$0$17,500,000$1,708,792$19,208,792$64,400,000 29.8%$422,900,000 FArkansas$12,040,814$0$0$12,040,814$1,522,930$13,563,744$36,700,000 37.0%$284,000,000 FCalifornia$208,013,081$39,637,000$3,600,000$251,250,081$3,571,588$254,821,669$347,900,000 73.2%$2,838,500,000 BColorado$0$22,711,711$360,000$23,071,711$1,692,350$24,764,061$52,900,000 46.8%$370,100,000 FConnecticut$0$0$0$0$1,177,808$1,177,808$32,000,000 3.7%$471,300,000 FDelaware$7,103,800$0$0$7,103,800$991,511$8,095,311$13,000,000 62.3%$139,900,000 CDistrict of$1,000,000$0$900,000$1,900,000$1,031,660$2,931,660$10,700,000 27.4%$63,100,000 F Columbia Florida$73,988,595$0$354,466$74,343,061$2,883,131$77,226,192$194,200,000 39.8%$1,486,900,000 FGeorgia$750,000$0$0$750,000$2,127,823$2,877,823$106,000,000 2.7%$405,600,000 FHawaii$6,582,277$0$836,542$7,418,819$1,156,607$8,575,426$13,700,000 62.6%$148,900,000 CIdaho$3,485,800$159,000$0$3,644,800$1,171,888$4,816,688$15,600,000 30.9%$75,300,000 FIllinois$10,100,000$0$0$10,100,000$2,241,976$12,341,976$136,700,000 9.0%$1,218,300,000 FIndiana$7,500,000$0$0$7,500,000$1,832,809$9,332,809$73,500,000 12.7%$542,600,000 FIowa$0$0$4,020,894$4,020,894$1,137,971$5,158,865$30,100,000 17.1%$265,200,000 FKansas$1,001,960$0$0$1,001,960$1,516,090$2,518,050$27,900,000 9.0%$181,400,000 FKentucky$2,000,000$0$0$2,000,000$1,656,354$3,656,354$56,400,000 6.5%$495,100,000 FLouisiana$500,000$3,838,246$1,198,000$5,536,246$1,635,696$7,171,942$59,600,000 12.0%$442,400,000 FMaine$4,286,575$4,100,000$0$8,386,575$1,169,002$9,555,577$15,900,000 60.1%$187,900,000 CMaryland$10,853,869$11,302$0$10,865,171$1,694,510$12,559,681$48,000,000 26.2%$565,400,000 FMassachusetts$0$0$5,618,793$5,618,793$1,902,654$7,521,447$66,900,000 11.2%$686,700,000 FMichigan$0$0$1,830,900$1,830,900$2,347,639$4,178,539$110,600,000 3.8%$1,159,400,000 FMinnesota$0$0$12,891,875$12,891,875$1,596,128$14,488,003$52,900,000 27.4%$723,400,000 FMississippi$7,420,000$0$1,275,000$8,695,000$1,341,100$10,036,100$36,500,000 27.5%$250,600,000 FMissouri$0$0$477,435$477,435$1,949,182$2,426,617$72,900,000 3.3%$257,200,000 FMontana$0$0$0$0$1,408,205$1,408,205$14,600,000 9.6%$105,800,000 FNebraska$0$0$2,570,000$2,570,000$1,187,754$3,757,754$20,800,000 18.1%$99,800,000 FNevada$0$0$3,554,015$3,554,015$1,384,475$4,938,490$30,000,000 16.5%$225,200,000 FNew Hampshire$0$0$589,166$589,166$1,144,210$1,733,376$16,500,000 10.5%$285,900,000 FNew Jersey$0$0$7,445,467$7,445,467$1,855,458$9,300,925$103,300,000 9.0%$838,200,000 FNew Mexico$0$0$3,898,300$3,898,300$1,142,861$5,041,161$22,800,000 22.1%$137,600,000 FNew York$39,769,600$0$0$39,769,600$2,905,769$42,675,369$203,000,000 21.0%$1,887,000,000 FNorth Carolina$11,000,000$0$2,399,600$13,399,600$2,353,231$15,752,831$99,300,000 15.9%$458,100,000 FNorth Dakota$0$0$5,684,000$5,684,000$1,055,244$6,739,244$9,800,000 68.8%$51,600,000 COhio$0$0$14,780,000$14,780,000$2,464,914$17,244,914$132,000,000 13.1%$1,267,300,000 FOklahoma$22,703,765$1,172,541$0$23,876,306$1,618,668$25,494,974$42,300,000 60.3%$526,700,000 COregon$0$36,900,000$0$36,900,000$1,556,750$38,456,750$39,300,000 97.9%$468,600,000 APennsylvania$16,001,000$0$0$16,001,000$2,399,303$18,400,303$140,000,000 13.1%$1,663,100,000 FRhode Island$0$0$396,732$396,732$1,383,858$1,780,590$12,800,000 13.9%$205,700,000 FSouth Carolina$0$5,000,000$0$5,000,000$1,720,878$6,720,878$51,000,000 13.2%$229,900,000 FSouth Dakota$0$0$4,500,000$4,500,000$1,046,792$5,546,792$11,700,000 47.4%$83,000,000 FTennessee$0$0$2,000,000$2,000,000$1,664,198$3,664,198$75,600,000 4.8%$411,600,000 FTexas$0$0$3,682,166$3,682,166$3,349,957$7,032,123$264,100,000 2.7%$1,870,900,000 FUtah$3,292,900$3,150,000$7,674,240$14,117,140$1,256,406$15,373,546$19,300,000 79.7%$133,600,000 AVermont$0$0$2,500,000$2,500,000$1,101,504$3,601,504$8,400,000 42.9%$103,400,000 FVirginia$13,181,451$0$0$13,181,451$1,847,658$15,029,109$91,600,000 16.4%$395,100,000 FWashington$0$0$1,555,942$1,555,942$1,828,532$3,384,474$63,600,000 5.3%$513,400,000 FWest Virginia$0$0$445,000$445,000$1,229,006$1,674,006$27,400,000 6.1%$232,600,000 FWisconsin$0$0$5,315,000$5,315,000$1,588,681$6,903,681$57,500,000 12.0%$747,400,000 FWyoming$4,408,951$0$214,884$4,623,835$1,021,016$5,644,851$8,500,000 66.4%$39,100,000 C*Information in this chart covers state fiscal year 2022,which is July 1,2021 to June 30,2022 for all states except Alabama,Michigan,New York and Texas as well as the District of Columbia.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202211 Lung.orgSmokefree Air Grading Chart Casinos/Recreational/Government Private Childcare Gaming Retail Cultural E-Cigarettes Total State Worksites Worksites Schools Facilities Restaurants Bars Establishments stores Facilities Included Penalties Enforcement Score GradeAlabama 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 2-2 4 2 14 FAlaska 5 5 4 4 4 4 N/A 4 4 0 4 4 42 BArizona 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4-2 4 4 43 AArkansas 4 3 4 4 3 1 1 4 4-2 4 3 33 CCalifornia 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 2 43 AColorado 5 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4-1 4 2 39 BConnecticut 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 0 3 3 44 BDelaware 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 0 4 4 45 ADistrict of Columbia 4 4 5 4 4 2 N/A 4 4 0 3 4 38 AFlorida 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 0 3 4 40 BGeorgia 4 3 4 4 3 1 N/A 3 4-2 1 2 27 DHawaii 5 5 4 4 4 5 N/A 4 4 0 4 3 42 AIdaho 4 3 4 4 4 0 4 4 4-2 3 2 34 CIllinois 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4-2 4 4 45 AIndiana 4 4 4 4 3 1 0 4 4-2 4 3 33 CIowa 4 4 5 4 4 4 1 4 4-2 4 4 40 AKansas 5 5 4 4 4 4 1 4 4-2 3 4 40 AKentucky 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 FLouisiana 4 4 4 4 4 0 1 4 4-2 3 4 34 CMaine 5 5 5 4 5 4 3 4 4-1 4 4 46 AMaryland 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4-2 2 4 41 AMassachusetts 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 0 4 3 42 AMichigan 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4-2 4 4 39 CMinnesota 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 0 3 4 42 AMississippi 3 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0-2 1 2 12 FMissouri 2 1 3 4 1 0 0 1 1-2 3 1 15 FMontana 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4-2 3 4 42 ANebraska 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 0 4 3 42 ANevada 4 4 5 4 4 1 1 4 4 0 2 2 35 CNew Hampshire 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 0 4 4 32 DNew Jersey 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 4 4 0 3 4 40 ANew Mexico 5 4 4 4 4 3 0 4 4 0 3 4 39 BNew York 4 4 5 4 4 2 4 4 4 0 4 4 43 ANorth Carolina 2 0 4 3 4 3 N/A 0 0-2 2 4 20 FNorth Dakota 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 0 3 3 45 AOhio 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 0 3 4 44 AOklahoma 3 3 5 4 3 0 3 4 4-2 3 3 33 DOregon 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 0 4 4 45 APennsylvania 4 4 4 4 3 0 2 4 4-2 3 4 34 DRhode Island 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 0 3 4 40 ASouth Carolina 1 0 2 4 0 0 N/A 0 1-2 3 1 10 FSouth Dakota 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 3 2 41 BTennessee 4 3 4 4 3 1 N/A 4 4 0 2 4 33 CTexas 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 10 FUtah 4 4 5 4 4 5 N/A 4 4 0 4 4 42 AVermont 4 4 4 4 4 4 N/A 4 4 0 3 3 38 AVirginia 1 0 3 3 2 2 0 1 1-2 2 3 16 FWashington 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4-2 3 4 44 AWest Virginia 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0-2 1 0 5 DWisconsin 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4-2 2 4 40 AWyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F*An N/A in the Casinos/Gaming Establishments category means either the state only has such establishments located on sovereign tribal lands,which are not subject to state smokefree laws or does not allow commercial gaming2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202212 Lung.orgTobacco Taxes Grading Chart Tax on Tax on Tax on Tax on Smokeless Pipe/RYO Tax on State Cigarette Tax Little Cigars Large Cigars Tobacco Tobacco E-Cigarettes Total Score GradeAlabama 6 1 1 0 0 0 8 FAlaska 18 2 2 2 2 0 26 DArizona 18 1 1 0 0 0 20 FArkansas 12 2 1 2 2 0 19 FCalifornia 24 2 2 2 2 2 34 BColorado 18 2 2 2 2 1 27 DConnecticut 30 2 1 0 1 0 34 BDelaware 18 1 1 0 1 0 21 FDistrict of Columbia 30 2 0 2 2 2 38 AFlorida 12 0 0 2 2 0 16 FGeorgia 6 1 2 2 2 0 13 FHawaii 24 2 1 2 2 0 31 CIdaho 6 2 2 2 2 0 14 FIllinois 24 2 1 0 1 1 29 CIndiana 12 2 2 0 2 0 18 FIowa 12 2 1 1 2 0 18 FKansas 12 1 1 1 1 0 16 FKentucky 12 1 1 0 1 1 16 FLouisiana 12 1 1 1 2 0 17 FMaine 18 2 2 2 2 2 28 CMaryland 24 2 1 1 1 1 30 CMassachusetts 24 2 1 2 1 2 32 BMichigan 18 1 1 1 1 0 22 FMinnesota 24 2 1 2 2 2 33 BMississippi 6 2 2 2 2 0 14 FMissouri 6 2 2 2 2 0 14 FMontana 12 2 2 0 2 0 18 FNebraska 6 2 2 0 2 0 12 FNevada 12 1 1 1 1 1 17 FNew Hampshire 12 2 0 2 2 0 18 FNew Jersey 18 1 1 0 1 0 21 FNew Mexico 18 2 1 1 1 1 24 DNew York 30 2 1 0 1 1 35 BNorth Carolina 6 2 2 2 2 0 14 FNorth Dakota 6 2 2 0 2 0 12 FOhio 12 2 1 1 1 0 17 FOklahoma 18 2 1 2 2 0 25 DOregon 24 2 1 0 2 2 31 CPennsylvania 18 2 0 0 0 1 21 FRhode Island 30 2 1 0 2 0 35 BSouth Carolina 6 1 1 1 1 0 10 FSouth Dakota 12 2 2 2 2 0 20 FTennessee 6 2 1 1 1 0 11 FTexas 12 0 0 2 2 0 16 FUtah 12 2 2 2 2 2 22 FVermont 24 2 2 2 2 2 34 BVirginia 6 2 2 0 2 0 12 FWashington 24 2 1 0 2 0 29 CWest Virginia 12 1 1 1 1 0 16 FWisconsin 18 2 1 2 2 0 25 DWyoming 6 2 2 2 2 2 16 F2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202213 Lung.orgAccess to Cessation Services Grading Chart Medicaid SEHP Investment Private Medicaid Medicaid Barriers to Medicaid SEHP SEHP Barriers to Per Insurance Tobacco Total State Medications Counseling Coverage Expansion Medications Counseling Coverage Smoker Mandate Surcharge Score GradeAlabama 14 6 3-8 4 2 1 0 0 0 22 FAlaska 14 4 10 0 4 3 1 20 0 0 56 BArizona 14 8 12 0 4 2 2 10 0 0 52 CArkansas 14 8 14 0 2 2 1 5 0 1 47 DCalifornia 14 12 12 0 2 2 1 15 0 2 60 BColorado 14 12 13 0 4 3 1 20 2 1 70 AConnecticut 14 12 13 0 4 4 1 0 0 1 49 CDelaware 12 8 9 0 4 4 2 20 1 0 60 BDistrict of Columbia 14 4 12 0 0 0 0 20 0 2 52 CFlorida 14 8 12-8 4 1 1 15 0 0 47 DGeorgia 11 8 7-8 4 2 1 0 0-2 23 FHawaii 11 8 11 0 3 3 1 20 0 0 57 BIdaho 14 4 12 0 4 2 2 15 0 0 53 CIllinois 14 12 9 0 3 1 1 10 1 0 51 CIndiana 14 8 12 0 4 2 2 5 0-2 45 DIowa 14 6 8 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 36 FKansas 14 12 14-8 4 0 2 0 0 0 38 FKentucky 14 12 14 0 4 3 1 0 5 1 54 CLouisiana 14 8 10 0 4 2 1 5 1 0 45 DMaine 14 12 12 0 4 2 1 20 0 0 65 AMaryland 14 8 12 0 4 2 2 15 2 0 59 BMassachusetts 14 12 14 0 3 2 1 5 2 2 55 CMichigan 14 8 13 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 43 DMinnesota 12 10 13 0 4 4 2 20 0 0 65 AMississippi 14 2 12-8 4 2 1 5 0 0 32 FMissouri 14 12 14 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 49 CMontana 14 8 13 0 3 3 2 15 0 0 58 BNebraska 14 8 10 0 3 3 2 5 0 0 45 DNevada 9 6 13 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 34 FNew Hampshire 14 8 12 0 4 3 1 5 0 0 47 DNew Jersey 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 19 FNew Mexico 14 8 14 0 2 4 1 20 3 0 66 ANew York 14 8 12 0 4 2 2 10 1 2 55 CNorth Carolina 14 8 10-8 4 2 1 5 0 1 37 FNorth Dakota 14 4 13 0 4 3 1 20 1 0 60 BOhio 14 12 13 0 4 4 1 10 0 0 58 BOklahoma 14 8 14 0 3 3 1 20 0 0 63 AOregon*14 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 40 IPennsylvania 12 6 11 0 2 2 2 5 0 0 40 FRhode Island 14 12 13 0 4 4 2 0 5 2 56 BSouth Carolina 14 12 14-8 3 2 1 20 0 0 58 BSouth Dakota 4 2 9-8 4 2 2 20 0 0 35 FTennessee 14 6 5-8 4 4 1 0 0 0 26 FTexas 14 10 11-8 4 3 2 0 0 0 36 FUtah 14 8 8 0 4 2 1 20 1 0 58 BVermont 14 12 12 0 1 2 1 20 3 2 67 AVirginia 14 12 14 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 44 DWashington 14 6 11 0 3 3 2 0 0 0 39 FWest Virginia 14 4 8 0 4 2 1 0 0 0 33 FWisconsin 14 10 14-8 4 3 1 0 0-2 36 FWyoming 14 8 7-8 2 0 2 20 0 0 45 D*Oregon earned an I for Incomplete grade this year for being unable to provide several pieces of information necessary for the grade before the report went to print.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202214 Lung.orgFlavored Tobacco Product Laws GradesState GradeAlabama FAlaska FArizona FArkansas FCalifornia*IColorado FConnecticut FDelaware FDistrict of Columbia FFlorida FGeorgia FHawaii FIdaho FIllinois FIndiana FIowa FKansas FKentucky FLouisiana FMaine FMaryland FMassachusetts AMichigan FMinnesota FMississippi FMissouri FMontana FNebraska FNevada FNew Hampshire FNew Jersey DNew Mexico FNew York DNorth Carolina FNorth Dakota FOhio FOklahoma FOregon FPennsylvania FRhode Island DSouth Carolina FSouth Dakota FTennessee FTexas FUtah FVermont FVirginia FWashington FWest Virginia FWisconsin FWyoming F*California earned an I for Incomplete grade because their flavored tobacco product law is not in effect and will be voted in a ballot measure this year2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202215 Lung.org“State Of Tobacco Control”2022 MethodologyThe American Lung Associations“State of Tobacco Control”2022 is a report card that evaluates state and federal tobacco control policies by comparing them against targets based on the most current,recognized criteria for effective tobacco control measures,and translating each state and the federal governments relative progress into a letter grade of“A”through“F.”A grade of“A”is assigned for excellent tobacco control policies while an“F”indicates inadequate policies.The primary reference for all state tobacco control laws is the American Lung Associations State Legislated Actions on Tobacco Issues on-line database.The American Lung Association has published this comprehensive summary of state tobacco control laws since 1988.Data for the state cessation section is taken from the American Lung Associations State Tobacco Cessation Coverage database.Calculation of Federal Grades Tobacco control and prevention measures at the federal level are graded in five areas:federal regulation of tobacco products;federal coverage of tobacco cessation treatments;federal excise taxes on tobacco products;federal mass media campaigns;and federal minimum age of sale for tobacco products.The sources for the targets and the basis of the evaluation criteria are described below.Federal Regulation of Tobacco ProductsSince the passage of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act giving the U.S.Food and Drug Administration the authority to regulate tobacco products in June 2009,the grading system for this category has been based on how the federal government is implementing its new authority,and whether Congress is providing full funding to FDA with no policy riders to limit the agencys authority.The American Lung Association has identified three important items that FDA was required by the Tobacco Control Act to implement,that FDA indicated they would take action on or would significantly improve the public health:1)implementation of a rule asserting authority over all other tobacco products besides cigarettes,smokeless tobacco and roll-your-own tobacco also known as the“deeming”rule;2)requiring large,graphic cigarette warning labels that cover the top 50%of the front and back of cigarette packs;and 3)issuing at least one product standard to reduce the toxicity,addictiveness and/or appeal of tobacco products,including removal of flavored tobacco products from the marketplace.Points were awarded based on how the federal government has implemented these three items as well as whether Congress funded FDAs Center for Tobacco Products at the levels called for in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.The Federal Regulation of Tobacco Products grade breaks down as follows:Grade Points EarnedA 15 or 16 Total PointsB 13 or 14 Total PointsC 12 Total PointsD 10 or 11 Total PointsF Under 10 Total Points2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202216 Lung.orgImplementation of Final“Deeming”Rule Giving FDA Authority over All Tobacco Products(4 points)Target is implementation of final rule that gives FDA authority over all tobacco products in addition to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. 4 points:Deeming rule fully implemented;pre-market review of all deemed tobacco products complete;products without PMTA are removed from marketplace. 3 points:FDA has begun the PMTA process for all deemed tobacco products. 2 points:FDA only implementing portions of deeming rule 0 points:FDA postpones implementation of the entire ruleGraphic Cigarette Warning Labels(4 points)Target is FDA requires large,graphic cigarette warning labels that cover the top 50%of the front and back of cigarette packs. 4 points:FDA requires large,graphic cigarette warning labels that cover the top 50%of the front and back of cigarette packs. 1 points:FDA proposes large,graphic cigarette warning labels that cover the top 50%of the front and back of cigarette packs. 0 points:No graphic warning label requirement is issued.Product standards to address toxicity,addictiveness and appeal of tobacco products,including removal of Flavored Tobacco Products such as Menthol Cigarettes(4 points)Target is FDA takes action to reduce the toxicity,addictiveness and/or appeal of tobacco products,including removing flavored tobacco products from the marketplace. 4 points:Strong product standard is finalized that will be appropriate for the protection of public health,including eliminating all flavored tobacco products. 3 points:Strong product standard is finalized,including removing some but not all flavored tobacco products. 2 points:Strong product standard is proposed that will be appropriate for the protection of public health,including eliminating all flavored tobacco products. 1 points:Product standard is proposed,including removing some but not all flavored tobacco products from the marketplace 0 points:No product standard is issued and all flavored products remain on the marketplace.Funding for FDA Center for Tobacco Products(4 points)Target is Congress provides funding for FDA Center for Tobacco Products at levels called for in Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act without attaching limiting policy riders. 4 points:Congress provides full funding without attaching limiting policy riders. 2 points:Congress provides full funding but with policy riders. 1 points:Congress provides funding at a level inconsistent with the Tobacco Control Act 0 points:No funding at all provided.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202217 Lung.orgFederal Cessation Treatment CoverageThe cessation treatment coverage criteria used in the American Lung Associations“State of Tobacco Control”2022 report is based on the coverage of tobacco cessation treatments provided by the federal government through its four main public insurance programs:1)Medicare(for Americans over age 65),2)Medicaid(for low-income and/or disabled Americans),3)TRICARE(for members of the military and their families),and 4)Federal Employee Health Benefits Program(for federal employees and their families).A fifth category covers federal requirements for tobacco cessation treatment coverage in state health insurance marketplaces under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or health care reform law.Providing help to quit through these programs and state health insurance exchanges will reach large numbers of tobacco users,improve health,prevent unnecessary death,save taxpayer money and set an example for other health plans.The federal government must lead by example and cover a comprehensive benefit for everyone to whom it provides health care.The definition of a comprehensive tobacco cessation benefit used in these criteria follows the recommendations in the Clinical Practice Guideline entitled Treating Tobacco Use and Dependence.In this Guideline,published in 2008 the U.S.Public Health Service recommends the use of seven medications and three types of counseling as effective for helping tobacco users quit.This definition has been reaffirmed in the 2015 United States Preventive Services Task Force(USPSTF)recommendation.The Federal Cessation Coverage grade breaks down as follows:Grade Points EarnedA 18 to 20 Total PointsB 16 to 17 Total PointsC 14 to 15 Total PointsD 12 to 13 Total PointsF Under 12 Total PointsMedicare(4 points)Target is all Medicare recipients have easy access to a comprehensive cessation benefit. 4 points:All Guideline-recommended medications and counseling are covered. 3 points:At least 4 medications and 1 type of counseling are covered. 2 points:At least 2 medications and 1 type of counseling are covered. 1 point:At least 1 treatment is covered. 0 points:No coverage.Medicaid(4 points)Target is all Medicaid enrollees have easy access to a comprehensive cessation benefit. 4 points All Guideline-recommended medications and counseling are required to be covered. 3 points:At least 4 medications and 1 type of counseling are required to be covered.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202218 Lung.org 2 points:At least 2 medications and 1 type of counseling are required to be covered. 1 point:At least 1 treatment is required to be covered. 0 points:No required coverage.TRICARE(4 points)Target is all TRICARE enrollees have easy access to a comprehensive cessation benefit. 4 points:All Guideline-recommended medications and counseling are covered. 3 points:At least 4 medications and 1 type of counseling are covered. 2 points:At least 2 medications and 1 type of counseling are covered. 1 point:At least 1 treatment is covered. 0 points:No coverage.Federal Employee Health Benefits(FEHB)(4 points)Target is all federal employees&dependents have easy access to a comprehensive cessation benefit. 4 points:All Guideline-recommended medications and counseling are covered. 3 points:At least 4 medications and 1 type of counseling are covered. 2 points:At least 2 medications and 1 type of counseling are covered. 1 point:At least 1 treatment is covered. 0 points:No coverage.Federal Requirements for State Health Insurance MarketplacesTarget is all plans in marketplaces cover a comprehensive tobacco cessation benefit. 4 points:All Guideline-recommended medications and counseling are required to be covered. 3 points:Administration releases guidance outlining coverage of a comprehensive tobacco cessation benefit as a preventive service. 2 points:Administration requires that all plans sold in the State Health Insurance Marketplaces cover tobacco cessation treatment as part of the preventive services requirement. 1 points:Administration proposes new regulations that no longer require all plans in the State Health Insurance Marketplaces to provide tobacco cessation. 0 points:Administration finalizes new regulations or issues guidance that no longer require all plans in the State Health Insurance Marketplaces to provide tobacco cessation.Bonus Points:1 bonus point in each category is awarded if coverage is provided with minimal barriers to access.Federal Tobacco Excise Taxes Criteria for the federal tobacco excise taxes grade are identical to the state tobacco excise tax grade.For more information,see the State Tobacco Excise Taxes section on p.25.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202219 Lung.orgThe Federal Tobacco Excise Tax grade breaks down as follows:Grade Points EarnedA 36 to 40 pointsB 32 to 35 pointsC 28 to 31 pointsD 24 to 27 pointsF 23 and below pointsFederal Mass Media Campaigns Health communications interventions,including mass media campaigns designed to encourage tobacco users to quit or discourage youth from starting to smoke have been found to be an effective intervention to prevent and reduce tobacco use,according to the U.S.Surgeon General and U.S.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC).More information on health communications interventions and their effectiveness can be found in CDCs Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs 2014.Two agencies of the federal government ran mass media campaigns for part or all of 2021 that seek to reduce or prevent tobacco use among different populations:1)CDCs Tips from Former Smokers media campaign,which targets adults who use tobacco and 2)FDAs Real Costs campaign,which targets youth ages 12 to 17 with tobacco prevention messages.Both mass media campaigns will continue to run in 2022.The federal mass media campaign grade criteria are based off the reach,duration and frequency of these mass media campaigns as well as if the campaign refers people to available services that can help them quit.The Federal Mass Media campaign grade breaks down as follows:Grade Points EarnedA 22 to 24 pointsB 20 to 21 pointsC 17 to 19 pointsD 15 to 16 pointsF Under 15 pointsReach(3 points for each campaign,6 points total)Target:Advertising from each mass media campaign reaches 75%or more of its target audience each quarter the campaign is running. 3 points:Ads reach 75%or more of target audience each quarter 2 points:Ads reach 55-74%of target audience each quarter 1 point:Ads reach 1-54%of target audience each quarter 0 points:No ad campaignDuration(3 points for each campaign,6 points total)Target:Each mass media campaign runs for 12 months of the year. 3 points:Ads run 9-12 months per year 2 points:Ads run 6-8 months per year 1 point:Ads run 1-5 months per year 0 points:No ad campaign2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202220 Lung.orgFrequency(3 points for each campaign,6 points total)Target:Each campaign has an average gross rating point of 1,200 for the 1st quarter the campaign is running and 800 or higher rating points for subsequent quarters. 3 points:Average targeted rating point of 1,200 or higher for 1st quarter of campaign;average targeted rating point of 800 or higher for subsequent quarters 2 points:Average targeted rating point of 1,000 or higher for 1st quarter of campaign;average targeted rating point of 600 or higher for subsequent quarters 1 points:Average targeted rating point of 800 or higher for 1st quarter of campaign;average targeted rating point of 400 or higher for subsequent quarters 0 points:No ad campaignPromotion of Available Services(3 points for each campaign,6 points total)Target:Media campaign refers people to available resources that can help them. 3 points:Media campaign refers people to available resources directly 1 points:Media campaign refers people to location where available resources can be accessed 0 points:Campaign does not refer people to additional resourcesFederal Minimum Age of Sale for Tobacco ProductsIn March 2015,the National Academy of Medicine(formerly the Institute of Medicine)issued a report looking at the impact increasing the age of sale for tobacco products could have on youth tobacco use rates.The report concluded that increasing the age of sale for tobacco products to 21 nationwide could prevent 223,000 deaths among people born between 2000 and 2019,including 50,000 fewer dying from lung cancer,the nations leading cancer killer.1A grade was awarded in this category based on whether the federal government increased the age of sale for tobacco products to 21 and issued the regulations as required by statute.The letter grade received deductions based on if groups,like active-duty military,were exempted from the age of sale of 21.The federal government would receive an automatic F grade if some tobacco products,such as e-cigarettes were exempted from the age of sale increase,preemption on state or local governments from raising the age of sale was imposed or the age of sale was 19 or 20 years old.Grade breaks down as follows:A=age of sale for all tobacco products is 21 years of age with no exceptions;B=age of sale for all tobacco products is 21 years of age,but certain groups,such as active-duty military are exempted;F=age of sale for tobacco products is below 21 years of age,some tobacco products are exempted from the age of sale to 21 increase or preemption on state or local governments concerning tobacco sales age increases is imposed.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202221 Lung.orgCalculation of State Grades State level tobacco control policies are graded in five key areas:tobacco prevention and cessation funding,smokefree air laws,state tobacco excise taxes,access to tobacco cessation treatments and services and state laws to end the sale of flavored tobacco products.The sources for the targets and the basis of the evaluation criteria are described below.State Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Program FundingIn January 2014,the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC)published an updated version of its Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs,which was first published in 1999,and previously updated in 2007.Based on“Best Practices”as determined by evidence-based analysis of state tobacco control programs,this CDC guidance document recommends that states establish programs that are comprehensive,sustainable and accountable.The CDC lists five components as crucial in a comprehensive tobacco control program:State and Community Interventions,Mass-Reach Health Communication Interventions,Cessation Interventions,Surveillance and Evaluation and Infrastructure,Administration and Management.The CDC also recommends an overall level of funding for each states tobacco control program based on a variety of state-specific factors such as prevalence of tobacco use,the cost and complexity of conducting mass media to reach targeted audiences and the proportion of the population that is below 200%of the federal poverty level.For the tobacco prevention and control spending area,the CDC recommendation for state funding of comprehensive programs served as the denominator in the percentage calculation to obtain each states grade.Each states total funding for these programs(including federal funding from the CDC given to states for tobacco prevention and cessation activities)served as the numerator.After calculating the percentage of the CDC recommendation each state had funded,grades were assigned according to the following formula.Percent of CDCGrade Recommended LevelA 80%or moreB 70%to 79%C 60%to 69%D 50%to 59%F Less than 50%Limitation of Grading System on State Tobacco Control ExpendituresThe American Lung Association bases its tobacco prevention and cessation program funding grades on the total amount allocated to tobacco control programs,including applicable federal funding,in each state,but does not evaluate the expenditure in each of the CDC-recommended categories.The Lung Association does not evaluate the efficacy of any element of any states program.Therefore,a state may receive a high grade but be significantly underfunding a component or components of a comprehensive program.It also may be true that a state with a low grade is adequately funding a specific component or program in one community.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202222 Lung.orgHowever,the CDC recommends a comprehensive program and explains that simply funding an element of the program will not achieve the needed results.The CDC explicitly calls for programs that are comprehensive,sustained and accountable.The American Lung Association agrees with the CDC and believes that the total funding is a fair basis for grading state programs and a states tobacco control funding performance.State Smokefree Air LawsThe smokefree air laws grading system is based on criteria developed by an advisory committee convened by the National Cancer Institute with some modification to reflect the current policy environment.The criteria were presented in the article,“Application of a Rating System to State Clean Indoor Air Laws(USA)”(Chriqui JF,et al.Tobacco Control.2002;11:26-34).This approach provides scoring in nine categories:Government Workplaces,Private Workplaces,Schools,Child Care Facilities,Restaurants,Retail Stores,Recreational/Cultural Facilities,Penalties and Enforcement.All laws are open to interpretation and our analysis may differ from those of the authors noted in the above study.To reflect the current policy environment,two additions have been made to the advisory committees recommended categories of smokefree establishments.An additional category for bars has been added to all states.A second category,Casinos/Gaming Establishments,was added to the states which allow casinos or gaming establishments.Adding these categories became necessary after the committee made its recommendations in 2002,because a number of states have prohibited smoking in bars and casinos/gaming establishments since then,and states need to be recognized in the grading system for protecting workers in these places from secondhand smoke.In addition,in“State of Tobacco Control”2019 a penalty was added to the grade for states that have not included e-cigarettes in their laws restricting or prohibiting smoking.A state that has not included e-cigarettes in their laws or only has included them in select locations receives a-2 point penalty;a state that has included e-cigarettes in many but not all public places and workplaces covered by state law gets a-1 point penalty;and no penalty is applied for states that have included e-cigarettes in all places where smoking is prohibited by state law.The smokefree air grade for each state is based on a total of all points received in all categories.The grades are based on a maximum score of 40 if the state has no casinos or gaming establishments,or 44 if the state has casinos or gaming establishments.Both these high scores have been attained by states in this years report.The maximum score of 40 or 44 becomes the denominator,and the states total points serve as the numerator.The percentage was calculated,and grades were assigned following a standard grade-school system.States receiving scores in the top 10%of the range(90 to 100%)earned an“A.”Those receiving scores falling between 80 and 89%got a grade of“B,”between 70 and 79%a“C”and between 60 and 69%a“D.”Those that fell below 60%received an“F.”The points break down as follows:2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202223 Lung.orgAssigned No State Casino/State Casino/Gamin Grade Gaming Establishments Establishments PresentA 36 to 40 40 to 44B 32 to 35 36 to 39C 28 to 31 31 to 35D 24 to 27 27 to 30F 23 and below 26 and belowThere are two situations that create exceptions to the grading system:Preemption or Local opt-out:State preemption of stricter local ordinances or states that have a provision in its law allowing communities to opt-out of the law is penalized by a reduction of one letter grade.States with preemption that have a score of 40 points or higher(or 44 points or higher dependent on whether the Casinos/Gaming Establishments category is applicable for that state)are not penalized for preemption.Local Ordinances:States without strong statewide smokefree laws may be graded based on local ordinances or regulations.Strong local smokefree air ordinances/regulations that include most workplaces,all restaurants and bars are considered according to the percentage of population covered in the state.States with over 95%of their population covered by comprehensive local smokefree ordinances will receive an“A,”over 80%a“B,”over 65%a“C”and over 50%a“D.”Local ordinances that cover less than 50%of the population will not be considered for evaluation under this exception.2Key to Smokefree Laws Ratings by CategoryFor all categories,laws that require that smoking be permitted or laws without any restrictions for the category receive a score of zero(0).1.Government Workplaces(4 points):Target is“state and local government workplaces are 100%smokefree,no exemptions.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on type of ventilation,location of smoking area and/or number of employees.A bonus point( 1)is available if the laws meet the target criteria and require the grounds or a specified distance from entries or exits to be smokefree.2.Private Workplaces(4 points):Target is“private workplaces are 100%smokefree,no exemptions.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on type of ventilation,location of smoking area and/or number of employees.A bonus point( 1)is available if the laws meet the target criteria and require the grounds or a specified distance from entries or exits to be smokefree.3.Schools(4 points):Target is“no smoking permitted in public and non-public schools during school hours or while school activities are being conducted.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on type of school,school hours,type of ventilation and/or location of smoking area.A bonus point( 1)is available if the laws meet the target criteria and extend the law/policy to any time in school facilities,on school grounds,and at school-sponsored activities.4.Child Care Facilities(4 points):Target is“no smoking permitted during operating hours in childcare facilities(explicitly including licensed,home-based facilities).”Score is lowered if restrictions depend on ventilation standards,location of smoking areas and/or exemptions for certain types of facilities.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202224 Lung.org5.Restaurants(4 points):Target is“restaurants(explicitly including bar areas of restaurants)are 100%smokefree.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on type of ventilation,location of smoking areas and/or exemptions for some restaurants.A bonus point( 1)is available if the laws meet the target criteria and extend the law/policy to outdoor seating areas of restaurants.6.Bars/Taverns(4 points):Target is“bars/taverns and similar types of establishments are 100%smokefree.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on ventilation standards,location of smoking area and/or if laws only applied to some but not all bars/taverns.A bonus point( 1)is available if the laws meet the target criteria and extend the law/policy to private clubs or similar establishments at all times.7.Casinos/Gaming Establishments(4 points):Target is“casinos/gaming establishments are 100%smokefree.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on ventilation standards,location of smoking area and/or if laws only apply to some but not all casinos/gaming establishments.This category does not apply to states that do not have casinos/gaming establishments or only casinos/gaming establishments on sovereign tribal lands.8.Retail Stores(4 points):Target is“retail stores or retail businesses open to the public are 100%smokefree.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on ventilation standards and/or location of smoking area,and if laws only apply to some but not all retail stores or businesses.9.Recreational/Cultural Facilities(4 points):Target is“recreational and cultural facilities are 100%smokefree.”Score is lowered if restriction depends on ventilation standards,location of smoking area and/or if laws only apply to some but not all recreational/cultural facilities.Note:state law does not apply to recreational/cultural facilities on sovereign tribal land.10.Penalties(4 points):Target is“graduated penalties or fines,applicable to smokers and to proprietors or employers,for any violation of clean indoor air legislation.”Score is lowered if penalties included possibilities for delay,exceptions for either smokers or proprietors/employers,or penalties that only apply to some but not all offenses.An intent requirement or affirmative defense against violation reduces the score by one(1)point.11.Enforcement(4 points):Target is“designate an enforcement authority for clean indoor air,require sign posting and have a phone number and/or online location to report violations.”Score is lowered if there is no requirement for sign posting,there is no phone number or online location to report violations,enforcement authority only applies to some sites,or an enforcement authority or sign requirement exists,but not both.A bonus point( 1)is available if the laws meet the target criteria and require the enforcement authority to conduct compliance inspections.State Tobacco Excise TaxesThe U.S.Surgeon General,in The Health Consequences of Smoking 50 Years of Progress,released in January 2014 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the first Surgeon Generals report on smoking in 1964,concluded that“increases in the prices of tobacco products,including those resulting from excise tax increases,prevent initiation of tobacco use,promote cessation and reduce the prevalence and intensity of tobacco use among youth and adults.”32022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202225 Lung.orgResearch has clearly demonstrated that as the price of cigarettes increases,consumption decreases.For each 10%price increase,it is estimated that consumption drops by about 7%for youth and 3 to 5%for adults.4 Increasing taxes on tobacco products other than cigarettes is also important as while rates of cigarette smoking are declining,rates of cigar smoking,and smokeless tobacco use are stagnant or increasing.In a number of states,rates of cigar smoking among youth exceed rates of cigarette smoking.Starting with“State of Tobacco Control 2015,”taxes on tobacco products other than cigarettes were incorporated into the grading system.The grading system also was switched to a points-based system,with the level of states cigarette tax worth up to 30 possible points and taxes on other tobacco products worth up to 10 possible points,for a total of 40 points available in the grading category.The 30 points for the level of a states cigarette tax will continue to be based on the average(mean)of all state taxes as the midpoint,or the lowest“C.”The average cigarette tax was chosen because it is often seen as an indication of where states are in their cigarette taxing policies.The average state excise tax on January 1,2022 was$1.91 per pack.The range of state excise taxes($0.17 to$4.50 per pack)is divided into quintiles,and a state is assigned 6 points for attaining each quintile.The score earned for the level of a states cigarette tax is broken down as follows:Score Tax30 points$3.82 and over24 points$2.866 to$3.81918 points$1.91 to$2.86512 points$0.955 to$1.9096 points Under$0.955For taxes on tobacco products other than cigarettes,a state is evaluated on whether the tax on five specific types of tobacco products is a)equivalent to the states tax on cigarettes and b)the tax on the specific type of tobacco product is not based on the weight of the product.Taxing tobacco products other than cigarettes by weight is inadequate because it means the tax level does not keep pace with inflation and tobacco industry or other price increases.The five specific types of tobacco products other than cigarettes which states are evaluated on are:1)little cigars,2)large cigars,3)smokeless tobacco,4)pipe/roll-your-own tobacco and 5)e-cigarettes.In“State of Tobacco Control”2020,e-cigarettes replaced dissolvable tobacco products as one of the five categories.States can earn up to 2 points total for each type of other tobacco product;1 point if the tax is equivalent to the cigarette tax and 1 point if the tax is not weight-based.States will not be penalized for having a weight-based tax if they also have a minimum tax that is equal to the current cigarette tax or the weight-based tax is equivalent to the cigarette tax.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202226 Lung.orgThe overall grade breaks down as follows:Grade Points EarnedA 36 to 40 pointsB 32 to 35 pointsC 28 to 31 pointsD 24 to 27 pointsF 23 and below pointsState Access to Cessation Services The Access to Cessation Services grading system sets targets for states and awards points in three areas:1)State Medicaid coverage of tobacco cessation treatments,2)State Employee Health Plan coverage of tobacco cessation treatments and 3)the Investment per Smoker each state makes in its quitline,a service available in all states that provides tobacco cessation counseling over the phone.Bonus points are available in two other target areas,Standards for Private Insurance and Tobacco Surcharges.In 2008,the U.S.Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Service published an update to its Clinical Practice Guideline on Treating Tobacco Use and Dependence.This Guideline,based on a thorough review of scientific evidence on tobacco cessation,recommends several treatment options that have proven effective in helping people quit smoking.These options include the use of five nicotine-replacement therapies(gum,patch,lozenge,nasal spray,inhaler),bupropion and varenicline(non-nicotine medications),and three types of counseling(individual,group and phone).It also recommends that all public and private health insurance plans cover the cessation treatments recommended in the Guideline.In 2020,the U.S.Surgeon General reiterated the need for this comprehensive cessation benefit without barriers in“Smoking Cessation:A Report of the Surgeon General.”Targets established in the Medicaid,State Employee Health Plan and Standards for Private Insurance categories were based on these Public Health Service Guideline and U.S.Surgeon General recommendations for cessation treatments.In the 2014 Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs document,discussed previously in the Tobacco Prevention and Control Spending section above,the CDC establishes benchmarks for quitlines that are funded at the recommended levels.Grading in this section is based on the amount of funding provided to the state quitline for services divided by the number of smokers in the state.In 2015,the Lung Association incorporated information on what tobacco cessation treatments are provided to the Medicaid expansion population into this grade.Points awarded in the Medicaid Coverage section below incorporate this information.Points available in the Medicaid coverage section were 40 to represent new Medicaid expansion enrollees.If a state has not opted to expand Medicaid up to the levels established in the Affordable Care Act(ACA),the state receives an automatic deduction of 8 points to represent the substantial number of tobacco users that do not have access to cessation treatments because of this decision.The Lung Association will deduct up to 2 points for any state that implements a policy to charge Medicaid enrollees a tobacco surcharge or that has policies that charge Medicaid enrollees that smoke more for coverage than 2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202227 Lung.orgnon-tobacco user Medicaid enrollees.The Lung Association also added 2 bonus points available to states who prohibit or limit tobacco surcharges,or health insurance policies that charge tobacco users more in premiums than non-tobacco users.States can limit or remove these surcharges.All data in the Cessation section of“State of Tobacco Control”2022 was collected and analyzed by the American Lung Association.The cessation grades are based on the maximum number of total points,a score of 70,assigned according to the categories described in detail below.Over half of the points(40 points total)under the Access to Cessation Services section are awarded for coverage under a states Medicaid program.This weighting is due to the higher smoking rates among the Medicaid population than among the general population,as well as the need to cover treatments to help people of lower income who smoke quit.Twenty points total are awarded for the investment per smoker in the states quitline and 10 points total are awarded for State Employee Health Plan coverage.The score of 70 serves as the denominator,and the states total points serves as the numerator to calculate a percentage score.Grades were given following a standard grade-school system using that percentage score.The grades break down as follows:Grade Points EarnedA 63 to 70B 56 to 62C 49 to 55D 42 to 48F 41 and underKey to Cessation Coverage Ratings by Category:Medicaid Coverage(40 points):5 Target is barrier-free coverage of all Guideline-recommended medications and counseling for the states entire Medicaid population(including the Medicaid expansion population).1.States receive up to 14 points for coverage of medications:2 points for coverage for all enrollees of each of the 7 medications.If coverage of a medication varies by plan or pregnancy status,1 point is awarded for each medication covered in this way;2.States receive up to 12 points for coverage of counseling:4 points for each type of counseling covered(individual,group and phone).If a counseling coverage varies by plan or pregnancy status,2 points is awarded for each type of counseling coverage;3.States receive up to 14 points for providing coverage without barriers:1 to 3 points are deducted for each barrier to coverage that exists in a state.Deductions vary based on type of barrier and severity.4.If a state has not expanded Medicaid coverage up to the levels established in the Affordable Care Act(138%of the federal poverty level for all eligibility categories),8 points are automatically deducted from the Medicaid coverage score.5.State that impose a tobacco surcharge or charge tobacco users higher premiums than non-tobacco users for Medicaid coverage will have 2 points deducted from the Medicaid coverage score.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202228 Lung.orgState Employee Health Plan Coverage(10 points):Target is barrier-free coverage of all Guideline-recommended medications and counseling for all of a states employees and dependents.1.0 to 4 points are given for coverage of medications;deductions were made if only some health plans/managed care organizations provide coverage;2.0 to 4 points are given for coverage of counseling;deductions were made if only some health plans/managed care organizations provide coverage;3.0 to 2 points are given if coverage is free of barriers.Quitlines(20 points):States are graded based on a curve set by the median investment per smoker,which in fiscal year 2021 was$2.41 per smoker.Points are awarded based on the scale below:$/smoker$4.82 20 points$/smoker$3.62-$4.81 15 points$/smoker$2.41-$3.61 10 points$/smoker$1.21-$2.40 5 points$/smoker$1.21 0 pointsStandards for Private Insurance Coverage(up to 5 bonus points):Target is a legislative or regulatory standard requiring coverage of all PHS-recommended medications and counseling in private insurance plans within the state.1.1 point given for the presence of a legislative or regulatory private insurance standard or if a state insurance commissioner issues a bulletin on the enforcement of the tobacco cessation FAQ issued by the federal government;62.0 to 2 points given for required coverage of medications;3.0 to 2 points given for required coverage of counseling.Tobacco Surcharges(up to 2 bonus points):Target is a state policy prohibiting small group and individual health insurance plans from charging tobacco users higher premiums than non-tobacco users.States can prohibit this practice or limit these surcharges to amounts smaller than federal law allows,which is 50%.1.2 points given if state prohibits tobacco surcharges;OR2.1 point given if state limits tobacco surcharges to less than 50%of the premium charged to non-tobacco users.State Flavored Tobacco Product LawsFlavored tobacco products have long played an important role in youth starting to use tobacco products and in the case of menthol keeping people,particularly Black Americans,addicted.According to CDCs 2021 National Youth Tobacco Survey,over 85%of high school students and close to 80%of middle school students who use e-cigarettes use a flavored product.7 And the latest data available from the 2019 National Youth Tobacco Survey found that close to 70%of youth tobacco users used a flavored product.8Menthol cigarettes play a key role in addicting youth smokers and keeping people hooked.About half of youth smokers ages 12-17 smoke menthol 2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202229 Lung.orgcigarettes.9 Black Americans are disproportionately impacted with over 80%of Black persons who smoke using menthol cigarettes.10 Menthol cigarette use is also elevated among LGBTQ Americans,pregnant women and persons with lower incomes.A recent study showed that while overall cigarette use declined by 26%over the past decade,91%of that decline was due to non-menthol cigarettes.11Given the key role that flavors play in getting and keeping people addicted to tobacco products,and the slow pace of action by the federal government on the topic,a new grade was added to“State of Tobacco Control 2021”evaluating states on whether they have prohibited the sale of all flavored tobacco products.This grade replaced the Minimum Age grade from“State of Tobacco Control”2020 and earlier years.Grades are based on the strength of a states restrictions on flavored tobacco products with exemptions for certain products or in certain locations decreasing the grade.Grades break down as follows:A=the sale of all flavored tobacco products is prohibited;B=the sale of most flavored tobacco products,including menthol cigarettes,is prohibited with some narrow exemptions;C=the sale of all flavored tobacco products,including menthol cigarettes,is limited to over age 21 stores/locations;D=the sale of one type of flavored tobacco product is completely prohibited(i.e.flavored e-cigarettes or flavored tobacco product restrictions that completely exempt menthol cigarettes);F=No state law on flavored tobacco products or the sale of one type of flavored tobacco product restriction that exempts menthol.There is one situation that creates an exception to the grading system:Local Ordinances:States without a statewide law or weaker statewide restrictions on flavored tobacco products may be graded based on local ordinances.Local ordinances that prohibit the sale of all flavored tobacco are considered according to the percentage of population covered in the state.States with over 95%of their population covered by local flavored tobacco product ordinances will receive an“A,”over 80%a“B,”over 65%a“C”and over 50%a“D.”Local ordinances that cover less than 50%of the population will not be considered for evaluation under this exception.State Statistics Used in the ReportAdult smoking rates are taken from the CDCs 2020 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.Adult smoking means having used cigarettes on one or more of the past 30 days.High school smoking and tobacco use,and middle school smoking rates are taken from CDCs 2019 Youth Risk Behavior Survey,state youth tobacco surveys or other state-based surveys that measure youth smoking or tobacco use rates.High school tobacco use includes having used cigarettes,cigars,smokeless tobacco or electronic vapor products on one or more of the past 30 days for most states.In states where the tobacco products covered by the survey used are different,a sentence has been added to the state-specific footnotes on each state page describing the tobacco products included.Health impact and economic information is taken from CDCs Smoking Attributable Mortality,Morbidity and Economic Costs(SAMMEC)software.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202230 Lung.orgSmoking attributable deaths reflect average annual estimates for the period 2005-2009 and are calculated for persons aged 35 years and older.Smoking-attributable health care expenditures are based on 2004 smoking-attributable fractions and 2009 personal health care expenditure data.Deaths and expenditures should not be compared by state.State-by-state tobacco-related revenue data(revenue from state tobacco settlement payments and tobacco taxes)is provided by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.1.Institute of Medicine,Public Health Implications of Raising the Minimum Age of Legal Access to Tobacco Products,Washington,DC:The National Academies Press,2015,http:/www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2015/TobaccoMinimumAgeReport.aspx.2.Data to calculate percent of state populations covered by local ordinances is obtained from the Americans for Nonsmokers Rights Foundation.3.U.S.Department of Health and Human Services.The Health Consequences of Smoking50 Years of Progress:A Report of the Surgeon General.Atlanta,GA:U.S.Department of Health and Human Services,Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion,Office on Smoking and Health,2014.4.There is general consensus among tobacco researchers that every 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes decreases cigarette consumption by about 4 percent in adults and about 7 percent in children.Tauras J,et al.Effects of Price and Access Laws on Teenage Smoking Initiation:A National Longitudinal Analysis,Bridging the Gap Research,ImpacTeen.April 24,2001.5.As of January 1,2014,the Affordable Care Act(ACA)required that state Medicaid programs no longer exclude coverage of tobacco cessation medications.In State of Tobacco Control 2020 a state was only given credit for covering tobacco cessation medications if there is documentable evidence that the Medicaid program is covering that medication,regardless of the federal requirement.6.On May 2,2014,the U.S.Departments of Labor,Health and Human Services and Treasury issued an FAQ that clarified what health insurance plans under the Affordable Care Act should cover in terms of tobacco cessation medications and counseling,https:/www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/aca_implementation_faqs19.html(see question 5).7.Park-Lee E,Ren C,Sawdey MD,et al.Notes from the Field:E-Cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students National Youth Tobacco Survey,United States,2021.MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021;70:13871389.8.Wang TW,Gentzke AS,Creamer MR,et al.Tobacco Product Use and Associated Factors Among Middle and High School Students United States,2019.MMWR Surveill Summ 2019;68(No.SS-12):122.9.Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administrations public online data analysis system(PDAS).National Survey on Drug Use and Health,2020.10.Ibid.11.Delnevo CD,Ganz O,Goodwin RD,Banning Menthol Cigarettes:A Social Justice Issue Long Overdue.Nicotine Tob Res,2020 Oct 8;22(10):1673-1675.https:/doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntaa1522022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202231 Lung.orgTobacco Taxes FCIGARETTE TAX:Tax rate per pack of 20:$1.01OTHER TOBACCO PRODUCT TAXES:Little Cigars:Equalized:Yes;Weight-Based:YesLarge Cigars:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:NoSmokeless Tobacco:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:YesPipe/RYO Tobacco:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:YesE-cigarettes:Equalized:N/A;Weight-Based:N/AMass Media Campaigns ATIPS FROM FORMER SMOKERS MEDIA CAMPAIGN:Reach:Meets TargetDuration:Under TargetFrequency:Meets TargetPromotion of Services:Meets TargetFDA“REAL COSTS”MEDIA CAMPAIGN:Reach:Meets TargetDuration:Meets TargetFrequency:Meets TargetPromotion of Services:Under TargetMinimum Age I*Minimum Age of Sale for Tobacco Products:21*The federal government gets an“I”for Incomplete because FDA has not issued implementing regulations that were required by statute to be issued by June 17,2020.Federal Regulation D of Tobacco ProductsImplementation of Rule Asserting Authority over All Tobacco Products:Rule partially implemented Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels:Warning labels finalized,but not in effect*Product Standards,including Flavored Tobacco Products:No product standard proposed or finalized Funding for FDA Center for Tobacco Products:Operating on continuing resolution until February 2022*FDA has finalized graphic warning labels for cigarettes,due to a federal court order the effective date for the rule is January 9.2023.Cessation Coverage DMedicaid Coverage:Partially Required Medicare Coverage:Partially Covered TRICARE Coverage:Covered Federal Employee Health Benefits Coverage:Covered State Health Insurance Exchanges:Partially Required DThumbs down for the federal government for undermining healthcare access to comprehensive tobacco cessation coverage.United States Report CardUNITED STATESFederal Highlights:The American Lung Association has identified four key actions for the Biden Administration and Congress to take in 2022 that will help ultimately eliminate the death and disease caused by tobacco use:1.FDA must adhere to the Tobacco Control Act and reject product marketing applications(PMTAs)for any product that fails to prove it is appropriate for the protection of the public health,including all flavored products;2.The Biden Administration must propose and finalize rules that will remove all menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars from the marketplace;3.Congress must increase federal funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC)s Office on Smoking and Health to help states combat the youth e-cigarette epidemic and to further strengthen its“Tips from Former Smokers”Campaign;and4.The U.S.Department of Health and Human Services(HHS)must clarify and ensure that most health plans,including state Medicaid expansion plans,cover a comprehensive tobacco cessation benefit without barriers and cost-sharing:and Congress must pass the“Quit Because of COVID-19”Act.2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202232 Lung.orgUNITED STATESlegislation has bipartisan support in the House and the Senate.In 2021,the House passed the Build Back Better act that which for the first time ever,taxed e-cigarettes.However,the tax on e-cigarettes was dropped in the Senate in December.The lawsuits brought by Altria and RJ Reynolds in two separate federal courts continue to hold up the graphic warning labels for cigarette packs.As a result of the delays,FDA will not finalize the proposed rules until at least 2023.The Lung Association and our partners are supporting FDAs legal efforts to push back against the industrys cases.United States FactsEconomic Costs Due to Smoking:$289,500,000,000Adult Smoking Rate:14.0ult Tobacco Use Rate:20.8%High School Smoking Rate:4.6%High School Tobacco Use Rate:23.6%Middle School Smoking Rate:1.6%Middle School Tobacco Use Rate:6.7%Smoking Attributable Deaths per Year:480,320Smoking Attributable Lung Cancer Deaths per Year:163,700Smoking Attributable Respiratory Disease Deaths per Year:113,100Adult smoking and tobacco use rates are taken from the 2019 National Health Interview Survey.High school and middle school smoking and tobacco use rates are taken from the 2020 National Youth Tobacco Survey.Health impact information is taken from the Smoking Attributable Mortality,Morbidity and Economic Costs(SAMMEC)software.Smoking attributable deaths reflect average annual estimates for the period 2005-2009 and are calculated for persons aged 35 years and older.Smoking-attributable health care expenditures are based on 2004 smoking-attributable fractions and 2009 personal health care expenditure data.Deaths and expenditures should not be compared by state.Key highlights from 2021 and Items for 2022 include:In response to a court-ordered deadline,in April 2021,the Biden Administration announced that by April 2022,it would propose two new rules to remove menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars from the marketplace.The Lung Association eagerly anticipates the proposed rules and strongly encourages comprehensive regulations.To meet the September 9,2021,court-ordered deadline,FDA began to review and issue denial orders to some of the millions of e-cigarettes that submitted premarket tobacco marketing applications.While FDA denied millions of applications,it has not acted on the applications from e-cigarette manufacturers with the largest market shares,nor has the agency appeared to issue any marketing orders denial orders to manufacturers for their menthol flavored e-cigarettes.We are also unaware of FDA action on any marketing orders for tobacco products other than e-cigarettes such as cigars and hookah.While the Lung Association is frustrated with FDAs lack of progress with the remaining deeming applications,we are supporting the agencys authority over these products in amicus briefs filed with the courts in lawsuits brought by e-cigarette companies whose products were denied marketing orders.The House-passed appropriations bill increased funding for CDCs Office on Smoking and Health(OSH)to$250 million for fiscal year(FY)2022;the Senate Appropriations committee bill includes an increase to$247.5.OSH was funded at$237.5 million in FY2021.However,it is unclear whether OSH will receive any increase,as the federal government is operating under a continuing resolution through February 18,2022.OSH funding provides support for critical efforts to reduce tobacco use such as CDCs“Tips from Former Smokers”campaign.This campaign,which is celebrating its 10th anniversary this year has led to more than 1 million smokers quitting.The Administration has not yet acted on limiting non-compliant health plans which are not required to cover treatment to help people quit tobacco use,to remain on the market.These“skimpy”plans compete with plans that are required to cover treatments to help people quit tobacco use.The Lung Association continues to urge Congress to pass the“Quit Because of COVID-19 Act”which would ensure all Medicaid enrollees have access to a comprehensive tobacco cessation benefit.The 2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202233 Lung.orgTobacco Taxes:FCIGARETTE TAX:Tax Rate per pack of 20:$0.675OTHER TOBACCO PRODUCT TAXES:Tax on little cigars:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:NoTax on large cigars:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:NoTax on smokeless tobacco:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:YesTax on pipe/RYO tobacco:Equalized:No;Weight-Based:YesTax on e-cigarettes:Equalized:N/A;Weight-Based:N/AAccess to Cessation Services:FOVERVIEW OF STATE CESSATION COVERAGE:STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM:Medications:All 7 medications are coveredCounseling:Some counseling is coveredBarriers to Coverage:Substantial barriers exist to access coverageMedicaid Expansion:NoSTATE EMPLOYEE HEALTH PLAN(S):Medications:All 7 medications are coveredCounseling:Some counseling is coveredBarriers to Coverage:Some barriers exist to access coverageSTATE QUITLINE:Investment per Smoker:$1.18;the median investment per smoker is$2.41OTHER CESSATION PROVISIONS:Private Insurance Mandate:No provisionTobacco Surcharge:No prohibition or limitation on tobacco surchargesCitation:See Alabama Tobacco Cessation Coverage page for coverage details.Flavored Tobacco Products:FRestrictions on Flavored Tobacco Products:No state law or regulationTobacco Prevention and F Control Program Funding:FY2022 State Funding for Tobacco Control Programs:$1,737,970FY2022 Federal Funding for State Tobacco Control Programs:$1,682,740*FY2022 Total Funding for State Tobacco Control Programs:$3,420,710CDC Best Practices State Spending Recommendation:$55,900,000Percentage of CDC Recommended Level:6.1%State Tobacco-Related Revenue:$290,900,000*Includes tobacco prevention and cessation funding provided to states from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.Smokefree Air:FOVERVIEW OF STATE SMOKING RESTRICTIONS:Government Worksites:RestrictedPrivate Worksites:No provisionSchools:RestrictedChild Care Facilities:RestrictedRestaurants:No provisionBars:No provisionCasinos/Gaming Establishments:No provisionRetail Stores:RestrictedRecreational/Cultural Facilities:RestrictedE-Cigarettes Included:NoPenalties:YesEnforcement:YesPreemption/Local Opt-Out:NoCitation:ALA.CODE 22-15A-1 et seq.(2003).Alabama Report CardALABAMA2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202234 Lung.orgALABAMAIn 2022,the American Lung Association in Alabama will advocate for the implementation of a comprehensive tobacco retail licensing program to ensure enforcement and compliance with tobacco control statutes while continuing to educate state legislators on best practices for tobacco control,including the benefits of a statewide smokefree law.In order to reduce the death and disease caused by tobacco use in Alabama,state legislators will need to recognize the health and economic burden of tobacco use and secondhand smoke exposure by enacting public health protections and investing in evidence-based tobacco prevention programs.The Lung Association will continue to work with partners in the Coalition for a Tobacco Free Alabama to ensure successful passage and preservation of comprehensive local smokefree ordinances.Alabama State FactsHealthcare Costs Due to Smoking:$1,885,747,576Adult Smoking Rate:18.5ult Tobacco Use Rate:N/AHigh School Smoking Rate:7.1%High School Tobacco Use Rate:26.7%Middle School Smoking Rate:3.4%Smoking Attributable Deaths:8,650Adult smoking data come from CDCs 2020 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.High school smoking and tobacco use rates are taken from the 2019 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System.Middle school smoking rates are taken from the 2016 Youth Tobacco Survey.Health impact information is taken from the Smoking Attributable Mortality,Morbidity and Economic Costs(SAMMEC)software.Smoking attributable deaths reflect average annual estimates for the period 2005-2009 and are calculated for persons aged 35 years and older.Smoking-attributable healthcare expenditures are based on 2004 smoking-attributable fractions and 2009 personal healthcare expenditure data.Deaths and expenditures should not be compared by state.Tobacco use remains the leading cause of preventable death and disease in the United States and in Alabama.To address this enormous toll,the American Lung Association calls for the following actions to be taken by Alabamas elected officials:1.Implement a comprehensive tobacco retail licensing program to ensure enforcement and compliance with tobacco control statutes;2.Pass a comprehensive statewide smokefree law that protects all workers and patrons from secondhand smoke;and3.Increase funding for the Alabama tobacco prevention and control program.In 2021,Representative Drummond introduced House Bill 273 to reduce kids access to e-cigarettes and protect them from a lifelong addiction to tobacco and nicotine.House Bill 273 aligned Alabamas statute with federal law increasing the sales age of tobacco products to 21 years of age while also adding some additional provisions to tobacco control statutes.Unfortunately,House Bill 273 did not adequately update state tobacco control laws to restrict youth access to tobacco,including e-cigarettes and expressly exempts non-nicotine products from being regulated by adjusting the definition of electronic nicotine dispensing devices.The Lung Association and other public health partners advocated for updating provisions for licensing,enforcement and compliance of tobacco products,including e-cigarettes,and removing youth penalties as polices that would have effectively reduced youth tobacco and nicotine use.Many local municipalities were inundated with needs to respond to their community as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and were unable to focus on other issues,such as implementing strong smokefree ordinances.Tobacco control partners continue to be engaged with community education on the dangers of tobacco use and secondhand smoke across Alabama.The Lung Association plays a prominent role by offering technical assistance on the best practices of tobacco prevention and control.The Alabama Department of Public Health continues to affect social norm change around tobacco use,address the marketing of tobacco products to youth,and promote policies that eliminate exposure to secondhand smoke through the Tobacco Prevention and Control Program.Alabama State Highlights:2022American Lung Association“State of Tobacco Control”202235 Lung.orgTobacco Taxes:DCIGARETTE TAX:Tax Rate per pack of 20:$2.00OTHER TOBACCO PRODUCT TAXES:Tax on little cigars:Equalized:Yes;Weight-Based:NoTax on large cigars:Equalized:Yes;Weight-Based:NoTax on smokeless tobacco:Equalized:Yes;Weight-Based:NoTax on pipe/RYO tobacco:Equalized:Yes;Weight-Based:NoTax on e-cigarettes:Equalized:N/A;Weight-Based:N/AAccess to Cessation Services:BOVERVIEW OF STATE CESSATION COVERAGE:STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM:Medications:All 7 medications are coveredCounseling:Some counseling is coveredBarriers to Coverage:Some barriers exist to access careMedicaid Expansion:YesSTATE EMPLOYEE HEALTH PLAN(S):Medications:All 7 medications are coveredCounseling:Most counseling is coveredBarriers to Coverage:Some barriers exist to access careSTATE QUITLINE:Investment per Smoker:$6.49;the median investment per smoker is$2.41OTHER CESSATION PROVISIONS:Private I

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House of Dragonslayers:The 117th Congress Legacy on China and Implications for Future Bilateral Trade and Technology EngagementYilun ZhangAmanda(Yue)JinAlec CaruanaNOVEMBER 2022House of DragonslayersIIIIINovember 2022The Institute for China-America Studies is an independent think tank in Washington D.C.ICAS focuses on the evolving dynamics in the U.S.-China relationship to promote greater collaboration and mutual understanding through sincere exchanges of fresh ideas,objective policy-oriented research,and fair assessments of this critical bilateral relationship.Our research covers China-U.S.strategic relations,maritime security,economics,trade and technology relations,climate change and environment policy,global governance,and other issues central to the bilateral relationship.Ultimately,we aim to provide a window into the worldviews of both the United States and China,and thereby serve as a vehicle to promote greater understanding between these two countries and societies.ICAS is a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization.ICAS takes no institutional positions on policy issues.The views expressed in this document are those of the author(s)alone.2022 by the Institute for China-America Studies.All rights reserved.Cover Image:The first session of the 117th Congress in the House Chamber at the US Capitol on January 3,2021 in Washington,DC.(Source:Getty Images,Photo by Tasos Katopodis)Institute for China-America Studies 1919 M St.NW Suite 310 Washington,DC 20036 202 968-0595|www.chinaus-icas.orgAbout ICASHouse of DragonslayersIVThis report would not have been possible without the support of the ICAS Trade n Technology Program and the programs past analytical works.We would like to express our deepest gratitude to Jessica Martin and the rest of the ICAS team for their generous support throughout the making of this endeavor.YZ,AJ&AC About the AuthorsAcknowledgementsYilun Zhang is a Research Associate and Administrative Officer at the Institute for China-America Studies.He is also the manager of the ICAS Traden Technology Program.His key area of research pertains to U.S.-China relations,trade and technology,security and the international relations in the Indo-Pacific region.His areas of specialization include:analysis of the U.S.-China strategic competition on security and trade and technology;analysis of major power relationships in East Asia(China-Japan-South Korea-U.S.)and trending issues in the Indo-Pacific region;analysis on the security dynamics in East Asia;and geospatial analysis of the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic region.He holds a masters degree in international relations with a concentration on international political economy from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,Johns Hopkins University.Amanda(Yue)Jin is a Research Assistant intern at the Institute for China-America Studies and a member of the ICAS Trade n Technology Program team.Her research interests include the U.S.-China technology and innovation competition,the governance of data and new technologies,and the international law of the sea.She holds a B.A.in Political Science/International Relations from Carleton College and a J.D.from Harvard Law School.She is currently pursuing a Masters degree in International Relations at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,Johns Hopkins University.Alec Caruana is a Research Assistant Intern at the Institute for China-America Studies and is a member of the ICAS Maritime Affairs Program team.He received a BSc in International Relations and History from the London School of Economics and Political Science specializing in cartographic history,American foreign policy,and Chinese involvement in the Global South.He is currently pursuing a masters degree in International Affairs taught jointly by Peking University and the LSE.VNovember 2022I-II EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1-2 PART I|INTRODUCTION3-21 PART II|TO PLAY THE CHINA CARD:REVIEWING THE 117TH CONGRESS LEGACY ON CHINA22-26 PART III|RED DRAGON OR RED HERRING?:THE CHINA FACTOR IN THE U.S.MIDTERM ELECTIONS27-31 PART IV|WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN THE 118TH CONGRESS?32 PART V|CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS33-36 ENDNOTESContentsBOXES&TABLESTABLE 1:Select Provisions that are Shared by USICA and AmCOM but Excluded from the CHIPS and Science ActTABLE 2:Manufacturers Top Choice of Provisions to be Included in a China Competition LegislationTABLE 3:Policy Purpose and Objective of the House Democratic Leadership and the White House Concerning the Competition BillTABLE 4:Research and Innovation Provisions of USICA and America COMPETES ActTABLE 5:Amount of Funding Authorized by the Semiconductor Division of the CHIPS and Science ActTABLE 6:Select Provisions of Controversy in USICA and AmCOMBOX 1:Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors Act(CHIPS for America Act 2021)Summary of the ProvisionsHouse of DragonslayersVIINovember 2022As the Biden administration continues to emphasize U.S.strategic competition with China,China has become a central focus of the 117th Congress over the past two years.Legislation was proposed,discussed and some adopted as law that directly addressed China on a variety of issues ranging from trade policy,technology and innovation competition,export controls,to measures targeting specific regions,specific industries,and specific public or private practices.During the last two years,the 117th Congress observed and experienced first-hand the consequences of the free fall that the U.S.-China bilateral relationship underwent during the Trump administration,and they consistently maintained this inertia throughout its duration.The 117th Congress could do little to reverse the trajectory or repair the bilateral relationship not only because of the personal beliefs of certain outspoken members of Congress,but also due to the general deterioration of the American public opinion on China indeed,no one shall go against the will of the voters.The complication of excess domestic lobbying,accompanied by the further deterioration of the U.S.-China relations on the international stage,has further raised unnecessary alarm on the Chinese side as Beijing interprets lobbying and political messages from the U.S.domestic discussions as proof of U.S.intention to further contain or even undermine Chinas rise.With the new congressional meeting starting in 2023,the 118th Congress will inherit both the deteriorating U.S.-China relations and the increasingly extreme rhetoric concerning China.As developments of the midterm election have Executive SummaryHouse of DragonslayersIIshown,China is a major issue to address for both the Democratic and the Republican party.As the presidential election becomes an increasingly hot domestic issue 2023-2024,the uncertainties of U.S.domestic politics will only increase.With Biden and Trump as the most likely finalists,the discussion over China and how the United States should continue to approach China will become the most dominant,if not only,issue on the candidates foreign policy agenda.In order to avoid turbulence caused by another incident in the like of Pelosis visit to Taiwan,an U.S.-China legislative dialogue should be established to avoid technology and trade issues from running into unknown and mutually harmful grounds.To use the newly elected 118th Congress and Chinas new Peoples Congress as a fresh start,both countries should increase communication on the legislative level and incorporate first-hand inputs from the business communities to stabilize the relationship.As developments in the bilateral relationship and in global events have led to increasing unpredictability and calls for more appropriate management,emerging policy issues in the field will require better coordination or at least sufficient communication between the two sides to avoid misunderstanding of intention and unnecessary escalation of tensions.1November 2022As the Biden administration continues to emphasize U.S.strategic competition with China,China has become a central focus of the 117th Congress over the past two years.On the one hand,legislation was proposed,discussed and some adopted as law that directly addressed China on a variety of issues ranging from trade policy,technology and innovation competition,export controls,to measures that target specific regions,specific industries,and specific public or private practices.On the other hand,even major bills that do not directly address China e.g.the domestic-focused Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,were associated with the strategic competition with China and discussed accordingly during the legislative process and,after they became law,in the implementation process.Most notably,both the lengthy legislative process of the“China competition bill”and the final enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act were defining moments of the 117th Congress.Even when the bill represented only a trimmed version of the most ambitious drafts of either the Senates United States Innovation and Competition Act(USICA)and the Houses America COMPETES Act(AmCOM),and even when it took significantly longer than expected or planned to pass,the bill was marked as a key legislative progress of the 117th Congress,the congressional leadership and other major supporters of the bill.In addition to the competition-focused legislations,the 117th Congress also continued to push for legislation to address increasingly negative U.S.views and issues that the U.S.and its public view as critical grievances towards the Peoples Republic of China.Human rights issues continue to be a persistent topic on which this Congress seeks to press China for changes.That said,unlike past legislation that focuses more on addressing the concerns and making the voices heard,the 117th Congress apparently seeks to put more pressure on China to address human rights issues through unilateral economic sanctions.Many of these sanction-based legislations are coincidentally overlapping with areas that are closely related to the U.S.-China bilateral trade and technology engagement,such as the sanctions suggested for the Chinese solar products,which are primarily produced from Xinjiang,where China is allegedly conducting problematic reeducation programs that mistreat its Uyghur minority.This had further complicated the 117th Congress move on China as economic benefits and technological decoupling came into play.In Summary:PART IIntroductionHouse of Dragonslayers2The 117th Congress efforts to empower the American manufacturing industry and to address concerns over Chinas rapidly developing innovative capabilities also put it in a leading position in advocating for further decoupling between the U.S.and China for various reasons.The 117th Congress not only seeks traditional federal investment-based industrial policies to“Out-China”China,but also shows certain signals to develop legislations that are designed to further decouple the two countries,and contain or even hurt Chinas development,at least in the short run.To address increasing American concerns over the issue of Taiwan,the 117th Congress also played a significant role in showcasing more American support for Taiwan and demanding a clearer position from the administration.Given Taiwans important role in the global semiconductor supply chain,as well as the economic potential of its market,the 117th Congress proposed moves on Taiwan could have significant impact on both the geopolitical and trade and tech engagement between the U.S.and China.With clocks ticking,the 2022 midterm elections could present a potential change of the American domestic political landscape.While the elections tend to focus more on domestic issues,China inevitably became a hot topic for both incumbent and challenging candidates.As many of the China-related legislations remained in the pipeline,the upcoming 118th Congress would play an important role in deciding the future trajectory of the U.S.-China bilateral relations,especially their bilateral trade and technological engagements.What are the consistent and persistent issues that we could expect the 118th Congress to inherit from the 117th?What are the newly emerged issues under the 117th Congress that could further expand under the 118th?What could the election results of the midterms tell about the 118th?This report will take a close look to some of the signature legislations under the 117th Congress,the ongoing campaigning of the 2022 midterm elections and the discussion over China,and provide an analysis of these above questions.3November 2022China has been a focal point in the 117th Congress,the first meeting of Congress under the Biden-Harris administration.In addition to congressional hearings and committee discussions,much focus has been placed on legislative efforts.Up to October 2022,the 117th Congress proposed 798 bills and resolutions that mentioned“China,”a number higher than either meeting of Congress under the Trump administration.1In the field of trade and technology,the most notable bill that became law is the CHIPS and Science Act,a trimmed version of the China competition bill.2 At the same time,other major legislative progress under the Biden administration have also been associated with the strategic competition with China,including the more domestic-focused Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.Meanwhile,a number of China-related bills remain in the pipeline.As the CHIPS and Science Act primarily addresses the semiconductor industry and government support for R&D,other provisions remain under discussion.These include a number of trade and foreign policy-focused provisions that were present in both the Senates United States Innovation and Competition Act(USICA)and the Houses America COMPETES Act(AmCOM)(see Table 1)as well as the more controversial and ambitious ones such as tariff reforms and outbound investment screening.Additionally,both chambers of Congress have proposed and even started to discuss some versions of the Taiwan Policy Act,which could have a significant technology and trade portion.During the last two years,the 117th Congress observed and experienced first-hand the consequences of the free fall that the U.S.-China bilateral relationship underwent during the Trump administration,and they consistently maintained this inertia throughout its duration.The 117th Congress could do little to reverse the trajectory or repair the bilateral relationship not only because of the personal beliefs of certain outspoken members of Congress,but also due to the general deterioration of the American public opinion on China indeed,no one shall go against the will of the voters.In Summary:PART IITo Play the China Card:Reviewing the 117th Congress Legacy on China House of Dragonslayers4TABLE 1:Select Provisions that are Shared by USICA andAmCOM but Excluded from the CHIPS and Science Act4 ProvisionsLevel of DivergenceChina and global supply chain:authorizes$15 million per year,2022-2026,to hire experts that will assist interested U.S.businesses with supply chain challenges related to ChinaNearly identicalGlobal infrastructure:Requires the President to develop a strategy on providing alternative infrastructure assistance to foreign governments;authorizes$75 million per year,2022-2026 to implement the strategy Requires the Executive Branch to comprehensively target Chinas predatory lending and financing in the energy sector of developing countriesMinor divergenceDigital commerce:Authorizes the establishment of the“Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership”to help foreign countries with internet access,free flow of data,cybersecurity,and promote U.S.ICT exportsNearly identicalStrategic partnership:Commits to deepen diplomatic,economic and security cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific Commits to strengthen engagement with Quad Sets out policy priority on cooperation with ASEAN Commits to enhance U.S.-Taiwan economic,political and security relationship,including on Taiwans involvement in international orgs Requires report to address Chinese Fentanyl trafficking Authorizes$100 million per year,2022-2026 against disinformation inside and outside of ChinaMinor divergenceInternational Security Authorizes$45 million,2022-2026 on military training and education in Indo-Pacific Requires report on building security capacities in Indo-Pacific Reemphasizes commitment to freedom of navigation in South China Sea Directs a report on strategy against Chinas nuclear and ballistic missile issues and one specifically on Chinas transfer of ballistic and nuclear technology to the Middle EastNearly identical5November 2022That being said,the failure of this 117th Congress is to further escalate the deterioration of U.S.-China relations into fields that are not necessarily of contention between the U.S.and China over the past five decades.Therefore,when analyzing the achievements and wrongdoings of this 117th Congress,it is important to distinguish between issues where the U.S.has long-standing grievances against China,e.g.intellectual property rights and market access concerns,and issues that were newly proposed by the members of the 117th Congress,e.g.supply chain resiliency,technological,economic and financial decoupling with China,etc.Admittedly,there are valid emerging concerns among those newly proposed issues that past administration and Congress either overlooked or did not foresee,e.g.Chinas rise,Chinas progress in innovation and Chinas technological development in AI,supercomputer,telecom and data governance.However,the sad reality is that an evil amalgama of increasingly negative public views against China,over-exaggeration of the“China factor”for domestic political gains and the occasional overreaction or sometimes,even more aggressively,hysteria to the shifting balance of power between U.S.and China,has turned into a major roadblock to securing a path towards a benign and manageable U.S.-China competition.Take the CHIPS and Science Act,a major component to the“China competition bill series”per Congress and President Biden,as an example.3 The CHIPS and Science Act:A“China Competition Bill”of Domestic-Focused ProvisionsIn mid-and late-July,2022,it became clear that the reconciliation process of the Senates USICA and the Houses America COMPETES Act commonly referred to as the“China competition bills”remained unfruitful despite the gradual approach of the midterm election and repeated urging from congressional leadership,Commerce officials and the American business community.5 On July 27,2022,the Senate proposed the CHIPS and Science Act(also known as the CHIPS for America Act of 2022 or the CHIPS-Plus Act).Containing only the semiconductor and research provisions of the competition bill,the CHIPS and Science Act would authorize$52.7 funding to incentivize semiconductor manufacturing and innovation in the United States and provide various government support for research and innovation in the United States.6 The House passed the Act the next day,and U.S.President Joe Biden signed the Act into law on August 9,2022.The provisions of the CHIPS and Science Act can be essentially traced back to four bills:The CHIPS Act of 2021,which became law on January 1,2021 to stimulate U.S.semiconductor manufacturing but received no funding until the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act;the National Science Foundation for the Future Act and Department of Energy Science for the Future Act,which aim to enhance U.S.research and innovation House of Dragonslayers6and passed the House on June 28,2021,and the Endless Frontier Act,a Senate-proposed equivalent intending to address the same problem.All the aforementioned bills address legitimate concerns and challenges for U.S.economy and innovation,but none of these issues whether its the offshoring of semiconductor manufacturing to China or the need to strengthen U.S.R&D was directly associated with China.Regardless,the combined package of the bills(i.e.USICA and AmCOM)was quickly framed as a“China competition bill”and“a comprehensive package”to compete with China and counter Chinas rise.7 This narrative has limited the possible scope of policy action and made it difficult to fully address the needs to build strength from home and revitalize the American manufacturing industry.On August 9,2022,U.S.President Joe Biden signed into law“The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022.”(Source:The White House,Public Domain)When the Endless Frontier Act,the first version of the research and innovation bills,was first introduced in the House in March,2021,the sponsors of the bill made it clear that they aim to enhance American economic and scientific competitiveness,bearing in mind both domestic societal challenges as well as the United States global leadership in technology and innovation.8 As the White House later details,the competition bill“aligned with the Presidents vision to enhance American economic and scientific competitiveness;build a stronger,more diverse,and more inclusive innovation ecosystem;and invest in strengthening critical supply chains,our domestic industrial base,and regional economic growth and development.”9Meanwhile,the business community in the United States has long called for government incentives to address the global semiconductor shortage crisis and to support the 1.From Addressing the Semiconductor Shortage to Increasing U.S.Competitiveness:Policy Concerns Behind the CHIPS and Science Act7November 2022domestic manufacturing sector.With open letters from the semiconductor industry,the manufacturer association and big tech companies,the bill is also a response to these needs and an expansion of earlier efforts to support U.S.industries.1.1 Background Legislation:Chips crisis 2020 and CHIPS Act 2021With the outbreak of a global semiconductor crisis in early 2020,the bipartisan legislative effort to stimulate U.S.chip manufacturing began as early as June,2020.Simultaneously introduced by Senator Mark R.Warner,Senator John Cornyn,U.S.Representative Doris Matsui and then House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Michael McCaul,the original version of Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors Act(CHIPS for America Act 2021,or CHIPS Act 2021)would,among others,create a 40%refundable investment tax credit for qualified semiconductor equipment or semiconductor manufacturing facility investment,a$10 billion federal funding that matches state and local incentives offered to the building of new semiconductor foundry with advanced manufacturing capabilities and new R&D funding streams to enhance government-supported R&D related to semiconductor technology.10 The Semiconductor Industry Association,a strong supporter of USICA and the CHIPS and Science Act,applauded the introduction of the bill.11On January 1,2021,a significantly revised version of the CHIPS Act 2021 became law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021(NDAA 2021).12 Department of Commerce:Incentivizes investment in U.S.semiconductor manufacturing and R&D by funding U.S.entities that provide equipment or materials for,or engage in semiconductor fabrication,assembly,testing,advanced packaging and R&D.National Science and Technology Council:Promotes U.S.leadership in microelectronics technology innovation by funding national technology center and public-private partnership programs that support advanced microelectronics R&D and the development of semiconductor manufacturing capabilities.Department of Defense:Ensures development and production capability of microelectronics that are critical to national security through the funding of public-private partnership and consortia of private companies.Department of Treasury:Enhances the security of semiconductor supply chains by establishing and maintaining a common funding mechanism,in coordination with trusted foreign partners,to support the development and adoption of secure semiconductor supply chains.BOX 1:Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors Act(CHIPS for America Act 2021)Summary of the Provisions21 House of Dragonslayers8The final CHIPS Act 2021 would direct the Department of Commerce,the National Science and Technology Council,the Department of Defense and the Department of Treasury to establish respective programs in support of U.S.semiconductor manufacturing,R&D and supply chain security.13 However,NDAA 2021 did not provide a funding mechanism for these programs.Later lobbying and legislative efforts have thus aimed at providing funding for the CHIPS 2021 programs through the competition bills.Additionally,some original provisions that were excluded from the CHIPS Act 2021,e.g.the investment tax credit and the R&D funding,eventually found its way back into the CHIPS and Science Act,albeit in revised and trimmed forms.1.2 Supporting U.S.Chips and Manufacturing:Calls from the American Business CommunityAs a cross-section of business groups continued to feel the impacts of a lasting global semiconductor crisis,the business community started to urge the 117th Congress to provide funding for the CHIPS 2021 programs.For the coalition led by the U.S.Chamber of Commerce and the alliance featuring Apple,Amazon,AT&T,Dell,General Electric,Google,HP,Microsoft,a bill to stimulate the U.S.semiconductor industry would not only address long-term chip shortage but also“strengthen U.S.economy,national security,and supply chain resilience.”14 Meanwhile,Lockheed Martin has highlighted the national security aspect of the issue,arguing that a robust supply of chips“is essential both to national security and to the health of the defense industrial base and the aerospace industry as a whole.”15Similarly,the semiconductor industry argued for government support not only to address the semiconductor shortage,but also for the long-term development and competitiveness of domestic semiconductor manufacturing.Semiconductor businesses,most notably Intel and Semiconductor Industry Association(SIA),have argued that the U.S.share in semiconductor manufacturing has declined because authorities in Taiwan,Korea and China are offering substantial manufacturing incentives to attract semiconductor manufacturing into Asia.16 Accordingly,Intel,SIA and Information Technology Industry Council(ITI)have constantly called for matching,or at least substantial incentives from the U.S.government to“level the playing field”or catch up with governments of“global competitors.”17 The end goal,according to ITIs policy priorities,is to ensure U.S.competitiveness for attracting semiconductor investment“vis-vis global partners and competitors who have robust incentives of their own.”18The National Association of Manufacturers(NAM)expanded the above-mentioned reasoning to the manufacturing sector in general.According to NAM,it is imperative that the federal government support the domestic manufacturing sector“in the face of increased global competition for industrial investment.”19 Among the manufacturers six top choices of new legislative provisions(see Table 2),the CHIPS and Science Act directly addressed two.9November 2022Notably,neither the CHIPS Act 2021 nor the business community included China or the direct countering of China as part of their policy needs and concerns.Even when mainland China was mentioned,it was joined by other U.S.allies and partners who have a strong semiconductor industry.Together,these Asian authorities were used as a benchmark to call for and validate the increase of U.S.government incentives but the business community by no means suggested or supported countering measures directly aimed at these“global competitors”in semiconductor manufacturing.Meanwhile,the National Association of Manufacturers finalized the above-mentioned statement in July,2021,at a time when relevant legislations were already by default“China competition bills.”Even then,most,if not all of NAMs top choices were domestic-oriented,with no mention of issues such as tariff,market access or countervailing duties,let alone those directed at China.TABLE 2:Manufactuers Top Choice of Provisions to be Included in a China Competition Legislation22#ProvisionStatus1Addressing port congestion and competition issues in ocean shippingThe Ocean Shipping Reform Act,which had been included in the America COMPETES Act,passed into law separately.2Eliminating ill-conceived labor provisions that facilitate unionization campaignsPer the White House,the CHIPS and Science Act support“good-paying,union construction jobs”by requiring Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rates for facilities built with CHIPS funding.23 3Strengthening U.S.leadership in energy innovation and competitivenessThe CHIPS and Science Act authorizes$67.9 billion over five years,for the Department of Energy,mostly for research and research infrastructure.4Funding to increase domestic semiconductor production capacityThe CHIPS and Science Act authorizes$52.7 billion over 5 years to incentives U.S.semiconductor innovation and production.5Investments to support the critical minerals supply chainNot addressed in the CHIPS and Science Act.6Full tax deduction for research expensesTax reduction for all research expenses is not addressed in the CHIPS and Science Act.House of Dragonslayers101.3 Supporting U.S.Chips and Manufacturing:Calls from the American Business CommunityWhile both the White House and Congress share a common understanding to promote U.S.economic and scientific competitiveness through the competition bills,a deeper read into the official documents reveals that at least between the White House and the House Democratic leadership,the nuances and primary focus of their respective policy focus and objectives vary.Below is a comparison based on the White Houses August 9 fact sheet and the House Democratic leaderships fact sheet,both concerning the CHIPS and Science Act:20 TABLE 3:Policy Purpose and Objective of the House Democratic Leadership and the White House Concerning the Competition Bill24 The White HouseHouse Democratic LeadershipEmphasis of Policy Purpose25“Keeping the United States the leader in the industries of tomorrow.”“Regaining U.S.strength and reducing long-term supply chain vulnerabilities in critical areas.”The industries of tomorrow contain nanotechnology,clean energy,quantum computing,and artificial intelligence.The critical areas include“advanced manufacturing,next-generation communications,computer hardware,and pharmaceuticals.”Highlighted policy objective of the bill“Advance U.S.global leadership in the technologies of the future.”Develop“use-inspired and translational research”and“technology-based solutions to national,societal or geostrategic challenges.”Shared technology and areas of focus Artificial intelligence Quantum computing Advanced communications technology/6G Advanced energy science Biotechnology House-unique technology and areas of focusN/A Biological and environmental research Sustainable chemistry Food-energy-water system Precision agricultureOther policy objectives mentioned Investment in the workforce Catalyze regional economic growth and development Research security11November 2022This difference in focus parallels the different approach between the older competition bill proposals,namely,the Senates USICA and the Houses America COMPETES Act.While both competition bills aim at promoting research and development,USICA focuses on enhancing U.S.competitiveness by increasing U.S.capacities in key cutting-edge technologies much alike the White Houses focus on“U.S.global leadership in the technologies of the future,”while AmCOM emphasizes“collaborative,purpose-driven R&D to address key societal challenges.”The parallel between the White House fact sheet and USICA might explain why the Senate is silent on its interpretation and vision for the CHIPS and Science Act,since it likely resembles that of the White House.TABLE 4:Research and Innovation Provisions of USICA and America COMPETES Act28 USICA(as of November,2021)America COMPETES Act(as of February,2022)General PurposeEnhance U.S.competitiveness and leadership in innovation and basic and applied research,especially in STEMAccelerate collaborative,purpose-driven R&D to address key societal challengesFocus AreasCapacities in key technology including:AI Semiconductor and advanced computing Quantum information technology Robotics,automation,and advanced manufacturing Advanced communications technology and immersive technology Data storage,data management and cybersecurity Batteries and other advanced energy and industrial efficiency technologies Advanced materials scienceSolutions to societal challenges including:Climate change and environmental sustainability Global competitiveness Cybersecurity National security STEM education and workforce Social and economic inequalityOther Supports the building of a STEM workforce as well as scholarship on the listed key technologies Separate funding for the Department of Energy to conduct R&D and address energy-related supply chain activities within the key technology focus areas Builds regional capacity and reduce geographic disparity(avoid undue geographic concentration of research and education funding)Supports all levels of STEM education Separate support to Department of Energy for research on energy storage,energy transition(solar,hydrogen,fusion,carbon removal,bioenergy),and critical materials Supports National Institute of Standards and Technology in research and standards development of cutting-edge technologies,including quantum information science,artificial intelligence,cybersecurity,privacy,engineering biology,advanced communications technologies,semiconductorsHouse of Dragonslayers12The actual texts of the final CHIPS and Science Act takes a compromised approach.The National Science Foundation(NSF)the agency that receives the majority of the research and innovation funding is instructed to use the funds to both address the societal challenges listed in AmCOM and advance the key technology focus areas as listed in USICA.26 However,the challenges and the technology focus areas do not have to directly align,and the NSF is instructed to review and adjust the list of challenges and technologies annually,in consultation with an advisory committee composed of stakeholders as well as industrial and academic experts.27 As such,the NSF has broad authority to set its investment priorities,either through adjusting the list of challenges and technologies of focus,or through deciding the specific projects to support.Compared to statements and concerns by the business community,the policy purposes of the White House and Congress show a slightly more outward approach the White House aims to ensure U.S.global leadership in future industries and technologies,while the House mentions supply chain vulnerabilities concerns which could have bilateral and multilateral implications.Nevertheless,both purposes landed on primarily domestic measures,i.e.on the building of U.S.capabilities.Even in areas where emphases vary,the difference centers around whether to focus on technology or societal challenges and thus tightly corresponds to the building of domestic capabilities.Indeed,in the White House fact sheet,China appeared only twice once in the title of the fact sheet and once when the fact sheet highlights a narrow guardrail to prevent CHIPS funding from being used in China.As the next section will reveal,this trend continues in the actual texts and provisions of the CHIPS and Science Act.2.Stimulating Chips and Science:A Summary of the Provisions2.1 Funding to Support Semiconductor Manufacturing and InnovationThe previous CHIPS Act of 2021 passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021(NDAA 2021)authorizes the Department of Commerce,Department of Defense and the Department of Treasury to establish respective programs to stimulate the semiconductor industry.The CHIPS and Science Act provides funding for those programs.Specifically,the bill authorizes:A total of$39 billion,from 2022 to 2026,to the Department of Commerce for stimulating semiconductor manufacturing,A total of$11 billion,from 2022 to 2026 to the Department of Commerce for research and workforce development,A total of$2 billion,from 2023 to 2027,to the Department of Defense for lab-to-fab transition of semiconductor technology and DOD-unique applications,13November 2022 A total of$500 million,from 2023 to 2027,to the Department of the Treasury to support relevant agencies in international information and communications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities A total of$200 million,from 2023 to 2027,to the Department of the Treasury to advance development of domestic semiconductor workforce,training and education.29Within the$39 billion of CHIPS funds for stimulating semiconductor manufacturing,$2 billion should be set aside to incentivize manufacturing of mature technology nodes.30 The White House and Senator Mark Kelly,a chief negotiator of the bill,both implied that this provision has in mind the automobile industry,among others,but the Department of Commerce has relative discretion in distributing these funds.315TABLE 5:Amount of Funding Authorized by the Semiconductor Division of the CHIPS and Science Act47 Fiscal YearManufacturing and R&D incentive(Commerce)48 R&D and workforce development(Commerce)DOD-unique applications and lab-to-fab transition of technology(Defense)49 International telecommunications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities(Through Treasury to State and other agencies)Workforce Development and Education(Treasury)2022$19 billion$5 billionN/AN/AN/A2023$5 billion$2 billion$400 million$100 million$25 million2024$5 billion$1.3 billion$400 million$100 million$25 million2025$5 billion$1.1 billion$400 million$100 million$50 million2026$5 billion$1.6 billion50$400 million$100 million$50 million2027N/AN/A$400 million$100 million$50 millionTotal$39 billion$11 billion$2 billion$500 million$200 millionTotal funding overall:$52.7 billionIn addition to the abovementioned fundings,the CHIPS and Science Act also establishes a 25%tax credit for investment in semiconductor manufacturing,if the manufacturing facilities will enter into service in or after 2023 and if construction begins before 2027.32 While not included in the previous versions of either USICA or AmCOM,this provision is a qualified House of Dragonslayers14version of the Facilitating American-Built Semiconductors Act(FABS Act)and reflects the approach of the originally proposed draft of the CHIPS Act 2021.Furthermore,the Act also prohibits recipients of the CHIPS funds from expanding semiconductor manufacturing capacity in China and“any other foreign country of concern”within 10 years since they receive the funding.“Legacy semiconductor”defined as 28 nanometer generation or older but subject to further modification by the Secretary of Commerce,are excluded from this prohibition.33 The act also prohibits recipients from using the CHIPS funds for stock buyback and dividends.34 Finally,the Act clarifies that upstream suppliers and nonprofits are eligible for CHIPS funds and specifies the goal of the programs as promoting U.S.“economic and national security interests.”35In addition to the semiconductor industry,the Act appropriates$1.5 billion to advance“open architecture,software-based wireless technologies”by funding“innovative,leap-ahead technologies in the U.S.mobile broadband market.”362.2 A Wide Range for Support for Advanced Research and Innovation BasisUnder the CHIPS and Science Act,a total of$169.9 billion are authorized over the next five years to support research projects in a number of agencies and departments.37 Specifically,the National Science Foundation(NSF)will receive$81 billion in funding to advance research and innovation,including through strengthening research infrastructure,promoting STEM education and training and expanding research programs and projects.38 The bulk of the funding will go to a new Directorate for Technology,Innovation,and Partnerships within the NSF to address societal challenges and advance key technology focus areas.The initial NSF focus areas are as follows:Societal challenges:National security Note:unlike AmCOM,the CHIPS and Science Act lists“national security”as the first of the societal challenges Manufacturing and industrial productivity Workforce development and skills gaps Climate change and environmental sustainability.Inequitable access to education,opportunity or other services.Key technology focus:AI Semiconductor and advanced computing Quantum information technology Natural disaster prevention or mitigation Note:not included in USICAs list Robotics,automation,and advanced manufacturing Advanced communications technology and immersive technology15November 2022 Biotechnology Note:not included in USICAs list Data storage,data management and cybersecurity Batteries and other advanced energy and industrial efficiency technologies Advanced materials science39The NSF is instructed to review and adjust the list of challenges and technologies annually,in consultation with an advisory committee composed of stakeholders as well as industrial and academic experts.40 The challenges and the technology focus areas do not have to directly align.Although the NSF has broad discretion in distributing the funds,it is also instructed to conduct a review of its progress in key technology focus areas and challenges no later than five years after the enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act.41 The review should cover,among others,the relative balance in leadership between the United States,allied and partner countries and China.The Department of Energy receives the second-most funding under the research and innovation provisions a total of$67.9 billion over five years.The bulk of this funding will go to the Department of Energys Office of Science,supporting its seven core research programs,i.e.Advanced Scientific Computing Research,Basic Energy Sciences,Biological and Environmental Research,Fusion Energy Sciences,High Energy Physics,Nuclear Physics,Isotope R&D and production.According to highlights summarized by the House Science Committee,the funding aims at supporting the fight against climate change as well as research in emerging areas,including quantum information science and artificial intelligence,among others.42The Act also provides$10 billion to the National Institute for Standards and Technology(NIST)to support the development of standards for emerging technologies and to provide further support and incentives to U.S.manufacturing.43Finally,the Department of Commerce is appropriated with$10 billion over 5 years to build regional technology hubs to expand innovation capacity in areas that are not leading technology centers.44 In accordance with the general goal to enhance innovative capacity and economic growth among all regions,the NSF is also instructed to build Regional Innovation Engines,with a special consideration for rural regions.The Regional Innovation Engines shall work in collaboration with the Department of Commerces regional technology hubs as well as relevant federal agencies,educational institutions and the private sector.2.3 Narrow Guardrails and Old Grievances:CHIPS Provisions that Directly Concerns ChinaAlthough the competition bill is often described as an effort to enhance U.S.competitiveness vis-vis China,a limited number of provisions in the 1034-page bill directly discuss China.House of Dragonslayers16As were previously mentioned,the CHIPS and Science Act prohibits recipients of the CHIPS funds from expanding semiconductor manufacturing capacity in China except for older-generation“legacy semiconductor.”In addition,Chinese companies are not allowed to participate in the NISTs Manufacturing USA Program without a waiver,and the NSF shall not provide funding to programs and projects that involve the Confucius Institute.45The CHIPS and Science Act,as is signed by U.S.President Joe Biden.(Source:The White House,Public Domain)As can be seen from the summary of the CHIPS and Science Act provisions,the bill primarily addresses U.S.domestic policy specifically,on the development of U.S.semiconductor manufacturing and on government supported R&D efforts in foundational and cutting-edge technologies.Although“China”was not entirely absent from the bill,it was neither a notable component of the policy concerns that the bill aims to address,nor a prevailing factor in the actual content of the bill.That being said,to allocate enough resources and to overcome partisan differences on the legislation,the China factor was used to rally enough political support especially to win over the hearts and minds of the partisan Republican.However,by doing so,the original and concrete aim of the package namely,macroeconomic-and innovation-oriented 3.Inclusion of the“China”Factor:A Shortcut to Political Support Turning to a Long Journey of Law-makingFurthermore,the Biden administration is also instructed to develop a national strategy in improving the U.S.technological competitiveness in support of the U.S.national security strategy and the national strategy must include an assessment of the extent to which intellectual property developed with federal defense funding is being used by China-related entities.46 The NSF is also instructed to review its progress including by comparing the“relative balance in leadership”between the United States,China and others in key technology focus areas and in addressing societal challenges.In sum,the“China”provisions of the CHIPS and Science Act can be generally summarized into three categories:First,“guardrail”provisions that prevent the CHIPS and Science Act funding from benefitting China and at least part of the Chinese entities;second,a provision that address,in passing,the conventional grievance of intellectual property rights;and third,a provision that use China as a benchmark to assess U.S.competitiveness much alike the approach of the business community as they promote for government incentive measures to support U.S.domestic industries.17November 2022stimulation was plagued by the hyped hysteric fear of China and the overemphasis of national security concerns.Meanwhile,the China factor also became a convenient excuse for any party to lobby or advocate for its own interests that were not supposed to be directly associated with China.This created an intricate phenomenon that during the lobbying process of the CHIPS and Science Act,parties that were both for the bill and against the bill mentioned U.S.strategic competition with China repeatedly,yet in the full body of the legislation,China was only present in five provisions three guardrail ones that prohibit CHIPS and Science Act funding from going to China,one that mentions the traditional grievance of intellectual property rights and one that uses China as a benchmark to assess U.S.competitiveness.Just as the introduction of the China factor helped ensure support for the bill,it also significantly extended the legislative process.As mentioned earlier,legislative efforts to address the semiconductor shortage crisis started even before the 117th Congress,in July 2020,and resulted only in a temporary conclusion but hardly a solution at the beginning of the 117th Congress.Meanwhile,the initial versions of the competition bills the Endless Frontier Act,the National Science Foundation for the Future Act and Department of Energy Science for the Future Act passed their respective chambers around June,2021.At the time,there was both bipartisan and industrial support to pass a bill to both fund the CHIPS Act 2021 and increase support for U.S.research and innovation,but the House and the Senate needed to reconcile their different approach with regard to the research and innovation provisions(see Table 4 and discussions above).Nevertheless,as the semiconductor and the research provisions became combined into a China competition bill,compromises and negotiations with the Republican Senators also resulted in the inclusion of more provisions in USICA most notably,the reinstatement of Section 301 tariff exclusion which incited controversy.An even more extreme case occurred with the Houses America COMPETES Act(AmCOM).AmCOM passed the House on February 4,2022,after at least seven months of debates,negotiations and compromises.As the Houses established proposal for the competition bill,the package not only proposed to expand the Trade Adjustment Assistance program and provisions on global climate partnership both partisan issues that most Republican lawmakers opposed,but it also incorporated a number of other bills that were labeled as important measures to counter China but strongly opposed by several major business groups,mostly because the“countermeasures”had excessively sweeping coverages or aggressive approach compared to the policy goals they proposed to secure(see Table 6).The concept of a China competition bill likely made it difficult to exclude these controversial and,at times,aggressive,bills from the package.And while the inclusion of the bills was likely vital to securing some political and legislative support for the competition bill,controversy surrounding these controversial bills added a multitude of new layers to House of Dragonslayers18the legislative discussion,making any reconciliation effort cumbersome,time-consuming and nearly impossible.By mid-to late-July,2022,Congress had repeatedly passed estimated and planned deadlines for passing the China competition bill,and congressional leaders previously vowed to pass the competition bill in July.51 On July 27,2022,the Senate proposed the CHIPS and Science Act,which contains only the semiconductor and research provisions of the competition bill with the exception of three additional China guardrail provisions and the necessary compromise between the Senate and the House approach,the CHIPS and Science Act closely resembles corresponding provisions in the National Science Foundation for the Future Act and Department of Energy Science for the Future Act,and the Endless Frontier Act,all passed more than a year ago and proposed even earlier.TABLE 6:Select Provisions of Controversy in USICA and AmCOM52 ProvisionsIn:Opposition and DisagreementReinstate the exclusion of Section 301 tariff on Chinese goodsUSICAOpposed by AFL-CIO;supported by Senate Republicans U.S.Chamber of Commerce.Lawmakers are divided on the issue.Trade Adjustment Assistance(TAA)AmCOMSupported by labor groups but opposed by Republican lawmakers.Senator Rob Portman suggested that TAA might pass if accompanied by the Trade Promotion Authority(TPA),but the Biden administration showed little interest in seeking TPA.Outbound investment screeningAmCOMOpposed by U.S.Chamber of Commerce,the U.S.-China Business Council and other business groups.De minimis tariff reformAmCOMOpposed by U.S.Chamber of Commerce and National Foreign Trade Council.AD/CVD reform(“Eliminating Global Market Distortions To Protect American Jobs Act of 2021”)AmCOMOpposed by U.S.Chamber of Commerce,National Foreign Trade Council,Autos Drive America;supported by American Iron and Steel Institute,Alliance for American Manufacturing and American Institute of Steel Construction.Global climate partnershipAmCOMOpposed by Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell and criticized by House Republicans.19November 2022The complication of excess domestic lobbying,accompanied by the further deterioration of the U.S.-China relations on the international stage,has further raised unnecessary alarm on the Chinese side as the Chinese government interprets lobbying and political messages from the U.S.domestic discussions as proof of U.S.intention to further contain or even undermine Chinas rise.Since the Senate introduced USICA as a China competition bill,the Chinese government has been critical of the competition bill.On April 22,2021,after the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed USICA,the Foreign Affairs Committee of Chinas National Peoples Congress criticized the bill for“consisting of Cold War mentality and ideological biases,slandering Chinas development strategy and domestic and foreign policies,and grossly interfering with Chinas internal affairs.”53 The statement specified,however,that“even if the United States and China would compete in certain areas,the competition should be fair,rule-based,benign and manageable,”and primarily denounced provisions that concern Taiwan,Xinjiang and Hong Kong.Similarly,on November 30,2021,Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for U.S.and Chinese businesses to“cease undermining and sanctioning Chinese companies,persuade Congress against passing China-related legislations such as the Innovation and Competition Act,and establish a fair area for U.S.and Chinese companies”aiming at benign competition.54As lobbying and legislative efforts for the China competition bill continued,Chinas position has also hardened and when the U.S.Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act,the critical attitude extended to the trimmed competition bill likely also due to the explicit“China guardrail provisions”that were added last-minute by China hawks.Following the congressional passage of the CHIPS and Science Act,Chinas Commerce Ministry said that the act“contains provisions that restrict relevant companies normal economic,trade and investment activities in China,which is discriminatory and will distort the global semiconductor supply chain and disrupt international trade.”55 The ministry urged the U.S.to implement the bill in accordance with relevant WTO rules and principles,maintain the security and stability of global industrial and supply chains and avoid fragmentation.56 China“firmly opposes”the bill and will“take forceful measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests when necessary,”according to the ministry.57 Following that line,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that the bill“is purportedly aimed at bolstering the competitive edge of the USs sci-tech and chip industries”but“certain provisions in the act restrain normal sci-tech cooperation between China and the US.”58 Meanwhile,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin called the bill“an example of economic coercion by the U.S.,”while emphasizing that“decoupling will harm both itself and others.”59 Restrictions and suppression will not stop the pace of Chinas technological and industrial development,Wang added.4.When Lobbying Rhetoric Leads to Diplomatic Response:Chinese Criticism of the China Competition BillHouse of Dragonslayers20As China became increasingly firm in its criticism and denouncement of the China competition bill,the U.S.lawmakers will interpret Chinas diplomatic pushback in two ways:First,they see China becoming increasingly assertive and intending to interfere with U.S.domestic politics,which deepens the perception of the China threat especially during election seasons.Second,Chinas strong opposition of the CHIPS Act makes lawmakers,especially the China hawks,believe that technological self-reliance and decoupling hurt Chinas interests,which means there will be even more incentives to push for further aggressive legislation to deepen U.S.-China trade and tech decoupling,or even escalating U.S.-China competition in general.Some of those can be observed from several China bills that are currently under discussion in the 117th Congress and could potentially carry over to the 118th Congress.First,looking at“the impact of outbound U.S.investment flows that could circumvent the spirit of export controls or otherwise enhance the technological capacity of U.S.competitors in ways that harm U.S.national security,”60 several lawmakers and congressional leaders have continued to push for the establishment of an outbound investment screening mechanism,ideally through the enactment of a legislation.The current legislative proposal,the National Critical Capabilities Defense Act,would establish an interagency committee to review and potentially suspend outbound investment activities that involve nations of concerns primarily China and“critical national capability.”Business communities and industrial stakeholders have criticized the current bill for having an overly expansive coverage,especially as the bill leaves“critical national capability”undefined and up to the interpretation of the interagency committee.61Second,two bills have been proposed to reform tariff and trade enforcement tools in an effort to counter China.Aiming at combating unfair trade practices“emanating from Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian at a press conference in Beijing on July 28,2022.(Source:Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China,Public Domain)A Free Fall Into China Threat and Decoupling?21November 2022China,”the Eliminating Global Market Distortions To Protect American Jobs Act of 2021 would strengthen and expand antidumping and countervailing duty measures,including by extending countervailing duties to cover“cross-border subsidy”resulting from the Belt and Road Initiative and similar practices.Meanwhile,the Import Security and Fairness Act would prohibit the de minimis exemption the practice to not charge tariffs on goods valued below$800 for imports from China.While some identified the de minimis reform as a needed change to address the increase of import packages under the de minimis level,partly attributed to the growing cross-border e-commerce,others argued that the reform would lead to significant administrative costs far surpassing possible benefits.62Third,Title V of the Taiwan Policy Act currently under discussion in the U.S.Senate,aims at“enhanced development and economic cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.”The provisions emphasized Taiwans role as a reliable partner“critical for diversifying our Nations supply chains,”for reducing U.S.reliance on China and highlighted the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue as well as its coverage over issues such as 5G networks and telecommunications security,supply chains resiliency,infrastructure cooperation,renewable energy,global health and science and technology.The bill further urged the administration to resume meetings under the United States and Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the goal to reach a bilateral trade agreement.From untraditional tariff measures such as the de minimis reform(namely,the Import Security and Fairness Act)and the introduction of new AD/CVD tools,to the unrelenting legislative push for an outbound investment screening mechanism(namely,the National Critical Capabilities Defense Act)despite pushback from the business community,the push to decouple U.S.-China trade and technology ties has continued and has expanded to new arenas,with the potential to impact an even broader range of industries,sectors and global actors.At the same time,corresponding tendencies can also be spotted in the debates and rhetoric surrounding the midterm elections,as candidates solidified a“tough on China”consensus regardless of their party and grew increasingly hawkish at least in rhetoric against China.However,as was discussed,such political narrative and messaging now have implications beyond mere domestic politics and lobbying efforts.In a world where the China talks have translated into a continuing U.S.-China trade war,increasing tightening of technology control and decoupling,heightened legislative discussion and the domestically applauded enactment of a China competition bill and Pelosis visit to Taiwan,it will be especially difficult if at all possible to convince China that the rhetoric does not reflect U.S.policy intent and strategic planning to contain China.As Chinas responses and pushbacks will only intensify the perception of China threat and lead to further efforts in decoupling,the developments could well translate into a self-fulfilling prophecy,where Congress is eventually bound to act just as hawkish as the political talks of the lawmakers.The next section will look into this issue by evaluating the current landscape of the midterm elections as related to the China issues.House of Dragonslayers22While the result of the upcoming U.S.midterm elections rests on several polarizing domestic issues,when it comes to Congress approach to China,most candidates only differ in just how tough they think the U.S.ought to act towards Beijing.This crystalizing tough on China consensus between the two parties Congressional caucuses is quite well-founded electorally.Chinas unfavorability rating has drastically increased across party lines since the last U.S.midterm elections were held in 2018.According to a recent Pew poll,roughly 9 in 10 Americans(89%)consider China as an enemy or competitor while 67el cold towards China,a sentiment that has expanded from 46%of the polled population in 2018.63Many candidates have talked tough in an attempt to court a voting public generally dissatisfied with the rise of China,but the lack of substantive debate regarding the relationship as well as the relative urgency of other issues has largely neutralized the China factor as an important distinguishing point between the two parties this November.Therefore,mentions of China in the midterm campaigns should be taken with a grain of salt Chinas salience electorally is largely a matter of rhetoric and bluster,while its real relevance as it relates to trade policymaking has gone largely unmentioned this election season.That being said,Republicans have generally centered critique of China in their electoral rhetoric to a greater degree than Democrats this election season.As they are poised to overtake Democrats handedly in the House of Representativesand possibly in the Senate as well by a narrower marginwe can expect a slightly harder line on China to emerge on the Hill that could pressure President Biden for the remainder of his term.In practice,this rhetoric around China has not neatly coalesced around certain policies.Rather,Republicans have played the China card in myriad ways:to signal ideological opposition to a strawman of Chinese communism,to pin blame on the President for In Summary:PART IIIRed Dragon or Red Herring?The China Factor in the U.S.Midterm Elections23November 2022perceived Chinese economic abuses,and to demonstrate their willingness to commit military resources in a hypothetical conflict between China and U.S.partners in East Asia.In response,challengers have sought to paint their rivals as hypocrites by calling out their own ties to Chinese firms and call their loyalty into question further devolving the discourse away from real discussions of China policy and towards personality contests.One such example occurred earlier this year in Pennsylvania,where the Republican primary candidate(now nominee)for Senate,Dr Mehmet Oz,squabbled with his challenger Dave McCormick over business dealings with Chinese health companies and hedge funds,respectively.64 While this episode was of electoral consequence when initially revealed,one should remember that both candidates positioned themselves as champions of America First policies and would likely have adopted similarly populist approaches towards China in office.These rhetorical battles over general toughness also serve as an unfortunate distraction to practical questions of how candidates would seek to counter China through the technicalities of trade policy or investment controls.As such,the remainder of this section will attempt to separate political theater from the real implications that midterm contest will have vis-vis China.The two dynamics to be explored are the replacement of a few trade-focused incumbents by more protectionist newcomers,and the lack of a clear partisan binary on trade issues.Trade-focused incumbents or candidates more often than not are from manufacturing states in the revitalizing Rust Belt of the mid-Atlantic and Midwest and especially in the tech sector the Sun Belt along the nations southern coast and border.Therefore,the retiring of Senators Toomey and Portman from Pennsylvania and Ohio,respectively,are two personnel changes that are bound to have a knock-on effect in how the Congressional parties will devise,amend,support,and move China-focused legislation through the next Congress.This is especially true given that the political climate has given way to more radical newcomers.American citizens voting in an election.(Source:Getty Images,Royalty-Free)1.Departures of Veteran Trade-Focused Incumbents is Expected to Further Politicize Trade and Technology PolicymakingHouse of Dragonslayers24Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania,while serving on the committees of Banking and Finance,consistently sought to prevent trade barriers with China while addressing imbalances in the relationship by other means.For instance,he reached an agreement with labor-aligned Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio on a bipartisan amendment to USICA that would have provided for sanctions on Chinese organizations involved in money laundering and intellectual property theft.65 However,Toomey ultimately opposed USICA for its government-directed spending that“imitates Chinese central planning.”66 Toomey also repeatedly called for Section 301 tariff relief and for a reform of the exclusion process to feature in the final China competition bill.67Toomeys departure has given way to a race in Pennsylvania between Republican television personality Dr.Mehmet Oz and Democratic Lieutenant Governor John Fetterman.Both candidates have vowed to get tough on China and preserve the states critical manufacturing sector.While Oz cultivated his anti-China bona fides during his primary race,he has come under fire in the general from Fetterman over his past partnership with a Chinese healthcare company and conspicuously rapid change in tone.Fetterman led solidly for much of the summer,but Oz is currently closing the gap,trailing Fetterman by 3 points on aggregate this week.68Rob Portman,an incumbent Republican Senator from Ohio,is another trade focused incumbent that is leaving Congress at the end of his term.As a former House Member,U.S.Trade Representative,Director of the Office of Management and Budget and a Finance,Energy,and Foreign Affairs committee member in the Senate Rob Portman consistently opposed what he saw as unfair trade practices in Beijing,including a successful WTO suit in 2005 against Chinas improper duties on auto parts imported from America.Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania speaking at the 2014 Conservative Political Action Conference(CPAC)in National Harbor,Maryland.(Source:Flickr/Gage Skidmore,CC BY-SA 2.0)U.S.Senator Rob Portman speaking at the 2015 Defending the American Dream Summit at the Greater Columbus Convention Center in Columbus,Ohio.(Source:Flickr/Gage Skidmore,CC BY-SA 2.0)25November 2022The term of Senator Portmans Democratic counterpart in the state of Ohio,Senator Sherrod Brown,will not end with this election cycle.Both Ohio senators,while divided by party lines,have worked together to protect their states manufacturing sector through measures like introducing legislation to strengthen trade remedy laws last year and,more recently,jointly urging President Biden to maintain Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods.69 Brown has not ruled out running for re-election to the Senate come 2024.The race for Portmans open seat is between Republican author and commentator J.D.Vance and long-time Democratic House member Tim Ryan.Vance is a Trump-style populist who has aligned himself with the former Presidents rhetoric on China.Representative Ryan,while having deep roots in organized labor,has also positioned himself as a conservative-friendly candidate saying he“agreed”with Trump on trade during his administration while the then-venture capitalist Vance was touting the importance of free-trade agreements at the expense of local manufacturing jobs.70 Vance is currently pulling away from Ryan in the polls,leading this week by 4 points on aggregate.71The replacement of one free trade advocate and one trade focused centrist with two more protectionist minded candidates will likely have a pronounced effect on increasing the polarization of the next Congress on issues of trade.The loss of these key individuals,with decades of experience in the technicalities of trade policy,could give way to more politically(as opposed to technocratically)motivated proposals,a dynamic which is likely to be even more pronounced if one or both chambers of Congress flip to the Republican side.Congress could become a source of less reasonable policy entrepreneurship,with measures designed moreso to challenge Bidens trade agenda than to supplement U.S.strategy towards China at large.Rather than a strictly partisan divide on trade and technology relations with China in the leadup to the midterm elections,there exist parallel divides within each party between free trade advocates and protectionists.The protectionist views in each party have emerged from similarly perceived issues in the American economy(such as the declining manufacturing sector)but they manifest in different ways due to the diverging voter bases of each party.Democrats who support more protectionist measures tend to have deeper ties to organized labor,while Democratic candidates with more suburban,upper-class bases of support tend to be less adamant about trade barriers.On the Republican side,support for protectionist measures tends to correlate with candidates who derive their support from the Trump base,while candidates who rely more on connections to the business community and main street Republican voters tend to be more classically liberalfavoring free trade while countering China in other areas.2.Pro-Trade and Protectionist Voices Across the Map and on Both Sides of the Aisle:Breaking the Partisan Binary House of Dragonslayers26As the aforementioned races in Ohio and Pennsylvania show us,there isnt always a clear binary in trade policy across party lines.In Ohio,for instance,the Democrat is outflanking the Republican and calling his Trumpian bona fides on China into question.However,the Wisconsin Senate race does display a more traditional partisan divide on trade policy between a pro-trade Republican and a pro-labor Democrat.Incumbent Senator Ron Johnson occupies the classical liberal wing of the GOP,consistently voting in favor of free trade agreements and tax cuts while opposing tariffs and federal subsidies.This means that the Senator has voted against several measures designed to confront China economically,such as the United States Innovation and Competition Act(USICA)and the CHIPS and Science Act,as well as called on the USTR to review the tariff exclusion process and reduce tariffs on China altogether.72However,the Senator has responded to claims that he is too soft on China by pointing to his support of measures to counter China in areas other than bilateral trade.For example,in March he introduced the Protect Americas Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act,which would reestablish an office in the Department of Justice to prevent Chinese spying against U.S.intellectual property and academic institutions.Senator Johnson also defended his vote against USICA by saying it did not adequately take China to task for stealing intellectual property and dodging investigations into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.Johnson is currently leading slightly in the polls against his Democratic challenger,Lieutenant Governor Mandela Barnes.73 Barnes has contrasted himself with Johnson by specifically addressing the U.S.-China trade relationship.For example,the Barnes campaign unveiled a plan to boost local manufacturing that calls for an end to“bad trade deals and anti-competitive practices”that he believes are stymieing Wisconsin businesses ability to compete with China.74Contrasting these cases reveals a vibrant spectrum of opinions on trade policy towards China hidden beneath electoral rhetoric,but there is as much disagreement internal to each party as there is across party lines.This is another indication that the outcome of the midterms will likely politicize China policy to a greater degree:if the Democrats manage to hold the Senate,the party will likely continue to transition away from neoliberal trade policies and support the Biden teams trade agenda with more gusto;if the Republicans win control of one or both chambers,the partys America First and pro-trade wings will likely throw up challenges to Bidens trade agenda from both sides(through measures like the aforementioned National Critical Capabilities Defense Act,the Import Security and Fairness Act,and the Taiwan Policy Act).Either way,Congress transition after the midterms will likely result in a relative decrease in technocratic policy entrepreneurship in favor of further buttressing or crippling the White Houses leading role in China-focused trade and technology policy.As to the specifics of how this will manifest in the 118th Congress,the next part of the report will go into more detail.27November 2022With the new congressional meeting starting in 2023,the 118th Congress will inherit both the deteriorating U.S.-China relations and the increasingly extreme rhetoric concerning China.As developments of the midterm election have shown,China is a major issue to address for both the Democratic and the Republican parties.As the presidential election becomes an increasingly hot domestic issue 2023-2024,the uncertainties of U.S.domestic politics will only increase.With Biden and Trump as the most likely finalists,the discussion over China and how the United States should continue to approach China will become the most dominant,if not only,issue on the candidates foreign policy agenda.Indeed,this trend will likely occur even when the Ukraine crisis persists in the upcoming years.Biden has already stated clearly through both his own statement and his national security strategy that even when Russia brutally invaded Ukraine,the Biden administration still considers China as the only capable pacing challenge to the United States.75 While for Trump,his China policy was one of the biggest selling points of his foreign policy success during both his 2016 and 2020 campaign.With no doubt,should Trump become the Republican finalist of the presidential election,he will continue his previous rhetoric and emphasize competition,if not confrontation,with China.As Biden and his Republican opponents are preparing and running for the 2024 presidential election,there will be more space for the 118th Congress to operate in 2023 and 2024.The 117th Congress has already shown a passion and eagerness to take more responsibility and press the Biden administration to be more active in addressing various issues with regard to China.As such,the 118th Congress should also continue this trajectory and,with several legislative issues and bills already in the pipeline,become more aggressive and more specific in dealing with many key issues concerning U.S.-China trade and technology engagement.In Summary:PART IVWhat to Look For in the 118th Congress?House of Dragonslayers28Accordingly,there could emerge an alarming tendency that as the U.S.-China relationships deteriorated and as hawkish China talks grew increasingly prevalent in the United States,legislative attention will turn to focus not on increasing U.S.competitiveness,but on containing and even hurting China.The 117th Congress has focused on playing the China card to ensure the passage of major pieces of legislation and has narrowly met the goal with the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act in August.The 118th Congress,in turn,could have both the tendency and the opportunity to advance specific counter-China measures,potentially at the expense of benign competition and further escalation of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.U.S.President Joe Biden delivers his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on March 1,2022.(Source:The White House via Flickr)1.Key legislative issues and topics to keep an eye on1.1 Enhanced economic ties between U.S.and Taiwan,especially on semiconductorTaiwan is a complicated issue that concerns both strategic geopolitical interests,security/arms sale and technology and supply chain concerns.Due to the fact that the Biden administration has been moving very slowly with establishing proper bilateral trade relationships between the United States and Taiwan,the 118th Congress will likely remain agitated on the issue and will seek to do more than just advocacy and open letters.So far,the top priority has remained on agricultural trade,an issue that is most relevant to the concerns of the voters.However,should this issue be resolved,judging by what House Speaker Pelosi discussed with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company(TSMC)executives,it is highly likely that the 118th Congress,regardless of whether the 29November 2022Democratic or the Republican party has majority,will still move forward to encourage Taiwan technology companies such as TSMC to invest in the United States as well as to increase bilateral trade and technology collaboration under bills such as the CHIPS and Science Act,other trade-and supply chain-related USICA provisions that could potentially become law,and the Taiwan trade bill that could be potentially proposed.In this case,the Taiwan Policy Act,though being regarded by the Biden administration as extremely radical,can nevertheless work as a blueprint for the 118th Congress.Notably,the Senate version of the bill included only non-mandatory,“sense of Congress”nudges that call for resumed meetings under the United States and Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the goal to reach a bilateral trade agreement.With the division of trade and foreign affairs power between the President and Congress,it is unclear whether Congress will have the ability or intent to impose an even stronger measure.Furthermore,future legislative efforts could allow for and encourage more input from local governments on semiconductor and technology investment,especially as the federal government gets distracted by domestic political events.As was discussed,the initial proposal for the CHIPS Act 2021,which was strongly supported by the Semiconductor Industry Association,would provide$10 billion federal funding to match state and local incentives offered to the building of new semiconductor foundry with advanced manufacturing capabilities.Accordingly,there is a strong likelihood that industrial incentive to amplify state and local support has remained.On the other hand,as the Commerce Department favors programs that have already secured state or local incentives when distributing the CHIPS and Science funding,76 the ties and connections between the industry and state and local governments will only intensify through the implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act,leading to a firmer foundation for state and local governments to play a greater role,especially with the appropriate federal support and authorization.1.2 New arenas of technology and capital controlAs several areas have become past issues and settled results,the 118th Congress will likely open up new arenas of U.S.-China tech and trade decoupling.Following trade decoupling led by the Section 301 tariffs as well as the tightened review of Chinese M&A activity and inward investment through the enactment of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act(FIRRMA),legislative and political interests have already moved to the supervision and control of outbound capital and technology.On the front of outbound investment screening,the current legislative proposal aims to establish an interagency committee much alike the review mechanism for inbound foreign investment into the United States to review and potentially block activities that relate to China and“critical national capability.”With calls from both legislators and businesses House of Dragonslayers30to narrow the scope of the bill,however,questions abound on the particulars:How will“critical national capability”be defined?Which of the outbound investment activities will be deemed as harmful to U.S.interests and accordingly blocked?How broad would the committees review authority apply?And where should the perimeter of extra-territorial application of jurisdiction reside,etc.?Even as some congressional leaders are calling for the White House to go ahead and establish an outbound investment screening mechanism amidst contemplation and debates among lawmakers,77 Congress will need to eventually present a definitive solution and clearly define the outer limits and specifics of the outbound investment review mechanism it wishes to establish.At the same time,the Bureau of Industry and Security(BIS)has been exploring multilateral and unilateral approaches to address congressional concerns,but hearing statements and open letters have shown that many in Congress believe that the administration can do more,whether on the front of emerging and foundational technologies,other dual-use technologies,or beyond.As is shown by proposed bills such as National Critical Capabilities Defense Act(outbound investment screening)and Import Security and Fairness Act(De Minimis Reform),Congress believes that the United States can and should do more to decouple U.S.-China trade and tech engagement in furtherance of U.S.interests.Alan Estevez,now head of the Bureau of Industry and Security(BIS),then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,giving a speech in 2015.(Source:Marvin Lynchard/Department of Defense via Flickr,Public Domain)1.3 Old GrievancesCongress will continue to pursue old American grievances towards China.As the bilateral relationship deteriorates,and as rhetoric on China remains extreme,the 118th Congress will only do more,not less,to call out China on issues like human rights,coercive actions and other national security related concerns.In this sense,the foreign strategy and international security provisions in USICA and the value-oriented statements in the America COMPETES Act will likely reenter the legislative discussion and have the potential to appear in even more aggressive tones.31November 2022The outcome of the midterm will also slightly change the approach of the 118th Congress.While the tough on China tone will persist regardless of the midterm election outcomes,it is generally understood that if Republicans win a majority in the House which they are expected to they will become more aggressive and hostile towards China than their Democratic counterparts.The Republicans will likely put extra pressure on issues such as export control and form special committees and groups directly aimed at addressing the China threat.Furthermore,Republican House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy has stated that he would visit Taiwan if he becomes House Speaker should he follow through with his promises,78 this can likely mean increased tensions between the United States and China,as well as accompanying legislative proposals on Taiwan.That being said,the specific stance of the 118th Congress will likely depend on developments in geopolitical events during its two years.Should the Taiwan Strait,the East China Sea and the South China Sea become hot issues,the attention will likely shift from trade and technology to general strategic and security matters.While such a shift cannot stop the further deterioration of U.S.-China relationship,it might at least not accelerate the bilateral tech and trade decoupling.Be that as it may,the uncertainty created by security-related tensions will nevertheless hurt the confidence of the global market.As the US-China Business Council has shown through its annual member survey,uncertainties around U.S.-China tensions and geopolitics have led a majority of the companies to enter a wait-and-see mode,while the increasing risk including lost sales due to uncertainty of supply has already harmed U.S.companies and their confidence in future prospects,all the while the companies continue to recognize Chinas importance to their global competitiveness.79 Any actions to and turbulence in the U.S.-China relationships will likely have a garner impact in the long run.Additionally,the domestic partisanship in the United States is not likely to be solved under the 118th Congress.Therefore,playing the China card will still be the most convenient way to win over the hearts and minds of the U.S.voters.As such,the abovementioned impacts of overly playing the China card be it the distorted policy intent,mismatched or inefficient solutions to inherently domestic problems,or the unnecessary deterioration of U.S.-China relationships can likely persist if unaddressed.2.Midterm Outcomes,Domestic Partisanship and Red-Blue Differences on ChinaHouse of Dragonslayers32Despite some rekindled hope that the U.S.-China relationship might have a more cooperative undertone under the Biden administration,power-based economic and political tensions between the United States and China have persisted in the past two years.As such,the 117th Congress will pass on to the 118th Congress a continuously deteriorating U.S.-China relationship,a legislative agenda that increasingly focused on China and growing suspicion of the Chinese government on U.S.legislative actions.As is shown by House Speaker Nancy Pelosis visit to Taiwan,it will be very difficult to exclude Congress whether actions or statements of congressional leadership and prominent lawmakers from U.S.foreign policy.At the same time,uncertainties,confusion,and misunderstanding have persisted.The bilateral relationship has become more nuanced than the friend vs.enemy dichotomy,while simplistic narratives of zero-sum rivalry blended into domestic politics and unavoidably policy making.The congressional involvement in foreign policy is not just another layer of complication.Rather,it contributes to the political uncertainty within the United States,making U.S.foreign policy unpredictable and potentially inconsistent in the eyes of China,the international society and non-public actors such as the business community.This issue can be addressed in one of two ways.Option one,the United States and China should take the U.S.Congress into full consideration.The two must reconstruct a new approach to bilateral engagements in technology and trade to preserve the most critical shared interests in the field,stabilize the foundation of the bilateral engagement and avoid the complete cut of ties between the two economies.Option two,actions and statements of the U.S.Congress should be taken less seriously by both sides.The U.S.leadership must boldly govern the decision-making process and firmly take hold of the foreign policy power.While it is necessary for domestic politics and the check-and-balance that congressional voices are to be heard,Congress should not hijack the administrations decision-making power in foreign policy.The United States as a single voice must clearly signal to China whos calling the shots in American foreign engagements.In Summary:PART V Conclusion and Implications33November 2022On the front of legislative issues,whats important isnt and wont be the routine China bills,e.g.human rights resolutions and legislations or NDAA.Rather,the special-issue bills such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act have become a popular form for Congress to specifically address“China issues”and call out China.At the same time,these legislations often contain both an explicit and specific policy intent and broad coverage.Accordingly,significant uncertainties were introduced following the enactment of the bill and the U.S.government needs to devote significant efforts and resources to implement the bill,balancing congressional wishes,policy predictability as well as feasibility and practicality.As such,either the Congress should agree on a more comprehensive and cohesive strategy,list out issues of concerns of priority,and provide the administration with a good list of matters to focus on,or the enacted legislation should not be taken too seriously,lest every one of these bills will turn out to require a comprehensive and costly response from the federal government,waste government resources and generate overall inefficiency.Finally,to avoid turbulence caused by another incident in the like of Pelosis visit to Taiwan,an U.S.-China legislative dialogue should be established to avoid technology and trade issues from running into unknown and mutually harmful grounds.As developments in the bilateral relationship and in global events have led to increasing unpredictability and call for more appropriate management,emerging policy issues in the field will require better coordination or at least sufficient communication between the two sides to avoid misunderstanding of intention and unnecessary escalation of tensions.1 According to search results from Congress.gov,the 116th Congress proposed 627 China-related bills and resolutions,while the 115th Congress proposed 288.Congress.gov,last accessed October 24,2022,https:/www.congress.gov/.2 The CHIPS and Science Act,House Committee on Science,Space and Technology,last accessed October 24,2022,https:/science.house.gov/chipsandscienceact;CHIPS Act of 2022,136 Stat.1372,Public Law 117-67,enacted August 9,2022.3 Chuck Schumer,“Majority Leader Schumer Floor Remarks On Final Senate Passage Of Chips And Science Legislation,”Senate Democrats,July 27,2022,https:/www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/majority-leader-schumer-floor-remarks-on-final-senate-passage-of-chips-and-science-legislation;Joe Biden,“Remarks by President Biden on Rebuilding American Manufacturing Through the CHIPS and Science Act,”The White House,September 9,2022,https:/www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/09/remarks-by-president-biden-on-rebuilding-american-manufacturing-through-the-chips-and-science-act/.4 United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,S.1260,117th Congress(2021-2022),https:/www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1260;United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,H.R.4521,117th Congress(2021-2022),https:/www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4521;CHIPS Act of 2022,136 Stat.1372,Public Law 117-67,enacted August 9,2022.5 Andrew Desiderio,“How Congress dream of a China confrontation got gutted,”Politico,July 20,2022.6 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.7 Chuck Schumer,“Majority Leader Schumer Floor Remarks On Final Senate Passage Of Chips And Science Legislation”;U.S.Senate Foreign Relations Committee,“Chairman Menendez Announces Bipartisan Comprehensive China Legislation,”April 8,2021,Chairmans Press,https:/www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/chairman-menendez-announces-bipartisan-comprehensive-china-legislation.8 National Science Foundation for the Future Act,H.R.2225,117th Congress(2021-2022),https:/www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2225,Section 2.9 Executive Office of the President,“STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY H.R.4521 America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing,Pre-Eminence in Technology,and Economic Strength(COMPETES)Act of 2022,”Office of Management and Budget,the White House,February 1,2022,https:/www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/HR-4521-SAP.pdf.10 U.S.Senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R.Warner Press Release,“Bipartisan,Bicameral Bill Will Help Bring Production of Semiconductors,Critical to National Security,Back to U.S.,”June 10,2020,https:/www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/bipartisan-bicameral-bill-will-help-bring-production-of-semiconductors-critical-to-national-security-back-to-u-s.11 Semiconductor Industry Association,“CHIPS for America Act Would Strengthen U.S.Semiconductor Manufacturing,Innovation,”June 10,2020,https:/www.semiconductors.org/chips-for-america-act-would-strengthen-u-s-semiconductor-manufacturing-innovation/.12 William M.(Mac)Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,134 Stat.3388,Public Law 116-283,enacted January 1,2021.13 William M.(Mac)Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,Public Law 116-283.14 U.S.Chamber of Commerce,“Letter to the Members of the United States Congress,”May 11,2022,https:/in America Coalition,“Letter to Speaker Pelosi,Leader Schumer,Leader McConnell and Leader McCarthy,”March 31,2022,https:/chipsinamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SIAC-Letter-to-Congressional-Leaders-Urging-Swift-Enactment-of-Competitiveness-Legislation-Including-Semiconductor-Incentives.pdf.15 David Shepardson and Patricia Zengerle,“Biden meets CEOs,labor;backs bill to boost U.S.chips production,”Reuters,July 25,2022,https:/Semiconductor Industry Association,“SIA Applauds Senates Procedural Vote to Advance CHIPS Act,Urges Final Passage,”July 26,2022,https:/www.semiconductors.org/sia-applauds-senates-procedural-vote-to-advance-chips-act-urges-final-passage/;Washington Post Live,“Transcript:The Path Forward:American Competitiveness with Pat Gelsinger,CEO,Intel,”The Washington Post,July 12,2022,https:/Information Technology Industry Council,“ITI Welcomes Progress on Bipartisan Innovation and Competition Legislation,”May 12,2022,https:/www.itic.org/news-events/news-releases/iti-welcomes-progress-on-bipartisan-innovation-and-competition-legislation.Endnotes18 Information Technology Industry Council,“Letter to Majority Leader Schumer,Speaker Pelosi,Minority Leader McConnell,and Minority Leader McCarthy,”February 23,2022,https:/www.itic.org/documents/general/FINALITIUSICACOMPETESConferenceLetter.pdf.19 National Association of Manufacturers,“Manufacturers Back Chips Bill,Call for Further Action from Congress,”July 19,2022,https:/www.nam.org/manufacturers-back-chips-bill-call-for-further-action-from-congress-18300/?stream=series-press-releases.20 The White House,“FACT SHEET:CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs,Create Jobs,Strengthen Supply Chains,and Counter China”;“The CHIPS and Science Act Fact Sheet as prepared by House Leadership,”House Committee on Science,Space and Technology,July 27,2022,https:/science.house.gov/download/chips-and-science-act-leadership-fact-sheet.21 William M.(Mac)Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,Public Law 116-283.22 National Association of Manufacturers,“Manufacturers Back Chips Bill,Call for Further Action from Congress.”23 The White House,“FACT SHEET:CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs,Create Jobs,Strengthen Supply Chains,and Counter China,”August 9,2022,https:/www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.24 The White House,“FACT SHEET:CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs,Create Jobs,Strengthen Supply Chains,and Counter China”;“The CHIPS and Science Act Fact Sheet as prepared by House Leadership,”House Committee on Science,Space and Technology.25 In its fact sheet,the House leadership mentions“global leadership”either as a background for the bill or when emphasizing the need to add guardrails for funding recipients.“Emerging technologies”and“new technologies”are mentioned in passing when discussing specific provisions.The White House also noted the need to“strengthen American supply chains”as part of its general industrial policy and as one of the impacts of the bill,but does not go deeper than that.26 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.27 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.28 United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,S.1260;United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,H.R.4521.29 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.30 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.31 The White House,“FACT SHEET:CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs,Create Jobs,Strengthen Supply Chains,and Counter China”;Mark Sullivan,“Senator Mark Kelly:Passing the CHIPS Act will help bring down costs of tens of thousands of consumer products,”Fast Company,July 28,2022,https:/CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.33 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.34 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.35 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.36 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.37 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.38 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.39 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.40 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.41 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.42“Science Committee Provisions in the CHIPS and Science Act Fact Sheet,”House Committee on Science,Space and Technology,July 27,2022,https:/science.house.gov/download/division-b-sst-fact-sheets.43 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.44 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.45 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.46 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.47 CHIPS Act of 2022,Public Law 117-67.48 The new CHIPS and Science Act establishes a CHIPS for America Fund within the Commerce department for related investment;funding for each year“remains available until expended.”49 Namely,CHIPS for America Defense Fund.50 The number was$1.8 billion under USICA.51 Brett Fortnam,“Pelosi confident that competition bill can pass Congress before July 4th,”Inside U.S.Trade,May 19,2022,https:/Spiegelman and Brett Fortnam,“Blumenauer:Compromise competition bill absolutely doable by Memorial Day,”Inside U.S.Trade,March 11,2022,https:/of the House Nancy Pelosi Press Release,“Pelosi,Schumer Statement on Bipartisan,Bicameral Leadership Meeting on COMPETES/USICA Conference,”June 21,2022,https:/www.speaker.gov/newsroom/62122.52 United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,S.1260;United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,H.R.4521.53 Xinhua,“Spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Chinas National Peoples Congress gave remarks concerning the U.S.Congress Senate Foreign Relations Committees passage of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021,”,April 22,2021,http:/Ministry of Foreign Affairs,“Take the opportunity and maintain and advance the U.S.-China trade and economic collaboration and local exchanges,”November 30,2021,https:/Xinhua,“China strongly opposes US chips bill:Commerce ministry,”The State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China,August 19,2022,http:/Xinhua,“China strongly opposes US chips bill:Commerce ministry.”57 Xinhua,“China strongly opposes US chips bill:Commerce ministry.”58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China,“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijians Regular Press Conference on July 28,2022,”July 28,2022,https:/China Daily,“China condemns unfair US chip bill,”The State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China,August 11,2022,http:/Jake Sullivan,“Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Global Emerging Technology Summit,”The White House,13 July 2021,https:/www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/briefing-room/2021/07/13/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligence-global-emerging-technology-summit/.61 United States Senate Committee on Banking,Housing,and Urban Affairs,“Examining Outbound Investment,”hearing,September 29,2022,https:/www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/examining-outbound-investment.62 Washington International Trade Association,“De Maximus De Minimis Debate,”event,June 3,2022,https:/www.wita.org/events/de-minimis/.63 Laura Silver,“Some Americans views of China turned more negative after 2020,but others became more positive,”Pew Research Center,September 28,2022,https:/www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/28/some-americans-views-of-china-turned-more-negative-after-2020-but-others-became-more-positive/.64 Dave Levinthal,“Mehmet Oz says hell be tough on China as a senator.But a 2013 announcement from a Chinese health tech company offers a different perspective,”Insider,August 23,2022,https:/United States Senate Committee on Banking,Housing,and Urban Affairs,“Br

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Discover the trends thatll dominate the US in 2023US REPORTClick the dots to navigateIn this reportShake it off21The exhausted States37Virtual and me71Intro1The new American dream3OK doomer55PageFielded monthly,Zeitgeist zeros in on the stuff that matters.Its topical,timely,and relevant.The data in Connecting the dots draws on surveys carried out throughout 2022.This is a recontact study,which means that respondents also took part in GWI Core.GWI Kids represents kids aged 8-15 who use the inter-net.To get a real picture of todays kids,you have to go beyond demographics and simply ask them.And with thousands of demographic,behavioral and psycho-graphic data points,thats exactly what we did.Dive into the hopes,fears,dreams and opinions of the young-est generation and find out exactly how to move them.Data sets included in this reportCore is our flagship survey and the worlds largest study on the digital consumer.Our data represents over 2.7 bil-lion internet users,offers 57k datapoints,and tracks 4k brands across 48 mar-kets.It never stops growing.By the second half of 2022 well be in 50 markets,launching our Core study in Norway and Chile.GWI CoreGWI KidsGWI ZeitgeistLaunched in July 2020,GWI USA represents the habits,behaviors,and attitudes of 240 million internet users across all 50 states.With America changing fast,this ongoing study tracks new and emerging trends not typically covered by market research providers,like ques-tions around cultural identity,race,and ethnicity.GWI USAEvery chart has a hyperlink that will bring you straight to the relevant question on our platform.You can then investigate all data by demo-graphics,over time,and among your own audiences.All the charts that use GWI Zeitgeist data also have links that will take you straight to the relevant question on our platform.There,you can dig into the data with no charge.Thats because all GWI Zeitgeist data is free and always will be.Discover the data on our platformInformation about the source and base SourceBaseEach of the graphs is numbered More information can be found in the Appendix section at the end of this reportJust click this iconto explore the dataon the platformYoure about to witness the strength of street knowledge 360 consumer insight.Weve trawled through our data,and pored through the numbers.Here we present to you the most need-to-know trends for anyone looking to under-stand the consumer mindset in the year ahead.We seem to be surrounded by crises right now,each of which can be under-stood using objective measurements and scales like GDP,CPI,global tem-perature,and loss of life.But different groups and cultures internalize the world around them in different ways,leading to different outcomes.What we give you here is the subjective side of things:how do consumers feel about these crises?Whats the deeper impact on peoples worldviews and pri-orities?What are they doing differently as a result?The most need-to-know trends for anyone looking to understand the consumer mindset in the year aheadHeres what you have to look forward toConnect the dots between what people say,think,and doUncover the deep logic and contradictions that make up the consumer psycheLet data and insight pinpoint the upcoming trends set to dom-inate 2023Be inspired and zero in on what really mattersbyCHASE BUCKLEIntr 2byMOANA TELLBUESCHERThe new American dreamHow consumers are craving the simple life in 2023 4The American dream is dead.Or not quite.But like many people,its strug-gling a little.Across virtually all areas of our research,we see signs of Americans lowering their ambitions,trading an appetite for success with more modest goals.While there will still be some post-pandemic splashing out,2023 is likely to see similar changes in spending habits and in American culture as we observed during the Great Recession.The years after 2008 saw Americans downsize in nearly every aspect of their life,from retirement to their childrens future to everyday expenses.Similar changes are on the horizon in the next 12 months as consumers face up to a cost of living crisis.Its a full circle moment for some,as I Need a Dollar becomes all too familiar again.The American dream is dead.Or not quite.But like many people,its struggling a little 6The new American dreamHeres the headline:Americans are getting worried about their financial security.51%of the nations consumers believe that the US economy will get worse in the next six months and con-fidence in personal finances looks to be waning too.Consumers have become more price-conscious about everyday expenses and,since Q2 2021,use of apps to track spending has increased 9%.Budgeting is back on the menu.Lockdowns reminded consumers of how important personal relationships are.34%say that being present for family and friends is their most important goal in life,an increase of 7%from last year.At the same time,the kind of YOLO(you only live once)attitude we saw when lockdowns were lifted is disappearing.Having a goal of“challenging myself”is down 8%,while“trying new things”is down 11%.Use of apps to track spending has increasedAPP USAGEStability is sexy1GWI USA Q2 2020-Q2 2022163,277 Americans aged 16 34 31 41 49 31 4 29-10 30-15 19-262020 Benchmark(0)%change since 2020Q1 2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4 2021Q1 2022Q2 2022Personal/household financesUS economy%change in the number of Americans who say the following will get better in the next 6 months(compared to 2020)Financial optimism is creeping back down 8The new American dreamGWI July Zeitgeist 20221,747 Americans who arent retired aged 16-64Salary/compensationWork-life balanceWork benefits(i.e.retirement benefits)Paid time offCareer progressionWorkplace where I can challenge myself756456513023While consumers still value a work-place where they can challenge themselves and progress,salary,ben-efits,and time off take precedence.Boundaries are being set,and career goals have been redefined to fit the“I work to live,not live to work”narrative.And with good reason,as US work-ers face some of the highest levels of burnout and being overworked.Striving for simplicity has led some to make big changes to their working life.Time away from a traditional 9 to 5 has allowed workers to explore other options,with the number who work while on the road or traveling increas-ing by 38%since Q3 2021.The search for the simple life is as much a cultural trend as it is an economic one.Some start the#vanlife because they have to,others because they want to.Whats your dream job?“I dont dream of labor”Challenging themselves is rarely the priority at work%of Americans who arent retired and say the following are most important to them in a workplace2 10The new American dreamThis is key for brands to understand in 2023 especially in luxury and pre-mium sectors.When times are hard,status symbols change.Sometimes simplicity is the biggest luxury,and people pay good money for it.Since mid 2021,theres been an 8%drop in the number of consumers who want brands to be“exclusive”,which means that some high-end brands wont be able to rely on their logo as much as they used to.(Not)Keeping up with the KardashiansSometimes simplicity is the biggest luxury,and people pay good money for itThe new American dream 12The biggest decreases in self-perceptions3Q2 2021Q2 202227221512118302316131210%changeI see myself as a natural leaderI enjoy entertaining guests in my homeI want my lifestyle to impress othersI have sophisticated tastesI am influenced by whats cool/trendyI like to be the center of attention-8-7-10-9-11-13GWI USA Q2 2021&Q2 202240,224 Americans aged 16 %of Americans who agree with the following,and the year-on-year%change for each statementAmericans are also much more modest about themselves.They see themselves as less sophisticated,less trend-focused,and less bothered about showing off.Influencers could benefit from turn-ing over a new leaf and branding themselves as a genuinflencer.The number of Gen Z who say that fol-lowing influencers is a top reason for using social media has dropped 22%since Q2 2021,while Americans of all ages are less likely to agree that social media is good for society.Yet interest in influencers is still there and growing,increasing by 16%year-on-year;and it will probably continue to grow,as long as the content shared shifts from aspi-rational to inspirational.The emergence of social platform BeReal,which has branded itself as a life without filters,is also driving a change in online expectations.This has cleared the path for more inspirational material year-on-year the number of Gen Z who use social media to find inspiration is up 12%.Theyre just less likely to be finding inspiration through chasing someone elses dreams.The new American dream 14Influencers are just the tip of big changes in the world of fashion.“Outfit of the day”inspiration will come less from influencers and more from your local Goodwill,as taking note of what influencers are wearing has dropped 7%since Q2 2021.Economic downturns often prompt changes in fashion,especially when inflation sends the cost of materials soaring.Whether its the comeback of indie sleaze or something else,2023s hot looks will be a product of this quest for simplicity.It will also provide a boost to the sec-ondhand fashion trend.Comfort with buying preowned items is up 12%year-on-year,and little wonder as the hunt for the next best#ThriftFlip has gar-nered over 2.8 billion views on TikTok.Good things come to those who thrift 16The new American dreamIf Americans are less keen on impress-ing others,what might they be prioritizing instead?Bound up in these cultural changes around social media,fashion,and other areas,is a new focus on more offline activities.Some of the fastest-growing per-sonal interests for Gen Z year-on-year are handicrafts( 16%)and books/literature( 15%).Both have a strong presence on social media,and making your own clothes is usually cheaper than buying them.But they also indi-cate a scaling down among young people in their online behavior in favor of more hands-on pastimes especially when interest in gaming,television,technology,and computers are all down among 16-25s.Back to basicsDont get ghosted by Gen Z.Heres how to make this generation fall in love with your brand.ReportYour 101 guide to Gen Z in the USFind out more 18The new American dreamThe automotive market is one of the best examples of just how differently consumer segments will behave in 2023.Since Q2 2020,theres been a 121%increase in the number interested in buying a Ferrari or Lamborghini.At the very top end,consumers will still want to splash out even if theyre more discreet about it.However,many car owners see their vehicles as less of a way to express their personality and status with those attitudes decreasing by 9%and 14%,respectively,since Q2 2021.Value for money is also the new motto in the automotive world.More are keen to have a vehicle thats as cheap and easy to maintain as possible( 7%).Travel is another example of this trend affecting people differently.Rich Americans are reportedly spending more than ever on flashier vacations.Though,generally,interest in new cul-tural experiences has decreased by 8%since Q2 2021,while the importance of familiarity with the destination has increased by 12%.Wanting good value for money has also ticked up.Life in the slow lanePeoples values and priorities are bound to shift over time its the nat-ural progression of any society.But with the American dream so heav-ily embedded in US culture,a wider change in outlook is no small feat.Americans have ultimately fashioned themselves a new dream based on the realities of today,one with more modest ambitions,and brands must cater to it.Reframing the American dream 20The new American dreamShake it offAmerican catharsis through mediabyTYLER ASHE 22We accept the reality of the world with which were presentedCHRISTOFThe Truman Show(1998)Americans arent living in a TV show like the namesake character from the 1998 film The Truman Show,nor can they exactly leave their world like Jim Carrey did.But in 2023 theyll be look-ing for an escape and some catharsis in the world theyre living in.Americans are dealing with a lot coming out of the pandemic-a cost of living crisis and security concerns to name a couple.And its taking a toll.According to the General Social Survey,only 19%say theyre very happy,which is by far the lowest its been in 50 years.Religion has acted as an outlet for tough times before,but other practices and beliefs are becoming go-tos.Interest in religion has declined in the last two years,while interest in spirituality and astrology are up.While we joke about Mercury being in retrograde,we cant joke about a billion-dollar business.Rising interests 24Shake it offApps such as Co-Star(which share birth charts and horoscopes with users)have captured the attention of venture capitalists.And even celebrities are cel-ebrating their links to the stars.Beyonc,one of the most-streamed artists in the world,frequently shouts about her Virgo sign,including a track called VIRGOS GROOVE on her latest album.Others arent looking to the stars for guidance,but they are looking to media for an escape.Americans now have ample stories to invest their emotions in.With our research into trending genres,we can forecast what sort of media will resonate most with viewers and listeners in 2023.4Americans are taking an interest in astrology%change in Americans interested in the following since Q2 2020GWI USA Q2 2020&Q2 202241,148 US internet users aged 16 110AstrologyMeditationSpiritualityReligion 10 8-6 26Shake it offWhen the first lockdowns started,over 80%of Americans thought the pan-demic would last 6 months or less.Of course that didnt happen,and restric-tions were mostly in place until mid-2021,a full year longer than most Americans predicted.The pandemic saw many issues over-run hospitals,mass layoffs,and a high death toll from the virus itself.When restrictions started to ease in early 2021,US consumers were pretty optimistic Out of the frying pan,into the fire about the future.37%thought the US economy would get better as well.Today,that number has decreased to only 18%.Now a cost of living crisis is slashing budgets,as consumers struggle to pay their bills.Fears of tax increases have also worried US consumers,with many thinking their already scarce budgets will shrink more.Concerns about gun violence and geopolitical tensions have also risen.15%of US consumers say theyre never satisfied with their life,up 6%from last 5840322753413427534036284544362748433629454238284541383540454038Tensions with foreign countriesTax increases Q22020Q42020Q12021Q22021Q32021Q42021Q12022Q22022Gun violence Infectious diseases and virusesyear-and one of the fastest-growing sentiments in the US.With all that is going on,Americans desperately need catharsis a way of releasing,or managing,the frustration theyre facing.For many,this is coming through the media they consume.Much of the situation Americans find themselves in is out of their control,but they can choose what they watch or listen to.5Safety and tax concerns have increased%of Americans who say they are worried about the followingGWI USA Q2 2020-Q2 2022163,277 US internet users aged 16 65FShake it off 28Helps relax/pass the timeSomething to do while I do other thingsIt improves my moodTo help relieve stress/anxietyExpand my knowledge/learn new thingsTo escape from reality/be a distraction615044383633True crime,true emotions The first CrimeCon in 2017 saw 800 fans packed in a hotel.In 2022,the event saw 5,000 attend.It now has plans to go international-and theres even a cruise ship gathering in the works.Were not surprised by this.While the subject matter may be morbid,it makes sense why Americans are so drawn to it.The story allows for the listener to exclaim disgust at the crime,then relief when the perpetrator is caught.The legal system sends the perpetrator away,and the justice system prevails.Whether or not this ending happens in real life,the listener doesnt care.They can release their emotions,and escape reality for a little bit.Over half of Americans say they listen to audio-be that music,podcasts,audiobooks,or talk radio-to help them relax,and over 1 in 3 say it helps release stress and anxiety.With mental health increasing in importance,consumers are turning to media to help them through the day.Advertisers are taking notice too.Online mental health company BetterHelp constantly outspends other advertisers on podcasts.True crime is one of Americas favorite podcast genres,and it saw a 21%growth in listeners from Q2 2020Audio content helps Americans relax%of Americans who listen to audio content for the following reasons6GWI Zeitgeist August 20221,909 US audio content listeners aged 16-64 30Shake it offWhats winning in Americas attention economy?ReportThe hottest US entertainment trendsGet the storyAggressive genres have risen in popularity%change in American listeners of the following genres since Q2 20207While podcasts boast advertisements from mental health companies,music has gotten aggressive.Some of the fastest-growing genres in the last two years are metal and punk,alongside high-BPM(beats per minute)genres like house and techno.Meanwhile,the genre falling most in popularity is acoustic/singer songwriter,which notoriously sits on the quiet side of the volume dial.Fans of metal and punk,as it happens,are 15%more likely than the average American to agree that mental health is important.Headbanging,as it turns out,is cathartic.Gothic/grunge/death metalHouse/technoPunkHeavy metalTechno/tranceRap/Hip-Hop/drum n bassElectronic/EDM/dubstepAlternative rockAcoustic/singer songwriter 22 16 15 15 14 9 8 7-9041,148 US internet users aged 16 GWI USA Q2 2020&Q2 2022 32Shake it off20%of Americans say theyve experi-enced anxiety regularly or often,up 32%from two years ago.The percentage who feel anxious while watching content?Only 3%.However,nearly half indicate that they watch content as an escape/diversion.Americans are watching TV/movies to distract themselves from whats going on away from the screen.On the small screen,viewers have been steadily losing interest in the news.With the economic and security crises going on,Americans are trying to avoid it,and any anxiety it may bring on a feeling they know all too well.So whats play-ing instead?Action/superhero movies for one.This isnt a surprise as Marvel movies have made over$10 billion in US box office revenue,and Marvel accounts for 4 of the 7 most watched shows on Disney .Americans see their action shows and movies as a cathartic experi-ence,knowing good will almost always overcome evil,but theyre kept on the edge of their seats.These stories are also exciting for the eye,as CGI has made action movies a spectacle.Away from the action,Americans are also in the mood for love.Times of eco-nomic hardship make romantic comedies a particularly popular genre.Screwball comedies,the predecessor to rom-coms,were born in the Great Depression.Romance and romantic comedies as a genre are up 9%in popularity in the last two years.Like action movies and true crime podcasts,these movies and shows are full of clichs and tropes,but almost always,the characters resolve their issues and come together for a happy ending.These more formulaic genres are oppo-sites to the world Americans find them-selves in.People are struggling to make ends meet.Safety seems to be at an all-time low both at home and abroad,and tax hikes still weigh heavily on the mind.And they cant do much about it.What can they do?Turn on the TV and select the movie or show that they know will take them through an emotional ride,but will ultimately end well for the good guys.Catharsis on the couch8GWI USA Q2 2020&Q2 202240,126 US TV/movie viewers aged 16 Action and romance are getting more viewers%change in American viewers of the following TV/movie genres since Q2 2020Action/superheroSci-FiRomance/romcomsAdventurePoliticsBusiness&financeNews/current eventsTalk shows 13 10 9 6-10-10-11-120 34Shake it offEven if Americans know that these stories will end,its the cathartic journey of the protagonist triumphing over their fears that brings them back,and maybe they hope to triumph over an unpredictable and ever-changing world.The next 12 months will be interesting for Americans.Some aspects of the cost of living crisis are improving,but its still left a hole in their wallets.The midterms will shape the political narrative for the next two years,and may give rise to new fears.In that climate,lifestyle habits and media preferences will continue to provide emotional release.Some old favorites will continue Marvel movies are scheduled out to 2025,while true crime will benefit from a podcast market expected to grow 31%annually to 2030.Other things like New Age spirituality,high-BPM music,and romcoms could represent new arrivals,bubbling up from subcultures and fandoms.The final word to sum up what consum-ers want to do in 2023 should go once again to Beyonc,from her number 1 hit BREAK MY SOUL:Been so down and under pressureRelease ya anger,release ya mind.BEYONCBREAK MY SOUL 36Shake it offThe exhausted States of equalityHow Americans want brands to approach social justice in 2023byLAURA CONNELL 38In May 2020,the Black Lives Matter(BLM)protests in response to the murder of George Floyd left a deep impression in America and around the world.Since then,wider attention has moved to a host of social justice issues including womens rights,the LGBTQ community,and climate change.As the emotional labor of the last two years has taken a toll,interest in equal-ity,social issues,and volunteering are in decline.According to our data,fatigue is replacing fighting spirit.Since 2020,the key theme has been“we need to do better”.But as other priorities weigh on consumers minds in 2023,they will be increasingly tired of hearing that message from brands.They will want evidence that brands have actu-ally created change for America.Less talk,more action.Its an obvious statement,but one that continues to be top of mind for consumers.Over the past two years,whenever social justice has been on the agenda,con-sumer sentiment toward brands has been consistent.They want action,impact,and results not meaningless PR pushes.After the initial BLM protests in 2020,US consumers wanted brands to review their hiring policies instead of show-ing support via social media.During Pride in 2022,US consumers top priority for brands was to edu-cate people on LGBTQ issues and misconceptions not changing logos and packaging to rainbow colors.After Roe v.Wade was overturned,US con-sumers wanted brands to provide paid leave for womens health issues rather than show support on social media.In 2023,brands should take these mes-sages from consumers in the last two years as absolute truth-shift your focus to assistance,education,and action.Shifting focus 40 40The exhausted States of equalityGWI Zeitgeist July 2022 May 2022 Coronavirus Study Wave 55,110 US internet users aged 16-64 4,154 US internet users aged 16-64 1,351 US internet users aged 16-64Consumers want to see practical behaviors from brandsMost/least important brand action for each social cause,based on the%of Americans who want companies to do the following to support it9Overturning Roe v.WadePride MonthMost importantLeast importantBlack Lives MatterPaid leave for womens health issues Post supportive messages on social mediaReview hiring policiesShow support via social mediaEducate people on LGBTQ issuesChange packaging/logos to rainbow colors 42 42The exhausted States of equalityThese feelings will become more acute in the next 12 months as an uncertain economy,coupled with a sense of com-passion fatigue,will force consumers to prioritize what theyre really concerned about.Alongside infectious diseases,election integrity,and job security-police bru-tality and racial relations are among the fastest-falling worries for consumers in the US since Q4 2020.In contrast,in line with current world events,some of the fastest-rising concerns are tensions with foreign countries and tax increases.On the surface,these figures appear encouraging because they suggest some progress has been made,but its a good example of how although we might see a trend decline,it doesnt always show the full story.Black Americans are still disproportion-ately concerned about police brutality and as of Q2 2022,theyre 20%more likely than Asian American and Pacific Islanders(AAPI),or Native Americans to worry about racism.And even though there are relatively similar decreases in concerns for racism between Black(-14%)and Hispanic(-15%)people since Q4 2020,the same is not felt by AAPI(-1%).Reports have found that discrim-ination has increased greatly for the AAPI community since 2020.Many,particularly white consumers,may have felt invigorated by the discus-sions in the last two years,but for some,the messages were merely a longstand-ing repeat of what has been said time and time again;injustices remain sys-temic,and more needs to be done.62%of US consumers care about the impact of social justice issues.And thats the key word impact.Weve seen how brands can play a dynamic role in social justice causes when they follow through on their public acknowledgments.Advocacy indica-tors and accountability commitments to social justice causes are still every part as valid as they were two years ago.But brands need to think long-term.Results and successes take time to build and cut through the noise.Putting out statements for self-serving reasons,or because everyone else is,can be actively harmful 46%of US consumers are tired of hearing about social justice causes all the time.GWI USA Q4 2020&Q2 202240,186 US internet users aged 16 Concerns have changed in the last two years%change based on the number of Americans who say they worry about the following since Q4 202010%change since Q4 2020- 0-TensionswithforeigncountriesTaxincreasesImmigrationlevelsStockmarketGunviolenceRacialrelations/racismJobsecurityElectionintegrityPolicebrutalityInfectiousdiseasesandviruses4417151091517171825Breaking old patternsWant to see this data in more detail?Find out moreof US consumers care about the impact of social justice issues.And thats the key word-impact.44The exhausted States of equality 44Consumer priorities have changedOur data from Q2 2020 reflects the mood of the nation during the height of the BLM protests-being socially responsible was the number one brand priority for Americans.Two years later,this has shifted to rank third in Q2 2022.In fact,its the fastest-falling brand initiative since 2020.This shift is mainly due to decreasing sentiment from older white consumers.Weve seen an 8crease in white Americans agreeing brands should be socially responsible,followed by baby boomers(-9%)and Gen X(-11%).Supporting diversity in the workplace is the fastest-rising brand initiative 46 46The exhausted States of equalityDr.Joseph Flynn refers to this as white fatigue,a wearying of potential allies in the fight against racism,and its a problem that has persistently taken place after historical racial move-ments;allyship fades.But for AAPI and Black Americans,this priority has remained unchanged.For People of Color(POC)in America its just as important as it was two years ago.Even though being socially responsi-ble has dropped in consumer priority,this doesnt mean brands are devoid of responsibility.Here again we see the pat-tern consumers want brands to walk the walk,not talk the talk.Supporting diversity and equality in the workplace is the fastest-rising brand initiative.Predominantly led by younger generations,we have seen considerable increases across all racial and ethnic demographics,and its an example of an area where brands can begin to enact real change.Even while strong mes-saging of support can be a good start,walking the walk is the more pressing issue according to consumers.Q2 2020Q2 2022Be socially responsibleListen to feedback1234567891012345678910Improve your day-to-day lifeBe socially responsibleReduce their environmental impactMake you feel valuedSupport diversity&equality in the workplaceProduce recyclable packaging/productsContribute to the local communitySupport charities/good causesSupport local suppliersImprove your day-to-day lifeListen to feedbackReduce their environmental impactContribute to the local communityMake you feel valuedSupport charities/good causesProduce recyclable packaging/productsSupport diversity&equality in the workplaceSupport local suppliersBrand priorities are shifting for consumersGWI USA Q2 2020&Q2 202241,148 US internet users aged 16 Rank based on the%of Americans who most want brands to do the following11 48 48The exhausted States of equalityWhen it comes to social justice causes,workers want to be at a workplace that supports them both professionally and personally.And what happens in the workplace impacts consumers too 47%say poor treatment of staff would discour-age them from buying from a brand.But in the last two years,many DEI leaders(diversity,equity,and inclu-sion)have felt the pressure to focus on immediacy rather than long-term change,which has led to many Chief diversity officers(CDO)feeling the effects of burnout.The average tenure for a CDO is now less than 2 years.With 29%of Gen Z and millennials wanting a working environment that makes them feel like theyre contribut-ing to society,the challenge for brands now is to transfer their accelerated efforts from 2020 into supporting the work being done by those in critical DEI roles.Focusing on the mental health of employees can be one way to alle-viate the personal and professional pressures that social justice causes may create.There are many exam-ples of where brands have integrated services such as on-site psycholo-gists,insurance coverage,and one-on-one coaching.Practical positioning to integrate diversity and inclusion into the root of your business structure,rather than seeing it as a separate initiative,alongside a compassionate recogni-tion within your brands core values,are incentives to aspire to.Adopt a people first mentalityFrom online TV habits to social media usage,get the answers you need on this generation.ReportYour 101 guide to millennials in the USDownload your copyIt always excites me when I can see a brand bring their presence,their platform,their authority and their capital to uplift the voices of those already doing the work 50KEVIN ECHAVARRIAMcCann Worldgroup global DEI 50The exhausted States of equality12Over half of Americans wish the US gov-ernment did more to help social justice causes,moving responsibility toward the systems and institutions that have the ability to create lasting change.But only 36lieve that positive pro-gress is being made in the US.People of color(POC)feel a greater sense of care and responsibility for social justice causes compared to white consumers.Weve seen how,just one year after the BLM protests,America changed.But now,for many consumers,the effort to maintain the fight for social justice is leading to a greater sense of fatigue.Although boycotts are one way consumers choose to tackle social injustices to place negative media attention and economic pressure on a brand,theres long been spec-ulation on their effectiveness.Its an example of how methods to fight social justice causes are becoming exhausting for consumers.Recognizing responsibility The effort to maintain the fight for social justice is leading to a greater sense of fatigueGWI Zeitgeist August 2022 2,037 US internet users aged 16-64White Americans are still lagging in interest for institutional injustices%of Americans who agree with the followingI care about the impact of social justice issuesI wish our government did more to help social justice causesIts my responsibility to stand up for social justice causesI want brands to support social justice causesPositive progress is being made on social justice causes globallyPositive progress is being made on social justice causes in my countryThe state of my personal life/relationships affects how I feel about social justice issuesIm tired of hearing about social justice causes all the timeThe state of my work/professional life affects how I feel about social justice issues726654494137353427594747363537254920People of ColorWhite Americans 52 52The exhausted States of equalitySocial injustices in the US will take time to amend,and brands will play a role in that.But in 2023,brands have to be aware of consumers collective head-space,whats important to them,and how they want to see change in these areas happen.Focus on what consum-ers really want meaningful action,communicated when its achieved clear results.Put purpose into practice.Brands that understand whats truly important to consumers will succeed,and those who dont risk being left behind.Reframe how to foster inclusion Focus on what consumers really want-meaningful action 54The exhausted States of equalityOK doomerHow consumers could getfatigued with climate changebySTEPHANIE HARLOW 56Over two-thirds of US consumers feel concerned about the potential global impact of climate change.And just as many are concerned about the impact it could have on the US itself.The state of the environment hasnt improved,and in 2022 all corners of the country have been hit with extreme weather.Most Americans view climate change as a real threat.But our research suggests that in 2023 they may,par-adoxically,want to stop hearing about it.Theyll still expect brands to take action,but will likely be less willing to hear about it in the news and on social media.Although pessimism around the envi-ronment is up since 2020,the number who actively worry about it hasnt changed.And around a fifth of con-sumers are tired of hearing about the climate crisis completely.If things dont change were likely to see more climate doomism-when people believe the battle against cli-mate change has already been lost.Even with the passing of landmark cli-mate change bills,the idea continues to go viral.Both news publishers and brands will have a stake in managing Americans fee-lings toward the environment in 2023.Doomism ultimately leads to climate inaction,which isthe opposite ofwhat we wantALAINA WOODSustainability scientistOK doomer 58Concerns about climate change have remained stable over the past two years,but the number who think that climate change will get worse in the next six months has significantly increased.People feel that the situa-tion is getting worse,but their levels of concern arent increasing.A strong caseof crisis fatigueEnvironmental outlook is gettingworse,but worry remains stable%change in Americans who feel the following since 20202020 Benchmark(0)Q1 2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4 2021Q1 2022Q2 2022I worry about climate changeThe environment/climate change will get worse in the next six months 1%-18%-4%-14% 4% 17% 1% 7%0% 7%0% 13%change since 2020GWI USA Q2 2020-Q2 2022163,277 US internet users aged 16 13 60OK doomerPut simply,many are fed up with the situation,and its having a knock-on effect on how they feel and what theyre doing about it repeated exposure is causing fatigue.And while Gen Z are the most concerned about the future of the environment,theyre also more likely than millennials to be tired of hearing about it.Theyre a good example of how concern can spill over into doomism.Next years cultural context is important.After two years of being locked down and languishing,people will still be grieving the opportunities they missed out on,and trying to make up for time they lost.Its one of the reasons why so many people booked a revenge vaca-tion in 2021,and why worry about travels environmental impact has dropped 10%since Q2 2020.Now theres a possible recession in the pipeline and if the economy takes a downturn,evidence sug-gests concern for the environment goes with it,as consumers prioritize other things.Our Work data also shows that businesses biggest challenges next year will be less about becoming more sustainable and more about managing the economic climate.Not only do Covid-19 and a possible recession have an impact on climate attitudes,theyre a pair of crises occu-pying the headlines alongside the war in Ukraine,abortion rights,and mass shootings.If we add climate change into the mix,it could all become too much for some people.We can see this in our data too.Peoples interest in news and current affairs is down since Q2 2020.In April 2022 a quarter said they were spending less time reading the news since the pandemic started to manage their mental wellbeing,and the climate is another topic likely to see consumers switch off for the sake of their health.Many are feeling overwhelmed andhelpless right now,leading to a phenomenon called“crisis fatigue”,which is what can happen when were exposed to constant pressures OK doomer 62When it comes to taking individual action,peoples behaviors are mixed.Many are choosing where to save and where to still spend,so sustainable actions could fall by the wayside while they treat themselves where they can.That said,a number of cost-cutting behaviors people are doing will end up having a positive impact on the envi-ronment too.Using a reusable water bottle and shopping bags are the most popular sustainable actions among consumers.These kinds of actions are likely popular because they help consumers feel like theyre playing an active role,but can also save money.With many looking to save where possible,consumers are likely to be tempted by schemes that offer them opportunities to save money or cut back.Individual powerHistorically,recycling in the US has lagged behind other coun-tries,and just 5%of plastic waste is being recycled.But there are schemes looking to tempt consumers into disposing of their waste sustainably.H&M,for example,has recycling boxes in stores across the globe where consumers can drop off a bag of old or unwanted clothes in exchange for a thank-you coupon toward their next purchase.Tapping into consumers thriftiness is one way of squaring sustainability commitments with a poor outlook for the economy.Importantly,its the kind of prac-tical action that consumers will respect,even as they tune out of some of the coverage around climate change.Offering consumers opportunities to actively supportthe environmentis also likely tohelp overcome doomismOK doomer 64 Are American consumers price-conscious or eco-conscious?Whats getting culled in the cost of living crisis?ReportSustainabilityin the USDownload your copyWhile people are fatigued with the climate change narrative,they still expect brands to be eco-friendly that hasnt changed.Consumers arent fed up with brands taking action on climate change but theyll be critical of brands that make a lot of noise with nothing to show for it.Something thats gaining momentum is a type of law known as extended producer responsibility.It means that producers are charged a fee,which is used to pay for recycling programs.The knock-on effect means that companies have an incentive to ensure their products are designed to be more recyclable.Brands arent off the hookIts these little moves that put the onus on companies rather than the consumer alone.If people see brands leading from the front,they may feel more supported.In September 2022,Patagonia reminded everyone what practi-cal action actually looks like.Its billionaire founder,Yvon Chouinard,gave away the company to a trust that will use the profits to help fight climate change.While most companies cant do the same,it sets a new benchmark that cant be ignored.And consumers will notice.OK doomer 66Our research shows that corporations are more trusted than the government.If theyre able to do positive things when politicians cant,it may help break through that doomerist mindset.That said,greenwashing is a great example of where noise from brands is actively harmful.Over a third in the US would be discouraged from buying from a brand if they made false sus-tainability or environmental claims.Often brands dont actually mean to make false claims,but miscom-munication between marketers and sustainability champions can cause the same result.News publishers also have a part to play.With so much doom and gloom in the media,its unsurprising that its impacting peoples outlook,and the climate beat will require a different approach.Research has shown that readers value more solutions-oriented journalism where the environment is concerned.Consumers want brands to have a moral compassBrand image is king%of Americans who want brands to do the following%of Americans who say the following would discourage them from buying from a brandGWI USA Q2 2022 GWI Zeitgeist March 202220,156 US internet users aged 16 2,029 US internet users aged 16-64Poor treatment of staffBad media/news stories about the brandPoor environmental track recordFalse sustainability/environmental claims(i.e.greenwashing)Negative comments on social mediaLack of diversity in workforceLack of supply chain transparency47403535191918Be socially responsibleReduce their environmental impactProduce recyclable packaging/productsSupport charities/good causesSupport local suppliers39373332301415OK doomer 68Despite being tired of hearing about climate change,people still care.In 2023 brands and publishers will need to change tack.For brands,its an opportunity to engage in a way that combines being eco-friendly with thrift-iness,and dial back on making noise around climate change unless they can demonstrate a clear impact in what theyre doing.For media outlets its an opportunity to focus on solutions,not problems.Hope isnt lost,but brands and media publishers need to recognize the prob-lem,adapt to it,and then lead the way.Moving forwardOK doomer 70This is virtual,this is meHow identity will shape the future of the metaverse in the USbyTOM HEDGES 72If you could be anything in the world what would you be?Would you be the same person that your colleagues see at work,the person your friends know,or something completely different?Since the internet was created,users have been able to experiment with their identity,and express them-selves in ways that they previously couldnt(or wouldnt)in the real world.Usernames,bios,personas,and ava-tars have all been important ways for people to manage their online identi-ties,whether its altering them slightly,or indulging in wild experiments.In 2023,well see this enter a new stage,as increasingly popular virtual worlds like Fortnite and Roblox provide more tools for identity play.Drawing on some clues from internet history,and insights about the people who currently use these spaces,heres what you should know in the year ahead.If you could be anything in the world.what would you be?74This is virtual,this is meLets start by setting the scene.A purple-haired character with fairy wings dances in a nightclub on a vir-tual island,created to promote a TV show based in Los Angeles,known for its pioneering portrayal of LGBTQ characters.Soon after,the island will host a sponsored Pride event,and the show will eventually go on to win an Emmy.The show is The L Word,and the year is 2007.A brief history lessonI think social media is good for societyI prefer being anonymous onlineI worry about how companies use my personal data onlineI buy new tech products as soon as they are availableI feel in control of my personal data online946543142040489203634332827InterestedSomewhat interestedNot interestedGWI Zeitgeist March 20222,029 Americans,of which 1,358 are interested in the metaverse,456 are somewhat interested,and 215 are not interested,aged 16-64Disinterest in the metaverse stems from a lack of confidence online%of Americans who are interested/uninterested in the metaverse and say the following describe them16This is virtual,this is me 76The program forged a unique connec-tion with its loyal and passionate fan base,moving beyond the traditional television experience,and embrac-ing the possibilities of virtual worlds.It may be old in internet terms,but how its community operated is extra relevant now,with community being a standout motivation for those inter-ested in the metaverse.Compared to the average American,those interested in the metaverse are over 3x more likely to buy products/services to access the community built around them,and over 4x more likely to buy tech products as soon as theyre available.Theyre a confident,affluent,and risk-taking group who want to be the first to try new things.But for these reasons,attention needs to be paid to how the metaverse is beginning to take shape.These interested Americans may be the first to take virtual steps in the metaverse,but they dont represent all those who actually prefer to spend their time online,rather than in the real world.Consumers in that latter group are more likely to be low income,part of the LGBTQ community,and have a physical disability.Success in 2023 means ensuring their needs are catered for in virtual spaces.78This is virtual,this is meAlthough no“true”metaverse exists yet,online 3D spaces are popular and already proving fruitful for brands to play around in.In proto-metaverses like Roblox,you can display your identity through ava-tars and props of varying sizes and types.You can express,highlight,and develop particular interests and life experiences.Its what Second Life brought to our attention all those years ago,where users could design and build their own experiences within a virtual world.The benefit of these environments is their open social design,where personal and group identities can draw on fantasy as much as reality.American LGBTQ consumers stand out for the importance they place on diversity and inclusion,equal rights,and clothing/fashion choices.The LGBTQ communities on Roblox are some of the latest places to offer a safe space,with the combination of anonymity and reinvention that was less accessible in earlier web tech-nologies.These spaces can act as a flexible testing ground for exploring all the traits that define who we are.New audiences in the metaverseThis is virtual,this is me 80Roblox has seen some of the biggest growth of any game played by kids in the US.Year-on-year,the number play-ing is up 56%among gamers aged 8-11,and 54%among teenagers.Its little surprise brands are investing early and investing big in Roblox expe-riences and assets,fighting for the attention of this generation.But their intentions must be genuine,as this audience is not only highly engaged,but value-focused.While 3 in 10 teen Roblox gamers say having the latest fashion/trends is important to them,they stand out for saying helping people is impor-tant,and are over 20%more likely to say protecting people from bullying is important.So while being on trend matters,creating experiences and products with wider benefits will go a long way in keeping them on side.Its what the likes of American Eagle have started to drive home.As of August 2022,its Roblox presence has seen 30 million unique visitors a figure higher than the population of Texas.For brands,its about getting in front of users exploring these spaces,but by leading meaningful change.Need to nail your brands NFT launch,or figure out your metaverse strat-egy?Heres our gamified rulebook.FeatureDeep dive into Web3Unlock the featureTeen players in virtual worlds have stronger social values%of teen players of the following games who say protecting people from bullying is important to them17The SimsFortniteRobloxGrand Theft AutoAssassins CreedMinecraft626261606059Average 12-15 year old51%GWI Kids Q1 20221,025 American teens and 862 gamers aged 12-15 82This is virtual,this is meUnderstanding users avatars may reveal a lot about the individual.Each represents a different part of the per-sons personality and lifestyle,whether its a mood,an interest,a social role,or their beliefs and values.For Americans,customization is key to this,and its a main motivation for users to partici-pate in the metaverse.In fact,62%of potential metaverse users say using the space to browse or shop for products is of interest to them,with clothing/outfits their prior-ity,ranking above art/collectibles,real estate,and cosmetics.This demand has been seen before.At its peak,Second Life had a vibrant economy,with millions of US dollars in monthly transactions and 230,000 user-made items being bought and sold each month.However,what brands need to consider in 2023 is that although interested Americans want to Appearance over apparelDemand for avatars and personalization is highbrowse for products in the metaverse,when it comes to identity play,its not their priority.Three-quarters(76%)of Americans who are interested in creating an avatar claim theyd like to customize its physical appearance.Its the coun-try with the most interest in 12 markets studied,and a lesson learned from early proto-metaverses,where cre-ating an avatar was serious business.The stakes are too high in the metaverse to exclude representation from the equation,and its future will fundamentally change the way we interact with brands.Selling a branded t-shirt in a virtual world isnt enough,but giving users the tools to become whoever they want to be,with the freedom to change,is the real currency.%of Americans in each generation who are interested in creating an avatar2,037 Americans aged 16-64GWI Zeitgeist August 202234342313Gen ZMillennialsGen XBaby boomers18This is virtual,this is me 84For Americans,physical appearance takes priority over apparel in the metaverse,with allyship becoming the new hallmark of these spaces US consumers place customization high on their priority list%in each country who are interested in avatars and in customizing the physical appearance of their characterUSJapanBrazilSingaporeItalyCanadaUKGermanyAustraliaFranceIndiaChina7674716967666464616160595,581 consumers interested in creating an avatar aged 16-64 in 12 marketsGWI Zeitgeist August 202219This is virtual,this is me 86Americans are taking advantage of the growing number of options to experiment with their identity online.Proto-metaverses provide immersive experiences for interaction and experi-mentation,and for many,playing with their identity online is a new form of entertainment.What was first seen in chat rooms like The Palace,then popular virtual worlds like Second Life,is how users adopt online personas to better understand their own identity.With the huge growth of Roblox,especially among kids,pro-to-metaverses are bringing this to the masses.The development of these Looking forwardvirtual worlds means there are more communities and opportunities for customization,especially among an audience of Americans who see strong social values as table stakes.Ultimately,communities are compli-cated environments that need some guidance to provide them with identity and purpose.Their fate will be decided by the efforts of software developers,and the influence of brands-but most of all,by the community itself.In 2023,the focus needs to be on the safety of these spaces and on creating worlds where all feel welcome,regardless of which version of themselves they choose to present.88This is virtual,this is meDefiningindexThroughout this report we refer to indexes.Indexes are used to compare any given group against the average(1.00),which unless otherwise stated refers to the global average.For exam-ple,an index of“1.20”(a)means that a given group is 20ove the average US consumer,and an index of“0.80”(b)means that an audience is 20low the average US consumer.Index 1.00a.1.20b.0.80This report mainly draws on figures from our GWI USA study,which represents American internet users aged 16 .To ensure our sample is representative,we set quotas on age,gender,race and eth-nicity,income and region.Each year,we interview over 80,000 respondents over 4 waves of fieldwork,representing approx-imately 240 million American internet users.Fieldwork takes place in two parts,with respondents first completing a 40-minute,online survey before being asked to complete a 20-minute fol-low-up survey focused primarily on CPG and healthcare.Approximately 50%of respondents complete this follow-up survey,meaning that the sample sizes presented throughout this report may differ as some questions are asked of all respondents while others are only asked of a subset.For more details on our research check out our Help Center.Methodology&definitions Book your demoWant to know what Americans think,feel and do?Every business has questions about its audiences;GWI has the answers.Powered by consistent,US-centric research,our platform is an on-demand window into their world.Book your demoWhich of the following describes you?Which of these are impor-tant to you?(Protecting people from bullying)How interested would you be in creating an avatar in a metaverse?(Fairly inter-ested/Very interested)Which of these would you be interested in customizing in the metaverse?(Physical appearance of the character e.g.hair color)In the next 6 months,how do you think the following things will change?(Per-sonal/household finances/US economy-Get better)Which of these are most important to you in a workplace?Which of these statements do you agree with?Which of these things are you interested in?Which of these things do you worry about?Which of these,if any,best describe why you listen to audiobooks/music/pod-casts/talk radio?Which of these music types do you enjoy listening to?Which of the following types of shows/movies do you enjoy watching?Which of the following would you most like to see employ-ers do to support employees?What would you like to see brands do in their Pride month campaigns this year?(asked to respondents who believe that brands should support LGBTQ causes)Which of these,if any,do you think brands/companies should be doing to support the Black Lives Matter movement?Which of these things do you worry about?Which of these things do you most want brands to do?To what extent do you agree or disagree with the follow-ing statements?(Strongly agree/Slightly agree)Which of these things do you worry about?(Climate change)How do you think the following will change in the next 6 months?(The environment/climate change-Get worse)Which of these things do you most want brands to do?Which of these would dis-courage you from buying from a brand?Appendix12345691011121314151617181987 94 GWI 2022

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Christopher A.ThomasOCTOBER 2022A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESFOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Semiconductors are the lifeblood of the digital economy.The semiconductor industry has moved to the foreground of political discourse both in the United States and other countries.The pushes from Americas economic rivals and the challenges faced by its own domestic industry,coupled with supply chain shortages,prompted calls for the U.S.government to“do something”to support the industry.The most visible response is the CHIPS Act,which allocates$39 billion in government funding for domestic semiconductor manufacturing facilities and billions more for semiconductor research and development(R&D)and workforce programs.1Many cite Americas declining share of semi-conductor manufacturing as the justification for such measures,with“unfair”subsidies by other countries as the root cause.Much of the debate has centered on evaluating what other countries are doing and matching their programs.Of course,benchmarking is not a strategy.Voluntarily exiting global markets is not a strategy.Fixing short-term product shortages(in ways the industry cannot)is not a strategy.In fact,the argument that the industry needs funding to fix shortages is ringing hollow at the time of this writing,as demand for semiconduc-tors for personal computers and smartphones drops.2 This“downcycle”is not only good for consumers of these products,but it also shifts the policy debate to a more appropriate objec-tive:How does the United States build a sustain-able,market-centric semiconductor policy that leverages the strengths of the American financial,industry,and academic environments to collectively accelerate the industry and not just for a few years,but in the decade to come?How does the United States ensure that global competition in semiconductors does not devolve to“zero-sum”negotiations around shifting manufacturing capacity,but rather that competition brings out the best in America:its ability to harness the worlds best scientists and entrepreneurs to solve hard technical issues,build business around those solutions,and scale those solutions to the world?In short,how does the United States build a government strategy that is open,global,long-term,committed,patient,and successful?To do so,the policy must recognize that competitive advantages do not come from emulating the approaches of others(for which U.S.capabilities are not a fit)but rather from deepening the existing advantages of the U.S.position.Those U.S.advantages are deep and broad,and not to be underestimated.I recommend that the government policy not solely focus on increasing Americas manufac-turing capacity,but rather holistically strengthen the entire semiconductor industry,enabling it to withstand supply shocks,drive technology tran-sitions,and win future industry control points.Fundamental research and the commercializa-tion of R&D breakthroughs are the ingredients for future success and will determine the global semiconductor manufacturing footprint as much as will subsidies.I recommend using the CHIPS Act funding as equity capital in a government fund that can scale via industry and Wall Street co-in-vestment to more than$300 billion and can reduce industry cost of capital by leveraging the Federal Reserve balance sheet.This fund would be self-replenishing,as it would harness U.S.innovation to fund projects that have market-level rates of return and generate significant returns for the government.These returns would then be reinvested in the next set of challenges the United States faces three,four,five,and 10 years from now.As opposed to copying policies that place all hope on singular national champions,often saddling them with policy goals that may or 2A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESmay not be achievable,the equity fund would have tiers of financial and industrial partners enabling funding to be provided to both small and large companies and would operate at all levels of the value chain and across the ecosystem.I would urge this U.S.government fund not to compete with incentives from other countries,but would instead encourage it to partner with those willing to co-invest transparently in a growing,global,diverse,de-risked,and market-driven semi-conductor industry.The resulting robust global supply chain,populated with more clusters and second supply sources across Europe and Asia,would only help the United States.In concert with creating this fund,the United States could address other barriers to success.The country simply does not have enough engineers to build and ramp the manufacturing facilities in the plan targeted and accelerated immigration must start now.Constructing and ramping fabrication plants(fabs)in the United States takes up to one year longer than it does in Asia.This self-inflicted slow pace,if not solved,will cost billions in lost opportunities and technology leadership for those companies building in the United States thus countering any benefit from the billions financed by the government.The fund would have a policy arm that partners with federal and state governments to aggressively simplify permitting requirements and close timing gaps.Too few entrepreneurs,professors and venture capitalists are taking risks on future semiconductor technologies and applications government funding can be a catalyst to reverse this trend,without giving the fund the mandate to pick winners.Finally,to effectively execute a long-term,committed,and patient investment program,the United States needs a new hybrid govern-ment team that can evaluate,structure,and monitor investments at the intersection of semiconductors and finance.The government needs to rapidly recruit this team from the semiconductor,financial,and policy spheres and insulate the team(via legislative action)from short-term political considerations while maintaining the oversight capability of elected leaders.Empowered as the primary point of contact for the execution of the U.S.semicon-ductor strategy,this team would ensure speed,consistency,and clarity in its role as the deci-sion-making authority.It would operate through different administrations,through industry cycles,through new generations of technology,and through changes in geopolitical priorities;and in doing so,it could continuously partner with the global industry to achieve a resilient,winning,global,and market-driven U.S.semi-conductor industry.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS3INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSA semiconductor,a substance that has specific electrical properties,serves as the foundational foundation for computers,servers,mobile phones and all other electronic devices.It is typically a solid chemical element or compound that conducts electricity under certain condi-tions but not others.A conductor is a substance that can conduct electricity and a diode is a substance that cannot conduct electricity.Semiconductors have properties that sit between the conductor and insulator.A diode,transistor and an integrated circuit(IC)are all made from semiconductors.3The global semiconductor industry is critical to all advanced economies.The American semiconductor industry is also critical to the global leadership and economic well-being of the United States.The industry directly provides nearly 300,000 American jobs and indirectly supports more than 1 million jobs throughout the supply chain and development ecosystem.4 It represents one of the countrys leading export industries,with an annual value of roughly$50 billion.It invests nearly$40 billion annually in R&D.The semiconductor industry also helps solidify U.S.national security,ensconcing U.S.leadership in cybersecurity and defense,as the frontier of semiconductors enables the advancement of national security tools.And by ensuring that the United States can set the pace of global technology innovation,the semicon-ductor industry confers enormous strategic advantage in foreign and economic policy.5However,as laid out below,there are acute challenges to Americas leadership in semi-conductors and there are imbalances in the U.S.supply chain that create geopolitical risk.U.S.-headquartered companies represent about 47%of global semiconductor sales,but the United States itself has only 10%of installed manufacturing capacity.There has been tangible progress over the last few years regarding increasing investment in the U.S.industry.Intel has proposed investing$20 billion in(i.e.a newly developed location)semiconductor plants in Ohio.6 The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company(TSMC),the worlds largest semiconductor manufacturer,is building a fabrication plant in Arizona.7 Two other large manufacturers,Texas Instruments and GlobalFoundries,have announced plans to build new capacity in Texas.8 But this is only a starting point for a new U.S.government strategy,not the endgame.U.S.government efforts need to accelerate this momentum and make it sustainable not just in response to the current industry issues but for the decades to come.THE PROBLEM STATEMENTIn the simplest terms,the U.S.semiconductor industry faces five problems:It is simply easier,faster,and cheaper to build scale front-end semiconductor manu-facturing in other countries;for more than two decades,global and American compa-nies have shifted more and more of their investment to Asia.The upstream(e.g.inputs into the manu-facturing process)and downstream(e.g.circuit boards and other systems integrating semiconductors)industries supporting 4A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESsemiconductor manufacturing are primarily located outside the United States,increasing the net delivered cost and time to market for the US-based end-to-end supply chain versus those in Asia.9 The U.S.venture capital market spendsnegligible amounts of its capital(1%)on new companies in the semiconductorindustry and has never really been a majorcontributor to the leading-edge chip develop-ment business.10 Many more semiconductorstartups(albeit of widely varying quality)are established in China than in the UnitedStates.The United States overwhelming spendingadvantage in pathfinding R&D across mate-rials and the physical,chemical,and elec-trical sciences has dwindled.While federalfunding of research has“only”dropped froman average of 1%of the gross domesticproduct(GDP)in the 1990s to about 0.7%in2020,actual funding for nondefense generalscience(the category most applicable tosemiconductors)rose by only$500 millionor 5%over the last 10 years,a time framewhen the industry doubled in size and U.S.GDP rose by 50%.11The U.S.semiconductor workforce,while ofvery high quality,is aging and is growing at apace far too slow to ensure U.S.leadershipin the future.Geopolitical rivals have a playbook to build up their nations semiconductor industries and have been working hard to execute it.Should the United States simply benchmark those efforts and match them,subsidy for subsidy and tax break for tax break?What would that entail?It would likely include establishing a top-down mandate for technology self-reli-ance,calling on the industry to build the whole supply chain in America,suppressing wages,pressuring global companies to invest in the United States or lose market access,making the government the(de facto)largest shareholder of unprofitable or politically connected semicon-ductor ventures,forcing government-subsidized companies to do all of their R&D or manufac-turing inside the United States,pressuring customers to“buy American,”and allowing subsidized firms to maintain negative margins or negative returns on capital through blank check subsidies.This will not work.In an industry with a complex,integrated,highly efficient global supply chain that simultaneously feeds the American chip industry and buys its products,any proposed requirements for self-reliance and localization will shrink the U.S.share of the industry.In an industry where success requires constant rein-vention,speed,and access to the best talent,money alone is insufficient.And in an economy where capital efficiency is the highest objective,money delivered solely as grants and subsidies will never be enough.In addition,the political will to maintain subsi-dies across administrations and constantly changing congressional periods is certain to lapse.It always has in the past.That constant uncertainty would itself undermine any positive lasting effects of the subsidies,as companies would continually have to plan for the cessation of government handouts in the sector.That is why the United States needs a national semiconductor policy that is strategic rather than politically convenient.Strategy is about what you do differently than your competitors;it requires building upon core competencies,not wishing you had other ones.We need a policy roadmap that other countries,both allies and rivals,simply cannot emulate.The semiconductor strategy I propose builds on the strengths of the United States,which include the following:A large and sophisticated set of capitalproviders with expertise across technolo-gies in every stage of development;Wall Streets unparalleled financial engi-neering capabilities to harness capitalefficiencies that other countries can onlydream about;The venture capital industrys distinct abilityto turn new technologies into profitable andscalable global business models;A body of laws and cases that provide theworlds best investor protections and disclo-sure requirements;FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS5The greatest pool of experienced andinnovative engineers,and a culture that isattractive to top global talent;Direct access to the worlds largest purchasersof semiconductors and largest end marketsfor semiconductor-enabled products;Access to semiconductor company leader-ship teams with a best-in-class ability to selland source globally;A deep and accomplished set of world-classresearch universities with experience inbuilding pathways to commercialize break-throughs;andMost importantly,a trusted relationshipwith the other countries and regions thatalso have semiconductor leadership andsubstantial end market demand.A strategy that accelerates these strengths and leverages them to shore up weaknesses via market-driven investment for example,by financing fab automation breakthroughs that reduce labor requirements has a much greater chance of success.A strategy that delivers more than one-off industry benefits will help engineer a long future of renewed growth,innovation,as well as onshore manufacturing leadership.BUILDING ON THE CHIPS ACT:A NEW NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR POLICY AND FUND FOR THE UNITED STATES The centerpiece of our proposal allocates a portion of the CHIPS Act semiconductor funding as equity capital in a domestic govern-ment fund(hereafter referred to as the U.S.Semiconductor Fund or the Fund).12 This equity,scaled via large amounts of industry and Wall Street co-investment,would drive$300 billion or more in total industry investment.The invest-ment would become self-replenishing,harness U.S.innovation to develop projects with market-level rates of return,generate significant returns and ancillary tax income for the government,and reinforce the global semiconductor supply chains need to have a substantial U.S.presence in both engineering and manufacturing.In other words,I envision the manufacturing incentives as well as a portion of the R&D funding in the CHIPS Act as permanent capital to be invested by experienced professionals on the basis of strategic and financial principles,not as a collection of subsidies and grants that compa-nies would bid for via government lobbying.The Fund would pay ever-higher dividends for the nation and the semiconductor industry by growing through low-risk,high-return invest-ments and thus increase impact over time.Co-investment is the first objective of the Fund.The recently approved$52 billion is not a game changer in an industry that spends nearly$300 billion annually in R&D and Capital Expenditures(TSMC alone has committed to investing more than$100 billion over just the next three years,while Samsung will invest more than$150 billion in leading logic manufacturing capacity over 10 years).13 Meeting Americas goals in even a single part of the supply chain,such as leading-edge logic front-end manufacturing,means adding five or more fabs in the next 10 years with each fab potentially requiring$20 billion in startup investment and then billions more in upgrades on a continuous basis.This one segment of the value chain alone could require far more than the current proposed funds and great investment is required in other segments as well.Without balance across the segments,all industry participants will question from day one the sustainability of a U.S.-centric global manufacturing hub.Hence,the scale of any national semiconductor policyneeds to match the scale of the industrysinvestment needs.That effort clearly cannot fallonly on the shoulders of government,but it willif there is no integrated solution that attractsthird-party capital to amplify the Fund.Continuity and consistency is the second objective.Semiconductors are the ultimate long game.Few projects pay back in less than five years;the climb to leadership is hard and arduous;and once you reach the summit,you need to invest incredible amounts every year to stay there.In general,it takes more than 10 years to research,design,and launch a new front-end manufacturing process technology.14 6A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESIn another example,it took Qualcomm the pioneer in code division multiple access(CDMA)and one of the worlds top 10 semicon-ductor companies 10 years to commercialize its technology after founding.15 A one-off injec-tion of government capital can spark comple-mentary co-investment in the next few years,but what about the checks that come due in 2025,2030,and 2035?Under a new administration,a new Congress,and a new set of economic pres-sures,will there be political appetite for another large appropriations bill?The United States is a country that took nearly two decades to pass a true,higher spend infrastructure bill.A perma-nent capital fund,designed to be self-sustaining,insulates investment decisions from short-term political winds and shifting national priorities and appropriation environments.Transparency and an equal playing field is the third objective.An investment fund with clear investment guidelines,decision-making rules,conflict-of-interest guardrails,and standard investor communication procedures would give both industry players and private co-investors greater assurance,thereby reducing their risk calculus and increasing their desire to invest.This means that decisions would need to be well out of the reach of politicians aiming for their states to have an ever-bigger piece of the pie;instead,U.S.capitalism,global semiconductor companies,and leading investors would need to drive the implementation and execution of the Fund.Companies would need to understand that if they put together a proposal that meets Fund guidelines and objectives,it will be accepted rather than rejected in favor of a proposal by a competitor that hires better lobbyists.At the same time,politicians and voters would need to know how this capital is being put to work,that there is constant oversight of the Fund and governance structures,and that there are clear and regularly published measures on how well the Fund is meeting all the objectives.The final objective is investment rigor,project due diligence,and execution accountability by enforcing the requirement for market-consistent returns.By bringing in third-party financial inves-tors,the U.S.Semiconductor Fund would benefit from their due diligence and their demands for market-consistent rates of return;this would ensure that the investments are more likely to be successful and self-sustaining.And there is an added side benefit:such an effort would increase the pool of financiers who understand,invest in,and have a passion for semiconductor and related technologies.The leveraging of that knowledge and passion into new core technologies beyond semiconductors could have a multiplier effect.To fulfill these objectives,a new semiconductor policy(hereafter referred to as the National Semiconductor Policy or the Policy)would need to structure the Fund to draw in and tap the countrys top private equity and venture capital firms to de-risk government investment and provide an additional layer of both diligence and governance.To ensure investment into the broadest set of needed opportunities,not just“leading edge fabs,”the Fund would have a tiered structure that enables smaller investors to write smaller checks to the small-and medi-um-sized businesses that support the overall semiconductor supply chain and ecosystem.To efficiently provide seed capital to the widest possible set of“new ideas and new technolo-gies,”the Fund would leverage existing tools like the Small Business Administrations Small Business Investment Companies(SBICs)to broaden reach to qualifying researchers and entrepreneurs.To protect government invest-ment,the Fund would have a capital allocation approach that puts government investment“at the top of the capital stack.”Finally,to spur nationwide investment into diverse and inno-vative foundational research,the Fund would invest direct government research funds into a network of labs and universities that can drive fundamental research across all technologies needed to drive future industry transitions,from materials to software.Money,even if smartly allocated and well spent,is not enough to supercharge the American semiconductor industry.The industry needs to recruit more talent,from top Ph.D.s to tradespeople specializing in fab construction.Targeted interventions in immigration policy are needed to allow skilled manufacturing and R&D personnel who can help to build up these fabs and R&D facilities,and incentives are needed to ensure that many more U.S.-trained graduates with semiconductor-relevant doctorates remain FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS7in the United States after their study ends.A coordinated push to streamline the permitting and approval processes for new constructions and expansions across jurisdictions and agen-cies is also needed;this could cut in half the time from initial inquiry to installed semicon-ductor tools on the fab floor.The United States also needs to market this effort via encouraging American talent to study the hard sciences that underpin semicon-ductor success(such as electrical engineering,mechanical engineering,optical engineering,and materials science).Essentially,the United States needs to create a series of holistic incen-tives and policies,so that the capital invested in the U.S.Semiconductor Fund goes much further and becomes an intergenerational,transforma-tive industry road map.The new Policy would also need to reimagine the United States technology collaboration with its allies.It is economically infeasible and opera-tionally impossible for the United States to build and maintain a top-class,end-to-end domestic supply chain that provides every input for every chip consumed by American businesses and consumers.Even a successful U.S.semicon-ductor industry will have to rely on a diverse and broad set of imported products and technolo-gies from a wide range of countries.Therefore,diversifying and strengthening the U.S.supply chain can only be achieved when like-minded countries strengthen their own domestic indus-tries,diversify their supply chains internationally,and partner deeply with the American semi-conductor ecosystem.To drive such actions by global partners,the Policys investments and the associated messaging need to center on innovation,new applications and new markets,rather than solely on risk reduction.The Policy needs to provide equal incentives to,and a level playing field for,American and non-American semiconductor companies;it should invite co-investment and“club deals”with semiconductor funds driven by U.S.global allies.It also should encourage the United States to offer reciprocal market access and customer prioritization,so that both the United States and its allies know neither party will be shortchanged in times of capacity constraints.The Policy should also espouse the“global use”of technologies created in the United States.As many technology companies learned the hard way over the decades,proprietary technology that cannot be leveraged by global partners will eventually fail or be worked around.The United States cannot afford to make the same mistake,even if in the short term,it makes for a domestic political win.This last point is controversial.Global collab-oration combined with the global free use of technology has helped the American industry reach its current level of success.But such collaboration will be difficult to achieve in the future if companies believe that the intellectual property(IP)created from R&D in the United States will de facto be excluded from global use.Limiting which U.S.-based technologies can be exported or used by companies head-quartered in our economic rivals has a negative impact on U.S.-based research investment by both local and global companies.The indus-tries built on leading-edge semiconductors(mobile communications,cloud,autonomous driving,artificial intelligence,the metaverse,and more)are based on robust ecosystems that demonstrate network effects.Each addi-tional participant strengthens the ecosystem for every other participant.The removal of a substantial number of(Chinese or other)participants from the American ecosystem weakens the ecosystem and decreases the ecosystems attractiveness as an investment destination.As the removal of any participant reduces the ROI of all R&D spending across the entire American ecosystem,export controls need to be used in transparent,judicious ways.It is important to thoughtfully execute a U.S.export control strategy that is balanced with the highest possible return on investment for R&D performed in the United States.These actions,in sum,will drive the industry and U.S.allies to view efforts related to the U.S.National Semiconductor Policy and the Fund as open,global,long-term,committed,and patient.Not only is this the positioning required for success,it is the positioning that U.S.economic rivals will have difficulty adopting due to the differences in their economic and financial systems.8A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESFinally,along with this new strategy,I propose a new approach to implementation.Without an executable plan,the U.S.Semiconductor Fund and the corresponding investment and policy strategy would undoubtedly fail through either negative returns or a lack of focused coordination.There are many ways this could happen:if responsibility for the National Semiconductor Policy is spread across multiple agencies and teams;if there is no centralized decision-making;if Policy objectives are fuzzy and can be manipulated for political gain;if there is no continuity of investment because the decisionmakers keep changing;if invest-ment decisions are constantly being shifted by short-term legislative horse trading;if invest-ment managers change every time there is a new administration or the control of Congress changes;and if investment decisions are made by teams lacking industry expertise.Even if just one of these instances were to become a reality,it is hard to envision the Fund being successful.How can the United States ensure that a good strategy is not undone by poor execution?First,I propose that the U.S.government appoint and empower a single organization to be the point of contact for the semiconductor and financial industries;the organization would coordinate and orchestrate semiconductor policy across all the relevant government agencies.Second,I propose that the government model this orga-nization comprised of financial,industry,and policy experts on the successful Overseas Private Investment Corporation(OPIC).OPIC leveraged market-based investment programs,permanent investment teams,a transparent set of investment guidelines,and impactful and rigorous government oversight.It persisted through multiple administrations,invested at scale,returned capital to taxpayers,and effec-tively took on both private sector and public sector roles.The remainder of this report provides further details on the Policy and the Fund.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS9SETTING THE BACKGROUNDBuilding a more robust semiconductor industry via government policy will not be easy.Spending money alone is not enough to dramat-ically change the semiconductor industry nor its global manufacturing footprint.China has been funding domestic semiconductor projects at a rate far greater than CHIPS envisions.Yet in the eight years since the launch of Chinas effort to boost its semiconductor industry(the so-called“Guideline for the Promotion of the Development of the National Integrated Circuit Industry”16 and the complementary“Big Fund,”a vehicle for funneling capital to its domestic chip industry),Chinese policy has not delivered a major shift in semiconductor market share,product leadership,or manufacturing footprint.For every successful government investment,there are far more failures,and the Chinese government has detained or is investigating many of the fund managers and recipients of government investment vehicles.17 There is little evidence that the policy attracted substantial foreign talent or capital.In the five years prior to the policy launch,four major foreign manu-facturers built greenfield fabs in China;since the launch of the policy,only one major global semiconductor company broke ground on a greenfield fab at technologies three genera-tions behind the leading edge.18 Despite major investments,the share of chips supplied by China-based fabs to China-based customers increased only slightly between 2011 and 2021:from roughly 13%to around 17%.China-based semiconductor production still represents much less than 5%of the global total.19The challenges to any countrys industry are complex and intertwined.SEMICONDUCTORS:A HIGHLY DIVERSE,MULTI-ECOSYSTEM GLOBAL INDUSTRYThe manufacturing chain for any given semicon-ductor is extraordinarily complex and relies on up to 300 different inputs,including raw silicon,commodity chemicals,specialty chemicals,and bulk gases.All of these inputs are processed and analyzed by upwards of 50 different types of processing and testing tools(see below for the taxonomy of the industry value chain).Those tools and materials are sourced from around the world and are typically highly engineered.Further,most equipment used in semiconductor manu-facturing,such as lithography and metrology machines,rely on complex supply chains that are also highly optimized and incorporate hundreds of different companies that deliver modules,lasers,mechatronics,control chips,optics,power supplies,and more.Finally,economies of scale and learning efficiencies have consolidated the industry,leading to a high concentration of market share being held by one company at each level of the value chain.The installed base of tools and equipment within a semiconductor factory today represents the cumulation of hundreds of thou-sands of person-years of R&D development.The manufacturing process that integrates these tools into a single manufacturing chain could represent hundreds of thousands more.Each company contributing to that ecosystem is taking action based on market opportunities,engineering feasibility,and financial returns,not government objectives.20 In addition,different segments comprise a different set of companies,capabilities,key success factors,technological hurdles,and capital needs.10A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESINDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN LAYERSThe following is a simplified summary of the semiconductor value chain and its seven key layers:1.Manufacturing process technology the expertise and IP that enables the manufac-turing capacity.2.Fabless design the design of complete semiconductors,relying on third-partyoutsourced manufacturers to fabricate them.3.Front-end manufacturing the large-scale fabrication of wafers.4.Outsourced assembly and testing(OSAT)the dicing of the manufactured wafers,testing of the chips,and packaging of the chips so that they can be further integratedinto an electronic system.5.Equipment and tools the large machines that process and test the wafers.6.Materials and chemicals the highly engineered raw materials that make up the phys-ical structure of the final semiconductor and/or are used in the manufacturing process.7.Electronic design tools the software packages that help companies design chips andprepares the physical layout of transistors such that the front-end manufacturing facili-ties can physically make the chips.In examining the challenges to the U.S.industry,it is helpful to know the rough global market share of U.S.-headquartered companies in each layer of the value chain.FIGURE 1U.S.relative market share by value chain layersSource:McKinsey&Company21FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS11Likewise,it is helpful to narrow the focus to high-level industry segments,as the vast number of product types can be confusing.The dozens of semiconductor product categories can be grouped into the following major segments:Leading-edge logic high-end centralprocessing units(CPUs)and graphicsprocessing units(GPUs)designed to powerthe most advanced phones,personalcomputers,and servers.Lagging-end logic lower capability,lessexpensive processing units designed forapplications with lower requirements(consumer electronics,large householdmachines,automotive sector).Memory semiconductors designed to holddata and usually made with the most lead-ing-edge processes.Analog and power specialty semiconduc-tors for power management,radio transmis-sion,wireline transmission,and other nicheapplications.Discrete nonintegrated chips,such asresistors,capacitors,and diodes.Optoelectronic semiconductors designedto handle both electrical currents and light.Photonic components for creating,manip-ulating,or detecting light,such as laserdiodes,light-emitting diodes,and solar andphotovoltaic cells.“BEYOND THE CHIP”ECOSYSTEM:AS IMPORTANT FOR SUCCESS AS THE SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCT ITSELFA healthy semiconductor industry requires delivering far more than just physical chips.The larger ecosystem that turns a chip into an end-user application is essential to semicon-ductor success.System-level technologies such as operating systems,development frameworks,application software,as well as physical and virtual interface standards,define how a chip becomes a usable product in the hands of an end consumer.These system-level technologies create control points whereby companies or consortia can exert influence on the end-to-end supply chain.Semiconductor vendors that individually,or via partners,define control points improve their product competitiveness,increase switching costs for competitors,and enable global scale.Therefore,leading-edge logic semiconductor vendors such as Intel,NVIDIA and Qualcomm increasingly define,deliver and package system-level technologies as part of their semiconductor offerings.They are some of the largest employers of software engineers in the United States and employ more software engineers than they do hardware engineers.22 In parallel to this business model expansion by semiconductor vendors,major consumers of semiconductors,such as mobile phone makers,PC vendors,and cloud service companies,have entered or will enter the fabless design segment of the semiconductor industry.These moves are blurring the traditional differences between the“providers”and the“users”of semiconductor technology there is more and more overlap.The global technology industry is always in a process of transitioning to new end-to-end capa-bilities,often on multiple vectors at once(for example,the industry is transitioning currently from 4G to 5G technologies,from on-premise to cloud computing,and from standard to artificial intelligence workloads in high performance computing systems).Each of these transitions require new system-level technologies,creating new control points for semiconductor vendors to win or to lose.Maintaining American leadership across these control points from generation to generation requires the entire ecosystem that defines,develops and scales technology transi-tions to be as strong as possible.Strengthening the ecosystem requires coordinating fundamental research to define the end-to-end system-level roadmap,accelerating that roadmap into commer-cial production,and engaging downstream“beyond the chip”industries to use the system-level technologies espoused by the American semiconductor industry;even if major participants in those downstream industries are located within the borders of Americas economic rivals.12A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESFIGURE 2Summary of“beyond the chip”ecosystem required to make leading-edge logic semiconductors successfulISSUES TO ADDRESS AND PITFALLS TO AVOID IN GOVERNMENT POLICYBeyond industry complexity,other difficult issues to deal with include the following:There is ample private funding availablefor many industry endeavors,but it is notnecessarily aligned with a national strategy.The industry in the United States does not,ingeneral,have a funding problem.In fact,U.S.semiconductor companies currently havestrong industry fundamentals and high profitmargins.U.S.-headquartered semiconductorcompanies invest heavily already,roughly$40 billion dollars in R&D and$35 billion inCapex per year.In the latest annual reportingperiod,the ten largest U.S.-headquarteredsemiconductor companies had over$110billion in cash and generated over$40billion in cash.23 There is also a mature andefficient private equity,growth equity,andventure capital industry that can adequatelyfund any commercial efforts with market-level returns on investment(ROIs).It makes little sense for the government to invest in areas where there is alternative private financing.Yet,while private financing optimizes outcomes for individual compa-nies,it is failing to close industry-level or country-level gaps that an individual company is unwilling to close by itself.For instance,since private capital companies can generally make higher ROIs by scaling U.S.-developed semiconductor innovationsin other countries,they have been doing soover the last two decades.Publicly driven research efforts andconsortia have less and less impact overtime.Over the lifespan of the industry,governments and government-relatedindustry groups(for example,theInteruniversity Microelectronics Centre,Sematech,and ITRS)have attempted manytimes to establish common industry roadmaps.However,these industry groupsefforts have become less relevant totechnology advancement than the indi-vidual efforts of major manufacturers whocoordinate their suppliers and customersaccording to a privately driven road map.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS13The U.S.industry has big challengesbeyond capital.Even with equivalent inputcosts,U.S.-based manufacturing will likelyend up with higher finished product coststhan their Asian competitors.Too often,U.S.-based facilities lag behind Asian-based facilities in speed and efficiency(inlaunch,in ramp to scale,and in continuingoperations)due to more stringent regu-latory regimes,Asian governments longexperience in“making manufacturingeasier,”and the outstanding manufacturingculture demonstrated by Asian competi-tors.24 The United States,at both the policyand company levels,needs to accelerateevery part of the end-to-end manufacturingapproach and pursue innovations(e.g.,viaautomation)to overcome inherent disad-vantages to U.S.-based manufacturing.Thegovernment can help most readily in areassuch as permitting/regulatory approvalsand industrial site setup(e.g.,clearingland,delivering gas and water lines,andconstructing access roads).These effortscan make a real difference in the return oninvestment to manufacturing investment.Studies show that over the last 20 years,ithas taken about 25%longer to build fabs inthe United States versus in South Korea or Japan.The United States is doing little,if anything,to increase the speed,while Asian countries are doing everything possible to accelerate it.In fact,the speed has been decreasing in the United States;the average U.S.-based semiconductor facility took 38%longer to construct in the years 2010-2020versus 1990-2000.25 For leading-edge semi-conductors,a nine-to-12 months head startis of enormous financial and strategic value;a more slowly built U.S.facility is a muchless competitive U.S.facility.FIGURE 3Comparison of the time from construction start to production1,0009008007006005004003002001000Days1990-20002000-20102010-2020USAMainland ChinaTaiwanSource:World Fab Watch26Another problem is that the United States has a very talented but too small,aging workforce.Roughly doubling the U.S.semi-conductor manufacturing base and R&D capacity in the next decade would require tens or even hundreds of thousands of highly skilled,highly trained(and highly sought-after globally)engineering talents to join the industry.A foreign company looking at investing in the U.S.semiconductor industry today may doubt that the United States can provide such talent and would scale back their aspirations accordingly.14A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESThe United States is competing with arising bar,as other countries executetheir own semiconductor strategies.Othercountries also aiming to scale their next-gen-eration semiconductor manufacturingcapacity are offering lower wages,few laborprotections,less stringent environmentalreview processes,and looser subsidy rules.Particularly notable,Chinese policies enticeboth American and third-party country semi-conductor suppliers to invest in an emergingChinese ecosystem.Many U.S.,European,South Korean,and Taiwanese companies(and American-trained engineers)willcontinue to take up Chinas offers becauseof financial and market share reasons.U.S.policy may slow but will not stop this trend companies and engineers will not respondwell to messages such as“do not serve theChinese market”or“turn down a big paypackage to work in Shanghai.”U.S.policy willneed to make investing and working in theUnited States a more attractive proposition.This means accelerating innovation,makingit easier and cheaper to get things built inAmerica,and burnishing the United Statesreputation for transparency,IP protection,and rule of law.Aptly playing to Americasstrengths and creating a favorable andcompetitive ecosystem at home are goingto be far more successful approaches thanblunt nationalist or protectionist policies.Previous U.S.industrial policies haverepeatedly failed to avoid common pitfalls.The United States needs to avoid commonmissteps that have plagued industrial policy.These include the following:“Protect”over“promote”thinking protectionist and/or punitive policystances advanced by well-intentionedU.S.stakeholders without the sufficientinvolvement of U.S.industry championsand executives.Half-hearted investments limited scaleinvestments in an extremely capital-in-tensive industry,with a focus on currentnot future technologies cannot lead totransformation impact.Blunt subsidies and industry handouts subsidy-led policies that lead to importduties on U.S.chip exports,which hurt,rather than help the industry.Subsidy-ledpolicies are not sustainable.Ineffective bureaucratic team structuresand decision-making processes thosethat do not reflect industry expertise anddo not move at the pace of the industry.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS15A TOP 10 OBJECTIVES LIST TO DEFINE SUCCESSA new U.S.National Semiconductor Policy must have a tangible impact,so I propose these top 10 objectives for the nations industry push a“North Star”to drive concrete policies:1.The global and American semiconductor industries are financially healthy and continue to drive global innovation,with posi-tive annual revenue growth across industry cycles with stable or increasing R&D intensity(R&D spending as a%of sales revenue).2.The United States maintains or improves its global semiconductor revenue share(47%today)and fabless revenue share(about 60%),while increasing its share of global semiconductor manufacturing from about 10%today to about 15%within 5-10 years,with a goal of reaching about 20%within 10-15 years.3.The top-five leading-edge semiconductor manufacturers(Intel,Samsung,TSMC,Hynix,and Micron)all have or are planning scale-level,best-in-class fabs in the United States,each with the capability to ramp leading-edge nodes as the alpha or beta ramp site.4.The supply chain for these U.S.-based manufacturing facilities(including materials,chemicals,and equipment)is resilient,with capacity via domestic suppliers,foreign companies manufacturing in the United States,or U.S.company-owned assets in low-risk foreign locations.In addition,the overall global semiconductor industry has no single point of failure with global leaders(e.g.,leading-edge foundry providers)possessing distributed networks to provide backup capacity even during unexpected,disruptive geopolitical or economic events.5.Each major,non-U.S.player in the global ecosystem(e.g.,TSMC,Infineon,ASML,Nikon,Tokyo Electron,Merck,ARM,MediaTek,and Hynix)and their much broader set of ecosystem partners are focusing their road maps on the require-ments of the U.S.semiconductor market and prioritizing U.S.customers(i.e.,the United States is their“must-win”market).6.Across emerging semiconductor segments and the fundamental technologies(e.g.,new materials,neuromorphic computing)under-lying those segments,the United States has a clear leadership position in research,development,and commercialization.This means that American companies,universi-ties,and labs are spending more,developing more breakthroughs,and retaining more of the absolute best talent in all key semicon-ductor research areas(e.g.,the creation of new semiconductor elements,transistor structures,lithography,wide bandgap materials,silicon photonics,and quantum computing).7.U.S.companies(both in semiconductors and in downstream industries)lead the global industry in delivering the critical system-level technologies that define the control points for technology transitions in semiconductors(e.g.mobile,PC and cloud operating systems;machine learning frame-works;software developer tools,interface standards,communication standards,etc.).8.U.S.investors double the amount of invest-ment in emerging semiconductor compa-nies(e.g.,startups,spinouts,business model expansion from the system or soft-ware industries),with efforts spread across all key emerging segments.16A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES9.The U.S.industry doubles the annual numberof new Ph.D.hires and increases its U.S.jobbase by more than 25%while increasing theparticipation and representation of underrep-resented groups in the industry.10.The U.S.industry establishes at least threenew semiconductor research clusters thathave the scale and expertise to thrive longterm.This can create a network effectthat goes well beyond the semiconductorindustry,reducing regional economic dispar-ities and developing economic multipliers.I recognize no set of objectives is perfect;industry experts could debate and refine these objectives ad infinitum,leading eventually to a different list.The key idea is the Policy(1)has defined quantitative objectives to help measure progress,rather than ambiguous objectives such as“supply chain security”that have no concrete meaning;(2)is aggressive,because the United States should be playing to win;and(3)comprises a holistic set of objectives thatmakes the entire global industry stronger,ratherthan objectives focusing on a single topic likeleading-edge fabs.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS17A DURABLE APPROACH TO FINANCING THE TOP 10 OBJECTIVESSo,how can the U.S.government achieve the best results?What type of government funding program would avoid waste,loss of capital,and negative geopolitical implications?A good approach would be to think about the ecosystem more broadly,focus resources on the big problems,encourage other“smart capital”to co-invest,be open and global,and operate with transparency.KEY INVESTMENT CRITERIA FOR ACHIEVING SUCCESSThe United States should develop clear invest-ment criteria that allocate public and private capital dollars to the initiatives that will have the most impact and that can organically compound success in perpetuity.These criteria include the following:Advancing Americas interest in the semi-conductor industry(the top 10 objectives)while returning taxpayer money and makinga return on that money;Investing in areas that are intriguing toprivate capital and companies but for whichthere are limited lead investors;Taking a full ecosystem view by building ahealthy,durable,and secure supply chainsupported by a robust software and systemarchitecture ecosystem;Supporting both American companiesand foreign companies critical to the U.S.ecosystem in a cohesive manner thatpromotes the unavoidable global intercon-nectedness of the industry;andGenerating co-investment from third-partyinvestors to effectively cap the overall govern-ment investment required,de-risk theseefforts,and simultaneously harness Americancapitalistic ingenuity and government dollarsto gain the massive scale necessary.SUPPORTING BOTH AMERICAN AND FOREIGN COMPANIESAs discussed previously,the goal of the proposed funding program is to leverage global industry investment to sustain American competitiveness in the semiconductor industry.In the current fraught geopolitical environment,the external positioning of this effort would be vital.The United States should avoid positioning this promotion effort as a competitive response to,or retaliation for,the industry-building efforts of other countries.The proposed U.S.effort is about building a strong American ecosystem that can provide inno-vation and growth for the technology industry around the world.If foreign companies meet the United States investment criteria,allow full due diligence,and operate with the required transparency,they should be allowed to partic-ipate no matter where their headquarters are located.American companies would have little basis to complain in taking this level-playing-field approach;since 2000,U.S.companies have located 85%of their greenfield fab construction outside the United States,taking advantage of the incentives and favorable oper-ating environment in those locales.27 18A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESA BROAD SET OF OPPORTUNITIES ALL REQUIRING INVESTMENTLogically,with a complex value chain,many types of investment are needed to ensure success.Each type carries a different level of return potential as well as different technical,execution,and other business risks.The Fund should look for the following opportunities:Strategic efficiency and capital stack invest-ments Level the playing field for Americanmanufacturers competing with overseascompanies through fundamentally lowercost capital and/or labor.Optimization and automation investments Invest in the companies and technologiesthat automate manufacturing and reducelabor intensity and cost disadvantages.Scale-up and commercialization investments Accelerate the link between advanced,early-stage research and the companiesand investors that could commercialize theresulting breakthroughs.Business expansion or new market entryinvestments Support semiconductorcompanies to make disciplined and well-man-aged efforts to enter adjacent semiconductormarkets or downstream(e.g.software orsystem-level technologies)integration;andpartner with system companies as theyinvest to enter the semiconductor designmarket specific to their product offering(e.g.automobile manufacturers designing autono-mous driving logic semiconductors)Innovative foundational research Providefunding for truly advanced research effortsthat benefit the whole industry,that arebeyond the investment time frame of mostcompanies,or that one single individualcompany would not have an incentive toinvest in,as well as for long-shot but strate-gically critical projects to remove industrysingle point of failures.Government procurement acceleratorprograms Build concrete links(e.g.,seedcapital programs)between U.S.-government-driven infrastructure(e.g.,the spaceprogram)and emerging U.S.semiconductorinnovations and companies.Future industry workforce foundations Strengthen the semiconductor-focusedtechnical workforce(e.g.,physics Ph.D.s)by investing in research programs at U.S.universities,providing incentives for U.S.and foreign-born talent to attend theseprograms,and encouraging the graduatesto remain in the United States and remain inthe semiconductors field after graduation.THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND CORRESPONDING PROGRAMSI summarize here the various proposed invest-ment programs reviewed in this section.Generating co-investment from partners:Turning$52 billion into$200-250 billion-plusAmerica absolutely needs more than$52 billion to meet the proposed top 10 objectives.28 The Policy leaders need to figure out how to use third-party capital to sustainably grow the funding to$200-250 billion-plus,the amount necessary to make a truly significant and durable impact.The approach to partnering with third-party investors must be flexible,depending on the type of investment to be made,the time frame,and the underlying business being financed.The approach needs to meet the return and risk requirements of sophisticated investors or the government fund will bear all the risk.Over the past decade,the U.S.government has success-fully implemented and executed several finan-cial structures that can be utilized to achieve this goal.Co-investment by private investors and semi-conductor companies will help stretch the$52 billion(provided by American taxpayers)to FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS19approximately$200-250 billion,enabling the U.S.semiconductor industry to gain enough capital,at the right cost,to drive change.Third-party capital will also provide a second layer of governance and human resources to ensure that these investments are a success.Likewise,over time,as government incentives help bring top-tier investment firms into the semiconductor sector,the firms increased knowledge and sophistication around such a complex industry and set of technologies should lead to a more robust set of third-party capital providers for decades to come.Again,extending the invest-ment multiplier well beyond the envisioned taxpayer capital makes this a self-sustaining,capitalistic solution that will build a more robust and thriving industry.Attracting different types of investors to maximize capitalThe U.S.financial system and the associated asset management industry are nearly as complex as the U.S.semiconductor industry.The key to raising the maximum amount of capital from third parties,at the right cost of capital,is to understand the different types of capital providers and their different return requirements and risk tolerances.The three main groups I propose focusing on are private equity,debt lenders,and venture capital.(Of course,the Fund can also work 1:1 with oper-ating companies as co-investors,as there is no mandate that an investment must have a third-party source of capital.)Private equity$70 billion of additional capitalPrivate equity investors are logical partners for manufacturing capacity investment.These firms generally search for investment returns in the high teens,but with government support and the asset-heavy nature of the business,a suffi-cient number of firms might be willing to accept 14-16%gross returns to invest alongside industry.While this is below the targeted gross returns for many private equity funds,the lower risk profile and predictable returns could justify the lower returns,especially as private equity firms can partner with industry-leading companies.The typical return on equity for a big semicon-ductor fabrication plant,a different financial metric,is in the high single digits.To close the gap,the government fund could invest in debt FIGURE 4Summary of proposed investment programs and capital allocation targetsFoundational Research“Scale Up”and CommercializationStrategic Efficiency,Capital Stack,Optimizationand EfficiencyPartnersEnterprisesUniversitiesNational LabsVenture CapitalEnterprisesPrivate EquityDebt LendersGovernment Fund ComponentNational Semiconductor Technology CenterPartnership for Revitalizing American Semiconductor ManufacturingCapital AllocationGovernment$39BPrivate Sector$9B$200-250B$2B$10-20BNational Semiconductor Venture Capital Pool Government Provided CapitalSubsidies,Preferred Equity and Debt via STARP and TALFVenture Capital FundingSubsidies and Grants20A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESand/or preferred equity that is more senior in the capital structure;this would solve two big problems for private equity investors and the government:taxpayer risk and the cost of capital.First,U.S.taxpayers will far less likely to lose money by making third-party capital subordinate to taxpayers,as is the case with investments by the U.S.Development Finance Corporation(DFC).Second,investing in debt and/or preferred equity is lower risk and can involve a fair but lower cost of capital,enabling common equity invested by private equity funds and semiconductor companies to generate the higher returns demanded by their investors,who are mostly U.S.pensions,endowments,and high net worth individuals.This similar structure was used during the financial crisis to recapitalize banks through the Troubled Asset Relief Program(TARP).Not only was TARP successful in recapitalizing some of the most challenged parts of the U.S.banking system and in flowing credit back into the economy,but taxpayers also made money.If the United States could combine the best of what worked with TARP and the DFC,it could create an entity with a track record of success modeled on public-private collaboration.To this end,I propose a new Semiconductor Technology Asset Revival Program(STARP),which when blended into the capital stack of a particular investment,would enable$70 billion of private equity capital to be economic and invested alongside STARP,but critically,on a subordinated basis to U.S.taxpayers.Debt lenders$120 billion of additional capitalA significant driver of ROIs is the considerable time it takes to construct a fab and the neces-sary capacity in the ecosystem to feed it.In addition,cost is a factor;the equipment for a fab plant is extremely expensive,especially leading-edge semiconductor equipment.The Fund could reduce the total capital cost of asset-heavy investments by leveraging a lending program like the Federal Reserves Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility(TALF),which was used in the administrations of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump to great success(TALF and TALF 2.0,respectively).29 In this case,instead of the Federal Reserve lending money to purchasers of certain asset-backed securities,it would lend money to any qualified fund that made loans or leases to companies building new semiconductor plants in the United States.This new TALF-like facility,or a Term Asset Lending Facility(TALF 3.0),borrowers of TALF 3.0 provide low-cost loans for property and equipment investments.This program could attract massive amounts of low-cost capital,leveling the playing field for new fab construc-tion in the United States with highly subsidized fab construction overseas.This effort would require the Fund to provide$5 billion in capital to the U.S.Treasury.The Treasury would use this capital to“equitize”the Federal Reserves TALF 3.0 13.3 Facility.With first lost capital from the Treasury and significant private equity capital in the form of subordinated,first loss common equity,TALF 3.0 could provide borrowers in the program 12.5-to-1 leverage,as was done for the many of the asset-backed security types in TALF 2.0(some asset-back securities categories were leveraged even higher than this).With 12.5x leverage,and a guarantee from Treasury,the Federal Reserve could lend short-to medi-um-term capital at a 1.5%interest rate to quali-fied TALF 3.0 borrowers to create a compelling opportunity to invest in these borrowers asset management products.The borrowers would raise additional capital,representing approxi-mately one-twelfth of the total loans and leases made.Investors of the TALF 3.0 borrowers would,after accounting for asset management fees,likely receive returns in the low teens,with the semiconductor companies receiving medium-term financing at just 2.50%.As the fabs enter the construction phase,the TALF 3.0 equipment loans could be rolled into new,senior-term debt loans at the senior most part of the capital stack,matching the semicon-ductor companies and private equitys common equity investments into these massive projects.The initial cash flow,after accounting for TALF 3.0 debt service and STARP returns,would go to pay back STARP.Depending on how high the returns of the new fab were,this payback could be achieved in seven to nine years.However,it is likely that the capital structure could be FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS21refinanced and STARP could be paid back from this refinancing much sooner than this time frame.Altogether,the Funds$5 billion to Treasury could attract more than$10 billion in first lost investor debt capital that the Federal Reserve provides$110 billion of loans against through TALF 3.0 thereby amounting to an additional$120 billion at the top of the capital structure.Obviously,more capital could be attracted if Treasury and the Federal Reserve were to deem a higher level of leverage appro-priate,which they have in the past for mort-gage-backed securities,for instance.The Fund,STARP,and TALF enabling a partnership for revitalizing American semiconductor manufacturingThe Fund,STARP,and TALF programs would be synergistic and thus need a common gover-nance umbrella to ensure the best fit for invest-ment opportunities.With increased government and third-party support,the United States would need a structure that validates investors and enterprises but,at the same time,allows the market to set valuation,structuring terms,and perform investment due diligence.To do so,the government would set the terms for receiving co-investment,based on a sliding scale of government support in relation to private sector support and on the amount of third-party private equity capital provided as a percentage of the total common equity pool for a project.The sliding scale would enable more government funding and greater leverage of TALF 3.0,as third-party capital increased.This package would be collectively known as the Partnership for Revitalizing American Semiconductor Manufacturing(hereafter referred to as the Partnership).This Partnership would be the fundamental mechanism for managing the Funds private equity and manu-facturing capacity investments.Semiconductor companies and third-party investors would be welcome to bring any investment proposal to the Partnership.The proposal would be approved if it supports the semiconductor strategy goals,meets the governance terms,and has committed investor capital.Whenever a semiconductor company and private equity investor start to draw on the approved,initial government capital(i.e.,invested in the project or joint venture),they would be legally bound to invest their proposed amount of capital,according to the Partnership.Through the Partnership and the Fund,the U.S.government would become a minority equity investor at either the project or corporate level.After making the investment,the governments sole role would be to protect it as is the role of any investor in any venture by ensuring that the project meets the investment commitments made during the proposal negotiations.This financially driven governance role is preferable to a more nebulous and idiosyncratic governance role the U.S.government would have to play as a provider of“strings attached”grants or subsidies.Research grants and venture capital$10-20 billion of additional capitalMajor industry players make limited invest-ments in advanced research because the payoff time frame is so far in the future.Venture capitalists(VCs)have shifted their investments to asset-light/digital business models that can scale up and provide much higher returns much faster.In addition,with the cost to design just one semiconductor on a leading-edge process semiconductor exceeding$100 million,the cost of entry for new design companies is simply too high and uncertain for most VCs.As a result,semiconductors today account for less than 5%of U.S.investment in venture capital(as opposed to more than 20%of Chinese invest-ment in venture capital in 2021).30This is a problem.Startup companies provide benefits that established giants cannot:dyna-mism,technology experimentation,and a pathway for new talent into the industry.The United States needs two separate approaches for stimulating venture capital.The first would be very early-stage investments and the second would be later-stage commercializa-tion investments.Very early-stage/“lab to world”tech transfer In this area,the government wouldwant a broad set of investors looking atthousands or tens of thousands of ideas.But the government would not be able to22A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESmicromanage individual research invest-ments;it would need to create a matching grant program that engages a wide-ranging set of organizations,such as SBICs,to administer a simple grant application in return for a fee.Applicants would need to work for an accredited U.S.higher education institution,as is often the case with National Institutes of Health grants.As the potential for loss is higher,this would be a relatively small pool of investment.Later-stage scale-up or commercialization investments I propose a government-led National Semiconductor Venture Capital Pool in which the Fund and private venture firms would be limited partner investors.Government-matching funds would have preference in the capital structure over third-party capital investors.In return,third-party investors would receive nearly all the upside(above and beyond a preferred return of about 5%to the Fund),as opposed to the standard venture capital 80/20 split.This setup would induce VCs to deploy much larger portions of their third-party capital funds in the semiconductor industry,as the VCs would gain additional upside poten-tial from the government-invested dollars,thereby lowering the cost of capital in these riskier projects.The government investment team would have a simple veto right up front before a VC spends significant time,money,and effort but only to make sure that the potential investment meets the broad strategic parameters of the National Semiconductor Policy.VCs would then use their standard investment toolkit and gover-nance approach to build winning companies and take them public,without government interference.This approach enhances the scale and scope of VC funding flowing into the industry and does not place the Fund in the role of picking winners.Government Procurement Accelerator Programs(GPAP)The U.S.federal and state governments purchase billions of dollars of semiconductors(directly or indirectly)annually.While many programs are in place to promote the purchase of U.S.-sourced technologies,the complexity and fragmentation of these programs makes it difficult for all but the largest companies to identify and pursue opportunities.The United States needs to simplify the interface and process to expand the links between industry and government.All companies and programs supported by the Fund should be eligible for inclusion across all government procurement efforts related to semiconductors.The United States could also design a“matchmaking”mechanism that communicates all procurement oppor-tunities to registered participants.Similar to the philosophy of the rest of the program,this matchmaking support would open to U.S.-headquartered companies and global companies that are making qualifying investments in the United States.In addition to increasing the financing available for R&D activities,the United States should use tax credits to encourage more R&D investment.These credits should be extended on an even playing field to both U.S.and global companies investing in the United States.Funding pure foundational research The last investment focus of the Fund would be foundational research.In many ways,this is more important than the manufacturing investments.A semiconductor fab is the physical instantiation of R&D investments that were initiated up to a decade earlier.The United States cannot lead in manufacturing if it does not lead in early-stage research.The semiconductor industry(and all the industries that depend on semiconductor innovation)cannot grow if it cannot continuously identify,improve and industrialize new materials,new transistor architectures and manufacturing techniques that increase the performance and lower the cost of computing.As current mate-rials and manufacturing techniques are hitting physical limits,we cannot assume that the industry will simply“figure it out”.There is an immense amount of basic research that must be completed much of which is not underway in the United States today.In prioritizing pure research topics,the focus should be on end-to-end ecosystem leadership across technology transitions.In other words,FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS23the research themes should comprehend both“winning in transitions”and building technology leadership across system-level technologies:investing in the full spectrum of standards,system architecture,processor architecture,operating system and applica-tions that enable future technologies to be launched.For example,the future move to quantum computing will require fundamental breakthroughs across transistor architecture,materials,design,manufacturing,supply chain;as well as entirely new approaches to software and system design.The research agenda needs to comprehend all of these components.It will be the holistic strength of the U.S.end-to-end ecosystem that ensures Americas future leader-ship in semiconductors,not just the strength of the U.S.manufacturing base.Therefore,focusing research investment on an R&D pilot line for leading-edge semiconductor manufac-turing is useful,but too narrow to be the sole focus of the research effort.The government team,in conjunction with the Industry Advisory Council created by the CHIPS Act,needs to develop a comprehensive R&D approach,one that allocates funding at scale across a series of R&D themes required to meet the top 10 objectives,and generates co-in-vestment from both private and public sectors sources of research capability.A National Semiconductor Research Center would be the centerpiece of this advanced research effort.The research center would operate as(1)a steering committee to drive nationwide research programs;(2)a connector across government,research,and industry;(3)a designer of programs to encourage talented students to pursue advanced degrees in the disciplines critical for semiconductors;(4)an evaluator of Americas competitiveness across different technology areas,and(5)the direct driver of research execution efforts on“moon-shot”technology breakthroughs or government priority projects that would be untenable for private industry to finance.The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft research organization in Germany is a compelling example to explore and potentially emulate as a model.This group comprises 76 affiliated institutes across Germany,employs nearly 30,000 researchers and is the biggest applied research organization in Europe.31 The Institutes ability to self-finance 70%of its expen-ditures via contract work,royalties and other means demonstrates that government funding can be multiplied(in this case by 2.5x)through an effective industry engagement model.In addition,the United States could accelerate the connection between the government and emerging technology providers via the GPAP program.This would allow the U.S.government to become a far more common alpha customer of new technologies,thereby de-risking the efforts of third-party investors.By sharing startup risk,the United States can vastly accel-erate the flow of capital and innovation in this critical research area of the industry.24A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESACCELERATING DEPLOYMENT AND ACCUMULATING TALENTFUTURE INDUSTRY WORKFORCE FOUNDATIONS:RECRUITING,TRAINING,AND TARGETED IMMIGRATIONThe U.S.semiconductor workforce is strong and world-class;but as one would expect,it is concentrated in the areas where the United States has greater share,such as fabless design.However,for the country to achieve the proposed top 10 objectives over the next decade,it would need to launch 10 or more manufacturing facilities(in the leading-edge,lagging-edge,analog and power,memory segment,and front-end and assembly/testing areas).With a simplistic assumption that each facility would require 5,000 highly skilled employees,such an expansion in facilities would require 50,000 new workers.32 And this is just workers for fabs to be built the industry needs new researchers,architects,designers,validation,verification,and software engineers.The demand for new personnel could reach more than 100,000 highly trained employees in the next five years a growth of 40%.33 The need for new talent is increased by an aging workforce.Roughly 60%of semiconductor engineers in the United States are over 40 years old,representing a much higher proportion than in the software industry.34 With every major country in the world now aiming to build up its semiconductor industry,the United States is in a talent war.U.S.companies are,of course,working hard to recruit and train talent.However,their efforts are not enough.While hiring for commercial activities is best performed by labs,universities,and companies,the govern-ment should do more to increase the size of the pool and remove roadblocks to accessing it.Forty percent of the semiconductor workforce in the United States is foreign-born;the country is great at attracting foreign talent.35 But with the war for global talent accelerating,with everyone chasing the same limited supply,the U.S.needs to up its game.America needs to incentivize large-scale immigration of the top South Korean,Taiwanese,and Japanese semiconductor workers(and,of course,talent from other leading semiconductor countries).These workers are best positioned to accelerate and de-risk the investment of South Korean,Taiwanese,and Japanese companies in the United States.Second,these workers run the best fabs and OSAT facilities in the world;the experience and tacit knowledge they could bring to new U.S.efforts(and could impart to U.S.workers)would be invaluable.Another type of talent will be urgently needed as multiple new fabs are built in the United States:specialized construction workers with specific talents required for high-end manufacturing facilities.Typically,up to 6,000 total workers are required for each greenfield fab construction.36 The“cleanroom”in a fab is the most advanced building in the world and therefore requires specialized and experienced construction capa-bilities,including translating 3D models to phys-ical spaces,making the worlds tightest welds,designing lethal gas protection systems,and inspecting airflow to sub-parts-per-million accu-racy(and hundreds more).These skill sets are in short supply in the United States and will be in increasing demand.The gaps offer opportuni-ties to generate high-quality blue-collar jobs that can later become advanced construction jobs(e.g.,to design and build facilities for lithium batteries and hydrogen capture systems).FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS25While the industry itself is making efforts to close these gaps,the National Semiconductor Policy can and should partner with the industry to accelerate the efforts.The United States needs to adopt a holistic set of bold initiatives to attract and grow more talent.These could include the following:Employee training and development funds asside-by-side Fund investments The UnitedStates could ensure that each Fund invest-ment includes a small amount of money,matched by financial and corporate inves-tors,for training and recruitment efforts.University research hiring programs TheUnited States could ensure that universitygrant programs funded by the proposedNational Semiconductor Research Center haveexplicit targets and money for bringing Ph.D.and postdoctoral talent into the program.Targeted immigration relief programs TheUnited States could remove the hard capson H1-B visas for workers seeking to joinsemiconductor manufacturing and researchprograms.In particular,to attract talent fromleading semiconductor manufacturing coun-tries in Asia,the U.S.government could setup country-specific programs,leveraging thetemplate set by the 10 existing country-spe-cific programs setup for other purposes.37Targeted attraction of global semiconductortalent The U.S.government,in collabo-ration with research universities and topcompanies,could identify the top severalhundred to a thousand research personnelglobally;co-develop incentive programs;andprovide an expedited,low bureaucracy pathfor these personnel to take on academic orcorporate research roles in the United States.ACCELERATING THE INDUSTRY:STREAMLINING PERMITTING AND REGULATORY PROCESSESAs mentioned,the United States is one of the most expensive and slowest countries in which to build manufacturing facilities issues that constrain investment in both leading-edge semiconductor fabrication facilities and the many smaller facilities that make the tools,gases,chemicals,and construction mate-rials needed for giant cleanrooms.There are numerous underlying causes of these issues,and many of them bring great benefits(such as citizens demand for clean air and water and the respect for private property rights)or are products of the United States federalist system.It is too far a stretch to propose refashioning the national regulatory system in the pursuit of greater success for the semiconductor industry.It is unlikely the U.S.system could ever match the decision-making efficiency of a monolithic city-state or a single-party political system.However,the United States should not accept the status quo;the Policy team must direct a set of partners to reduce the time-to-market gap from 40%-plus to less than 20%.I propose a set of common-sense,feasible steps to accelerate the process:Create a central mechanism to coordinateand streamline regulatory engagement bysemiconductor companies.Staff an empow-ered organization to be the single windowthrough which semiconductor companyinvestors can understand,review,discuss,and monitor permitting and regulatoryprocesses.Similar,successful setups canbe found in other countries and regions.38Delete duplicative reviews and procedures.Create a mechanism to review federalpermitting procedures for technologymanufacturing facilities,with two purposesin mind:removing those procedures that areoutdated or no longer needed and removingthose are duplicative of state requirements.Build best practices and a problem-solvingculture.Staff a national expert team todevelop a sustainable process to sharebest practices with industry players andstate and local officials and to collaboratetogether to remove bottlenecks that slowdown launches.Prioritize speed in the investment process.Incorporate into team training,investmentevaluation,and decision-making the under-standing that speed is a core competitive26A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESfactor and that locations and companies that do not have best-in-class speed are less attractive investing targets.Benchmark the best.Evaluate the“speedysemiconductor starts”of global leadingcountries such as Japan and Singapore,identify their best practices,and bring thosepractices back to the United States.Onereason to create a stand-alone team for theFund is so that the Fund can replicate globalbest practices in a way that establishedgovernment agencies cannot.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS27WIN-WINS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS GLOBAL PARTNERSGovernments around the world understand that the semiconductor industry is the underpinning platform for innovation-led economies.These governments are rolling out policies either to promote investment in semiconductors,to protect their industry from overseas compet-itors,or to stop their national champions from investing outside their home market.For instance,in December 2020,19 European Union member states signed the European Initiative on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies in a bid to reestablish the EU as a global power-house in the semiconductor industry.39 The joint declaration aims to enhance cooperation and increase investment in equipment and materials,design,and advanced manufacturing and packaging and includes a total pledge of 145 billion euro in support(of which little is new funding and therefore readily available for European companies).In February 2022,the European Commission announced the European Chips Act,which includes a target to more than double Europes share of global manufacturing output to 20%.40 In May 2021,South Korea announced a 50%reduction in tax rates for semiconductor companies and that,together,South Korean companies and the government will invest more than$400 billion in the industry over the next 10 years.41 In December 2021,India announced a new policy to build up the semiconductor industry in the country,with a goal becoming a global hub for lagging-edge manufacturing facilities.42U.S.policy will need to be successful within this context.But success does not depend on these other country efforts failing.In fact,the growth and success of semiconductor industries in similarly aligned countries could be a great boon to the U.S.industry;diversified geographic footprints increase supply chain resilience,provide market opportunities for U.S.firms,and supply more“smart brains”to solve the hardest industry-related problems.The endgame needs to be a stronger and more resilient order in the global semiconductor ecosystem.First,success means that the globally leading semiconductor companies,such as those headquartered in Taiwan,South Korea,and Japan,are manufacturing at scale in the United States,are performing R&D in the United States,and consider the United States a second home.Non-American partners are essential to achieving the top 10 objectives,as many are important suppliers,customers,or intellectual property owners.These non-American compa-nies will need tacit or explicit approval from their home governments to invest in the United States.Therefore,a common understanding and agreement with governments in key semi-conductor countries will be required.Second,success means engagement with Europe on technology has been renewed,whereby the American and European indus-tries especially in the areas of automotive,industrial,medical,and telecommunications semiconductors consider themselves part of the same ecosystem that leverages common technologies,manufacturing capacity,and business rules.Renewing this engagement is of particular importance to the European tech-nology industry,and specifically Germany.As noted later in this paper,semiconductors are the foundation of Germanys most important 28A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESindustries,and that foundation has been progressively weakening.Partnering to turn that around offers the United States a rare opening to renew the critical US-German relationship.Third,success means careful diplomacy with Asian nations to define the“win-wins”and global industry rules with the Asian nations that lead in many semiconductor segments and now represent more than 70%of global installed manufacturing capacity.43 The United States needs to identify ways in which Asian countries,companies,and capital benefit from,rather than bear costs from,U.S.policy.There is only one path to accomplish this win-win scenario:expanding the pie by creating new technologies,markets and customers,so that all countries can increase employment and deploy more capital.Innovation through R&D is a far more compelling centerpiece of Americas foreign policy regarding semiconductors than supply chain realignment.The former creates opportu-nities for everyone to grow and benefit,while the latter drives countries to defend their turf and see the policies of the United States as a threat.ENGAGING FOREIGN COMPANIES TO INVEST IN THE UNITED STATESFor the United States to achieve the top 10 objectives,non-American leading companies need to invest in U.S.-based manufacturing capacity and U.S.-based advanced R&D activi-ties.In fact,the objectives cannot be achieved without the substantial contribution of many of the most important non-American semicon-ductor companies.In the long term,the United States needs to have a simple but aggressive goal:for leading foreign companies to consider the United States a second home,a base from which they can serve U.S.customers and scale their business globally.Leading companies are constantly making investment decisions to boost production and enhance their capabilities and innova-tion leadership.In all cases,investment and research decisions made years ago are still being implemented today.The challenge for the United States will be to convince global leaders to invest outside their home market,which is usually where they acquire the technical talent,engineering talent,suppliers,and services needed to build their business.Fitting into the ongoing long-term capital expenditure programs of these global leaders will be no easy feat,even for companies willing to work closely with the United States.Key plan imperatives include the following:Encouraging and incentivizing global leadersin leading-edge logic,advanced packaging,memory,and other industry segments tobuild and invest in the United States and tobring along their partners.Besides offeringfinancial incentives(e.g.,low-cost capitaland tax incentives),the United States mustunequivocally demonstrate a long-termcommitment,provide access to othersuppliers and their IP,and espouse certaintyto ensure a proper return for the leaderstime,money,and effort.The effort willinvolve complex and difficult decisions by allparties.Compelling global companies to build R&Dcenters in the United States,or to add staffto their existing centers.Again,the resultingIP and know-how must be allowed to crossborders freely,or they will not invest.Global leaders will decide on manufacturing and R&D locations from a business standpoint;first and foremost,investing in America must make business sense.For manufacturing,they will need inducements similar to those required by U.S.companies:adequate returns on capital invested,the meeting of customer needs,and the avoidance of stranded capital.They will want to be part of a flourishing industry cluster that can both reduce risk and attract talent for their opera-tions.Therefore,they will follow the lead of big players in their industry segment.This is why it is so important for the United States to first gain the commitment of a few strategic partners,in each corresponding segment,to invest in capacity in America.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS29R&D investment:A more challenging taskThe strategy must incentivize global R&D investment into the United States with as much vigor as it does factory investment.Without a constant stream of new process technologies based on continuous R&D breakthroughs,a leading edge fab will soon fall behind and become economically unviable.Promoting a global shift in R&D will be more difficult(or at least less straightforward)than in manufacturing.Foreign companies will find it hard to separate out R&D functions and place them in different locations;they tend to cluster their core R&D functions at headquarters and around the“alpha fab”where new process technologies are rolled out.Companies make R&D decisions based on these factors:Strategic considerations;Proximity to the market and customers;Talent,at both the senior and junior levels;Associated costs and overall financialreturns;andPolitical,regulatory,and operational risks.In general,U.S.-based R&D will score well on strategic considerations and market proximity.However,global companies will have substan-tial concerns about access to talent,the level of returns,and the comparatively higher regulatory and political risks.Some major concerns and issues to be addressed include the following:Organizational costs While the UnitedStates has clear leadership and significantsenior research talent,it,unlike other coun-tries,has a smaller and more expensive poolof junior engineers.For instance,China isgraduating more than 10 times the numberof bachelors-level electrical engineers thanthe United States.In addition,the averageengineering salary in the city of Hsinchu,Taiwan site of the worlds largest semi-conductor cluster is only about$30,000,versus an average of roughly$75,000in Hillsboro,Oregon,a large U.S.-basedmanufacturing cluster.Add in insurance,other benefits,and taxes and the U.S.labor costs are roughly four times higher.44Other financial return drivers Beyond laborcosts,there are many other issues thataffect an R&D centers financial returns.These include the centers ability to receiveU.S.government grants to help supportdirect R&D expenses,its access to equiva-lent R&D tax credits as U.S.-headquarteredcompanies,and the existence of a largeenough U.S.-based ecosystem to warrant aseparate well-funded R&D operation.Open access to major U.S.customers The government should not push U.S.-headquartered companies or governmentagencies to“buy American,”as this will mini-mize a major reason to invest in the UnitedStates proximity to the worlds largestcustomer base.Free global use Non-U.S.companies will beconcerned that if they develop IP in the UnitedStates,they might not be allowed to export itto their overseas affiliates or will be subjectto export controls.The United States needsto establish substantial coordination betweenthe National Semiconductor Policy team anda separate,independent government teamthat sets related export control policies.Open access for home-country capital providers Global leading semiconductor compa-nies have home-based capital providersthat will want to access investment in newU.S.-based facilities;non-U.S.investors needcomparable access to the U.S.Fund program.ENGAGING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS:TAILORED APPROACHES TO HOME MARKET ISSUESThe home countries of leading semiconductor companies face broader issues,including a more complicated calculus beyond near-term financial returns(e.g.,national security,foreign policy,domestic politics,and industrial relations).Their semiconductor strategy is one piece of a 30A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESSegmentsRelative capabilities indexed to Market LeadersIndustry Segment CapabilitiesLeading-Edge LogicMemoryAnalog and PowerOptoelectronicsand PhotonicsValue Chain CapabilitiesProcess technologyFoundry front-end manufacturing capacityEquipment and ToolsElectronic Design Tools(0%)(100%)USEuropeNon-PRC Asia Mainland ChinaFIGURE 5High-level comparison of capabilities by region45 much larger plan to support multistakeholder national interests.A U.S.policy approach must take into account these specific hot button issues,which will vary in each country.As part of this broader engagement,the United States must make building in the country an easy decision.The following considerations are important:Foreign government buy-in Winning foreigngovernment buy-in will require highlightingthe economic rationale for the companiesto produce in the United States,as well asdemonstrating how U.S.semiconductorpolicy is not meant to choke off local produc-tion and negatively impact that countrysindustry employment.Just like the UnitedStates does,foreign countries benefit whentheir companies enter new markets and havediverse global supply chain footprints.Local regulatory changes In certain cases,it will make sense to request foreign govern-ments to change laws to enable local compa-nies to invest in the United States(e.g.,exportcontrols or technology transfer restrictions).Appropriate countermeasure deterrents TheUnited States must avoid bidding wars(e.g.,country X promises its home players“wewill match or beat U.S.economics”for semi-conductor investments)not only by building friendly,collaborative relationships with semiconductor authorities in other countries,but also by emphasizing that transparency in government support is essential and that the United States will use proper channels,such as the World Trade Organization,to stop or fully offset new subsidies created in a race to the bottom.While there are no tools that can fully stop“secret”or excessive subsidies,global cooperation can deter the worst excesses.DIFFERENT COUNTRIES NEED DIFFERENT ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIESWhile the United States has enough internally generated demand to provide a baseline scale for nearly any investment in semiconductors,other leading countries generally do not.Therefore,these countries specialize in one or more industry segments or layers of the value chain.The table below,which by necessity is simplified and high level,lays out the compara-tive capabilities of major regions.FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS31There are several simple takeaways from this chart:(1)Asian countries and regions grade tops in numerous categories;(2)no country has the ability to be self-sufficient,as they all rely on a global value chain;(3)different countries have different problems to solve and therefore will have different engagement models vis-vis the United States;and(4)other countries will be more concerned with protecting their own vulnerabilities than with supporting the United States domestic efforts.Engaging an important partner:A deeper dive into the German situationThe automotive and industrial automation industries are Germanys economic mainstays.46 In total,advanced manufacturing drives more than 25%of German GDP and more than 75%of its exports.Leading-edge semiconductors,new materials,and software are critical inputs into these German industries.To protect its world-leading position,the German automotive industry needs access to new technology innovation,stability in supplies,and ecosystem support to put together the full solution for leading electric vehicles(e.g.,batteries,battery management systems,sensor systems,power electronics,CPUs for automotive control and autonomous driving,and underlying software stacks).Roughly 75%of the EUs semiconductor firms are headquartered in Germany.47 The countrys companies have strengths in certain analog,power,and sensing technologies and select equipment markets,but Germany on the whole lacks the semiconductor manufacturing capacity(e.g.,in leading-edge logic processing,software capability,and materials)to be a leader in the future automotive and“industrial internet”industries.As a result,German auto-motive and industrial automation industries rely on foreign suppliers and do not control their own future.In addition,Germanys current semiconductor strengths are being eroded by technology transitions.For instance,the coun-trys traditional,silicon-based,power inverter semiconductors for automotive applications are now less relevant than emerging materials for future electric vehicle powertrains,such as silicon carbide and gallium nitride.This is a significant and growing issue for German car companies and the government.American companies have strong market share,IP position,and manufacturing know-how in many of the key technology areas where Germany has gaps.They see opportunities in the German and European markets.This is why Intel and GlobalFoundries,major U.S.semicon-ductor companies,have already announced plans to invest in Germany.48The respective national funds of both countries could jointly facilitate the build-out of the supply chain in both the United States and Germany to leverage economies of scale and foster a more resilient global supply chain.The United States could extend the frontiers of a National Semiconductor Research Center umbrella to include Germany so that the countrys research teams can join either broad or individual,specific U.S.efforts.The framework could encourage U.S.and German companies to work together on key semiconductor solutions for the electric vehicle,autonomous driving,and indus-trial Internet of Things markets.U.S.semicon-ductor companies would get new customers,new insights into customer needs,and more access to German technology,while German companies(or German subsidiaries of U.S.companies)would gain experience in designing and building out advanced semiconductor manufacturing and more access to better tech-nologies and U.S.markets and customers.Of course,Germany would need to step up its efforts for this collaboration to work.They would need to commit real capital,invest in partnerships with the Fund,remove roadblocks to allow German companies to invest in the United States,establish common rules on global access to critical semiconductor tech-nologies and supplies,and give U.S.semicon-ductor companies open access to the German customer base.32A SEMICONDUCTOR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATESA BIGGER OPPORTUNITY:SEMICONDUCTORS AS A FOUNDATION FOR A TECH PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPEThe engagement with Germany could be both an example of and the foundation for a renewed technology partnership with Europe.A win-win partnership would help align the European tech-nology and business communities closer with the corresponding American communities.The United States could provide more market access,proximity to customers and capital,and joint investment in future technology break-throughs.Europe holds less than 10%of global installed semiconductor capacity,less than 4%of annual capital expenditures,and less than 5%of global annual venture capital investment into semiconductors.And its major industries(e.g.,auto,industrial,telecoms,and medical devices)are highly dependent on the innovations that semiconductors bring.In return for U.S.support,Europe could provide joint funding and help define a competitive,global,transparent and robust semiconductor ecosystem.A more robust European semiconductor manu-facturing cluster would not only benefit the U.S.semiconductor industry,but also boost the busi-ness case for Asian companies to build their capacity to serve the European market which will be necessary to meet the top 10 objectives for global supply chain resiliency.This type of global partnership does entail tradeoffs;American companies supported by the Fund would build some of their global manu-facturing capacity in Europe rather than solely in the United States.However,these tradeoffs are inevitable if the United States wants global support for its own manufacturing revitalization efforts.In fact,the United States should see the investment by other countries as a way to achieve the Policys top 10 objectives,because only the United States has the ability and foun-dational elements to lift all boats in the global semiconductor industry,if policy is coordinated and messaged correctly.Formalizing the global approach:Launching a global semiconductor partnership frameworkTo win the hearts and open the wallets of the global semiconductor community,the U.S.National Semiconductor Policy needs to be open,global,long-term,committed,and patient.Just like leading U.S.companies,top foreign companies invest many years,across many cycles,to develop true breakthroughs.The Dutch company ASML spent 17 years developing its extreme ultraviolet technology,while the UK company ARM spent more than six years building its first 64-bit micropro-cessor.49 To fully convince the executives of global semiconductor companies and t

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P a g e|1 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market MM Market estimates and forecasts P a g e|2 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Table of Contents 1 About Us.12 1.1 Our Expertise.13 1.2 Disclaimer Policy.13 1.3 License.13 1.3.1 Single User License.14 1.3.2 Multi-User License.14 1.3.3 Corporate User License.14 2 Research Methodology.15 2.1 Hypothesis through Desk Research and Internal Repository.15 2.2 Companies revenue tracking,narrow down,and exhaustive interviews.15 2.3 Data Triangulation and Validation.15 3 U.S.Coffee Machine Market With Regional Overview.17 3.1 Overview.17 3.2 North America.19 3.2.1 North America Coffee Machine Market,By Application.19 3.2.2 North America Coffee Machine Market,By Product.21 3.2.3 North America Coffee Machine Market,By Country.23 3.2.3.1 U.S.26 3.2.3.1.1 U.S.Coffee Machine Market,By Application.26 3.2.3.1.2 U.S.Coffee Machine Market,By Product.28 4 Global Coffee Machine Market,By Application.31 4.1 Overview.31 4.2 Residential.32 4.2.1 Residential Market,By Region.32 4.2.1.1 North America Residential Market,By Country.35 4.2.1.2 Europe Residential Market,By Country.37 4.2.1.3 Asia-Pacific Residential Market,By Country.40 P a g e|3 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 4.2.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential Market,By Country.43 4.3 Commercial.45 4.3.1 Commercial Market,By Region.45 4.3.1.1 North America Commercial Market,By Country.48 4.3.1.2 Europe Commercial Market,By Country.50 4.3.1.3 Asia-Pacific Commercial Market,By Country.53 4.3.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial Market,By Country.56 5 Global Coffee Machine Market,By Product.59 5.1 Overview.59 5.2 Drip Filter.61 5.2.1 Drip Filter Market,By Region.61 5.2.1.1 North America Drip Filter Market,By Country.63 5.2.1.2 Europe Drip Filter Market,By Country.66 5.2.1.3 Asia-Pacific Drip Filter Market,By Country.68 5.2.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Drip Filter Market,By Country.71 5.3 Capsule.73 5.3.1 Capsule Market,By Region.73 5.3.1.1 North America Capsule Market,By Country.76 5.3.1.2 Europe Capsule Market,By Country.78 5.3.1.3 Asia-Pacific Capsule Market,By Country.81 5.3.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Capsule Market,By Country.83 5.4 Espresso.86 5.4.1 Espresso Market,By Region.86 5.4.1.1 North America Espresso Market,By Country.88 5.4.1.2 Europe Espresso Market,By Country.90 5.4.1.3 Asia-Pacific Espresso Market,By Country.93 5.4.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Espresso Market,By Country.96 5.5 Bean-to-Cup.98 5.5.1 Bean-to-Cup Market,By Region.98 P a g e|4 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 5.5.1.1 North America Bean-to-Cup Market,By Country.101 5.5.1.2 Europe Bean-to-Cup Market,By Country.103 5.5.1.3 Asia-Pacific Bean-to-Cup Market,By Country.106 5.5.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Bean-to-Cup Market,By Country.109 P a g e|5 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market List of Tables TABLE 1 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 17 TABLE 2 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)18 TABLE 3 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 18 TABLE 4 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)19 TABLE 5 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 19 TABLE 6 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)20 TABLE 7 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,TON 20 TABLE 8 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)21 TABLE 9 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,MILLION USD 21 TABLE 10 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)22 TABLE 11 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,TON 22 TABLE 12 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)23 TABLE 13 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 23 TABLE 14 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)24 TABLE 15 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 25 TABLE 16 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)26 TABLE 17 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 26 TABLE 18 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)26 TABLE 19 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,TON 27 TABLE 20 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)27 TABLE 21 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,MILLION USD 28 TABLE 22 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)28 TABLE 23 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,TON 29 TABLE 24 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)30 TABLE 25 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 31 TABLE 26 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)31 TABLE 27 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,TON 32 TABLE 28 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)32 TABLE 29 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 32 TABLE 30 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)33 TABLE 31 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 34 TABLE 32 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)35 TABLE 33 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 35 TABLE 34 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)36 TABLE 35 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 36 TABLE 36 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)37 TABLE 37 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 37 TABLE 38 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)38 P a g e|6 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 39 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 39 TABLE 40 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)40 TABLE 41 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 40 TABLE 42 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)41 TABLE 43 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 41 TABLE 44 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)42 TABLE 45 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 43 TABLE 46 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)44 TABLE 47 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 44 TABLE 48 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)45 TABLE 49 COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 45 TABLE 50 COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)46 TABLE 51 COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 46 TABLE 52 COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)47 TABLE 53 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 48 TABLE 54 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)49 TABLE 55 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 49 TABLE 56 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)50 TABLE 57 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 50 TABLE 58 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)51 TABLE 59 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 52 TABLE 60 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)53 TABLE 61 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 53 TABLE 62 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)54 TABLE 63 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 54 TABLE 64 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)55 TABLE 65 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 56 TABLE 66 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)57 TABLE 67 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 57 TABLE 68 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)58 TABLE 69 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,MILLION USD 59 TABLE 70 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)60 TABLE 71 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,TON 60 TABLE 72 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)61 TABLE 73 DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 61 TABLE 74 DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)62 TABLE 75 DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 62 TABLE 76 DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)63 TABLE 77 NORTH AMERICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 63 TABLE 78 NORTH AMERICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)64 P a g e|7 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 79 NORTH AMERICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 65 TABLE 80 NORTH AMERICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)65 TABLE 81 EUROPE DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 66 TABLE 82 EUROPE DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)67 TABLE 83 EUROPE DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 67 TABLE 84 EUROPE DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)68 TABLE 85 ASIA-PACIFIC DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 68 TABLE 86 ASIA-PACIFIC DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)69 TABLE 87 ASIA-PACIFIC DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 70 TABLE 88 ASIA-PACIFIC DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)71 TABLE 89 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 71 TABLE 90 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)72 TABLE 91 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 72 TABLE 92 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)73 TABLE 93 CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 74 TABLE 94 CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)74 TABLE 95 CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 75 TABLE 96 CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)76 TABLE 97 NORTH AMERICA CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 76 TABLE 98 NORTH AMERICA CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)77 TABLE 99 NORTH AMERICA CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 77 TABLE 100 NORTH AMERICA CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)78 TABLE 101 EUROPE CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 78 TABLE 102 EUROPE CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)79 TABLE 103 EUROPE CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 79 TABLE 104 EUROPE CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)80 TABLE 105 ASIA-PACIFIC CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 81 TABLE 106 ASIA-PACIFIC CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)82 TABLE 107 ASIA-PACIFIC CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 82 TABLE 108 ASIA-PACIFIC CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)83 TABLE 109 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 83 TABLE 110 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)84 TABLE 111 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 85 TABLE 112 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)85 TABLE 113 ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 86 TABLE 114 ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)87 TABLE 115 ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 87 TABLE 116 ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)88 TABLE 117 NORTH AMERICA ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 88 TABLE 118 NORTH AMERICA ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)89 TABLE 119 NORTH AMERICA ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 89 P a g e|8 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 120 NORTH AMERICA ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)90 TABLE 121 EUROPE ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 91 TABLE 122 EUROPE ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)91 TABLE 123 EUROPE ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 92 TABLE 124 EUROPE ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)93 TABLE 125 ASIA-PACIFIC ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 93 TABLE 126 ASIA-PACIFIC ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)94 TABLE 127 ASIA-PACIFIC ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 95 TABLE 128 ASIA-PACIFIC ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)95 TABLE 129 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 96 TABLE 130 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)97 TABLE 131 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 97 TABLE 132 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)98 TABLE 133 BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 98 TABLE 134 BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)99 TABLE 135 BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 100 TABLE 136 BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)101 TABLE 137 NORTH AMERICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 101 TABLE 138 NORTH AMERICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)102 TABLE 139 NORTH AMERICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 102 TABLE 140 NORTH AMERICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)103 TABLE 141 EUROPE BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 103 TABLE 142 EUROPE BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)104 TABLE 143 EUROPE BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 105 TABLE 144 EUROPE BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)106 TABLE 145 ASIA-PACIFIC BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 106 TABLE 146 ASIA-PACIFIC BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)107 TABLE 147 ASIA-PACIFIC BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 107 TABLE 148 ASIA-PACIFIC BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)108 TABLE 149 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 109 TABLE 150 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)110 TABLE 151 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 110 TABLE 152 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)111 P a g e|9 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market List of Figures FIGURE 1 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)17 FIGURE 2 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)18 FIGURE 3 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)20 FIGURE 4 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)20 FIGURE 5 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)22 FIGURE 6 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)23 FIGURE 7 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)24 FIGURE 8 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)25 FIGURE 9 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)26 FIGURE 10 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)27 FIGURE 11 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)28 FIGURE 12 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)29 FIGURE 13 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)31 FIGURE 14 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)32 FIGURE 15 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)33 FIGURE 16 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)34 FIGURE 17 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)36 FIGURE 18 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)37 FIGURE 19 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)38 FIGURE 20 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)39 FIGURE 21 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)41 FIGURE 22 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)42 FIGURE 23 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)43 FIGURE 24 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)45 FIGURE 25 COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)46 FIGURE 26 COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)47 FIGURE 27 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)48 FIGURE 28 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)50 FIGURE 29 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)51 FIGURE 30 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)52 FIGURE 31 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)54 FIGURE 32 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)55 P a g e|10 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market FIGURE 33 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)56 FIGURE 34 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)58 FIGURE 35 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)59 FIGURE 36 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)60 FIGURE 37 DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)62 FIGURE 38 DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)63 FIGURE 39 NORTH AMERICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)64 FIGURE 40 NORTH AMERICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)65 FIGURE 41 EUROPE DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)66 FIGURE 42 EUROPE DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)68 FIGURE 43 ASIA-PACIFIC DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)69 FIGURE 44 ASIA-PACIFIC DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)70 FIGURE 45 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)72 FIGURE 46 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA DRIP FILTER MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)73 FIGURE 47 CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)74 FIGURE 48 CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)75 FIGURE 49 NORTH AMERICA CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)77 FIGURE 50 NORTH AMERICA CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)78 FIGURE 51 EUROPE CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)79 FIGURE 52 EUROPE CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)80 FIGURE 53 ASIA-PACIFIC CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)81 FIGURE 54 ASIA-PACIFIC CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)83 FIGURE 55 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA CAPSULE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)84 FIGURE 56 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA CAPSULE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)85 FIGURE 57 ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)86 FIGURE 58 ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)88 FIGURE 59 NORTH AMERICA ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)89 FIGURE 60 NORTH AMERICA ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)90 FIGURE 61 EUROPE ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)91 FIGURE 62 EUROPE ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)92 FIGURE 63 ASIA-PACIFIC ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)94 FIGURE 64 ASIA-PACIFIC ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)95 FIGURE 65 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA ESPRESSO MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)96 FIGURE 66 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA ESPRESSO MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)98 FIGURE 67 BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)99 FIGURE 68 BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)100 FIGURE 69 NORTH AMERICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)102 P a g e|11 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market FIGURE 70 NORTH AMERICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)103 FIGURE 71 EUROPE BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)104 FIGURE 72 EUROPE BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)105 FIGURE 73 ASIA-PACIFIC BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)107 FIGURE 74 ASIA-PACIFIC BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)108 FIGURE 75 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)109 FIGURE 76 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA BEAN-TO-CUP MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)111 P a g e|12 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 1 About Us Apollo Research Reports offers market studies to over 70%of the fortune 1,000 companies,enabling them to make decisions and optimize their revenues.The company also helps the new market entrants including SMEs grow their revenue in the short and mid-term.Top 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Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 2 Research Methodology 2.1 Hypothesis through Desk Research and Internal Repository a)Initially the manufacturers/service providers of various categories are enlisted from our internal data repository.A list of companies is generated for a standard of over key 40 countries globally who could have been the prospective end-users of the target product/service.Through paid contact databases,LinkedIn,and call onboard numbers,the primary research team generates contact details of personnel engaged in manufacturing/service divisions of those companies.Besides,through a similar approach,the contact details of target product/service manufacturers are also deduced.b)In the execution sub-phase of research,scheduled quick telephonic confirmation calls with the mid-level management are done.The purpose of the call is to confirm the usage of the target products/services.An initial level analysis of the collected data is performed to understand the number of target products/services per Tier 1,Tier 2,and Tier 3 companies.2.2 Companies revenue tracking,narrow down,and exhaustive interviews a)In the next level of research,target product/service manufacturers overall estimated revenue is tracked through secondary research,paid databases,and telephonic interviews.Their revenue is narrowed down to estimate the revenue through target products/services.The summation of their revenue through target product/services is considered as market value,to be analyzed further.The interviews and secondary research are also used to collect pricing details of various target products.All prices collected are converted into US$.b)The data and information collected in the hypothesis phase of research are utilized as a sample to derive a rough market volume(In the case of the product-based market)for each country.The country-level information is summed at the global level considering a rough estimate of revenue through countries apart from the focused ones.With this rough volume at country and global level is derived.The pricing obtained in the previous phase of research is used to derive the average selling price.Through our pricing model,the average selling price of the target product/services is calculated.The derived volume is multiplied by the average selling price to arrive at market value.2.3 Data Triangulation and Validation In the third phase of research,the market value calculated is triangulated to check gaps in the numbers.Possible causes for gaps are noted.A telephonic discussion with a section of interview participants(target product/service providers)is performed to discuss our findings.Simultaneously,a group of senior analysts,research heads,statisticians,and economic experts also brainstorm about the data gaps.The outcome of P a g e|16 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market second-level interviews and brainstorming sessions resulted in the evolution of market value.Through in-house pre-defined statistical models,market forecasting is done for all segments and sub-segments across countries,which is summed through a mix of bottom-up and top-down approaches to obtain regional and global levels.P a g e|17 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 3 U.S.Coffee Machine Market With Regional Overview 3.1 Overview TABLE 1 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD Region 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)North America 2437.8 2637.9 2857.1 5591.2 8.70%Europe 1939.4 2129.3 2339.9 5145.4 10.30%Asia-Pacific 1284.9 1453.9 1646.6 4609.5 13.68%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 342.3 362.4 384.2 635.7 6.44%Total 6004.4 6583.5 7227.8 15981.8 10.36%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Coffee Machine market was valued at$6,004.4 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$15,981.8 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.36%from 2023 to 2032.North America is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$2,437.8 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$5,591.2 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.70%.Asia-Pacific is anticipated to reach$4,609.5 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 13.68%.North America and Europe collectively expected to account for about 72.9%share of the Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 40.6%share.Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 13.68%and 10.30%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 53.7%in the overall Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 61.0%by 2032.FIGURE 1 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 40.62.3!.4%5.75.02.2(.8%4.0%0 0Pp0%North AmericaEuropeAsia-PacificRest of World20222032 P a g e|18 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 2 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Region 2023 2024 2025 2032 North America 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Europe 9.8%9.9.0.7%Asia-Pacific 13.1.3.4.1%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.9%Total 9.6%9.8%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 3 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON Region 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)North America 2428.4 2627.9 2846.4 5572.2 8.71%Europe 1889.9 2074.5 2279.2 5003.3 10.28%Asia-Pacific 1234.9 1396.9 1581.6 4418.0 13.65%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 324.1 343.0 363.4 598.4 6.38%Total 5877.3 6442.3 7070.6 15592.0 10.32%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Coffee Machine market was 5,877.3 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 15,592.0 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.32%from 2023 to 2032.North America is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 2,428.4 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 5,572.2 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.71%.Asia-Pacific is anticipated to reach 4,418.0 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 13.65%.North America and Europe collectively expected to account for about 73.5%share of the Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 41.3%share.Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 13.65%and 10.28%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 53.2%in the overall Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 60.4%by 2032.FIGURE 2 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|19 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 4 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Region 2023 2024 2025 2032 North America 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Europe 9.8%9.9.0.7%Asia-Pacific 13.1.2.3.1%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 5.8%5.9%6.0%6.8%Total 9.6%9.8%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 3.2 North America 3.2.1 North America Coffee Machine Market,By Application TABLE 5 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,MILLION USD Application 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Residential 1064.3 1150.8 1245.5 2423.6 8.63%Commercial 1373.5 1487.1 1611.5 3167.6 8.76%Total 2437.8 2637.9 2857.1 5591.2 8.70%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The North America Coffee Machine market was valued at$2,437.8 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$5,591.2 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.70%from 2023 to 2032.Commercial segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,373.5 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$3,167.6 by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.76%.41.32.2!.0%5.55.72.1(.3%3.8%0 0Pp0%North AmericaEuropeAsia-PacificRest of World20222032 P a g e|20 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market FIGURE 3 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 6 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Application 2023 2024 2025 2032 Residential 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Commercial 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Total 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 7 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,TON Application 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Residential 1060.3 1146.4 1240.7 2413.0 8.62%Commercial 1368.2 1481.5 1605.6 3159.2 8.78%Total 2428.4 2627.9 2846.4 5572.2 8.71%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for North America Coffee Machine market 2,428.4 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 5,572.2 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.71%from 2023 to 2032.Commercial segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,368.2 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 3,159.2 by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.78%.FIGURE 4 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)43.7V.3C.3V.7%0 0Pp0%ResidentialCommercial20222032 P a g e|21 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 8 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Application 2023 2024 2025 2032 Residential 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Commercial 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Total 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 3.2.2 North America Coffee Machine Market,By Product TABLE 9 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,MILLION USD Product 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Drip Filter 1184.7 1282.1 1388.9 2721.5 8.72psule 626.2 677.9 734.6 1443.2 8.76%Espresso 420.6 455.4 493.5 970.3 8.77an-to-Cup 206.4 222.5 240.1 456.1 8.30%Total 2437.8 2637.9 2857.1 5591.2 8.70%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The North America Coffee Machine market was valued at$2,437.8 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$5,591.2 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.70%from 2023 to 2032.Drip Filter segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,184.7 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$2,721.5 by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.72%.Espresso segment is anticipated to reach$970.3 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 8.77%.Drip Filter and Capsule segments collectively expected to account for about 74.3%share of the North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 48.6%share.Espresso and Capsule segments are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.77%and 8.76%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of 43.7V.3C.3V.7%0 0Pp0%ResidentialCommercial20222032 P a g e|22 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market these two segments is estimated to be around 42.9%in the overall North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 43.2%by 2032.FIGURE 5 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 10 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Product 2023 2024 2025 2032 Drip Filter 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1psule 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Espresso 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2an-to-Cup 7.8%7.9%8.0%8.7%Total 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 11 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,TON Product 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Drip Filter 1180.3 1277.6 1384.1 2714.9 8.74psule 624.1 675.5 731.9 1436.4 8.74%Espresso 419.4 454.1 492.1 967.7 8.77an-to-Cup 204.6 220.7 238.2 453.2 8.32%Total 2428.4 2627.9 2846.4 5572.2 8.71%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for North America Coffee Machine market 2,428.4 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 5,572.2 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.71%from 2023 to 2032.Drip Filter segment is expected to 48.6%.7.3%8.5H.7%.8.4%8.2%0 0Pp0%Drip FilterCapsuleEspressoBean-to-Cup20222032 P a g e|23 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,180.3 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 2,714.9 by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.74%.Espresso segment is anticipated to reach 967.7 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 8.77%.Drip Filter and Capsule segments collectively expected to account for about 74.3%share of the North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 48.6%share.Espresso and Capsule segments are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.77%and 8.74%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 43.0%in the overall North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 43.1%by 2032.FIGURE 6 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 12 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Product 2023 2024 2025 2032 Drip Filter 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1psule 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Espresso 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2an-to-Cup 7.8%7.9%8.0%8.7%Total 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 3.2.3 North America Coffee Machine Market,By Country TABLE 13 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 48.6%.7.3%8.4H.7%.8.4%8.1%0 0Pp0%Drip FilterCapsuleEspressoBean-to-Cup20222032 P a g e|24 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)U.S.1845.4 1998.1 2165.4 4257.5 8.77nada 246.2 266.1 287.8 557.4 8.56%Mexico 346.2 373.7 403.9 776.3 8.46%Total 2437.8 2637.9 2857.1 5591.2 8.70%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The North America Coffee Machine market was valued at$2,437.8 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$5,591.2 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.70%from 2023 to 2032.U.S.is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,845.4 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$4,257.5 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.77%.U.S.and Mexico collectively expected to account for about 89.9%share of the North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 75.7%share.U.S.and Canada are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.77%and 8.56%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 85.8%in the overall North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 86.1%by 2032.FIGURE 7 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 14 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 75.7.1.2v.1.0.9%0 0Pp0%U.S.CanadaMexico20222032 P a g e|25 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market U.S.8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2nada 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Mexico 8.0%8.1%8.2%8.9%Total 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 15 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)U.S.1845.4 1998.1 2165.4 4257.5 8.77nada 242.3 261.9 283.4 549.8 8.59%Mexico 340.7 367.9 397.6 764.9 8.47%Total 2428.4 2627.9 2846.4 5572.2 8.71%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for North America Coffee Machine market was 2,428.4 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 5,572.2 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.71%from 2023 to 2032.U.S.is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,845.4 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 4,257.5 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.77%.U.S.and Mexico collectively expected to account for about 90.0%share of the North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 76.0%share.U.S.and Canada are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.77%and 8.59%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 86.0%in the overall North America Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 86.3%by 2032.FIGURE 8 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 76.0.0.0v.4%9.9.7%0 0Pp0%U.S.CanadaMexico20222032 P a g e|26 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 16 NORTH AMERICA COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 U.S.8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2nada 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Mexico 8.0%8.1%8.2%8.9%Total 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 3.2.3.1 U.S.3.2.3.1.1 U.S.Coffee Machine Market,By Application TABLE 17 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,MILLION USD Application 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Residential 802.8 868.6 940.6 1839.2 8.69%Commercial 1042.7 1129.5 1224.7 2418.2 8.83%Total 1845.4 1998.1 2165.4 4257.5 8.77%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The U.S.Coffee Machine market was valued at$1,845.4 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$4,257.5 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.77%from 2023 to 2032.Commercial segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,042.7 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$2,418.2 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.83%.FIGURE 9 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 18 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Application 2023 2024 2025 2032 43.5V.5C.2V.8%0 0Pp0%ResidentialCommercial20222032 P a g e|27 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Residential 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Commercial 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Total 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 19 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,TON Application 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Residential 802.8 868.6 940.6 1839.2 8.69%Commercial 1042.7 1129.5 1224.7 2418.2 8.83%Total 1845.4 1998.1 2165.4 4257.5 8.77%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for U.S.Coffee Machine market was 1,845.4 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 4,257.5 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.77%from 2023 to 2032.Commercial segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,042.7 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 2,418.2 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.83%.FIGURE 10 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 20 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Application 2023 2024 2025 2032 Residential 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Commercial 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Total 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 43.5V.5C.2V.8%0 0Pp0%ResidentialCommercial20222032 P a g e|28 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 3.2.3.1.2 U.S.Coffee Machine Market,By Product TABLE 21 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,MILLION USD Product 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Drip Filter 893.2 967.3 1048.5 2064.9 8.79psule 472.4 511.7 554.8 1094.2 8.81%Espresso 317.4 343.9 372.9 736.5 8.83an-to-Cup 162.4 175.2 189.3 361.9 8.39%Total 1845.4 1998.1 2165.4 4257.5 8.77%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The U.S.Coffee Machine market was valued at$1,845.4 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$4,257.5 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.77%from 2023 to 2032.Drip Filter segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$893.2 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$2,064.9 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.79%.Espresso segment is anticipated to reach$736.5 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 8.83%.Drip Filter and Capsule segments collectively expected to account for about 74.0%share of the U.S.Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 48.4%share.Espresso and Capsule segments are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.83%and 8.81%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 42.8%in the overall U.S.Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 43.0%by 2032.FIGURE 11 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 22 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Product 2023 2024 2025 2032 Drip Filter 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2H.4%.6.2%8.8H.5%.7.3%8.5%0 0Pp0%Drip FilterCapsuleEspressoBean-to-Cup20222032 P a g e|29 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Capsule 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Espresso 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2an-to-Cup 7.9%8.0%8.1%8.8%Total 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 23 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,TON Product 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Drip Filter 893.2 967.3 1048.5 2064.9 8.79psule 472.4 511.7 554.8 1094.2 8.81%Espresso 317.4 343.9 372.9 736.5 8.83an-to-Cup 162.4 175.2 189.3 361.9 8.39%Total 1845.4 1998.1 2165.4 4257.5 8.77%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for U.S.Coffee Machine market was 1,845.4 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 4,257.5 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.77%from 2023 to 2032.Drip Filter segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 893.2 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 2,064.9 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.79%.Espresso segment is anticipated to reach 736.5 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 8.83%.Drip Filter and Capsule segments collectively expected to account for about 74.0%share of the U.S.Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 48.4%share.Espresso and Capsule segments are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.83%and 8.81%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 42.8%in the overall U.S.Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 43.0%by 2032.FIGURE 12 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 48.4%.6.2%8.8H.5%.7.3%8.5%0 0Pp0%Drip FilterCapsuleEspressoBean-to-Cup20222032 P a g e|30 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 24 U.S.COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Product 2023 2024 2025 2032 Drip Filter 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2psule 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Espresso 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2an-to-Cup 7.9%8.0%8.1%8.8%Total 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform P a g e|31 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 4 Global Coffee Machine Market,By Application 4.1 Overview TABLE 25 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,MILLION USD Application 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Residential 2660.4 2915.8 3199.8 7055.8 10.32%Commercial 3344.0 3667.8 4028.0 8926.1 10.39%Total 6004.4 6583.5 7227.8 15981.8 10.36%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Coffee Machine market was valued at$6,004.4 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$15,981.8 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.36%from 2023 to 2032.Commercial segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$3,344.0 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$8,926.1 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.39%.FIGURE 13 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 26 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Application 2023 2024 2025 2032 Residential 9.6%9.7%9.9.9%Commercial 9.7%9.8.0.0%Total 9.6%9.8%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 44.3U.7D.1U.9%0 0Pp0%ResidentialCommercial20222032 P a g e|32 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 27 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,TON Application 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Residential 2595.7 2843.9 3119.9 6859.4 10.28%Commercial 3281.6 3598.3 3950.6 8732.6 10.35%Total 5877.3 6442.3 7070.6 15592.0 10.32%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Coffee Machine market was 5,877.3 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 15,592.0 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.32%from 2023 to 2032.Commercial segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 3,281.6 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 8,732.6 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.35%.Commercial and Residential segments are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 10.35%and 10.28%respectively,during the forecast period.FIGURE 14 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 28 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY APPLICATION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Application 2023 2024 2025 2032 Residential 9.6%9.7%9.8.9%Commercial 9.7%9.8%9.9.9%Total 9.6%9.8%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.2 Residential 4.2.1 Residential Market,By Region TABLE 29 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD 44.2U.8D.0V.0%0 0Pp0%ResidentialCommercial20222032 P a g e|33 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Region 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)North America 1064.3 1150.8 1245.5 2423.6 8.63%Europe 863.6 947.4 1040.3 2274.0 10.22%Asia-Pacific 576.8 652.7 739.2 2069.5 13.68%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 155.7 164.9 174.7 288.8 6.43%Total 2660.4 2915.8 3199.8 7055.8 10.32%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Residential market was valued at$2,660.4 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$7,055.8 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.32%from 2023 to 2032.North America is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,064.3 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$2,423.6 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.63%.Asia-Pacific is anticipated to reach$2,069.5 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 13.68%.North America and Europe collectively expected to account for about 72.5%share of the Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 40.0%share.Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 13.68%and 10.22%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 54.1%in the overall Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 61.6%by 2032.FIGURE 15 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 30 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)40.02.5!.7%5.94.32.2).3%4.1%0 0Pp0%North AmericaEuropeAsia-PacificRest of World20222032 P a g e|34 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Region 2023 2024 2025 2032 North America 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Europe 9.7%9.8%9.9.6%Asia-Pacific 13.2.3.4.1%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.9%Total 9.6%9.7%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 31 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON Region 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)North America 1060.3 1146.4 1240.7 2413.0 8.62%Europe 838.2 919.2 1009.1 2200.3 10.18%Asia-Pacific 551.1 623.5 706.1 1975.5 13.67%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 146.2 154.8 164.0 270.6 6.40%Total 2595.7 2843.9 3119.9 6859.4 10.28%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Residential market was 2,595.7 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 6,859.4 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.28%from 2023 to 2032.North America is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,060.3 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 2,413.0 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.62%.Asia-Pacific is anticipated to reach 1,975.5 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 13.67%.North America and Europe collectively expected to account for about 73.1%share of the Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 40.8%share.Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 13.67%and 10.18%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 53.5%in the overall Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 60.9%by 2032.FIGURE 16 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|35 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 32 RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Region 2023 2024 2025 2032 North America 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Europe 9.7%9.8%9.9.6%Asia-Pacific 13.1.2.4.1%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.8%Total 9.6%9.7%9.8.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.2.1.1 North America Residential Market,By Country TABLE 33 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)U.S.802.8 868.6 940.6 1839.2 8.69nada 109.1 117.8 127.3 243.9 8.42%Mexico 152.4 164.5 177.7 340.4 8.42%Total 1064.3 1150.8 1245.5 2423.6 8.63%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The North America Residential market was valued at$1,064.3 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$2,423.6 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.63%from 2023 to 2032.U.S.is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$802.8 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$1,839.2 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.69%.U.S.and Mexico collectively expected to account for about 89.7%share of the North America Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 75.4%share.U.S.and Canada are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.69%and 8.42%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be 40.82.3!.2%5.65.22.1(.8%3.9%0 0Pp0%North AmericaEuropeAsia-PacificRest of World20222032 P a g e|36 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market around 85.7%in the overall North America Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 86.0%by 2032.FIGURE 17 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 34 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 U.S.8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1nada 7.9%8.0%8.1%8.8%Mexico 7.9%8.0%8.1%8.8%Total 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 35 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)U.S.802.8 868.6 940.6 1839.2 8.69nada 107.5 116.0 125.3 240.1 8.41%Mexico 150.0 161.8 174.7 333.7 8.38%Total 1060.3 1146.4 1240.7 2413.0 8.62%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for North America Residential market was 1,060.3 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 2,413.0 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.62%from 2023 to 2032.U.S.is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 802.8 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 1,839.2 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.69%.U.S.and Mexico collectively expected to account for about 89.9%share of the North America Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 75.7%share.U.S.and 75.4.3.3u.9.1.0%0 0Pp0%U.S.CanadaMexico20222032 P a g e|37 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Canada are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.69%and 8.41%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 85.9%in the overall North America Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 86.2%by 2032.FIGURE 18 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 36 NORTH AMERICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 U.S.8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1nada 7.9%8.0%8.1%8.8%Mexico 7.9%8.0%8.1%8.8%Total 8.1%8.2%8.3%9.0%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.2.1.2 Europe Residential Market,By Country TABLE 37 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD 75.7.1.1v.2%9.9.8%0 0Pp0%U.S.CanadaMexico20222032 P a g e|38 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Germany 180.1 197.8 217.4 478.5 10.31%France 127.9 140.9 155.3 350.6 10.66%U.K.174.0 191.5 211.0 473.2 10.57%Italy 84.0 92.3 101.6 226.3 10.47%Spain 70.2 76.7 83.9 177.1 9.75%Russia 50.3 55.1 60.5 131.6 10.16%Rest of Europe 177.1 193.1 210.6 436.7 9.49%Total 863.6 947.4 1040.3 2274.0 10.22%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Europe Residential market was valued at$863.6 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$2,274.0 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.22%from 2023 to 2032.Germany is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$180.1 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$478.5 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.31%.France is anticipated to reach$350.6 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 10.66%.Germany and U.K.collectively expected to account for about 41.0%share of the Europe Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 20.9%share.France and U.K.are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 10.66%and 10.57%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 35.0%in the overall Europe Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 36.2%by 2032.FIGURE 19 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 38 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Germany 9.8%9.9.0.7%France 10.2.3.4.1 .9.8 .1%9.7%8.1%5.8 .5!.0.4 .8%9.9%7.8%5.8.2%0 0Pp0%GermanyFranceU.K.ItalySpainRussiaRest of Europe20222032 P a g e|39 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market U.K.10.1.2.3.0%Italy 10.0.1.2.9%Spain 9.2%9.3%9.4.1%Russia 9.7%9.8%9.9.6%Rest of Europe 9.0%9.1%9.2%9.9%Total 9.7%9.8%9.9.6%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 39 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Germany 177.0 194.3 213.5 469.6 10.30%France 124.1 136.6 150.6 338.0 10.59%U.K.167.7 184.6 203.3 455.3 10.55%Italy 81.5 89.6 98.5 218.1 10.39%Spain 67.7 73.9 80.8 170.7 9.75%Russia 48.9 53.6 58.7 126.9 10.06%Rest of Europe 171.3 186.6 203.6 421.8 9.48%Total 838.2 919.2 1009.1 2200.3 10.18%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Europe Residential market was 838.2 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 2,200.3 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.18%from 2023 to 2032.Germany is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 177.0 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 469.6 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.30%.France is anticipated to reach 338.0 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 10.59%.Germany and U.K.collectively expected to account for about 41.1%share of the Europe Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 21.1%share.France and U.K.are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 10.59%and 10.55%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 34.8%in the overall Europe Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 36.1%by 2032.FIGURE 20 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|40 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 40 EUROPE RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Germany 9.8%9.9.0.7%France 10.1.2.3.0%U.K.10.0.1.2.0%Italy 9.9.0.1.8%Spain 9.2%9.3%9.4.1%Russia 9.6%9.7%9.8.5%Rest of Europe 9.0%9.1%9.2%9.9%Total 9.7%9.8%9.9.6%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.2.1.3 Asia-Pacific Residential Market,By Country TABLE 41 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)China 141.7 160.3 181.6 508.0 13.67%India 54.6 62.1 70.6 204.2 14.15%Japan 131.8 149.5 169.6 482.2 13.90%Australia 44.8 51.1 58.2 171.9 14.44%South Korea 29.4 33.5 38.2 112.0 14.36%Rest of Asia 174.4 196.3 221.0 591.1 13.03%Total 576.8 652.7 739.2 2069.5 13.68%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Asia-Pacific Residential market was valued at$576.8 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$2,069.5 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 13.68%from 2023 to 2032.China is expected to be the 21.1.8 .0%9.7%8.1%5.8 .4!.3.4 .7%9.9%7.8%5.8.2%0 0Pp0%GermanyFranceU.K.ItalySpainRussiaRest of Europe20222032 P a g e|41 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market highest contributor to this market,with$141.7 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$508.0 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 13.67%.Australia is anticipated to reach$171.9 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 14.44%.China and Japan collectively expected to account for about 47.4%share of the Asia-Pacific Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 24.6%share.Australia and South Korea are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 14.44%and 14.36%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 12.9%in the overall Asia-Pacific Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 13.7%by 2032.FIGURE 21 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 42 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 China 13.2.3.4.1%India 13.6.7.8.6%Japan 13.4.5.6.3%Australia 13.9.0.1.9%South Korea 13.8.9.0.8%Rest of Asia 12.5.6.7.4%Total 13.2.3.4.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 43 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 24.6%9.5.9%7.8%5.10.2$.5%9.9#.3%8.3%5.4(.6%0 0Pp0%ChinaIndiaJapanAustraliaSouth KoreaRest of Asia20222032 P a g e|42 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)China 136.7 154.7 175.2 489.7 13.66%India 52.1 59.2 67.3 194.0 14.10%Japan 125.3 142.1 161.3 458.9 13.91%Australia 42.6 48.5 55.3 162.4 14.37%South Korea 27.9 31.8 36.2 106.3 14.34%Rest of Asia 166.3 187.2 210.8 564.2 13.04%Total 551.1 623.5 706.1 1975.5 13.67%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Asia-Pacific Residential market was 551.1 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 1,975.5 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 13.67%from 2023 to 2032.China is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 136.7 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 489.7 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 13.66%.Australia is anticipated to reach 162.4 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 14.37%.China and Japan collectively expected to account for about 47.6%share of the Asia-Pacific Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 24.8%share.Australia and South Korea are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 14.37%and 14.34%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 12.8%in the overall Asia-Pacific Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 13.6%by 2032.FIGURE 22 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 44 ASIA-PACIFIC RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)24.8%9.5.7%7.7%5.10.2$.8%9.8#.2%8.2%5.4(.6%0 0Pp0%ChinaIndiaJapanAustraliaSouth KoreaRest of Asia20222032 P a g e|43 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 China 13.1.2.3.1%India 13.6.7.8.5%Japan 13.4.5.6.3%Australia 13.8.0.1.8%South Korea 13.8.9.0.8%Rest of Asia 12.5.6.7.5%Total 13.1.2.4.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.2.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential Market,By Country TABLE 45 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Brazil 49.4 53.0 56.8 102.6 7.63%South Africa 18.7 19.9 21.3 37.0 7.12%GCC 40.2 42.6 45.1 74.1 6.34%RoW Countries 47.3 49.4 51.5 75.1 4.77%Total 155.7 164.9 174.7 288.8 6.43%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential market was valued at$155.7 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$288.8 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 6.43%from 2023 to 2032.Brazil is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$49.4 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$102.6 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 7.63%.Brazil and RoW Countries collectively expected to account for about 62.2%share of the Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 31.7%share.Brazil and South Africa are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 7.63%and 7.12%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 43.7%in the overall Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 48.4%by 2032.FIGURE 23 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|44 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 46 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Brazil 7.1%7.2%7.3%8.0%South Africa 6.6%6.7%6.8%7.5%GCC 5.9%5.9%6.0%6.7%RoW Countries 4.3%4.4%4.5%5.1%Total 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 47 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Brazil 46.9 50.3 53.9 97.1 7.59%South Africa 17.5 18.7 19.9 34.6 7.12%GCC 37.7 39.8 42.2 68.9 6.27%RoW Countries 44.1 46.0 48.0 69.9 4.76%Total 146.2 154.8 164.0 270.6 6.40%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential market was 146.2 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 270.6 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 6.40%from 2023 to 2032.Brazil is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 46.9 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 97.1 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 7.59%.Brazil and RoW Countries collectively expected to account for about 62.3%share of the Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential market in 2022,with the former constituting around 32.1%share.Brazil and South Africa are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 7.59%and 7.12%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-31.7.0%.80.45.5.8%.6&.0%0 0Pp0%BrazilSouth AfricaGCCRoW Countries20222032 P a g e|45 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market segments is estimated to be around 44.1%in the overall Latin America,Middle East&Africa Residential market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 48.7%by 2032.FIGURE 24 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 48 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA RESIDENTIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Brazil 7.1%7.2%7.3%8.0%South Africa 6.6%6.7%6.8%7.5%GCC 5.8%5.9%6.0%6.7%RoW Countries 4.3%4.4%4.5%5.1%Total 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.8%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.3 Commercial 4.3.1 Commercial Market,By Region TABLE 49 COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,MILLION USD Region 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)North America 1373.5 1487.1 1611.5 3167.6 8.76%Europe 1075.8 1181.9 1299.6 2871.4 10.37%Asia-Pacific 708.1 801.2 907.4 2540.0 13.68%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 186.6 197.6 209.5 347.0 6.462.1.0%.80.25.9.8%.5%.8%0 0Pp0%BrazilSouth AfricaGCCRoW Countries20222032 P a g e|46 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Total 3344.0 3667.8 4028.0 8926.1 10.39%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Commercial market was valued at$3,344.0 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$8,926.1 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.39%from 2023 to 2032.North America is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,373.5 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$3,167.6 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.76%.Asia-Pacific is anticipated to reach$2,540.0 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 13.68%.North America and Europe collectively expected to account for about 73.2%share of the Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 41.1%share.Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 13.68%and 10.37%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 53.3%in the overall Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 60.6%by 2032.FIGURE 25 COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 50 COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Region 2023 2024 2025 2032 North America 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Europe 9.9.0.1.8%Asia-Pacific 13.1.3.4.1%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.9%Total 9.7%9.8.0.0%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 51 COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,TON 41.12.2!.2%5.65.52.2(.5%3.9%0 0Pp0%North AmericaEuropeAsia-PacificRest of World20222032 P a g e|47 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Region 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)North America 1368.2 1481.5 1605.6 3159.2 8.78%Europe 1051.8 1155.3 1270.1 2803.0 10.35%Asia-Pacific 683.8 773.4 875.5 2442.5 13.63%Latin America,Middle East&Africa 177.9 188.2 199.3 327.9 6.36%Total 3281.6 3598.3 3950.6 8732.6 10.35%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Commercial market was 3,281.6 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 8,732.6 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.35%from 2023 to 2032.North America is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,368.2 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 3,159.2 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.78%.Asia-Pacific is anticipated to reach 2,442.5 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 13.63%.North America and Europe collectively expected to account for about 73.7%share of the Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 41.7%share.Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 13.63%and 10.35%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 52.9%in the overall Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 60.1%by 2032.FIGURE 26 COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 52 COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY REGION,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Region 2023 2024 2025 2032 North America 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Europe 9.8%9.9.0.8%Asia-Pacific 13.1.2.3.1A.72.0 .8%5.46.22.1(.0%3.8%0 0Pp0%North AmericaEuropeAsia-PacificRest of World20222032 P a g e|48 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Latin America,Middle East&Africa 5.8%5.9%6.0%6.8%Total 9.7%9.8%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.3.1.1 North America Commercial Market,By Country TABLE 53 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)U.S.1042.7 1129.5 1224.7 2418.2 8.83nada 137.1 148.3 160.6 313.5 8.67%Mexico 193.8 209.3 226.2 435.9 8.49%Total 1373.5 1487.1 1611.5 3167.6 8.76%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The North America Commercial market was valued at$1,373.5 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$3,167.6 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.76%from 2023 to 2032.U.S.is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$1,042.7 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$2,418.2 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.83%.U.S.and Mexico collectively expected to account for about 90.0%share of the North America Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 75.9%share.U.S.and Canada are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.83%and 8.67%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 85.9%in the overall North America Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 86.2%by 2032.FIGURE 27 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|49 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 54 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 U.S.8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2nada 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Mexico 8.0%8.1%8.2%8.9%Total 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 55 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)U.S.1042.7 1129.5 1224.7 2418.2 8.83nada 134.8 145.9 158.0 309.8 8.73%Mexico 190.7 206.1 222.9 431.2 8.55%Total 1368.2 1481.5 1605.6 3159.2 8.78%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for North America Commercial market was 1,368.2 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 3,159.2 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 8.78%from 2023 to 2032.U.S.is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 1,042.7 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 2,418.2 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 8.83%.U.S.and Mexico collectively expected to account for about 90.1%share of the North America Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 76.2%share.U.S.and Canada are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 8.83%and 8.73u.9.0.1v.3%9.9.8%0 0Pp0%U.S.CanadaMexico20222032 P a g e|50 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 86.1%in the overall North America Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 86.4%by 2032.FIGURE 28 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 56 NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 U.S.8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2nada 8.2%8.3%8.4%9.1%Mexico 8.1%8.2%8.3%8.9%Total 8.3%8.4%8.5%9.2%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.3.1.2 Europe Commercial Market,By Country TABLE 57 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Germany 229.1 251.9 277.4 618.2 10.49%France 159.2 175.5 193.7 440.3 10.76%U.K.215.8 237.7 262.1 591.1 10.65%Italy 104.1 114.6 126.2 282.6 10.55%Spain 86.9 95.2 104.3 224.8 10.02%Russia 62.2 68.4 75.3 167.1 10.43%Rest of Europe 218.5 238.5 260.7 547.4 9.67v.2%9.9.9v.5%9.8.6%0 0Pp0%U.S.CanadaMexico20222032 P a g e|51 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Total 1075.8 1181.9 1299.6 2871.4 10.37%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Europe Commercial market was valued at$1,075.8 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$2,871.4 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.37%from 2023 to 2032.Germany is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$229.1 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$618.2 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.49%.France is anticipated to reach$440.3 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 10.76%.Germany and U.K.collectively expected to account for about 41.4%share of the Europe Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 21.3%share.France and U.K.are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 10.76%and 10.65%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 34.9%in the overall Europe Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 35.9%by 2032.FIGURE 29 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 58 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Germany 10.0.1.2.9%France 10.3.4.5.2%U.K.10.1.2.3.1%Italy 10.0.1.2.0%Spain 9.5%9.6%9.7.4%Russia 9.9.0.1.8%Rest of Europe 9.2%9.3%9.4.1%Total 9.9.0.1.8%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 21.3.8 .1%9.7%8.1%5.8 .3!.5.3 .6%9.8%7.8%5.8.1%0 0Pp0%GermanyFranceU.K.ItalySpainRussiaRest of Europe20222032 P a g e|52 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 59 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Germany 226.6 249.1 274.2 609.6 10.45%France 155.7 171.6 189.2 428.3 10.70%U.K.209.7 231.1 254.8 576.6 10.69%Italy 101.2 111.4 122.7 274.6 10.55%Spain 84.9 93.0 101.9 219.5 10.01%Russia 60.7 66.7 73.3 161.5 10.33%Rest of Europe 212.9 232.4 254.0 532.9 9.66%Total 1051.8 1155.3 1270.1 2803.0 10.35%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Europe Commercial market was 1,051.8 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 2,803.0 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.35%from 2023 to 2032.Germany is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 226.6 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 609.6 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.45%.France is anticipated to reach 428.3 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 10.70%.Germany and U.K.collectively expected to account for about 41.5%share of the Europe Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 21.5%share.France and U.K.are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 10.70%and 10.69%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 34.7%in the overall Europe Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 35.8%by 2032.FIGURE 30 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|53 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 60 EUROPE COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Germany 10.0.1.2.9%France 10.2.3.4.1%U.K.10.2.3.4.1%Italy 10.0.1.2.0%Spain 9.5%9.6%9.7.4%Russia 9.8%9.9.0.7%Rest of Europe 9.2%9.3%9.4.1%Total 9.8%9.9.0.8%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.3.1.3 Asia-Pacific Commercial Market,By Country TABLE 61 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)China 177.0 200.3 227.0 636.8 13.71%India 66.2 75.3 85.7 249.7 14.25%Japan 161.1 182.7 207.3 589.5 13.90%Australia 54.1 61.7 70.5 210.1 14.58%South Korea 36.1 41.1 46.8 136.5 14.27%Rest of Asia 213.6 240.1 270.2 717.4 12.93%Total 708.1 801.2 907.4 2540.0 13.68%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Asia-Pacific Commercial market was valued at$708.1 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$2,540.0 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 13.68%from 2023 to 2032.China is expected to be the 21.5.8.9%9.6%8.1%5.8 .2!.7.3 .6%9.8%7.8%5.8.0%0 0Pp0%GermanyFranceU.K.ItalySpainRussiaRest of Europe20222032 P a g e|54 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market highest contributor to this market,with$177.0 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$636.8 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 13.71%.Australia is anticipated to reach$210.1 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 14.58%.China and Japan collectively expected to account for about 47.7%share of the Asia-Pacific Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 25.0%share.Australia and South Korea are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 14.58%and 14.27%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 12.7%in the overall Asia-Pacific Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 13.6%by 2032.FIGURE 31 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 62 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 China 13.2.3.4.1%India 13.7.8.9.7%Japan 13.4.5.6.3%Australia 14.1.2.3.0%South Korea 13.8.9.0.7%Rest of Asia 12.4.5.6.3%Total 13.1.3.4.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 63 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON 25.0%9.3.8%7.6%5.10.2%.1%9.8#.2%8.3%5.4(.2%0 0Pp0%ChinaIndiaJapanAustraliaSouth KoreaRest of Asia20222032 P a g e|55 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)China 172.6 195.4 221.3 619.4 13.68%India 63.8 72.5 82.5 240.2 14.23%Japan 154.1 174.7 198.2 562.6 13.88%Australia 52.2 59.5 67.9 201.9 14.55%South Korea 34.8 39.6 45.0 130.3 14.15%Rest of Asia 206.3 231.8 260.6 688.1 12.85%Total 683.8 773.4 875.5 2442.5 13.63%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Asia-Pacific Commercial market was 683.8 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 2,442.5 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 13.63%from 2023 to 2032.China is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 172.6 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 619.4 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 13.68%.Australia is anticipated to reach 201.9 Ton by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 14.55%.China and Japan collectively expected to account for about 47.8%share of the Asia-Pacific Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 25.2%share.Australia and India are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 14.55%and 14.23%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 17.0%in the overall Asia-Pacific Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 18.1%by 2032.FIGURE 32 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 64 ASIA-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)25.2%9.3.5%7.6%5.10.2%.4%9.8#.0%8.3%5.3(.2%0 0Pp0%ChinaIndiaJapanAustraliaSouth KoreaRest of Asia20222032 P a g e|56 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 China 13.2.3.4.1%India 13.7.8.9.6%Japan 13.4.5.6.3%Australia 14.0.1.2.0%South Korea 13.6.7.8.6%Rest of Asia 12.3.4.5.3%Total 13.1.2.3.1%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 4.3.1.4 Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial Market,By Country TABLE 65 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,MILLION USD Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Brazil 60.4 64.8 69.5 125.7 7.65%South Africa 22.1 23.6 25.2 44.5 7.32%GCC 48.1 50.8 53.8 87.9 6.28%RoW Countries 56.0 58.4 61.0 88.8 4.77%Total 186.6 197.6 209.5 347.0 6.46%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial market was valued at$186.6 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$347.0 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 6.46%from 2023 to 2032.Brazil is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$60.4 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$125.7 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 7.65%.Brazil and RoW Countries collectively expected to account for about 62.4%share of the Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 32.4%share.Brazil and South Africa are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 7.65%and 7.32%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 44.2%in the overall Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 49.1%by 2032.FIGURE 33 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)P a g e|57 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 66 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VALUE,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Brazil 7.2%7.3%7.4%8.0%South Africa 6.8%6.9%7.0%7.7%GCC 5.8%5.9%6.0%6.7%RoW Countries 4.3%4.4%4.5%5.2%Total 5.9%6.0%6.1%6.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 67 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,TON Country 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Brazil 58.1 62.2 66.7 120.0 7.56%South Africa 20.9 22.4 23.9 41.9 7.23%GCC 45.5 48.1 50.9 82.5 6.17%RoW Countries 53.2 55.5 57.8 83.4 4.64%Total 177.9 188.2 199.3 327.9 6.36%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial market was 177.9 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 327.9 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 6.36%from 2023 to 2032.Brazil is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with 58.1 Ton in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 120.0 Ton by 2032,registering a CAGR of 7.56%.Brazil and RoW Countries collectively expected to account for about 62.6%share of the Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial market in 2022,with the former constituting around 32.7%share.Brazil and South Africa are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 7.56%and 7.23%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,32.4.8%.80.06.2.8%.3%.6%0 0Pp0%BrazilSouth AfricaGCCRoW Countries20222032 P a g e|58 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market share of these two sub-segments is estimated to be around 44.5%in the overall Latin America,Middle East&Africa Commercial market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 49.4%by 2032.FIGURE 34 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 68 LATIN AMERICA,MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA COMMERCIAL MARKET VOLUME,BY COUNTRY,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Country 2023 2024 2025 2032 Brazil 7.1%7.2%7.3%8.0%South Africa 6.7%6.8%6.9%7.6%GCC 5.7%5.8%5.9%6.6%RoW Countries 4.2%4.3%4.4%5.0%Total 5.8%5.9%6.0%6.8%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 32.7.8%.6).96.6.8%.2%.5%0 0Pp0%BrazilSouth AfricaGCCRoW Countries20222032 P a g e|59 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market 5 Global Coffee Machine Market,By Product 5.1 Overview TABLE 69 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,MILLION USD Product 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Drip Filter 2975.1 3262.8 3582.9 7938.1 10.38psule 1568.7 1721.2 1891.1 4206.7 10.44%Espresso 1059.6 1162.3 1276.5 2830.1 10.39an-to-Cup 401.0 437.2 477.3 1006.9 9.71%Total 6004.4 6583.5 7227.8 15981.8 10.36%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The Coffee Machine market was valued at$6,004.4 Million in 2022,and is projected to reach$15,981.8 Million by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.36%from 2023 to 2032.Drip Filter segment is expected to be the highest contributor to this market,with$2,975.1 Million in 2022,and is anticipated to reach$7,938.1 Million by 2032,registering a CAGR of 10.38%.Capsule segment is anticipated to reach$4,206.7 Million by 2032 with the highest CAGR of 10.44%.Drip Filter and Capsule segments collectively expected to account for about 75.7%share of the Coffee Machine market in 2022,with the former constituting around 49.5%share.Capsule and Espresso segments are expected to witness significant growth rates at a CAGR of 10.44%and 10.39%respectively,during the forecast period.Presently,share of these two segments is estimated to be around 43.8%in the overall Coffee Machine market in 2022,and is anticipated to reach 44.0%by 2032.FIGURE 35 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,SHARE ANALYSIS(%)Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform 49.5&.1.6%6.7I.7&.3.7%6.3%0 0Pp0%Drip FilterCapsuleEspressoBean-to-Cup20222032 P a g e|60 Copyright 2021 Apollo Reports U.S.Coffee Machine Market TABLE 70 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VALUE,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,YOY GROWTH(%)Product 2023 2024 2025 2032 Drip Filter 9.7%9.8.0.0psule 9.7%9.9.0.0%Espresso 9.7%9.8.0.0an-to-Cup 9.0%9.2%9.3.3%Total 9.6%9.8%9.9.9%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform TABLE 71 GLOBAL COFFEE MACHINE MARKET VOLUME,BY PRODUCT,2022-2032,TON Product 2022 2023 2024 2032 CAGR%(2023-2032)Drip Filter 2904.0 3186.4 3500.7 7790.7 10.44psule 1534.4 1683.2 1848.8 4104.8 10.41%Espresso 1030.7 1130.5 1241.6 2752.0 10.39an-to-Cup 408.2 442.2 479.4 944.5 8.80%Total 5877.3 6442.3 7070.6 15592.0 10.32%Source:Open&Paid Databases,Surveys&Expert Interviews,Apollo Research Platform The total demand for Coffee Machine market was 5,877.3 Ton in 2022,and is projected to reach 15,592.0 Ton by 2032 growing at a CAGR of 10.32%from 2023 to 2032.Drip Filter segment is expected to be the highes

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U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability October 26,2022 Congressional Research Service https:/crsreports.congress.gov R47294 Congressional Research Service SUMMARY U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Aluminuma lightweight,ductile,malleable,and corrosion-resistant metalis a major component used in a wide range of consumer,industrial,and technological goods,including aircraft,building materials,motor vehicles,and several types of defense and military equipment.The aluminum industry comprises three segments:upstream,secondary or recycled,and downstream.The upstream sector consists of mining bauxite,refining it to produce alumina,and smelting it to yield primary aluminum.Secondary aluminum is derived from recycled scrap metal.The downstream sector uses both primary and secondary aluminum to produce a variety of aluminum products.Through 2000,the United States ranked as the worlds largest producer of primary aluminum.In 2021,the United States accounted for less than 2%of global primary aluminum production and ranked as the ninth-largest primary aluminum producing country.Primary aluminum smelting is highly energy-intensive,with electricity estimated to account for up to 40%of production costs.Consequently,a major reason for the decline in U.S.primary aluminum production is that the United States is a relatively high-cost producer.The worlds leading producers of primary aluminum are generally countries with comparatively low energy costs,including Canada,Russia,and the United Arab Emirates.By contrast,the United States is a major producer of secondary aluminum.In 2021,more than 75%of domestic supply came from secondary smelters.Secondary aluminum production is often more economically tenable than primary production,as it is approximately 95%less energy-intensive than primary smelting.Secondary aluminum often has significant impurities,as it is derived from recycled products or scrap.Thus,manufacturers of components used in electronics and aerospace manufacturing often favor primary aluminum meeting specified purity standards.Many defense-related products must comply with particularly high purity standards.At present,the United States has one active smelter that produces aluminum of sufficient purity for use in military aircraft,as well as lightweight armor plating found in many defense ground and weapon systems.The greatest aluminum-related security concern regarding defense requirements appears to be the domestic availability of specific high-purity aluminum alloys,which can be derived from primary aluminum.The U.S.and Canadian aluminum industries are highly integrated,as each market is a major trading partner of the other across the aluminum value chain.In 2021,more than 75%of Canadian production went to the United States,while roughly half of U.S.downstream products were exported to Canada.U.S.primary aluminum smelters operated at 55%of the industrys rated production capacity in 2021,compared with 95%in Canada and 88%globally.Over half of global primary aluminum smelting capacity is in China,which has become the worlds leading producer in most segments of the aluminum value chain over the past two decades.Excess capacity in the aluminum sector has been a growing concern for domestic producers.The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found that the global aluminum industry received up to$70 billion in government support between 2013 and 2017,with the large majority of support concentrated in China and countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.In addition to being an energy-intensive process,aluminum manufacturing contributes approximately 2%to global greenhouse gases(GHG),equivalent to roughly 1.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide.More than half of GHG emissions related to aluminum manufacturing come from the generation of electricity used in primary aluminum smelting.A transition to carbon-neutral aluminum is likely to require significant capital investment in decarbonizing the electrical grid and in specific technologies used in primary smelting and recycling.P.L.117-169(commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022),signed into law on August 16,2022,established the Advanced Industrial Facilities Deployment Program in which the Department of Energy is expected to provide financial assistance to producers and production facilities of a variety of heavy manufacturing industries,including aluminum,that use advance technologies in manufacturing processes that effectively reduce GHG emissions.This could incentivize producers to invest further in decarbonizing specific production assets in aluminum manufacturing.R47294 October 26,2022 Christopher D.Watson Analyst in Industrial Organization and Business U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service Contents Introduction.1 The Aluminum Manufacturing Process.1 Domestic Production.2 Primary Aluminum.2 Secondary and Downstream Aluminum.5 The Aluminum Market.6 Employment and Wages.8 Trade Measures,Regulatory Support,and Global Excess Capacity.9 Price Determination.12 National Security Concerns.13 Decarbonizing Aluminum Manufacturing.14 Challenges of Decarbonizing.16 Considerations for Congress.17 Figures Figure 1.Aluminum Sources and Uses.2 Figure 2.U.S.and Canadian Primary Aluminum Production.3 Figure 3.U.S.Primary Aluminum Smelters,2021.4 Figure 4.U.S.Aluminum Production and Consumption.7 Figure 5.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing Employment.8 Figure 6.Global Primary Aluminum Production,2021.11 Contacts Author Information.19 U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 1 Introduction Congress has long been concerned with the health of the U.S.manufacturing base.One component of this base is aluminuma lightweight,ductile,malleable,and corrosion-resistant metal.Aluminum is used in a wide range of consumer,industrial,and technological goods,including aircraft,building materials,motor vehicles,and many types of defense and military equipment.This report provides an overview of factors affecting aluminum production in the United States,including energy costs,trade and regulatory issues,and demand.It also examines national security concerns tied to aluminum production and efforts to reduce the industrys greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions.The report concludes with a discussion of selected issues that may be of interest to Congress.The Aluminum Manufacturing Process The aluminum sector comprises three segments:The upstream sector,which includes the mining of bauxite,the refining of bauxite into alumina(aluminum oxide),and the smelting of alumina to yield primary aluminum.The molten aluminum is cast into ingots,billets,or slabs,collectively referred to as unwrought aluminum.Secondary aluminum is derived from recycled scrap metal.Secondary production involves smelting both old scrap recovered from finished products,such as cans and auto parts,and new scrap,material left over from processing aluminum into consumer or industrial products.Similar to primary aluminum,secondary aluminum typically is cast into unwrought shapes.The downstream sector uses primary or secondary aluminum to make aluminum products,which may then be used in the manufacture of motor vehicles,construction materials,consumer durables,and other products.Wrought aluminum consists of downstream products that are worked in solid form by rolling,drawing,extruding,forging,or other mechanical processing.These are known commonly as semi-finished or mill products.Wrought aluminum can be resmelted and combined with alloying elements,such as copper,silicon,and zinc,to create metals with unique properties that may be necessary for specific applications.Figure 1 depicts aluminum sources and their uses.Generally,primary aluminum production is undertaken by vertically integrated holding companies that control bauxite mines,alumina refineries,smelting facilities,and in some instances,rolling and processing mills.This model affords producers insulation from price fluctuations and helps secure raw material supply.The secondary aluminum segment consists of smelting facilities and attached rolling mills that produce finished aluminum products from semi-finished aluminum.The downstream segment represents the largest component of the domestic aluminum industry,consisting of dozens of firms that produce flat-rolled and extruded products.1 1 Jameson Ayers,Aluminum Manufacturing in the US,IBISWorld,October 2022,p.25.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 2 Figure 1.Aluminum Sources and Uses Source:CRS,adapted from NERA Economic Consulting,Impacts of Potential Aluminum Tariffs on the U.S.Economy,June 2017,p.1.Domestic Production Primary Aluminum The U.S.and Canadian aluminum industries are highly integrated.The two markets are major trading partners with one another across the aluminum value chain.The large majority of Canadian unwrought aluminum goes to the United States.Roughly half of U.S.semi-finished aluminum products are exported to Canada.In the context of domestic production,the linkage between the two countries industries is significant,specifically regarding the production of primary aluminum and downstream fabrication.In 2021,the United States produced 908,000 metric tons of primary aluminum,significantly below peak domestic output of 5.1 million metric tons in 1980.2 Through 2000,the United States ranked as the worlds top producer of primary aluminum,but it had slipped to the ninth-largest by 2021,accounting for less than 2%of global primary aluminum production.Canada is the worlds fourth-largest primary aluminum producing country,accounting for 5%of global output in 2021.Combined U.S.-Canadian primary aluminum production declined 33tween 2000 and 2016 but has been relatively stable since 2016(Figure 2).U.S.primary aluminum smelting capacity was 1.64 million metric tons in 2021.Domestic primary smelters operated at 55%of rated production capacity.Canadian smelters,by contrast,used nearly all of their 3.27 million metric tons of capacity in 2021.One domestic producer,Alcoa Corp.,has three primary smelters in Canada and is estimated to account for almost one-third of that countrys total primary smelting capacity.3 Globally,primary aluminum smelters operated at 88%of rated capacity in 2021.2 The Aluminum Association,Industry Statistics,North American Primary Aluminum Production;and U.S.Bureau of Mines,Mineral Yearbook:Metals and Minerals 1980(Washington,DC:USGPO,1981).3 Alcoa Corporation,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,p.6;and U.S.Geological Survey(USGS),Mineral Commodity Summaries,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”January 2022.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 3 Figure 2.U.S.and Canadian Primary Aluminum Production Sources:The Aluminum Association,Industry Statistics,North American Primary Aluminum Production;and U.S.Geological Survey(USGS),“Aluminum Statistics and Information.”Bauxitethe raw material used by primary smeltersis largely sourced overseas.Bauxite reserves are heavily concentrated in Australia,Guinea,and Vietnam.In 2021,the United States imported 3.6 million metric tons of bauxite;about 70%was refined into alumina used by primary smelters,while the remainder was used in products such as abrasives,cement,and chemicals.4 Import sources for both mined bauxite and alumina include Australia,Brazil,and Jamaica.A major reason for the decline in U.S.primary aluminum production capacity is that the United States is a relatively high-cost producer.Primary aluminum smelting is highly energy-intensive,with electricity estimated to account for up to 40%of the cost.5 In 2021,Alcoa reported that electric power represented approximately 31%of the companys primary aluminum production costs.6 Century Aluminum Companychiefly a domestic producercites electricity as the companys single largest operating cost.7 Generally,the worlds leading producers are countries with lower energy costs,including Canada,Russia,and the United Arab Emirates(UAE).According to the World Bank,one kilowatt-hour of electricity cost,on average,$0.163 in the United States in 2019 compared with$0.123 in Canada,$0.081 in Russia,and$0.109 in the UAE.8 In 2000,12 companies operated 23 primary smelting facilities in the United States;by the close of 2021,six primary smelters were operated by three firmsAlcoa,Century Aluminum,and Magnitude 7 Metals LLC(Figure 3).9 In April 2020,Alcoa announced that it would curtail indefinitely its Intalco smelting facility in Ferndale,WA,reducing industry production capacity 4 USGS,Mineral Commodity Summaries,“Bauxite and Alumina Statistics and Information,”January 2022.5 The Aluminum Association,Primary Production 101,at https:/www.aluminum.org/primary-production-101.6 Alcoa Corporation,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,pp.7,14,and 67.7 Century Aluminum Company,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,pp.22,51,and 58;and Century Aluminum Company,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2019,p.40.8 World Bank,“GovData360,Getting electricity:Price of electricity,”at https:/govdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/h6779690b?country=BRA&indicator=42573&viz=line_chart&years=2014,2019.9 USGS,Mineral Commodity Summaries,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”January 2001 and January 2022.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 4 by 230,000 metric tons.10 In July 2022,Alcoa announced that it would partially curtail its Warrick smelter in Evansville,IN,by 54,000 metric tons citing operational challenges.11 Alcoa had announced the permanent closure of the Warrick smelter in March 2016 citing similar reasons;it restarted three of the five smelting potlines12 there in 2018,representing approximately 60%of the facilitys production capacity.13 Figure 3.U.S.Primary Aluminum Smelters,2021 Annual production capacity in metric tons(MT)Sources:CRS using location of smelters obtained from Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data,Nonferrous Metal Processing Plants.Data for smelter production capacities are based on Alcoa Corporation,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,pp.6-7;Century Aluminum Company,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,pp.2-3;and USGS,“Aluminum Statistics and Information.”Note:Alaska and Hawaii are not shown on the map and no primary smelters are located in either state.Much of the U.S.aluminum industry developed in areas where two federally owned utilities,the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee V alley Authority,furnished electricity at low cost.As those entities have raised electricity prices over time,most of the aluminum smelters have closed,and imports now meet a large share of domestic demand.In addition to Alcoas three primary smelters in Canada,it has one in Iceland and two in Norway,while Century Aluminum has one smelter in Iceland;in each case,the smelter has access to relatively inexpensive hydroelectric or geothermal power.Canadian imports meet a large share of U.S.demand for 10 Alcoa Corporation,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,p.80.11 Alcoa Corporation,“Alcoa Announces Partial Curtailment at Warrick Smelter in Indiana,”press release,July 1,2022,at https:/Smelting potlines are comprised of an interconnected row of electrolytic reduction pots used to smelt alumina into aluminum.13 Alcoa Corporation,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2016,p.17;and Alcoa Corporation Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2018,p.13.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 5 unwrought aluminum.By contrast,smelters in both Iceland and Norway almost exclusively sell to customers in Europe.14 U.S.primary smelters use older and less energy-efficient technologies than newer facilities abroad.The newest U.S.primary aluminum facility is Century Aluminums Mt.Holly,SC,plant,which opened in 1980.15 Primary smelting requires relatively large capital investments.A new smelter,for example,may represent at least a$1 billion investment while taking a minimum of three years to build and bring online.16 Some domestic producers have chosen to invest in countries with lower energy costs:no new primary smelters are under construction in the United States.However,Alcoa is in negotiations to sell its closed Intalco primary smelter in Ferndale,WA,to Blue Wolf Equity Partners,which expects to spend roughly$175 million in modernizing the plant with new technology to produce 240,000 metric tons of aluminum annually.17 The transaction may depend on Blue Wolfs ability to reach a power supply agreement with the Bonneville Power Administration.Secondary and Downstream Aluminum The United States is a major producer of secondary aluminum.Since the early 2000s,aluminum derived from scrap has represented an increasing share of total U.S.aluminum output.Secondary aluminum accounted for 78%of the 4.1 million metric tons of aluminum produced by U.S.smelters in 2021.Of that secondary production,53me from new scrapmaterial left over from primary smeltingand 47%from old scrap.Secondary aluminum producers face a different cost structure from primary producers.Secondary production is roughly 95%less energy-intensive than primary production,18 and the capital cost of a secondary smelter is comparatively low.Unlike primary production,secondary aluminum production in the United States has generally increased over time and is over twice the level of the early 1980s.In May 2022,Novelis Inc.,the U.S.subsidiary of an India-based secondary and downstream producer,announced an investment of$2.5 billion in a new secondary smelter with an attached rolling mill in Bay Minette,AL,with the ability to produce 600,000 tons annually.19 Over the past decade,the aluminum industry has invested more than$6.5 billion in new facilities and expansions,with the vast majority of such investments directed toward secondary smelting and the downstream segment.20 14 International Trade Centre,“Trade MapTrade statistics for international business development,”exports of unwrought aluminum(HS 7601)for Iceland and Norway.For the underlying data,see https:/www.trademap.org/Index.aspx.15 Century Aluminum Company,“Mt.Holly,SC,”at https:/Century Aluminum Company,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,p.3.16 Kirk Maltais,“US aluminium industry ponders case for building new smelter,”Fastmarkets MB,April 3,2018,at https:/Joshua Partlow and Steven Mufson,“A factory wants to reopen making green aluminum.Now it just needs clean energy,”Washington Post,June 7,2022,at https:/The Aluminum Association,Secondary Production 101,at https:/www.aluminum.org/secondary-production-101.19 Novelis,Inc.,“Novelis to Build$2.5 Billion Low-Carbon Aluminum Recycling and Rolling Plant,”press release,May 11,2022,at https:/The Aluminum Association,“$2.5 Billion Low Carbon Recycling&Rolling Plant Investment Meets Growing U.S.Aluminum Demand,”press release,May 11,2022,at https:/www.aluminum.org/25-billion-low-carbon-recycling-rolling-plant-investment-meets-growing-us-aluminum-demand.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 6 The downstream sector is by far the largest segment of the U.S.aluminum industry.Downstream producers accounted for over 75%of the industrys$31.5 billion earnings in 2020.21 There are dozens of downstream production facilities scattered across the United States,largely concentrated in the Midwest and Southeast.The largest downstream producers in the United States include Arconic Corp.,Constellium SE,Kaiser Aluminum Corp.,Novelis,and Sapa Extrusions.Most major downstream producers rely on a combination of primary and secondary aluminum in their manufacturing operations.The amount of primary versus secondary aluminum used varies according to the performance requirements of the final product.Aluminum producers often must manage the properties of the aluminum alloy precisely to meet customer specifications,and this often favors the use of primary aluminum.The Aluminum Market Demand for aluminum is cyclical and largely depends on the health of the manufacturing sector,particularly pertaining to aviation products,motor vehicles,electrical equipment and machinery,packaging,and construction materials.In 2021,demand for aluminum in the United States totaled 4.3 million metric tons,up 8%from 2020even as the Coronavirus Disease 2019(COVID-19)pandemic contributed to curtailments and reduced production at facilities of aluminum-consuming industries.Domestic consumption remains below the recent peak of 5.7 million metric tons in 2017(Figure 4).The three largest domestic end markets for aluminum in 2021 were transportation equipment,packaging,and building and construction.These end markets accounted for a combined 74%of U.S.aluminum consumption.22 Since the mid-2010s,U.S.aluminum demand has been generally flat.However,CRU International,a consulting company,forecasts that demand for aluminum in North America will expand by 5.1 million metric tons,or 45%,between 2020 and 2030.CRU estimates that roughly half of this growth will occur in the transportation sector as North America becomes a major electric vehicle production location.23 Demand for packaging and construction combined is expected to increase by 27%.The Aluminum Associationthe domestic industrys largest trade groupreported that North American(U.S.and Canadian)aluminum demand grew by 6.6%through the first half of 2022,driven by packaging among other segments.24 21 Bureau of the Census,“Annual Survey of Manufacturers,”at https:/data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=AM1831BASIC&n=3313:331313:331314:331315:331318.22 USGS,Mineral Commodity Summaries,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”January 2022.23 CRU International,Opportunities for aluminum in a post-Covid economy,January 28,2022,p.20,at https:/international-aluminium.org/resource/opportunities-for-aluminium-in-a-post-covid-economy/.24 The Aluminum Association,“North American Aluminum Demand Up 6.6%Through First Half of 2022,”press release,August 30,2022,at https:/www.aluminum.org/north-american-aluminum-demand-66-through-first-half-2022.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 7 Figure 4.U.S.Aluminum Production and Consumption Sources:The Aluminum Association,Industry Statistics,U.S.Primary Aluminum Production;and USGS,“Aluminum Statistics and Information.”Note:Production includes primary and secondary aluminum.As discussed above,the U.S.and Canadian aluminum industries are heavily interconnected.In 2021,imports supplied 44%of the U.S.aluminum market,up from 39%in 2020.25 More than half of U.S.aluminum imports in 2021 came from Canada.Canadian output of primary aluminum reached an estimated 3.13 million metric tons in 2021,more than three times that of the United States,with 81%of that production exported to the United States.26 Mexico is not a major producer of aluminum but consumes large volumes of North American aluminum.Through the first half of 2022,the United States exported 219,000 metric tons of semi-finished aluminum products,with 59%going to Canada and 33%to Mexico.During the same period,U.S.imports of unwrought aluminum amounted to 2.14 million metric tons,with more than 60%coming from Canada.27 Over the past decade,58%-69%of domestic supply of aluminum was exported each year.An important reason for the imbalance between production and consumption is that the United States is a major exporter of aluminum scrap,which represented 72%of total export volume in 2021.Mexico,Malaysia,and Canada were the three largest export markets,in that order,accounting for over half of total aluminum export volume from U.S.mills.28 Canada and Mexico import the vast majority of U.S.non-scrap aluminum exports,including semi-finished products as well as small volumes of unwrought aluminum and alloys.Global demand for semi-finished aluminum products is expected to increase up to 80%by 2050.29 This could be significant for the prospects of U.S.producers,particularly for exports of aluminum 25 USGS,Mineral Commodity Summaries,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”January 2022.26 The Aluminum Association,Industry Statistics,North American Primary Aluminum Production;and U.S.Department of Commerce,“U.S.Aluminum Import Monitor,”accessed July 28,2022.27 USGS,Mineral Industry Surveys,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”Table 8,June 2022.28 USGS,Mineral Industry Surveys,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”Table 9,December 2021.29“World aluminium industry must cut emissions by 77%by 2050-IAI,”Reuters,March 16,2021,at https:/Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 8 scrap and for semi-finished products.Moreover,the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement(USMCA),in effect since July 2020,requires 70%North American aluminum content for automobiles and auto parts to qualify for duty-free trade.This could increase demand for U.S.and Canadian aluminum over time.30 Employment and Wages Direct employment in U.S.aluminum manufacturing has declined 38%,from 91,388 workers in 2001 to 56,515 workers in 2021.31 However,that decline occurred largely between 2001 and 2008;employment in the industry as a whole has been generally flat in recent years(Figure 5).In 2021,fewer than one in four workers in aluminum manufacturing were employed in primary or secondary aluminum smelting.The majority of jobs in aluminum manufacturing are at downstream sector facilities that make plate,sheet,extruded,and rolled products.The U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS)projects employment in aluminum manufacturing to shrink approximately 6tween 2021 and 2031.32 Figure 5.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing Employment Source:Bureau of Labor Statistics,Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,North American Industry Classification System(NAICS)codes 331313Alumina Refining and Primary Aluminum Production;331314Secondary Smelting and Alloying of Aluminum;331315Aluminum Sheet,Plate,and Foil Manufacturing;and 331318Other Aluminum Rolling,Drawing,and Extruding.In 2021,workers in primary aluminum smelting and manufacturing of plate,sheet,and foil were among the aluminum sectors highest earners,with annual average wages of$84,164 and#:text=LONDON, March 16 (Reuters),Aluminium Institute said on Tuesday.30 Office of the U.S.Trade Representative(USTR),The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Fact Sheet:Automobiles and Automotive Parts,accessed June 21,2022,at https:/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/fs/USMCA/USMCA-Autos_and_Auto_Parts.pdf.31 Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS),Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,North American Industry Classification System(NAICS)3313Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing,at http:/www.bls.gov/qcew.32 BLS,Employment and Output by Industry,Table 2.11,accessed September 8,2022,at https:/www.bls.gov/emp/tables/industry-employment-and-output.htm.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 9$88,136,respectively.33 The secondary aluminum sector paid an annual average wage of$69,319,while workers involved in aluminum rolling and extruding were paid an average of$63,639 annually.34 As a whole,the aluminum industrys annual average pay was$74,149,3%lower than the annual average of$76,580 for all manufacturing.Trade Measures,Regulatory Support,and Global Excess Capacity Since the early 2010s,the United States has imposed or negotiated restraints on imports of a variety of downstream aluminum products in response to complaints by aluminum producers and industry associations that the U.S.industry was injured or threatened with injury by imports sold below fair market value(“dumped”),subsidized,or otherwise supported by unfair trade practices.In addition,the U.S.Department of Commerce has self-initiated some trade remedy proceedings involving aluminum.The most recent round of trade actions began in March 2018 when the Trump Administration imposed a 10%tariff on certain aluminum products from virtually all countries under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,35 which allows restrictions,such as tariffs or import quotas,on imports that have been found to harm national security.36 The Trump Administrations stated objective was to reduce import volumes to a level that would enable the domestic industry to operate at an average of 80%or more of production capacity.37 An additional aim was to raise the price of imported aluminum to encourage domestic producers to restart idled capacity and expand employment.38 In October 2021,the United States and the European Union(EU)reached an agreement under which the Section 232 tariffs on imports from EU countries were replaced with a tariff-rate quota allowing a specified quantity of aluminum imported from the EU to enter the United States duty-free each year.39 The United States reached a similar agreement with the United Kingdom in March 2022.40 33 BLS,Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,NAICS 331313Alumina Refining and Primary Aluminum Production,and 331315Aluminum Sheet,Plate,and Foil Manufacturing.34 BLS,Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,NAICS 331314Secondary Smelting and Alloying of Aluminum,and 331318Other Aluminum Rolling,Drawing,and Extruding.35 19 U.S.C.1862,as amended.36 At the same time,Section 232 tariffs were applied to steel imports at a 25%rate.In May 2019,Canada and Mexico were exempted permanently from the Section 232 tariffs.Australia is not subject to any import restrictions;Argentina is subject to an annualized quota in lieu of the tariffs as are individual product imports that receive a product exclusion from the U.S.Department of Commerce.37 Bureau of Industry and Security,The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security,2018,p.107.38 Ibid.,p.104.39 Under the agreement,the United States will exempt up to 18,000 metric tons(MT)of unwrought aluminum under two product categories and 366,000 MT of semi-finished(wrought)aluminum under 14 product categories imported from the European Union from Section 232 tariffs each year.If imports exceed this quantity,then the Section 232 duties would be reimposed for the remainder of the calendar year.USTR,“Joint US-EU Statement on Trade in Steel and Aluminum,”press release,October 31,2021,at https:/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Statements/US 232 EU Statement.pdf.40 The agreement with the United Kingdom allows 900 MT of unwrought aluminum under two product categories and 11,400 MT of semi-finished(wrought)aluminum,other than foil(Harmonized System Heading 7607),under 12 product categories to enter the United States duty-free each year,effective June 1,2022.For aluminum foil(7607),the agreement allows 9.3 TMT(thousand metric tons)under two product categories to enter duty-free each year.USTR,“Announcement of Action on UK Imports Under Section 232,”March 22,2022,at https:/merce.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/UK232-US-Statement.pdf.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 10 Separately,there are numerous antidumping(AD)and countervailing duty(CVD)orders imposing punitive duties on aluminum and aluminum products.Most of these orders were put into place after the Trump Administrations imposition of Section 232 duties.AD or CVD duties may be imposed when imports are found to have been sold below cost in the U.S.market or subsidized and threaten to injure a domestic industry.41 As of September 2022,34 AD or CVD orders concerning aluminum were in force,including many on semi-finished aluminum products imposed under the Biden Administration in 2021.42 In June 2021,the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce implemented the aluminum import monitoring and analysis system to track imports of aluminum products and provide an early warning of import surges.43 The Section 232 restrictions are intended to raise domestic prices of the covered products,leaving downstream manufacturers that use those products to face higher input costs.Consequently,some U.S.manufacturers claimed to have difficulty competing with imported finished or derivative products and sought AD/CVD protection as wella development some economists have referred to as“cascading protection.”44 A report from the Economic Policy Institute estimates that Section 232 measures have provided relief to domestic aluminum producers through improved output,employment,and capital investments while creating no adverse effects for aluminum-consuming industries,such as motor vehicle parts,construction goods,and canned beverages.45 By contrast,research from HARBOR Aluminum on behalf of the Beer Institute estimates that between March 2018 and February 2022,Section 232 aluminum tariffs cost the U.S.beverage industry$1.4 billion,while amounting to$463 million in 2021.46 Data from BLS show little change in employment at secondary smelters and at aluminum sheet,plate,and foil mills since 2018,while employment in primary aluminum production and at rolling,drawing,and extrusion plants has declined.On balance,the net effect on employment within the aluminum industry seems to be relatively minor.The global aluminum sector has seen major changes over the last two decades with Chinas rise to be the leading producer in most segments of the aluminum value chain.Global output of primary aluminum has more than doubled,from 23,900 million metric tons in 2000 to 68,000 million metric tons in 2021.The majority of global smelting capacity is in China,which accounted for 57%of global primary aluminum output in 2021;combined,the United States and Canada represented 6%(Figure 6).41 For more information on antidumping(AD)and countervailing duty(CVD)orders,see CRS Report R46296,Trade Remedies:Antidumping,by Christopher A.Casey;and CRS Report R46882,Trade Remedies:Countervailing Duties,by Christopher A.Casey and Liana Wong.42 Of the 34 AD/CVD orders covering aluminum,26 were introduced in 2021,affecting imports from Armenia,Bahrain,Brazil,China,Croatia,Egypt,Germany,India,Indonesia,Italy,Oman,Romania,Russia,Serbia,Slovenia,South Africa,Spain,Taiwan,and Turkey.U.S.Department of Commerce,“AD/CVD Proceedings,”accessed September 6,2022,at https:/www.trade.gov/data-visualization/adcvd-proceedings.43 For information about the Aluminum Import Monitoring and Analysis(AIM)system,see International Trade Administration,“Industry Import Monitoring and Analysis,”at https:/www.trade.gov/aluminum.44 Chad P.Bown,“Trumps steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading out of control,”Peterson Institute for International Economics,February 4,2020,at https:/Adam S.Hersh and Robert E.Scott,“Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S.Section 232 import measures,”Economic Policy Institute,May 25,2021,at https:/www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/.46 Beer Institute,“New Research Shows the Tariffs on Aluminum Have Cost the U.S.Beverage Industry$1.4 Billion,”press release,April 14,2022,at https:/www.beerinstitute.org/press-releases/new-research-shows-the-tariffs-on-aluminum-have-cost-the-u-s-beverage-industry-1-4-billion/.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 11 Figure 6.Global Primary Aluminum Production,2021 Top 10 producing countries Source:USGS,“Aluminum Statistics and Information.”Note:USGS estimates that in 2021,global primary aluminum smelting capacity was 77,000 million metric tons.The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)estimates that primary smelting capacity in China amounted to roughly 48.7 million tons in 2018.47 The OECD reports that excess capacity in the aluminum sector is hard to measure,as reliable capacity information may not be available for producers that are not publicly listed on stock exchanges.The Chinese government has acknowledged that its aluminum sector,which is in part state-owned,suffers from excess capacity and indicated as of 2019 that continued efforts to reduce inventory,cut overcapacity,and achieve a balance in supply and demand remain priorities.48 In addition,OECD economists found that subsidies and other market-distorting practices,particularly in China and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC),contribute to excess capacity and impact global competition in the aluminum sector.49 The research looked at 17 of the industrys largest firms,representing more than half of global smelting capacity,which the OECD estimates received up to$70 billion in total government support between 2013 and 2017.Although all 17 firms received some form of support,five recipients,all Chinese,received 85%of all support.U.S.-based Alcoa was one of the 17 firms,having received approximately$1.5 billion in the form of nonfinancial support,chiefly through energy subsidies coming overwhelmingly from Canada and a GCC country(likely Saudi Arabia,where it has a joint venture).50 A recent analysis by several international organizations,including the OECD,estimated that from 2014 to 2018,global aluminum firms benefited from subsidized intermediate 47 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD),“Measuring distortions in international markets:the aluminium value chain,”OECD Trade Policy Papers,no.218,OECD Publishing,Paris,2019,p.53,at http:/dx.doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en.48 Ibid.,p.51.49 The Gulf Cooperation Council includes Saudi Arabia,Kuwait,the United Arab Emirates,Qatar,Bahrain,and Oman.Ibid.,pp.6,9.50 Ibid.,pp.13-14.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 12 inputs,including energy,valued at$2.5 billion and from below-market borrowings of$8 billion per year.51 In April 2021,the Aluminum Association unveiled a policy document,A Trade Policy Framework for the U.S.Aluminum Industry.The framework expresses the associations view of global excess capacity as a significant challenge,urging the Biden Administration to engage in multilateral efforts to address market-distorting industrial policies with an emphasis on China.52 Unlike the steel sector,no OECD or other multinational forum has been established exclusively to monitor global excess capacity in the aluminum sector.Price Determination Aluminum is a globally traded commodity,and its price is effectively determined by the price of futures contracts traded on the London Metal Exchange(LME).Regional and value-added premiums,such as the Midwest Premium,typically are added to LME prices to establish the base price of aluminum in the United States.This price is usually higher than the LME price,reflecting the cost of delivery to LME-approved warehouses in the United States,as well as U.S.demand conditions.Through the first half of 2022,for example,the average U.S.price for aluminum was$3,507 per metric ton,above the LME price,which averaged$2,789 per metric ton during the same period.53 At that time,the LME price was at its highest level since 2008.According to S&P Global,aluminum prices were at record highs due to limited supply resulting from production curtailments,modification of Section 232 tariffs,demand growth in China,reduced Chinese exports of primary semi-finished aluminum,and economic sanctions on Russia.54 Reliance on LME price benchmarks has been blamed for unreasonably high U.S.aluminum prices.In 2014,the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations examined allegations that certain financial institutions,notably investment bank Goldman Sachs,had acquired LME-approved warehouses and used their control to delay delivery of metal to buyers,thereby creating artificial supply shortages that inflated aluminum prices.55 Between 2010 and 2014,the average queue time to receive aluminum from an LME-approved warehouse in the United States went from roughly 40 days to over 600 days;during the same period,the Midwest Premium rose from approximately$134 per metric ton of aluminum to slightly above$450 per metric ton.56 The subcommittees investigation found a broad consensus that the longer queue times had led to a wider gap between LME prices and U.S.prices,but there 51 IMF et al.,Subsidies,Trade,and International Cooperation,OECD Publishing,Paris,2022,pp.14-16,at https:/doi.org/10.1787/a4f01ddb-en.52 The Aluminum Association,A Trade Policy Framework for the U.S.Aluminum Industry,at https:/www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/TAA_Trade Framework-FINAL.pdf.53 USGS,Mineral Industry Surveys,“Aluminum Statistics and Information,”Table 6,June 2022.54 S&P Global Commodity Insights,“Aluminum prices hit 13-year high on supply tightness,concerns,”February 10,2022,at https:/David Kocieniewski,“A Shuffle of Aluminum,but to Banks,Pure Gold,”New York Times,July 20,2013,at https:/U.S.Congress,Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,Wall Street Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities,113th Cong.,2nd sess.,November 21,2014,pp.173,178-179.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 13 was disagreement as to whether the longer queue times resulted in a higher absolute level of aluminum prices for U.S.buyers.57 Litigation over claims that financial firms violated antitrust laws by manipulating aluminum prices has persisted into this decade.In February 2021,a New York district court ruled in favor of defendants Goldman Sachs,JPMorgan Chase,and Glencorestating that many aluminum purchasers bought aluminum overwhelmingly from smelters such as Alcoa and Rio Tinto rather than directly from the defendants;therefore the purchasers did not qualify as efficient enforcers of antitrust laws and lacked standing to sue.58 Another case was decided in favor of Goldman Sachs and several others in June 2022 on similar grounds.59 National Security Concerns As secondary aluminum is derived from recycled products or scrap,it often contains significant impurities.This makes it unsuitable for uses that require high and consistent quality.Manufacturers of components used in electronics and aerospace manufacturing often favor primary aluminum that meets specified purity standards.Many defense-related products must comply with particularly high purity standards.Specialty alloys and materials used in wrought aluminum products often have enhanced mechanical properties,such as heighted electrical conductivity and corrosion resistance,which are greatly preferred for aerospace and defense applications.However,military demand alone is insufficient to support domestic production of high-purity primary aluminum alloys.According to the Department of Defense(DOD),U.S.military requirements for aluminum represent approximately 3%of annual domestic production.60 The greatest aluminum-related security concern regarding defense requirements appears to be the availability of specific high-purity aluminum alloys,which can be derived from primary aluminum.The supply of high-purity aluminum is important to the production of high-performance aluminum alloys used in aerospace and defense products.In addition,aluminum alloys are one of several energetic materials used in missile and munition systems,according to DOD.61 One active U.S.smelter produces aluminum of sufficient purity for use in military aircraft,as well as in the lightweight armor plating found in many defense ground and weapon systems.62 Centurys Hawesville,KY(Figure 3),smelter produces primary aluminum with a purity of 99.9%compared with standard-purity aluminum of 99.7%.Standard ingots can undergo further 57 Ibid.,p.180.58 In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig.,520 F.Supp.3d 455(S.D.N.Y.2021).59 Reynolds Consumer Prod.LLC v.Glencore AG,No.16-cv-0595(S.D.N.Y.June 3,2022)(order granting joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice).60 Letter from James N.Mattis,Secretary of Defense,to Wilbur L.Ross Jr.,Secretary of Commerce,Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce:Response to Steel and Aluminum Policy Recommendations,2018,at https:/merce.gov/sites/default/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf.61 Department of Defense,Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy,Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress,2020 Annual Report,January 2021,pp.85-87,at https:/media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/14/2002565311/-1/-1/0/FY20-INDUSTRIAL-CAPABILITIES-REPORT.PDF.62 Bureau of Industry and Security,The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security,2018,p.3;and Adam S.Hersh and Robert E.Scott,Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S.Section 232 import measures,Economic Policy Institute,May 25,2021,at https:/www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 14 electrolysis processing,known as the Hoopes process,to reach an“ultra”purity grade of up to 99.99%.63 Centurys Hawesville smelter produced 172,000 tons of primary aluminum in 2021,64 with the large majority going to the commercial aerospace and electrical conductor markets.With respect to defense requirements,this smelter is a major supplier of high-purity aluminum to downstream producers,including Arconic,Constellium,and Kaiser.These firms use high-purity alloys and materials to produce aluminum products for an array of advanced aerospace and defense applications.In June 2022,Century announced that it would temporarily idle its high-purity smelter for up to a year due to rising energy prices.65 Downstream producer Arconic has the capability to produce high-purity aluminum from a standard ingot using a specific fractionalization crystallization process.66 Canadian downstream producer Nature Alu manufactures aluminum ingots with an ultra-purity grade of 99.99%through a proprietary technology.The company states that it is the only North American manufacturer of high-purity aluminum that supplies the international market.67 It is unclear whether the United States imports materials from this firm for use in military applications.The Department of Homeland Security has designated 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States.One of these,“critical manufacturing,”encompasses domestic production of primary metals,including aluminum,among other materials.68 The Trump Administrations Section 232 aluminum report asserted that nearly all of the designated critical infrastructure sectors rely on aluminum products to accomplish their principal missions.69 Separately,the aluminum industrys broadest trade group has pushed for the designation of the aluminum industry as an“essential industry”to allow continuation of operations in the event of a federal emergency,such as was declared during the COVID-19 pandemic.70 Decarbonizing Aluminum Manufacturing The aluminum sector contributes approximately 2%to global GHGs,equivalent to roughly 1.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide.71 As global demand for aluminum is expected to increase up to 80%by 2050,the aluminum industry is facing pressure to develop low-carbon or carbon-neutral manufacturing processes.72 Aluminum producers,like firms in other industries,face increasing 63 Danilo C.Curtolo et al.,“High-and Ultra-High-Purity Aluminum,a Review on Technical Production Methodologies,”Metals,vol.11,no.1407(September 6,2021),p.4,at https:/Century Aluminum Company,Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,2021,p.3.65 Century Aluminum,“Century Aluminum to Temporarily Idle Its Hawesville Smelter Due to Soaring Energy Prices;Issues WARN Notice to Employees,”press release,June 22,2022,at https:/Bureau of Industry and Security,The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security,2018,p.30.67 See Nature Alu website,at https:/Department of Homeland Security,Cybersecurity&Infrastructure Security Agency,“Critical Manufacturing Sector,”at https:/www.cisa.gov/critical-manufacturing-sector.69 Bureau of Industry and Security,The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security,2018,p.36.70 GlobalNewsWire,“American Aluminum an Essential Industry in a Moment of National Emergency,”press release,March 19,2020,at https:/International Aluminium Institute,Aluminium Sector Greenhouse Gas Pathways to 2050,September 2021,at https:/international-aluminium.org/resource/aluminium-sector-greenhouse-gas-pathways-to-2050-2021/.72 International Aluminium Institute,IAI releases aluminium sectors decarbonisation dataset in line with the U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 15 demands from customers and investors that they publicly disclose the GHG emissions throughout their supply chains and seek to reduce those emissions levels,potentially placing producers with comparatively high emissionsnamely primary aluminum smeltersat a competitive disadvantage.73 Primary aluminum smelting generates direct emissions from the electrolysis of alumina using a carbon anode during smelting and from fuel combustion to produce heat and steam used in casting and fabrication.Direct emissions account for roughly 30%of total emissions from aluminum manufacturing.74 More than 60%of indirect GHG emissions related to aluminum manufacturing come from the generation of electricity used to refine bauxite ore into alumina and to smelt the alumina into aluminum.75 The emissions attributable to a particular producer may depend heavily on the power source.About 90%of Canadian aluminum is produced from hydroelectric power in Quebec,76 resulting in comparatively low GHG emissions per metric ton,whereas China,which relies predominantly on coal-fired electric generating plants,has much higher emissions per metric ton.77 The United States stands in the middle in terms of sectoral GHG emissions per ton.78 Secondary aluminums rising share of total domestic supply is chiefly responsible for the U.S.decline in average emissions per ton.U.S.producers have also introduced process and technology improvements in aluminum smelting.The Aluminum Association asserts that the domestic industry reduced its GHG emissions by 59tween 2005 and 2018.79 However,annual domestic production of primary aluminum fell sharply during this period,from 2.48 million metric tons in 2005 to 897,000 metric tons in 2018,a decline of 64%.Given that over 90%of emissions from aluminum manufacturing comes from primary smelting,80 reduced primary smelting activity is likely to have been a major cause of decline in the sectors emissions.Secondary aluminum uses just 5%of the energy required for primary production,81 so to the extent that greater availability of secondary aluminum reduces demand for primary aluminum,the industrys emissions per metric ton could be expected to fall,even in the absence of changes to production methods.International Energy Agencys Beyond 2 Degrees findings,September 9,2021,at https:/international-aluminium.org/iai-releases-aluminium-sectors-decarbonisation-dataset-in-line-with-the-international-energy-agencys-beyond-2-degrees-findings/.73 Primary aluminum smelting is also a major source of global perfluorocarbon(PFC)emissions,a highly potent greenhouse gas.74 Mission Possible Partnership,Closing the Gap for Aluminium Emissions:Technologies to Accelerate Deep Decarbonization of Direct Emissions,December 2021,pp.5-6,at https:/missionpossiblepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Closing-the-Gap-for-Aluminium-Emissions.pdf.75 International Aluminium Institute,Aluminium Sector Greenhouse Gas Pathways to 2050,September 2021,at https:/international-aluminium.org/resource/aluminium-sector-greenhouse-gas-pathways-to-2050-2021/.76 Investissement Qubec,The Greenest Aluminum in the World,accessed July 20,2022,at https:/Ali Hasanbeigi et al.,Aluminum Climate Impact:An International Benchmarking of Energy and CO2 Intensities,Global Efficiency Intelligence,February 2022,pp.3,16,and 19 at https:/Ibid.,pp.3,15.79 The Aluminum Association,Aluminum Sector Snapshot:Environmental Reporting,April 2021,pp.1,5,at https:/www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/Aluminum Association_Smart Sector Report.pdf.80 IEA,Aluminium,Paris,2022,at https:/www.iea.org/reports/aluminium.81 World Economic Forum,The answer to the aluminium industrys emissions issue?Aluminiums infinite recyclability,December 9,2021,at https:/www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/12/aluminium-emissions-recycling-circular-economy/.U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 16 Challenges of Decarbonizing A transition to carbon-neutral aluminum is likely to require significant capital investment in decarbonizing the electrical grid and in specific technologies used in smelting and recycling.A recent study from Mission Possible Partnership,working in collaboration with the International Aluminium Institute,82 estimates that approximately$1 trillion in investment is needed for the transition to a low-carbon upstream aluminum sector,with the majority of investment used to decarbonize electricity supplies.83 This figure does not include the cost of decarbonizing other aspects of aluminum production.A study from the World Economic Forum estimates that low-emission aluminum is expected to be available as early as 2030 and may command a premium of up to 40%.84 Decarbonizing the domestic aluminum industry is likely to require changes in the U.S.energy grid.85 At present,electricity is largely derived from nonrenewable energy sources.In 2021,20.1%of electricity generated in the United States came from renewable sources,86 and much of this generation is distant from smelting facilities.In addition to decarbonizing the electricity sector,many technologies under development seek to address direct emissions in aluminum manufacturing,specifically targeting aluminum smelting and thermal energy and fuels used in casting and fabrication.Inert Anodes.This technology could be used as an alternative to carbon anodes,which are consumed in electrolysis during smeltingthe most carbon-intensive process in aluminum manufacturing.Most research,at present,is focused on identifying the optimal anode material.Current materials being explored include ceramics,metal alloys,and sintered cermet,a ceramic-metal composite.Currently,the large majority of primary smelters use carbon anodes,which enable the process of electrolysis,with the combustion of these anodes emitting large quantities of carbon dioxide.In contrast,inert anodes have little to no direct GHG emissions.87 ELYSIS,a joint venture between Alcoa,Rio Tinto,and Apple,seeks to create inert anodes that would eliminate GHG emissions from aluminum smelting,yielding carbon-free aluminum.The companies aim to demonstrate the viability of the technology in 2023,make it commercially available by 2024,and produce larger volumes of carbon-free aluminum approximately two years later.88 82 Aluminum is the preferred spelling in the United States;aluminium is the preferred spelling in the United Kingdom and many other English-speaking nations.83 Mission Possible Partnership,Making Net-Zero Aluminium Possible,September 2022,p.52,at https:/missionpossiblepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Making-1.5-Aligned-Aluminium-possible.pdf.84 World Economic Forum,The Net-Zero Industry Tracker:Aluminium Industry,July 28,2022,at https:/www.weforum.org/reports/the-net-zero-industry-tracker/in-full/aluminium-industry/.85 William Alan Reinsch and Emily Benson,Decarbonizing Aluminum:Rolling Out a More Sustainable Sector,Center for Strategic and International Studies,February 25,2022,at https:/www.csis.org/analysis/decarbonizing-aluminum-rolling-out-more-sustainable-sector.86 U.S.Energy Information Administration,What is U.S.electricity generation by energy source?,March 4,2022,at https:/www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3.87 Mission Possible Partnership,Closing the Gap for Aluminium Emissions:Technologies to Accelerate Deep Decarbonization of Direct Emissions,December 2021,p.6,at https:/missionpossiblepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Closing-the-Gap-for-Aluminium-Emissions.pdf.88 Alcoa,“Carbon free aluminium smelting a step closer:ELYSIS advances commercial demonstration and operates at industrial scale,”press release,November 4,2021,at https:/Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 17 Carbon Capture,Utilization,and Storage(CCUS).89 CCUS units could be installed or retrofitted at smelting facilities to capture direct emissions resulting from industrial processes.The gases then may be stored underground or used to produce chemicals,such as methanol.In the aluminum industry,CCUS could be the most viable midterm solution for smelting facilities that use fossil fuels.90 Hydrogen.Hydrogen could be used to produce high-temperature heat to power secondary smelters but also could be used in alumina refining.There are three primary methods used to generate hydrogen:(1)gray hydrogen,produced using fossil fuels by splitting natural gas into hydrogen and carbon dioxide;(2)blue hydrogen,produced using the same process as gray hydrogen with the use of CCUS to capture roughly 90%of emissions;91 and(3)green hydrogen,produced via electrolyzers from electricity generated from renewable energy sources.Mechanical Vapor Recompression(MVR).MVRpiloted by Alcoa with financial support from the Australian governmentrecovers waste heat from steam that would otherwise be discharged during alumina refining.The steam is captured and redirected to a compressor that raises its pressure and temperature so the steam may be reused.Alcoa is evaluating MVR powered by renewable energy and states that the technology could reduce carbon emissions from the alumina refining process by up to 70%.92 Another step in encouraging sustainability in the aluminum industry is to deploy better recycling technology to improve the quality of secondary aluminum.Sorting technologies,such as manual eddy current separators,make it possible to sort recycling inputs by material type.A more recent technological development in recycling involves X-ray transmission technology,which uses sensors that determine differences in quality and material density and sorts metal products,including aluminum,accordingly.93 After scrap has been sorted,it is usually sent to secondary smelters where it is processed into molten aluminum.More precise sorting enables secondary smelters to produce higher quality aluminum and wrought alloys.As domestic aluminum capacity shifts from primary to secondary smelting,developing and refining methodologies to increase the usability of the declining supply of quality scrap become more important.Considerations for Congress U.S.primary smelters seem likely to face greater headwinds due to a slowing economy and rising energy costs,which have led to recent production curtailments and idling of capacity.The large scale.89 For a discussion of the technology and policy considerations regarding carbon capture,utilization,and storage(CCUS),see CRS Report R44902,Carbon Capture and Sequestration(CCS)in the United States,by Angela C.Jones and Ashley J.Lawson.90 World Economic Forum and Accenture,Aluminium for Climate:Exploring pathways to decarbonize the aluminium industry,November 2020,p.15,at https:/www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Aluminium_for_Climate_2020.pdf.91 Michael Liebreich,Liebreich:Separating Hype from Hydrogen Part One:The Supply Side,BloombergNEF,October 8,2020,at https:/Australian Renewable Energy Agency,Mechanical Vapour Recompression for Low Carbon Alumina Refining,October 26,2021,at https:/arena.gov.au/projects/mechanical-vapour-recompression-for-low-carbon-alumina-refining/.;and Alcoa,“Alcoa explores technology to reduce carbon emissions,”press release,May 20,2021,at https:/technology can turn aluminum green,”recycling today,September 14,2021,at https:/Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service 18 amount of unused capacity in the upstream sector has been and remains an issue for domestic smelters.The adverse impact of global excess capacity on the domestic industry also remains a challenge.Secondary and downstream aluminum producers,however,may experience improved commercial success over the next few years,as demand is expected to expand over the decade,domestic prices have registered record highs,and continued measures limiting imports remain in effect.Decarbonizing the aluminum sector presents obstacles for domestic producers(see the“Challenges of Decarbonizing”section).The majority of the investment in decarbonization is likely to focus on improvements in the energy grid to decarbonize electricity supply;additional investment is likely to be made in reducing carbon emissions in aluminum production.P.L.117-169(commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022),signed into law on August 16,2022,established the Advanced Industrial Facilities Deployment Program(50161)at the Department of Energy.This program seeks to provide federal financial assistance to a variety of manufacturing industries,including aluminum,that introduce advanced technologies in production processes that effectively reduce GHG emissions.The Department of Energy is to administer this program and award approximately$5.8 billion in financial assistance through September 2026.Eligible production facilities would carry out projects for“(1)the purchase and installation,or implementation,of advanced industrial technology;(2)retrofits,upgrades to,or operational improvements at an eligible facility to install or implement advanced industrial technology;or(3)engineering studies and other work needed to prepare an eligible facility for activities.”94 The Secretary of Energy may provide financial assistance of up to 50%of the cost of a project carried out by an eligible production facility.In addition,the Secretary may give priority consideration of financial assistance to projects that demonstrate“(1)the expected GHG emission reductions to be achieved by carrying out the project;(2)the extent to which the project would provide the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people within the area in which the eligible facility is located;and(3)whether the eligible entity participates or would participate in a partnership with purchasers of the output of the eligible facility.”95 The Trade Security Act of 2021(S.746),introduced by Senator Rob Portman,would amend Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and require the Secretary of Defense to initiate investigations regarding whether certain U.S.imports present a national security threat.In addition,it would allow Congress to block a presidential import adjustment through a joint resolution.Under current law,the Department of Commerce is charged with conducting Section 232 investigations and is required to consult with DOD concerning imports under investigation.Prior Congresses have considered legislation to address concerns that inadequate domestic production of primary aluminum could pose a risk in a national security crisis.Section 852 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act(FY2021 NDAA;P.L.116-283)required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by March 1,2022,on how the Defense Production Act(DPA;50 U.S.C.4501 et seq.)could be used to increase domestic aluminum refining,processing,and manufacturing.It is unclear whether this report was submitted to Congress and/or if it has been declassified for public viewing.Considering the deep integration of the U.S.and Canadian aluminum industries,if the DPA were to be used,it may treat primary aluminum produced by Canadian smelters as domestic content.96 94 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022(P.L.117-169,50161).95 Ibid.96 50 U.S.C.4552(7).U.S.Aluminum Manufacturing:Industry Trends and Sustainability Congressional Research Service R47294 VERSION 1 NEW 19 Section 829 of the House-passed version of the FY2021 NDAA sought to add aluminum and aluminum alloys to DODs specialty metals provision(10 U.S.C.4863)and apply a domestic sourcing mandate to DOD and the Department of Transportation.Section 829 was not included in the FY2021 NDAA.Author Information Christopher D.Watson Analyst in Industrial Organization and Business Acknowledgements The author thanks Jamie Hutchinson,CRS Visual Information Specialist,for providing assistance with certain figures in this report.Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service(CRS).CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress.It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRSs institutional role.CRS Reports,as a work of the United States Government,are not subject to copyright protection in the United States.Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS.However,as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party,you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

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