《美国特别竞争研究计划：2025中美技术竞争差距分析报告：中美技术竞争五维透视（英文版）（62页）.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《美国特别竞争研究计划：2025中美技术竞争差距分析报告：中美技术竞争五维透视（英文版）（62页）.pdf（62页珍藏版）》请在三个皮匠报告上搜索。

1、Welcome tothe ArenaWhos Ahead,Whos Behind,and Where We Are HeadedNext in the U.S.-ChinaTechnology CompetitionJanuary 20252025 Gaps Analysis ReportContentsS P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 2 Introduction The intensifying technological competition between the Unit

2、ed States and the Peoples Republic of China(PRC)represents one of the most consequential dynamics shaping the 21st century.This rivalry encompasses critical sectors that define economic power,national security,and global influence.Both nations are advancing rapidly across emerging technologies,with

3、strategies that reflect starkly contrasting priorities,governance structures,and resource allocations.This report,Welcome to the Arena:Whos Ahead,Whos Behind,and Whats Next in the U.S.-China Technology Competition,aims to provide a comprehensive,data-driven examination of this evolving landscape,bui

4、lding upon the foundation established in the Special Competitive Studies Projects(SCSP)2022 gaps analysis.1 This document is designed to fulfill five key purposes:1.One-Stop Diagnostic Resource for Policymakers:Tailored for the incoming Presidential Administration,the report serves as a strategic gu

5、ide,identifying opportunities,challenges,and insights to inform technology policy and decision-making.2.Analysis of How Nations Prioritize Critical Technologies:The report examines how various stakeholders within the U.S.innovation ecosystem prioritize key technologies,revealing strategic alignment

6、and divergence across sectors.3.Update from SCSPs 2022 Gaps Analysis:This report incorporates new data and developments across twelve strategically critical technology areas reflecting significant changes in the technological and geopolitical landscape since 2022.4.Forecast Geopolitical and Technolo

7、gical Trajectories:By analyzing trends,investments,and strategic initiatives,this document surveys potential geopolitical wildcards and forecasts possible future trajectories of these key technologies and their implications for the global competition.5.Simulate the Functions of a Theoretical U.S.Tec

8、hnology Competition Council:By providing a structured and holistic analysis,the report demonstrates what a dedicated 1 Methodology Note:In 2022,SCSP conducted a gap analysis(“Gaps 1.0”)of twelve technology areas that we believed would drive the competition between the United States and China from 20

9、25 to 2030.Now,three years after our initial analysis,we thought it would be an opportune time to revisit our previous assessment and do a comprehensive update.These twelve tech areas are derivatives of a broader set of strategic sectors we judge to be central to building national competitiveness(Mi

10、d-Decade Challenges to National Competitiveness):artificial intelligence,biotechnology,advanced compute and microelectronics,advanced networks,advanced manufacturing,and next-generation energy.We used a framework of analytic questions to select and examine these tech areas through three lenses:tech

11、phenomena,competition factors with China,and the state of the U.S.innovation ecosystem(Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation).We assert that the evidence selected for these conclusions should be a mix of quantitative and qualitative metrics of actual fielded capabilities that differ for each tec

12、hnology,using secondary variables like publication trajectories as indirect proxies for understanding real positional advantages.S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 3 U.S.Technology Competition Councils output might look like,emphasizing cross-sector collaboration

13、 and actionable assessments.2 This report seeks to equip policymakers,industry leaders,and researchers with the state of play needed to navigate the U.S.-China technology competition.By identifying areas of strength,vulnerability,and opportunity,it provides a roadmap to strengthen the United States

14、position in the global innovation ecosystem while ensuring long-term resilience and competitiveness.The following sections delve into each technology area,presenting a nuanced analysis of where the United States and China stand today,and where they may be heading in the years to come.Key Findings Ch

15、inas Dominance in Key Infrastructure:Chinas sprawling manufacturing industrial base gives Beijing systemic advantages in capital-intensive sectors,such as advanced batteries and fifth-generation wireless networks(5G)infrastructure.Thanks to significant state investments,control over critical supply

16、chains,and scalable manufacturing,China has daunting leads in these technology areas.Although the United States has made measurable progress in fielding some of these infrastructure-heavy technologies,supply chain gaps and bureaucratic red tape is hindering U.S.competitiveness.U.S.Leadership in Emer

17、ging Technologies:The United States maintains leadership in sectors such as artificial intelligence(AI),quantum computing,and synthetic biology,driven by strong private-sector ecosystems,global collaboration,and innovation in foundational technologies.However,Chinas centralized funding and focus on

18、commercialization are narrowing the gap in these areas.Divergence in Prioritization:Over the past three years,some U.S.industry stakeholders have shifted focus to AI,fintech,and human-machine interfaces,while some U.S.government departments and agencies continue to focus on advanced networks and adv

19、anced computing.2 The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence(NSCAI)in 2021 proposed the establishment of a Technology Competition Council(TCC),a recommendation that SCSP has echoed,to empower a single entity in the White House to set strategic direction and oversee a coordinated app

20、roach to technology competition.Furthermore,SCSP has proposed that the TCC and/or a new supporting entity such as an Office for Global Competition Analysis,conduct regular comparative analysis of U.S.and adversarial technological capabilities to better inform policymakers on how to prioritize resour

21、ces and policy agendas.See Final Report,National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence at 166(2021);Harnessing the New Geometry of Innovation,Special Competitive Studies Project at 49(2022).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 4 Commercialization and Marke

22、t Gaps:While the United States leads in innovation,China excels in commercialization across sectors such as biopharmaceuticals and synthetic biology,leveraging its superior production infrastructure,biomanufacturing capacity,and integrated ecosystems.Global Standards and Strategic Dependencies:The c

23、ompetition extends to influence over global standards(e.g.,6G,quantum technologies)and strategic dependencies in supply chains.U.S.reliance on international production,especially in semiconductors and biopharmaceuticals,highlights vulnerabilities that China could exploit through economic leverage or

24、 export restrictions.S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 5 How Nations Prioritize Critical Technologies In 2022,SCSP conducted a survey of 78 tech lists that outlined the current stated priorities of various government and non-government organizations in the Unite

25、d States,China,and around the world.From our analysis of the data,we published our“list of lists,”an aggregated estimate of modern technology priorities.3 To construct this report,SCSP revisited this analysis to conduct an updated survey of the current state of priorities in the U.S.innovation ecosy

26、stem.Our researchers identified 112 new tech lists from the United States,China,and foreign allies and partners published or updated since 2022.In this section,we use this updated data to analyze how stated technology priorities have changed over time,compare across our allies and adversaries,and di

27、ffer between government and non-governmental actors.Which Technologies Have Risen and Fallen in Mentions Since 2022?3 Our analysis breaks down each list by identifying the specific technologies mentioned and classifying them into different innovation categories.By counting how many lists each techno

28、logy appears in,SCSP has crafted our“list of lists,”highlighting the most widely prioritized technologies across different organizations and sectors.Our analysis aims to use these lists as a geopolitical proxy to gauge how nations and innovation ecosystem stakeholders think about technology prioriti

29、es and spot differences between the stated priorities of organizations across the innovation ecosystem.We have chosen to focus narrowly on publicly released technology lists as a novel signpost of stakeholder priorities though many other indicators exist,such as investment trends and R&D spending.Th

30、is analysis builds on SCSPs 2022 work,Whats in a Tech List?,Special Competitive Studies Project(2022).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 6 AI and advanced computing industries have grown in priority dramatically across all U.S.technology lists.AI and advanced com

31、puting technologies have long been a top focus,but,since 2022,theyve grown to represent 24%of all technology priorities listed.Mentions of AI applications to include explicit mentions of AI,autonomy,or“smart”technologies have also grown from 12%in 2022 to 22%in 2024,in line with broader industry gro

32、wth in generative AI innovations.Among advanced computing innovations,cloud/edge computing and quantum technologies are prominently mentioned.Although quantum innovations remain the most frequently mentioned advanced computing technology priority among the U.S.lists SCSP tracked,since 2022,these tec

33、hnologies have fallen from representing nearly 34%of computing priorities in 2022 to 29%in 2024.Across the same time period,cloud and edge computing technologies have nearly doubled from 10%in 2022 to nearly 19%in 2024.As a proxy for the broader biotechnology sector,health data has become a new prio

34、rity in this latest survey of U.S.technology lists.AI diagnostics,pandemic tracking,and other innovations have risen from representing 12%of listed biotechnology priorities in 2022 to 27%in 2024.Interest in data-informed health innovation has risen notably in non-government lists.Advanced networks a

35、nd autonomy/robotics,despite consistently being in the top five listed technologies in 2022,have declined in mentions.Since 2022,advanced networks has been mentioned as a priority on 57%fewer occasions across U.S.government and non-government lists.Similarly,autonomy/robotics has seen the second-lar

36、gest decline in mentions out of any technology,mentioned 40%fewer times.S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 7 Energy technologies have remained stable as a priority.Since 2022,energy technologies have consistently represented around 7-8%of all technology prioritie

37、s listed.Within energy technologies,nuclear energy innovation,including fusion energy,has grown from representing 10%of energy priorities in 2022 to 17%in 2024.Cybersecurity,on the other hand,has shot up in interest.In 2022,cybersecurity innovations were mentioned in only 11 out of the 40 total U.S.

38、technology lists.Since 2022,these same technologies have become a top five priority in both government and non-government organizations.Particularly,in government lists since 2022,mentions of cybersecurity technologies have doubled.Which Technologies are U.S.Stakeholders Focusing On?Within the U.S.i

39、nnovation ecosystem,industry and government organizations tend to have dramatically different technology priorities.From our split analysis of government and non-government technology lists,we identify that non-government organizations tend to prioritize computing technologies such as AI,human-machi

40、ne interfaces,software at much larger proportions than government lists.Comparatively,government organizations have prioritized more traditional,hard infrastructure technologies,such as advanced manufacturing,advanced networks,and advanced computing.S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S

41、P R O J E C T P A G E 8 Non-government U.S.stakeholders Are the Drivers of Mentions of Fintech,Software,and Enterprise Technologies.Out of the 14 government lists since 2022,these three technologies each represent less than 1%of the technologies mentioned.In fact,financial technologies are not menti

42、oned once within government lists.U.S.Private Capital Investors Are Focused on AI,Fintech,and Biotechnologies.Out of the new 15 lists published by U.S.accelerators and investors since 2022,the top three technologies mentioned were in biotechnology/health,fintech,and AI.As one would expect,since Chat

43、GPTs launch in late-2022,AIs prominence has grown,with 29%of industry listed technologies having explicit mention of AI,compared to 11%in 2022.U.S.Government Lists Have Focused on AI,Advanced Computing,and Advanced Networks,largely in line with Biden Administration priorities set out by policies inc

44、luding the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act,Executive Order 14110 on AI,and the National Artificial Intelligence R&D Strategic Plan.S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 9 Gaps Analysis Advanced Batteries,2025 Analysis Assessment:PRC-Lead Confidence Interval:High Directio

45、n:Trend Contested Confidence Interval:Low _ China Dominates Battery Production as the United States Aims to Close the Gap Over the past three years,Chinas control over the advanced battery market has continued to strengthen,solidifying its position as a global leader in the field.The root of Chinas

46、dominance in the advanced battery sector stems from its control over the critical minerals supply chain and its impressive battery production capacity,which both rely heavily on the nations industrial manufacturing base and infrastructure-first industrial policies.Despite the geographical distributi

47、on of critical mineral production across several countries,China has strategically focused on refining minerals such as lithium and graphite,crucial raw materials in the battery manufacturing process.4 Chinas dominance in these areas has allowed it to maintain a firm grip on the downstream battery s

48、upply chain,including electric vehicles(EVs)and a range of other battery-dependence platforms such as commercial drones,underscoring the strategic role critical materials play in the global supply chain.5 4 Outlook for Key Minerals,International Energy Agency(2024).5 Jon Emont,China Harnesses a Tech

49、nology That Vexed the West:Unlocking a Treasure Chest,Wall Street Journal(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 10 Source:Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024,International Energy Agency(2024).Source:Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024,International Energy

50、Agency(2024).Beyond critical mineral mining and processing,Chinas battery manufacturing capacity also remains unmatched globally,producing a staggering 1,705 gigawatt-hours(GWh),dwarfing the S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 11 United States 93 GWh in 2023.6 Thi

51、s disparity is particularly evident in the lithium-ion segment of the sector,where China commanded 80%of the worlds shipments of lithium-ion battery components in 2023,7 accounting for approximately 60%of the global EV battery market.8 PRC companies,led by giants like CATL and BYD,maintain their gri

52、p on the EV landscape,collectively accounting for over 50%of global market share.9 Notably,no U.S.-based companies are among the top ten global EV battery makers.Source:Leading Countries by Battery Manufacturing Capacity Worldwide in 2023,Statista(2024).To bolster domestic advanced battery innovatio

53、n and manufacturing,the United States has undertaken significant policy actions in the past two years,to include landmark pieces of bipartisan legislation like the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law(BIL)and the Inflation Reduction Act(IRA).The BIL allocated over$3 billion to support 25 projects across 14

54、 states for domestic battery production.10 Furthermore,the IRA included measures designed to incentivize consumers to purchase EVs with batteries made in the United States and provided tax credits to manufacturers to build new battery facilities.11 As a result of these initiatives,the number of batt

55、ery facilities in 6 Leading Countries by Battery Manufacturing Capacity Worldwide in 2023,Statista(2023).7 Chinas Market Share in Key EV Battery Components Tops 80%,Nikkei Asia(2024).8 China Already Makes as Many Batteries as the Entire World Wants,Bloomberg(2024).9 Lei Kang,Global EV battery market

56、 share in 2023:CATL 36.8%,BYD 15.8%,CNEV Post(2024).10 Biden-Harris Administration Announces Over$3 Billion to Support Americas Battery Manufacturing Sector,Create Over 12,000 Jobs,and Enhance National Security,U.S.Department of Energy(2024);Battery Materials Processing Grants,U.S.Department of Ener

57、gy(2024).11 Owen Minott&Helen Nguyen,IRA EV Tax Credits:Requirements for Domestic Manufacturing,Bipartisan Policy Center(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 12 the United States has increased from two in 2019 to more than 34 in 2024.12 Over the past two year

58、s,U.S.investments both public and private in batteries and critical minerals refining has grown at least threefold,with battery manufacturing investments totaling nearly$43 billion from 2023 to 2024.13 Overseas,the United States is working to strengthen the battery supply chain alongside allies and

59、partners through recent initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership(MSP)and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF).14 These initiatives aim to bolster the battery supply chain by promoting responsible sourcing and investment in critical minerals among members.Continued pr

60、ioritization of and investment into the United States battery industry will be critical to reduce dependence on China.Wildcards Are Tariffs and Other Market Restrictions on PRC EVs Too Little Too Late?Washington is implementing measures to prevent PRC-made EVs from flooding the U.S.market including

61、100%tariffs and restrictions on PRC-origin interconnected vehicle hardware and software.15 U.S.allies are taking similar actions.The EU imposed a lower,provisional anti-subsidy tariff of 45.3%,while Canada increased its 6.1%import tariff on Chinese EVs to 100%.16 But these tariffs differ in aim:the

62、United States views tariffs as one element of a larger strategic toolkit to reduce dependency and bolster domestic capabilities,whereas the EU is using them as a targeted,rules-based mechanism to correct identified market distortions.17 In response,China has both retaliated and adapted,exporting mor

63、e hybrid vehicles and shifting some assembly to Europe to mitigate tariff impacts.Whether these measures effectively reduce reliance on Chinas entrenched EV supply chain and at what cost remains uncertain.18 Will PRC Battery Overcapacity Distort Global Markets?While Chinas dominant position in batte

64、ry production is impressive,its accompanied by the prospect of significant overcapacity as the world transitions from internal combustion engines(ICE)to electric vehicles.EVs are by and large driving the demand for todays advanced batteries.In 2023,China utilized less than 40%of its maximum cell out

65、put,and the 12 Tracking the EV Battery Factory Construction Boom Across North America,TechCrunch(2024).13 Lily Bermel,et al.,Clean Investment Monitor:Tallying the Two-Year Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act,Rhodium Group(2024).14 Joint Statement on the High-Level Minerals Security Partnership For

66、um Event in New York City,U.S.Department of State(2024);Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity,U.S.Department of Commerce(last accessed 2024).15 USTR Finalizes Action on China Tariffs Following Statutory Four-Year Review,Office of the U.S.Trade Representative(2024);David Sanger,et al.,Biden

67、Administration Proposes Ban on Chinese Software in Vehicles,New York Times(2024).16 EU,China Close to Agreement over EV Import Tariffs,Leading MEP Says,Reuters(2024);Joo da Silva,Canada Hits China-made Electric Cars with 100%Tariff,BBC(2024).17 Francesca Ghiretti,Not All Tariffs Are the Same:The Cor

68、e Differences between U.S.and EU Tariffs against Chinese EVs,Center for Strategic and International Studies(2024).18 Melissa Eddy&Jenny Gross,Europe Imposes Higher Tariffs on Electric Vehicles Made in China,New York Times(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E

69、13 countrys installed manufacturing capacity for cathode and anode active materials far exceeded global EV cell demand.19 To alleviate this excess,China has become the worlds largest exporter of EV cells,cathodes,and anodes,and CATL Chinas largest battery manufacturer is considering pulling back on

70、lithium production,demonstrating some of the early signs of oversupply amid weak demand.20 What to Watch AI Innovations Likely to Yield New Advanced Materials and Battery Chemistries.AI innovations in battery-related R&D could transform the energy storage sector and will be the lynchpin for the Unit

71、ed States and its allies and partners to regain an upper hand in the sector.AI has already accelerated the search for novel battery chemicals,narrowing 32.6 million possibilities to 18 promising candidates in under a week a task that would otherwise have taken 20 years.21 Deep learning AI models and

72、 programs like the Materials Genome Initiative are unlocking thousands of new materials for future technologies,like the next generation of long-duration energy storage.22 New Models of Public-Private Partnerships Could Supercharge Battery R&D.New public-private partnerships in this space are also s

73、howing some promise:an AI-focused partnership between the U.S.government and industry early this year led to the discovery of a new kind of solid-state electrolyte that could cut down the amount of lithium used in a battery by as much as 70 percent.23 However,the PRC has demonstrated an ability to r

74、apidly move novel battery chemistries into mass production.24 Additional progress in synthesizing AI-designed materials and scaling production for novel battery chemistries will be critical for the United States to catch up.19 Outlook for Battery and Energy Demand,International Energy Agency(2024);T

75、rends in Electric Vehicle Batteries,International Energy Agency(2024).20 Sherry Qin,Lithium Miners Shares Surge on Possible CATL Supply Cut,Wall Street Journal(2024).21 Accelerating the Discovery of Battery Materials with AI,Science(2024);Casey Crownhart,How AI Could Supercharge Battery Research,MIT

76、 Technology Review(2023).22 See for example,Jonathan Godwin,Introducing Orb-The Worlds Fastest and Most Accurate AI Model for Simulating Advanced Materials,Orbital(2024);About the Materials Genome Initiative,Materials Genome Initiative(last accessed 2024);Amil Merchant&Ekin Dogus Cubuk,Millions of N

77、ew Materials Discovered with Deep Learning,Google DeepMind(2023).23 Mark Johnson,New Battery Material that Uses Less Lithium Found in AI-Powered Search,Wall Street Journal(2024).24 Edward White,et al.,Can Anyone Challenge Chinas EV Battery Dominance?,Financial Times(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I

78、 T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 14 Advanced Manufacturing,2025 Analysis Assessment:PRC-Lead Confidence Interval:High Direction:PRC Confidence Interval:Medium _ China Supercharging Manufacturing Industrial Base,United States Looks for Leapfrogs China leads the world in terms of manufactu

79、ring capacity and is responsible for nearly 35%of gross global output,followed by the United States at around 12%,with Japan,Germany,and South Korea following closely behind.25 In recent years,the PRC government has identified advanced manufacturing as the primary basis of Chinas economic power,with

80、 PRC net lending to the sector rising from just$63 billion in 2019 to over$680 billion in the first three quarters of 2023.26 Guided by a number of national strategies,China has established leadership positions across a range of advanced industries,from batteries to solar cells,electric vehicles,and

81、 legacy chips,and leads the world in terms of robotics deployment.27 In 2023,PRC firms deployed as many industrial robots as the rest of the world combined.28 These factors position China to capitalize on trends in automation and cement its position as the worlds sole advanced manufacturing superpow

82、er into the decade.25 Richard Baldwin,China is the Worlds Sole Manufacturing Superpower:A Line Sketch of the Rise,Centre for Economic Policy Research(2024).26 Keith Bradsher,More Semiconductors,Less Housing:Chinas New Economic Plan,New York Times(2023).27 Alexander Brown et al.,Robotics Sector+Compl

83、ete Industrial Chain+Industrial Internet,Mercator Institute for China Studies(2023).28 Record of 4 Million Robots in Factories Worldwide,International Federation for Robotics(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 15 Source:The Future of Industrialization,Unite

84、d Nations Industrial Development Organization at 17(2024).Despite Chinas status as an industrial powerhouse,various metrics suggest that,at the technology layer,advanced manufacturing remains a contested battleground.U.S.companies have a significant lead in generative AI,which is driving innovation

85、across a range of advanced manufacturing activities.29 More broadly,U.S.firms are pioneering novel manufacturing techniques and software-defined manufacturing paradigms which,if widely adopted across the U.S.industrial base,could offset PRC advantages.30 Like the United States,China has experienced

86、challenges in encouraging domestic manufacturing firms to adopt advanced manufacturing technologies:according to PRC state-affiliated sources,as of 2022,only 37%of manufacturers in China had reached a basic level of digitalization and industrial intelligence,while only 4%of PRC manufacturers had att

87、ained leading-edge capabilities.31 29 Jacob Achenbach,et al.,Harnessing Generative AI in Manufacturing and Supply Chains,McKinsey(2024).30 Action Plan for United States Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing,Special Competitive Studies Project at 15(2024).31 China Electronics Technology Standardizatio

88、n Institute(中国电子技术标准化研究院),Intelligent Manufacturing Maturity Index Report(智能制造成熟度指数报告),(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 16 Wildcards Will Humanoid Robot Adoption Take Off?The widespread deployment of humanoid robots may materialize within the next decade

89、,driven by advances in generative AI and significant venture capital investments.With manufacturing costs declining rapidly,robotic labor could become economically competitive with human labor.Yet critical barriers remain,including reliability and safety issues,perfection of training methods based o

90、n limited data,and cultural resistance to automation in the United States.China holds a significant manufacturing advantage,with domestic firms producing robots that are 80%as capable but 30%cheaper than U.S.models,backed by massive state investments.32 Will U.S.Cultural and Political Attitudes Stym

91、ie Robotics Deployment?Recent strikes at U.S.ports demonstrate that some unions increasingly view automation with increasing suspicion.33 Based on recent polling,citizens in the United States and other western countries tend to have more negative outlooks on the effects of automation than Asian coun

92、tries.34 The extent to which these differences in cultural attitudes shape the U.S.robotics deployment landscape has yet to be determined.However,they could significantly impact U.S.manufacturing competitiveness in the near future.Will China Escalate the Use of Retaliatory Measures to Undermine U.S.

93、Efforts at Reindustrialization?Given its virtual monopoly on a range of advanced technology inputs,such as rare earth minerals mining and processing,China has significant geoeconomic leverage.35 This leverage could be wielded to counter U.S.export control and investment screening measures.Indeed in

94、December,Beijing imposed export restrictions on four critical minerals to the United States,a marked escalation in its retaliatory responses to U.S.policy actions.36 What to Watch Will China Dominate the Robotics Hardware Stack?China has long been a robotics importer,but PRC firms met over half of d

95、omestic demand for the first time last year.37 32 Robert D.Atkinson,How Innovative Is China in the Robotics Industry?,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).33 Heather Long,The Real Reason 47,000 Dockworkers Are On Strike,The Washington Post(2024).34 Courtney Johnson&Alec Tyson,People Gl

96、obally Offer Mixed Views of the Impact of Artificial Intelligence,Job Automation On Society,Pew Research Center(2020).35 Gracelin Baskaran,What Chinas Ban on Rare Earths Processing Technology Exports Means,Center for Strategic and International Studies(2024).36 Keith Bradsher,Chinas Critical Mineral

97、s Embargo Is Even Tougher Than Expected,New York Times(2024).37 Will the United States or China Lead in Humanoid Robotics?,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024);Jacky Wong,China Needs More Factory Robots.Can It Build Its Own?,Wall Street Journal(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D

98、I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 17 Recent policy guidance38 from Beijing seeks to establish China as the global manufacturing hub for humanoid robotics by 2027.39 PRC firms already dominate downstream supply chain inputs,such as batteries,electric motors,and raw materials.40 Will U.S.Policy Continue to

99、Emphasize Reindustrialization?The Biden Administration worked with Congress to pass massive investments in advanced manufacturing industries,including EVs,energy storage,and semiconductors.41 The incoming administration will likely continue to advance these efforts,while also using tools like tariff

100、s to achieve industrial policy goals.42 Efforts to rebuild U.S.manufacturing may come down to tax policy:extending expensing provisions for capital equipment from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act would help drive robotics deployment.Will Chinas Trading Partners Accept a China Shock 2.0?PRC policymaker

101、s have identified advanced manufacturing industries,so-called“new quality productive forces,”or sectors such as renewable energy technology and electric vehicles,as the basis of the PRCs economic growth into the near future.43 As fears of Chinas industrial overcapacity mount,growing trade restrictio

102、ns could reduce Chinas ability to export its way out of its economic slowdown.Artificial Intelligence,2025 Analysis Assessment:Contested Confidence Interval:Moderate Direction:Contested Confidence Interval:Moderate _ U.S.and China Jockeying for Leadership in AI The United States continues to have a

103、robust AI ecosystem led by an established private sector,where a handful of large companies such as Anthropic,Google,OpenAI,Meta,and Microsoft 38 Guiding Opinions on the Innovation and Development of Humanoid Robots Was Issued:Reaching the Worlds Advanced Level by 2027,Ministry of Industry and Infor

104、mation Technology(2023).39 Will the United States or China Lead in Humanoid Robotics?,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024).40 Jacqueline Du,et al.,Humanoid Robot:The AI Accelerant,Goldman Sachs(2024).41 Heather Boushey,The Biden-Harris Administration Has Catalyzed$1 Trillion in New U.S.Private

105、Sector Clean Energy,Semiconductor,and Other Advanced Manufacturing Investment,The White House(2024).42 Dylan Butts,Trump Likely to Uphold CHIPS Act Despite His Campaign Rhetoric,Policy Experts Say,CNBS(2024).43 Arthur R.Kroeber,Unleashing“New Quality Productive Forces”:Chinas Strategy for Technology

106、-led Growth,Brookings Institution(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 18 have produced most of the worlds foundation models in the last five years.44 In 2023,private AI investment in the United States was almost nine times greater than the amount invested in

107、 China,the country with the second-highest investment,and 897 new U.S.AI companies were created.45 The United States remains a top destination for top-tier AI talent,46 but as big U.S.tech companies begin to turn more opaque in terms of research and development,47 the number of AI patents48 and publ

108、ications produced by the United States are starting to slip.49 Source:Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024,Stanford University(2024).However,China has started to expand its AI ecosystem and has the most developers of large-language models worldwide.50 The PRCs AI advancements are largely driven

109、 by academia and a handful of national champions like Alibaba and Baidu.51 PRC universities and labs have become 44 Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024,Stanford University(2024).45 Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024,Stanford University(2024).46 The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0,MacroPolo

110、(2023).47 Nathan Benaich,State Of AI Report 2024,Stateof.ai(2024).48 Country Activity Tracker(CAT):Artificial Intelligence,Emerging Technology Observatory(2024).49 Eliot Chen,Chinese AI Companies Are Catching Up Despite U.S.Restrictions,The Wire China(2024);China May Soon Be the Top AI Innovator in

111、the World,New Report Finds,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).50 Paul Triolo&Kendra Schaefer,Chinas Generative AI Ecosystem in 2024:Rising Investment and Expectations,The National Bureau of Asian Research(2024).51 Eleanor Olcott,Chinese AI Groups Get Creative to Drive Down Cost of Mo

112、dels,Financial Times(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 19 leading AI research centers,52 with Tsinghua University becoming a key hub for AI startups like Moonshot AI and Zhiphu AI.53 Models produced by these startups and giants like Alibaba are competing a

113、gainst second-tier U.S.frontier models54 with competitive edges like fluency in non-English languages55 and various specializations,such as AI-generated text-to-video or vision capabilities.For example,PRC startup DeepSeeks V3 model is reported to outperform OpenAIs GPT-4o and Metas recent version o

114、f Llama.56 This increase in model capability is translating into real-world AI applications,like AI-enabled industrial robots.57 Source:Notable AI Models,Epoch AI(2024).Wildcards How Can China Utilize Open-Source AI to Overcome Restrictions on U.S.-Controlled Hardware?Beijing is squeezing whatever e

115、fficiency gains it can acquire from open source 52 ChinAI,MacroPolo(last accessed 2024).53 China May Soon Be the Top AI Innovator in the World,New Report Finds,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).54 Nathan Benaich,State Of AI Report 2024,Stateof.ai(2024).55 Sam Eifling,Chinas Biggest

116、AI Model is Challenging American Dominance,Rest of World(2024).56 Kyle Wiggers,DeepSeeks New AI Model Appears to Be One of the Best Open Challengers Yet,TechCrunch(2024).57 Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024,Stanford University(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E

117、 C T P A G E 20 as the U.S.and other countries tighten its access to AI hardware.58 Open-source AI models can be accessed and used by anyone without restrictions,providing an alternative to U.S.-controlled technologies.In spite of the countrys strict censorship requirements,Chinas leading AI firms h

118、ave built high-performing open-source AI models that are on par with closed-source U.S.AI models.59 Qwen,a family of AI LLMs developed by PRC Internet giant Alibaba,is among the most downloaded and most popular models on online repository Hugging Face.60 Will the United States Overcome the Energy Bo

119、ttleneck in its AI Data Center Buildout?AI growth,particularly the buildout of data centers and AI training facilities that require immense computational power,is placing unprecedented demands on U.S.electric infrastructure and could consume as much as 8%of U.S.electricity by 2030.61 While major tec

120、h companies and utilities are racing to quickly expand electricity supply,these efforts may not be enough to address systemic problems within the U.S.power system that could constrain further AI development in the United States,like the permitting and regulation of next-generation energy sources.62

121、What to Watch New Model Training Paradigms.Distributed training runs,like those pioneered by startups such as the U.S.-based Prime Intellect,63 create decentralized GPU networks that democratize computational power across multiple organizations,which could potentially solve the current resourcing an

122、d access challenges to model development.A More General Form of AI Is on the Horizon.The path to artificial general intelligence(AGI)64 is accelerating through continuous improvements in large language models,65 development of more complex AI capabilities such as reasoning,66 and transformative adva

123、nces across the AI stack,like quantum computing.67 AGI could arrive as soon as 2025-58 Meaghan Tobin,China is Closing the A.I.Gap with the United States,New York Times(2024).59 Liza Lin,China Puts Power of State Behind AIand Risks Strangling It,Wall Street Journal(2024);Wendy Chang,Large Language Mo

124、del Development in China Thrives,But Geopolitics May Spell Trouble,MERICS(2024);Paul Triolo&Kendra Schaefer,Chinas Generative AI Ecosystem in 2024:Rising Investment and Expectations,The National Bureau of Asian Research(2024).60 Arjun Kharpal,China Wants to Dominate in AI and Some of Its Models Are

125、Already Beating Their U.S.Rivals,CNBC(2024).61 AI is Poised to Drive 160%Increase in Data Center Power Demand,Goldman Sachs(2024).62 Fortifying American Energy Dominance in the Age of AI,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024).63 Jack Clark,10B Distributed Training Run;China VS the Chip Embargo;An

126、d Moral Hazards of AI Development,Import AI(2024);INTELLECT-1 Release:The First Globally Trained 10B Parameter Model,Prime Intellect(last accessed 2024).64 AGI Will Arrive In Three Ways,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024).65 Robots Learn,Chatbots Visualize:How 2024 Will Be AIs Leap Forward,New

127、 York Times(2024).66 Learning to Reason with LLMs,OpenAI(2024).67 Quantum AI:Harnessing the Power of Quantum Computing for AI,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 21 2027,68 potentially disrupting entire economic sectors an

128、d representing a critical technological inflection point.Biopharmaceuticals,2025 Analysis Assessment:Contested Confidence Interval:Moderate Direction:Contested Confidence Interval:Moderate _ The U.S.Lead in Biopharmaceuticals Continues to Face Rising Competition from China The United States continue

129、s to lead in the initial stages of the biopharmaceutical value chain,supported by a regulatory environment that avoids government price controls,ensures strong intellectual property protections,and benefits from substantial public investment in research.National Institutes of Health(NIH)funding rema

130、ins robust,averaging around$48 billion annually,69 with roughly 83%supporting extramural research via nearly 50,000 competitive grants awarded to more than 300,000 researchers nationwide.70 As a result,U.S.biotechnology firms command significant early-stage capital,attracting about$57 billion in 202

131、371 representing 35%of global biotechnology investment.68 In Good Company:Dario Amodei-CEO of Anthropic,Norges Bank Investment Management(2024).69 National Institutes of Health(NIH)Funding:FY1996-FY2025,Congressional Research Service(2024).70 Budget,National Institutes of Health(last accessed 2024).

132、71 Brian Buntz,The Global Biotech Funding Landscape in 2023:U.S.Leads While Europe and China Make Strides,Drug Discovery&Development(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 22 Source:Biopharmaceutical Pipeline Funded by Venture Capital Firms,2014 to 2024,Health

133、Affairs Scholar(2024).Meanwhile,Chinas“14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Pharmaceuticals Industry”72 marks a notable pivot from merely adopting foreign innovations to actively pioneering them.73 The National Natural Science Foundation of China(NNSF),its largest public science funder,exp

134、anded basic research and frontier exploration funding to nearly$5.2 billion74 across 51,600 grants in 2022.75 In the private sector,PRC firms secured about$21 billion in biotechnology investments in 2023(12.7%of the global total).76 These efforts have rapidly borne fruit,evident in the surge of Chin

135、as global biopharmaceutical innovation share from 4.1%to 13.9%by 202077 and its rising slice of global biotechnology patents,now reaching 10%.78 The United States still maintains a leading position,holding 39%of global biotechnology patents in 2020.79 72 Issuance of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Natio

136、nal Drug Safety and High-Quality Development,National Medical Products Administration(2021).73 Sandra Barbosu,How Innovative Is China in Biotechnology?,Information Technology and Innovation Foundation(2024).74 Chinas Science Foundation Ups Research Budget to 33B Yuan,The State Council of the Peoples

137、 Republic of China(2022).75 2022 Annual Report,National Natural Science Foundation of China(2022).76 Brian Buntz,The Global Biotech Funding Landscape in 2023:U.S.Leads While Europe and China Make Strides,Drug Discovery&Development(2024).77 Sujai Shivakumar,et al.,Understanding the U.S.Biopharmaceuti

138、cal Innovation Ecosystem,Center for Strategic and International Studies(2024).78 The Global Landscape of Biotech Innovation:State of Play,EU Science Hub(2024).79 The Global Landscape of Biotech Innovation:State of Play,EU Science Hub(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E

139、C T P A G E 23 Source:John Wong,et al.,Competing in Chinas Biopharma Market:Key Success Factors for Multinational Companies,BCG(2020).A critical indicator of innovation leadership is the ability to bring novel drugs to market.Between the periods of 2000-2008 and 2009-2017,U.S.Food and Drug Administr

140、ation(FDA)approvals rose by 44.5%.80 By 2023,the FDA approved 55 new drugs,81 including three from PRC developers.82 In parallel,Chinas National Medical Products Administration(NMPA)approved 87 novel drugs in 2023,including five first-in-class drugs from domestic firms.83 These outcomes highlight ho

141、w Chinas regulatory reforms84 have reduced approval backlogs and increased both imported and domestically developed medicines since 2011,85 underscoring its growing ability to transform discoveries into marketable products.80 Angelika Batta,et al.,Trends in FDA Drug Approvals Over Last 2 Decades:An

142、Observational Study,National Library of Medicine(2020).81 Novel Drug Approvals for 2023,U.S.Food&Drug Administration(2023).82 Lang Zheng,et al.,Targeted Drug Approvals in 2023:Breakthroughs by the FDA and NMPA,Signal Transduction and Targeted Therapy(2024).83 Lang Zheng,et al.,Targeted Drug Approval

143、s in 2023:Breakthroughs by the FDA and NMPA,Signal Transduction and Targeted Therapy(2024).84 Lili Xu,et al.,Reforming Chinas Drug Regulatory System,Nature(2018).85 Ling Su,et al.,Trends and Characteristics of New Drug Approvals in China,20112021,Springer Nature Link(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T

144、I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 24 Source:How Innovative Is China in Biotechnology?,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).Where the United States struggles to compete with China in biopharmaceuticals is,like in many other sectors,on the commercialization and production sid

145、e of the value chain.Supply chain,regulatory,and production capacity factors have improved Chinas relative position.While the United States still led in 2020 with 28.4%of global pharmaceutical production(up from 26.2%in 1995),Chinas share climbed to 17.4%during the same period,a dramatic increase of

146、 14.4%.86 This shift is evident in trade patterns:in 2022,U.S.biopharmaceutical imports from China totaled$10.2 billion,outpacing exports of$9.3 billion.87 Moreover,PRC firms now supply about 17%of U.S.Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients(APIs),88 at a time when only 28%of API manufacturers are based i

147、n the United States.89 Reflecting these dependencies,the U.S.biopharmaceutical trade deficit with China grew from$959 million in 2010 to$4.07 billion by 2022.90 86 Robert D.Atkinson&Ian Tufts,The Hamilton Index,2023:China Is Running Away With Strategic Industries,Information Technology&Innovation Fo

148、undation(2023).87 Niels Graham,The U.S.Is Relying More on China for Pharmaceuticals and Vice Versa,Atlantic Council(2023).88 Niels Graham,The U.S.Is Relying More on China for Pharmaceuticals and Vice Versa,Atlantic Council(2023).89 Testimony of Dr.Janet Woodcock,Director of the Center for Drug Evalu

149、ation and Research,Food and Drug Administration,before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,Subcommittee on Health,“Safeguarding Pharmaceutical Supply Chains in a Global Economy”(2019).90 Sandra Barbosu,Not Again:Why the United States Cant Afford to Lose Its Biopharma Industry,Information Tech

150、nology&Innovation Foundation(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 25 Source:Not Again:Why the United States Cant Afford to Lose Its Biopharma Industry,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).In response,U.S.policymakers have designated pharmaceutic

151、als as a critical supply chain priority,committing$40 million to domestic biomanufacturing91 and an additional$35 million under the Defense Production Act for essential medicines.92 Although the United States remains a leader in innovation,Chinas role as a critical supply chain link reflected in gro

152、wing U.S.reliance on PRC-origin APIs and widening trade deficits shows that competition has evolved beyond innovation to encompass the entire pharmaceutical value chain.Wildcards Could the United States Alter the Biopharma Landscape and Limit Business with PRC Biotechnology Firms?U.S.policymakers ha

153、ve proposed limiting federal contractors from working with certain PRC biotechnology firms.93 Though such limitations could initially increase costs and disrupt production,it could strengthen U.S.supply chain security over the longer term.94 With 79%of U.S.biotechnology firms holding contracts with

154、PRC partners,95 there is a clear need for diversification.India stands out as a strong alternative given its API production and contract manufacturing expertise,96 while Japan97 and South 91 Fact Sheet:The United States Announces New Investments and Resources to Advance President Bidens National Bio

155、technology and Biomanufacturing Initiative,The White House(2022).92 Fact Sheet:President Biden Announces New Actions to Strengthen Americas Supply Chains,Lower Costs for Families,and Secure Key Sectors,The White House(2023).93 H.R.8333,BIOSECURE Act(2024)passed by the U.S.House in September 2024.The

156、 Senate companion,S.3558 failed to pass the Senate.94 Elijah Moore,The BIOSECURE Act and Its Impact on U.S.Biopharma Expansion,Site Selection Group(2024).95 Trade Association Survey Shows 79%of US Biotech Companies Contract with Chinese Firms,Reuters(2024).96 Elijah Moore,The BIOSECURE Act and Its I

157、mpact on U.S.Biopharma Expansion,Site Selection Group(2024).97 Takedas Plasma-derived Therapies Manufacturing Facility,Japan,Pharmaceutical Technology(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 26 Korea98 also offer reliable options.These moves could reduce geopoli

158、tical risks and improve the U.S.biopharma sectors long-term resilience.Could China Retaliate Against U.S.Biopharma Firms?Recognizing the difficulty of immediate derisking,policy proposals to limit business with PRC biotechnology firms,such as the BIOSECURE Act,would allow existing contracts with PRC

159、 suppliers to continue until 2032.99 Enactment of such a proposal could push China to respond aggressively.The PRCs recent restrictions on critical minerals show a willingness to use economic leverage in retaliation.100 If China were to apply similar tactics to biopharma supplies,U.S.companies might

160、 have to accelerate supply chain shifts,incurring high costs and widespread disruption.This highlights the importance of early planning and broader supplier networks.What to Watch Biomanufacturing Automation Could Eliminate Chinas Cost Advantage in Production.Advanced manufacturing technologies like

161、 continuous bioprocessing101 and automated quality control systems102 could change cost equations in biopharmaceutical production.However,the impact will depend on adoption rates and whether automation can truly offset other cost factors.If widely adopted,these innovations could weaken the cost adva

162、ntage currently held by PRC manufacturers.AI Tools Could Radically Accelerate Drug Development Timelines.AI tools are increasingly being deployed across the drug development pipeline,103 from target identification to clinical trial optimization.This includes advancements in AI-powered simulations,li

163、ke those being developed in self-driving labs,which can predict the behavior of molecules and accelerate the design process.104 Both U.S.and PRC companies are making significant investments in AI-enabled drug discovery platforms:as of the first quarter of 2023,78%of the top 50 investors in AI for dr

164、ug discovery were based in the United States,with China accounting for around 12%.105 The technologys actual impact on 98 Competitive Landscape of Biosimilars in Korea,Aranca(2024).99 H.R.8333,BIOSECURE Act(2024).100 Amy Lv&Tony Munroe,China Bans Export of Critical Minerals to US as Trade Tensions E

165、scalate,Reuters(2024).101 The Cost Efficiency of Continuous Biomanufacturing for First-in-Human Biopharmaceutical Supply,Evotec(2024).102 Digitization,Automation,and Online Testing:Embracing Smart Quality Control,McKinsey&Company(2021).103 Guadalupe Hayes-Mota,AI Is Rapidly Transforming Drug Discove

166、ry,Forbes(2024).104 Charles Yang,Self-Driving Labs:AI and Robotics Accelerating Materials Innovation,CSIS(2024);Chris Hubbuch,Self-Driving Lab Speeds Protein Discovery Process,Wisconsin Energy Institute(2024).105 Distribution of Leading 50 Investors Involved in AI in Drug Discovery Worldwide as of 2

167、023,by Region,Statista(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 27 development timelines and success rates106 will be a key metric for assessing future competitive advantages in biopharmaceutical innovation.Localized Bioproduction Could Reduce Dependence on Centr

168、alized Global Supply Chains.Decentralized bioproduction technologies,such as modular biologics manufacturing platforms107 and single-use bioreactors,108 could revolutionize the pharmaceutical supply chain by enabling local production.These systems reduce dependency on large,centralized facilities,po

169、tentially lessening reliance on China for cost-effective manufacturing.Early adopters of these models may gain a significant edge,especially in responding to global health emergencies or regional shortages.109 Tracking developments in this space will highlight the players reshaping biopharma product

170、ion logistics.Commercial Drones,2025 Analysis Assessment:PRC-Lead Confidence Interval:High Direction:Trend PRC Confidence Interval:High _ China Maintains Lead Amid Rising U.S.Security Concerns China continues to maintain its substantial lead in the global commercial drone market,with industry leader

171、 DJI holding over 90%of the global consumer market110 and nearly 70%of the overall drone sector,111 while other companies including Autel continue to gain market share.112 In the U.S.market alone,DJI holds close to 80%of the commercial segment.113 This dominance is driven not only by DJIs scale,comp

172、etitive pricing,and advanced features but also by significant 106 Sandra Barbosu,Harnessing AI to Accelerate Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).107 Emerging Technologies in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing:Modular and Automated Platforms,Frost

173、&Sullivan(2024).108 Jan Kaiserle,Single-Use Bioreactors Plateau,Other Single-Use Tech On the Rise,Biopharma Curated(2024).109 Marquerita Algorri,et al.,Considerations for a Decentralized Manufacturing Paradigm,International Society for Pharmaceutical Engineering(2023).110 Zeyi Yang,Why Chinas Domina

174、nce in Commercial Drones Has Become a Global Security Matter,MIT Technology Review(2024).111 Ishveena Singh,The Secret to DJIs Drone Market Dominance:Revealed,DroneDJ(2024).112 Gina Chon,DJI Is a More Elusive U.S.Target Than Huawei,Reuters(2021).113 Brad Dress,Chinas Dominant Drone Industry Is a Ste

175、p Ahead of Congress,The Hill(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 28 government support,114 which has strengthened Chinas drone industry and enabled PRC firms to consistently outperform U.S.competitors.The PRCs stronghold on the commercial drone sector has ra

176、ised security concerns in the United States,particularly as PRC drones have demonstrated military applications in recent conflicts.115 Despite various U.S.initiatives to reduce dependency,American drones often remain more expensive,glitch-prone,and challenging to repair than their PRC-made alternati

177、ves.116 As a result,DJI products continue to account for 70 to 90%of drones used across U.S.commercial,government,and consumer applications,117 leaving Chinas dominance in the commercial drone supply chain largely unchallenged.114 Whitepaper:AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness,AUVSI Partners

178、hip for Drone Competitiveness,(2024).115 Paul Mozur&Valerie Hopkins,Ukraines War of Drones Runs Into an Obstacle:China,New York Times(2023;Hannah Beech&Paul Mozur,Drones Changed This Civil War,and Linked Rebels to the World,New York Times(2024).116 Heather Somerville,Why First Responders Dont Want t

179、he U.S.to Ban Chinese Drones,Wall Street Journal(2024).117 Heather Somerville,Why First Responders Dont Want the U.S.to Ban Chinese Drones,Wall Street Journal(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 29 Source:Ed Alvarado,Ranking the Leading Drone Manufacturers,D

180、rone Industry Insights(2023).In the broader context of the U.S.-China technology competition,the reliance on PRC drones within U.S.government agencies serves as an example of the pervasive dependency on PRC-manufactured drones.From 2010 to 2022,on average 85%of drones purchased by state agencies wer

181、e PRC-made,underscoring how entrenched this dependency has become at all levels.118 118 Lars Schnander,Securing the Skies:Chinese Drones and U.S.Cybersecurity Risks,Foundation for American Innovation(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 30 Source:Securing the

182、 Skies:Chinese Drones and U.S.Cybersecurity Risks,Foundation for American Innovation(2023).Wildcards Are Market Access Restrictions Enough to Stop Chinas Drone Dominance?Since 2017,the U.S.Army has banned PRC-origin drones over security concerns,119 and the American Security Drone Act of 2023 extend

183、ed these restrictions to all federal entities.120 Some agencies,like the Department of the Interior(DOI),allowed limited use of PRC drones for emergencies,but the broader restrictions still disrupted operations.121 In 2022,the DOI permitted non-emergency use under procurement rules that remain in ef

184、fect as of 2024,with certain exemptions for critical missions like wildfire management,where alternatives were either too costly or less capable.As the incoming administration considers the trade-offs of restricting or banning the sale of PRC-origin drones,PRC drone manufacturers will 119 Timeline o

185、f U.S.Federal Government Activity Identifying and Addressing Unsecure UAS,Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International(2024);Eric Holdeman,Federal Government Will Require Purchase of Made in America Drones,Government Technology(2024).120 American Security Drone Act Of 2023,General Services

186、 Administration(last accessed 2024);Gallagher,Colleagues Introduce Bipartisan American Security Drone Act,The Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party(2023).121 Jaron Schneider,U.S.Department of the Interior Says Anti-DJI Regulation Hurt Its Operations,PetaPixel(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E

187、T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 31 likely continue to dominate other markets,barring a breakout domestic supplier or international action.122 Source:Timeline of U.S.Federal Government Activity Identifying and Addressing Unsecure sUAS,Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems Internati

188、onal(2024);Lars Erik Schnander,States Push Back Against Chinese Drones,The Hill(2023).Could Chinas Retaliatory Actions Against U.S.Commercial Drone Companies Accelerate Supply Chain Realignment?Chinas recent export controls on U.S.drone companies,which cut off access to essential components like bat

189、teries and are forcing U.S.firms to seek alternative suppliers,123 underscore Beijings readiness to use supply chain dependencies as leverage amid escalating U.S.-China tensions.PRC actions could stimulate investment in U.S.manufacturing and innovation or push firms to look toward non-PRC sourcing o

190、f drone components.Although this alone does not address the technical sophistication and price competitiveness of PRC drones,it could sow the seeds for a potentially building a more resilient and secure domestic supply chain What to Watch Software and AI Capabilities Will Define the Next Phase of Dr

191、one Competition.The future of competition in commercial drones is likely to move from hardware to software and AI-enabled capabilities,offering the United States an opportunity to leverage its strengths.The United States is beginning to see early wins in the competitive drone 122 David Shepardson,US

192、 Considers Potential Rules to Restrict or Bar Chinese Drones,Reuters(2025).123 Agence France Presse,U.S.Drone Maker Says China Sanctions To Hit Supply Chain,Barrons(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 32 landscape,signaling potential.124 Nearly 300 U.S.-base

193、d drone technology companies have raised approximately$2.5 billion in venture capital since 2022,125 underscoring strong investor confidence in this sector.As hardware becomes commoditized,advancements in autonomous navigation,AI-driven data processing,and secure data transmission will become essent

194、ial differentiators.U.S.firms focused on software and cybersecurity may gain a competitive edge by developing secure,decentralized systems for data control,catering to clients prioritizing data privacy and compliance with Western security standards.Taiwan Seeks to Become Americas New Production Hub

195、for Drones.In March 2024,Taiwans newly elected president affirmed Taiwans ambitions to become the Asian center for the democratic drone supply chain,with backing from U.S.partnerships.126 Taiwan and the United States have been exploring collaborations to reduce reliance on PRC-origin drone component

196、s,127 reflecting lessons learned from Ukraine,where electronic warfare has highlighted the value of AI-driven,resilient drone systems.Swarm Technology Emerges as the Next Frontier in Commercial Drone Applications.Emerging technologies like swarm capabilities which enable the coordinated operation of

197、 multiple drones are expected to play a vital role in commercial128 and defense129 applications.China has aggressively pursued swarm technology,with field deployments already in progress,130 while U.S.firms face stricter regulatory controls,potentially impacting their development timelines.Fifth-Gen

198、eration Wireless Networks(5G),2025 Analysis Assessment:PRC Lead Confidence Interval:High Direction:Trend PRC Confidence Interval:High 124 Heather Somerville,American Drone Startup Notches Rare Victory in Ukraine,Wall Street Journal(2024).125 Heather Somerville&Brett Forrest,How American Drones Faile

199、d to Turn the Tide in Ukraine,Wall Street Journal(2024).126 Joyu Wang,Taiwan Wants a Drone Army but China Makes the Drones It Wants,Wall Street Journal(2024).127 Chris Buckley&Amy Chang Chien,Taiwan and U.S.Work to Counter Chinas Drone Dominance,New York Times(2024).128 Ed Alvarado,Commercial Use of

200、 Drone Swarms,Drone Industry Insights(2024).129 Zachary Kallenborn,Swarm Clouds on the Horizon?Exploring the Future of Drone Swarm Proliferation,Modern War Institute(2024).130 Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2024,U.S.Department of Defense(2024).S P E C I A

201、L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 33 _ China Still Leads in 5G Infrastructure as the United States Works to Overcome Policy Impasses Despite similar annual capital expenditures of roughly$50 billion by major telecom operators131132 China outpaces the United States in 5G inf

202、rastructure deployment.133 With over 4 million base stations reportedly deployed(equating to 206 per 100,000 residents)compared to the United States approximate 100,000 base stations(77 per 100,000 residents),134 China has achieved a scale advantage that allows for broader,denser,and more affordable

203、 network coverage.135 China surpassed 1 billion 5G connections in 2024,136 covering 88%of its mobile users,137 whereas the United States lags at approximately 45%.138 Overall download speeds are marginally higher in China at 139 Mbps,139 compared to 123 Mbps in the United States.140 PRC firms like H

204、uawei and ZTE dominate the global exportable hardware market,leveraging competitive pricing,state-backed funding,and rapid deployment to outperform U.S.and allied competitors.141 China also excels in 5G network processing,142 integrating advanced hardware capable of managing massive data volumes.143

205、 Although the United States holds a larger share of wireless spectrum,which is critical for expanding capacity,144 challenges in spectrum allocation and management have hindered its deployment.145 Conversely,China has optimized mid-band spectrum use,achieving a balance between coverage and speed.146

206、 While U.S.providers turn their attention147 to developing AI-powered advanced networks148 including private 5G networks149 131 Mike Dano,For 5G Vendors in the US,The Worst May Be Over,Light Reading(2024).132 Kenji Kawase,Chinese State Telecoms 5G Investment Tops Out While Dividends Surge,Nikkei Asi

207、a(2024).133 Maciej Biegajewsk,Why China Is Winning the 5G Race And What the West Doesnt Want You to Know!,RFBenchmark(2024).134 Juan Pedro Tomas,China Reaches Over 4 million 5G Base Stations,RCR Wireless(2024);Number of 5G Base Stations in Selected Countries Worldwide 2023,Statista(2024);The 5G Mara

208、thon,KPMG UK(2024).135 Dan Strumpf,U.S.vs.China in 5G:The Battle Isnt Even Close,Wall Street Journal(2020).136 Chinas 5G Subs Climb to 1.15 billion,Telecom TV(2024).137 Catherine Sbeglia Nin,China to surpass 1 billion 5G Connections this year,RCR Wireless(2024).138 Petroc Taylor,5G in the United Sta

209、tes,Statista(2024).139 Chinas Mobile and Broadband Internet Speeds,Speedtest Global Index(last accessed 2024).140 United Statess Mobile and Broadband Internet Speeds,Speedtest Global Index(last accessed 2024).141 Ngor Luong,Forging the 5G Future:Strategic Imperatives for the US and its Allies,Atlant

210、ic Council(2024).142 Kitty Wheeler,The Impact of China Unicom&Huaweis 5G-Advanced Network,Technology Magazine(2024).143 China Mobile Breaks the Data Processing Bottleneck,Intel(last accessed 2024).144 Mark Giles,5G in the U.S.Additional Mid-band Spectrum Driving Performance Gains,Ookla(2024).145 Lin

211、g Zhu,National Spectrum Policy:Interference Issues in the 5G Context,Congressional Research Service(2022).146 The U.S.vs.China:The Path to Securing Wireless Leadership,Axios(2024).147 Kavit Majitha,Verizon Strategy Boss Turns Attention to 5G-Advanced,Mobile World Live(2022).148 The integration of 5G

212、-A and AI,Unleashing Technological Potential and Promoting Industry Innovation,Data Center Dynamics(2024).149 Suman Bhattacharyya,Telecom Companies Pin 5G Hopes on Private Industrial Networks,Wall Street Journal(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 34 and edg

213、e computing solutions150 these efforts remain nascent compared to Chinas more mature deployment.151 Source:5G in the U.S.Additional Mid-Band Spectrum Driving Performance Gains,Ookla(2024).Wildcards Will the U.S.Government Break the 5G Logjam?The second Trump Administration is expected to restart pre

214、vious efforts to replace PRC equipment in U.S.and allied networks with trusted alternatives.152 The Trump Administrations planned deregulatory efforts153 could extend to easing infrastructure deployment,154 including for private 5G networks,which will prove decisive in integrating network technologi

215、es155 with emerging IoT applications.156 In the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act,Congress provided 150 5G and Edge Computing:Why Does 5G Need Edge?,STL Partners(last accessed 2024).151 Harry Baldock,China Unicom and Huawei Showcase 5G-Advanced with New Beijing Deployment,Total Telecom(2024).1

216、52 Dean DeChairo,Trump Order Clears Path to Ban Huawei 5G Equipment from United States,Roll Call(2019);Mark Scott,How Trump Won Over Europe on 5G,Politico(2021).153 Trump Inc.:How a Second Administration Could Rewrite the Way America Does Business,Wall Street Journal(2024).154 Scott Patterson,Trump

217、Pledges to Speed Permitting for Companies Investing Over$1 Billion,Wall Street Journal(2024).155 Satyajit Sinha,State of Private 5G in 2024:Key Growth Trends,Use Cases,and Forecast,IoT Analytics(2024).156 What is IoT?-Internet of Things Explained,Amazon Web Services(last accessed 2024).S P E C I A L

218、 C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 35 the Federal Communications Commission(FCC)with$3 billion157 to execute the Trump-signed rip and replace program,158 which aims to eliminate reliance on PRC communications technology.159 However,the program remains impeded by years of chro

219、nic underfunding160 and supply chain disruptions.161 Improved spectrum management,which could support greater network deployment,remains a challenge.Congress has yet to renew the FCCs authority,162 which lapsed in March 2023,to auction and streamline underutilized government spectrum.163 The resolut

220、ion of this legislative bottleneck,while aligning regulatory overhauls with infrastructure rollout,will be pivotal in accelerating 5G progress and ensuring the United States can compete in the global telecommunications race.Will Open RAN Pan Out?The United States may leverage allied and partner capa

221、bilities through strategic partnerships with European telecom operators such as Nokia,Ericsson,and T-Mobile.Although such partnerships are unlikely to close the infrastructure gap with China,they could bolster domestic 5G infrastructure while enhancing capabilities in advanced network technologies l

222、ike Open Radio Access Network(RAN)164 and AI-driven network management.165 Open RAN has generated excitement for its ability to allow operators to mix and match hardware and software components from multiple vendors,while diversifying supply chains and being cost effective.166 As the technology is s

223、till maturing,167 it is facing concerns about its performance,security,and integration,thereby slowing deployment.168 Furthermore,Chinas investments in proprietary alternatives and its influence in emerging markets through cost-effective turnkey solutions169 challenge170 Open RANs global adoption.17

224、1 While the United States and allies grapple with Beijings increasing subterfuge of the 157 H.R.5009,Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 at Sec.5404(c)(2024);Eduard Kovacs,2025 NDAA Provides$3 Billion Funding for FCCs Rip-and-Replace

225、Program,SecurityWeek(2024).158 President Signs Rip and Replace Bill Into Law,U.S.Senate Committee on Commerce,Science,&Transportation(2020).159 Jill C.Gallagher,Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program:Frequently Asked Questions,Congressional Research Service(2023).160 Jake N

226、eenan,Rip-and-Replace Continues to Feel Funding Shortfall,FCC Says,Broadband Breakfast(2024).161 Nicole Ferraro,FCC approves more rip-and-replace extensions due to supply chain,Light Reading(2024).162 Patricia Moloney Figliola&Jill C.Gallagher,The Federal Communications Commissions Spectrum Auction

227、Authority:History and Options for Reinstatement,Congressional Research Service(2023).163 Monica Alleven,AT&T Says Its Not Getting Windfall from 4.9 GHz Spectrum,Fierce Network(2024).164 Explore Open RAN:Innovation and Flexibility,Ericsson(last accessed 2024).165 Dan Jones,T-Mobile Readies 5G-Advance

228、d Launch at The End of the Year,Fierce Network(2024).166 Chair Latta Opening Remarks on Strengthening American Communications Leadership with Open Radio Access Networks,U.S.House Committee on Energy&Commerce(2024).167 O-RAN:Challenges and Prospects on the Road to Maturity,LitePoint(2023).168 The Opp

229、ortunities and Challenges of Open RAN:What it Means for the Future of Telecom,RCR Wireless(2024).169 Manoj Harjani,O-RAN is Overhyped as Avoiding Chinese 5G Influence,Australian Strategic Policy Institute(2024).170 Iain Morris,How Huawei and Open RAN Misfires Hurt Ericsson,Nokia and Telcos,Light Rea

230、ding(2024).171 Chris Antilitz,Open RAN Adoption in 2024,TBR Insight Center(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 36 global telecommunications infrastructure,172 Open RANs success will depend on overcoming technical maturity issues,ensuring interoperability,lev

231、eraging allied capabilities,and addressing security considerations173 to provide competitive alternatives,particularly in price-sensitive regions.What to Watch Step-Changes to 5G Architectures May Spur New Commercial Applications.The integration of AI into advanced networks is poised to define the n

232、ext phase of 5G competition.The lack of compelling commercial use cases has so far hindered widespread adoption of 5G in the United States.174 However,the convergence of AI with 5G networks175 has the potential to drive adoption by unlocking new applications across sectors such as agriculture,176 ma

233、nufacturing,177 and defense.178 These emerging use cases could partially offset infrastructure gaps and position the United States to capitalize on its strengths in AI and software innovation.As China makes strides179 in network slicing technology180 a capability critical for industrial IoT the Unit

234、ed States may leverage its strengths in AI,software,and cloud services to accelerate the rollout of private 5G networks and 5G RedCap(Reduced Capability),designed for IoT applications requiring lower power and cost.181 Addressing existing security concerns around Open RAN could potentially reshape t

235、he competitive landscape by reducing reliance on single-vendor solutions and diversifying global supply chains.The Ongoing Battle for Influence over 6G Standards.Although 6G networks are not expected until 2030,182 the development of technical standards for 6G will be a pivotal battleground.183 In S

236、eptember 2024,the International Telecommunication Union(ITU)adopted184 three 6G standards proposed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences185 and 172 Dustin Volz,Dozens of Countries Hit in Chinese Telecom Hacking Campaign,Top U.S.Official Says,Wall Street Journal(2024).173 Open Radio Access Networks Secu

237、rity Considerations,Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency(2024).174 The Challenge of Monetizing 5G,PwC(2023).175 Baris Kavakli,Why 5G needs AI:A Technology-Driven Revolution Lacking Initial User Demand,Portera(2024).176 How 5G Networks Support Precision Agriculture,Avnet(2023).177 Dan Oma

238、lley,5G in Manufacturing:The Key to Industry 4.0,NYBSYS(2024).178 Leland Brown&Stan Mo,How to Combine 5G networks,Artificial Intelligence to Aid Warfighters,C4ISR(2022).179Joe Madden,Network Slicing is Alive in China,Fierce Network(2022).180 Kinza Yasar&John Burke,What is Network Slicing?,Tech Targe

239、t(2024).181 What is 5G RedCap?Exploring Benefits and Use Cases,Telenor IoT(last accessed 2024).182 Arjun Kharpal,Tech Next-Gen Mobil Internet 6G Will Launch in 2030,Telecom Bosses Say,Even as 5G Adoption Remains Low,CNBC(2023).183 Ananmay Agarwal,The Silent Struggle:How Technical Standards Shape Glo

240、bal Tech Power,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024).184 Rimjhim Singh,Chinas ITU-Approved 6G Standards Set Stage for Advanced Telecom Solutions,Business Standard(2024).185 Cole McFaul et.al,Fueling Chinas Innovation:The Chinese Academy of Sciences and Its Role in the PRCs S&T Ecosystem,Center f

241、or Security and Emerging Technology(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 37 China Telecom.While Chinas dominance in 5G infrastructure positions it favorably for shaping future standards,the United States is collaborating with allies and partners to develop sh

242、ared principles for 6G.186 As the 5G race moves into its next phase and the groundwork for 6G is laid,technological advancements,strategic partnerships,and the ability to shape standards will determine long-term leadership in the global telecommunications ecosystem.Fusion Energy,2025 Analysis Assess

243、ment:U.S.-Lead Confidence Interval:High Direction:Trend Contested Confidence Interval:Low _ The U.S.Lead in Fusion Energy is Narrowing The fusion energy competition between the United States and China is more contested than ever before.While the United States still benefits from cutting-edge researc

244、h and robust industry investment,China is moving rapidly to close the gap.The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratorys(LLNL)National Ignition Facility(NIF)achieved a historic milestone in December 2022 by producing more energy from fusion than was put into the reaction187 an achievement hailed as“one

245、 of the most significant scientific achievements of the 21st century.”188 This breakthrough,consistently reproduced189 and unmatched by any other nation,marks a pivotal step toward commercial fusion energy.Recent progress in AI,physics,and applied science has broadened the U.S.fusion ecosystem beyon

246、d national labs,with 25 of the worlds 45 active fusion companies based in the United States,collectively raising over$6 billion of the$8 billion190 in total global private fusion investment.In contrast,Chinas three known fusion companies have secured a combined$580 million.191 186 Joint Statement En

247、dorsing Principles for 6G:Secure,Open,and Resilient by Design,The White House(2024).187 Breanna Bishop,Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Achieves Fusion Ignition,Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(2022).188 Jeremy Thomas,A Shot for the Ages:Fusion Ignition Breakthrough Hailed as One of the

248、Most Impressive Scientific Feats of the 21st Century,Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(2022).189 Jeff Tollefson,U.S.Nuclear-Fusion Lab Enters New Era:Achieving Ignition Over and Over,Nature(2023).190 2024 Global Fusion Industry Report,Fusion Industry Association(2024).191 2024 Global Fusion Ind

249、ustry Report,Fusion Industry Association(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 38 Chinas commitment to catching up is evident in its strategic approach192 to government funding in fusion energy,which mimics193 U.S.development plans,194 national laboratory mode

250、ls,and company strategies.195 Although the U.S.Department of Energys(DOE)Fusion Energy Sciences(FES)budget reached$790 million in FY2024,196 Beijing invests nearly twice that amount about$1.5 billion annually though gaining a detailed understanding of PRC government spending can be elusive.197 Addit

251、ionally,while these funding comparisons appear straightforward,the distinction between government and private sector investment in China is often less clear-cut than in the United States because many PRC companies maintain close state ties,align with national priorities,and receive significant state

252、 funding.China is focused on commercialization by directing most of its funding toward facilities that can compete with leading U.S.private companies.198 Much of U.S.fusion spending,on the other hand,supports legacy programs rather 192 Losing the Race for Nuclear Fusion,Special Competitive Studies P

253、roject(2024).193 Opening Statement of Chairman Joe Manchin,before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee,Full Committee Hearing to Examine Fusion Energy Technology Development(2024).194 Powering the Future:Fusion&Plasmas,Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee(2020).195 Angela Dewan&Ell

254、a Nilsen,The U.S.Led on Nuclear Fusion for Decades.Now China Is in Position to Win the Race,CNN(2024).196 Congress Increases U.S.Funding for Fusion Energy Sciences Research,Fusion Industry Association(2024).197 Jean Paul Allain,Building Bridges:A Bold Vision for the DOE Fusion Energy Sciences,Office

255、 of Science for Fusion Energy Sciences(2023).198 Jennifer Hiller&Sha Hua,China Outspends the U.S.on Fusion in the Race for Energys Holy Grail,Wall Street Journal(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 39 than cutting-edge development199 and nearly one-third of

256、the annual FES budget200 goes to the delayed International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor(ITER)project in France.201 China is already translating its funding and commercialization focus into action,constructing infrastructure that spans every stage of fusion development.202 The Experimental Adva

257、nced Superconducting Tokamak(EAST)supports advanced research,while the Comprehensive Research Facility for Fusion Technology(CRAFT)203 and the Burning Experimental Superconducting Tokamak(BEST)204 drive development efforts.The China Fusion Engineering Test Reactor(CFETR)205 serves as a demonstration

258、 platform,all leading toward a future gigawatt-scale power plant.By contrast,the United States excels at research but relies more on private companies for development and demonstration,with no national deployment facility planned.Chinas integrated approach may allow it to move more quickly toward fu

259、ll-scale commercial fusion power.Source:Jean Paul Allain,Building Bridges:A Bold Vision for the DOE Fusion Energy Sciences,U.S.Department of Energy(2023).199 Jennifer Hiller&Sha Hua,China Outspends the U.S.on Fusion in the Race for Energys Holy Grail,Wall Street Journal(2024).200 The Current U.S.App

260、roach to Fusion,Special Competitive Studies Project(2024).201 Elizabeth Gibney,ITER Delay:What It Means for Nuclear Fusion,Nature(2024).202 Testimony of Patrick White,before the U.S.Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,Full Committee Hearing to Examine Fusion Energy Technology Developmen

261、t(2024).203 Victoria Bela,China Launches Kuafu Nuclear Fusion Research Facility,Named After Mythical Giant,in Quest to Build Artificial Sun,South China Morning Post(2023).204 China New Growth:Controlled Nuclear Fusion Emerges as New Frontier for Chinas Venture Capitalists,Xinhua(2024).205 Research,I

262、nstitute of Plasma Physics,Chinese Academy of Sciences(last accessed 2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 40 Beyond infrastructure,Chinas human capital and intellectual property advantages add to its momentum.It produces ten times as many Ph.D.s in fusion sci

263、ence and engineering as the United States206 and surpassed American fusion technology patent application filings in 2023.207 Its fusion workforce operates with remarkable efficiency,keeping facilities running nearly nonstop.Experts predict that at this rate,China could overtake U.S.and European magn

264、etic fusion capabilities within three to four years.208 Although the United States leads in foundational research and total private investment,breakthroughs alone may not preserve that lead.Achieving commercial fusion requires coordinated efforts that bridge the gap between laboratory success and sc

265、alable power plants an area where Chinas comprehensive,state-backed strategy may ultimately give it the upper hand.Wildcards Will New Federal Programs Bridge the Public-Private Development Gap?Building on the 2022 Bold Decadal Vision,209 recent U.S.initiatives aim to push fusion toward commercializa

266、tion.The DOEs 2024 Fusion Energy Strategy focuses on three pillars:bridging technological gaps for a pilot plant,enabling sustainable deployment,and forging external partnerships.210 It identifies near-term challenges in the 2020s(capital flow,materials,regulations),mid-term issues in the 2030s(infr

267、astructure and supply chains),and large-scale hurdles in the 2040s.211 New efforts like the$45 million FIRE Collaboratives212 provide testing infrastructure that private firms cannot develop on their own,while the Milestone-Based Fusion Development Program seeks to reduce investment risk.213 However

268、,spending lags behind authorized funds,214 and two forthcoming developments the DOEs 2025 commercialization roadmap215 and the ADVANCE Acts potential licensing reforms216 could either accelerate progress or introduce new uncertainties.206 Jennifer Hiller&Sha Hua,China Outspends the U.S.on Fusion in

269、the Race for Energys Holy Grail,Wall Street Journal(2024).207 Rimi Inomata,China Tops Nuclear Fusion Patent Ranking,Beating U.S.,Nikkei Asia(2023).208 Jennifer Hiller&Sha Hua,China Outspends the U.S.on Fusion in the Race for Energys Holy Grail,Wall Street Journal(2024).209 Readout of the White House

270、 Summit on Developing a Bold Decadal Vision for Commercial Fusion Energy,The White House(2022).210 Fusion Energy Strategy 2024,U.S.Department of Energy(2024).211 Fusion Energy Strategy 2024,U.S.Department of Energy(2024).212 DOE Science FY24 Final Appropriation Excerpt,U.S.Department of Energy(2024)

271、.213 Department of Energy Announces$50 Million for a Milestone-Based Fusion Development Program,U.S.Department of Energy(2022).214 DOE Announces$46 Million for Commercial Fusion Energy Development,U.S.Department of Energy(2023).215 Fusion Energy Strategy 2024,U.S.Department of Energy(2024).216 U.S.S

272、enate Passes ADVANCE Act,Including Legislation to Codify US Fusion Regulations,Fusion Industry Association(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 41 Source:Fusion Energy Strategy 2024,U.S.Department of Energy(2024).How Will Chinas Supply Chain Control Impact U.

273、S.Fusion Progress?China is expanding its influence beyond research advances,positioning it to control portions of the fusion supply chain by securing critical materials and components.217 Although the U.S.currently excels in some technologies(lasers,superconductors,software),Chinas dominance in rare

274、 earths,high-quality manufacturing,and mass production is poised to create vulnerabilities for American firms particularly given uncertain long-term demand signals and a shortage of skilled workers.218 This strategic approach mirrors its success in solar panels and electric vehicle batteries,219 pot

275、entially limiting the United States ability to scale fusion engineering breakthroughs into commercial reactors.While new DOE programs and regulatory reforms may speed U.S.development,true leadership in fusion will also require securing supply chains a lesson reinforced by Chinas track record of leve

276、raging control over critical minerals to shape entire industries.What to Watch AI Technologies Accelerate Critical Breakthroughs in Fusion Development.AI is emerging as a powerful tool in fusion,enabling both the United States and China to push beyond conventional trial-and-error approaches.The Unit

277、ed States is applying AI across 217 Aaron Larson,U.S.in a Race with China to Develop Commercial Fusion Power Technology,POWER(2024).218 Angela Dewan&Ella Nilsen,The U.S.Led on Nuclear Fusion for Decades.Now China Is in Position to Win the Race,CNN(2024).219 You Xiaoying,The New Three:How China Came

278、to Lead Solar Cell,Lithium Battery,and EV Manufacturing,Dialogue Earth(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 42 multiple fronts:Googles advanced AI systems enhance reactor efficiency,220 Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratorys AI platforms predict and prevent pla

279、sma instabilities in real time,221 and LLNLs cognitive simulation methods helped achieve fusion ignition by optimizing experimental designs.222 China has also harnessed AI,using neural networks trained on extensive plasma data sets to improve measurement speeds by a factor of ten.223 These advances,

280、coupled with sophisticated modeling and simulation environments like the Idaho National Laboratorys MOOSE and FENIX frameworks,can accelerate learning,tackle persistent engineering challenges,224 and ultimately bring fusion closer to commercial reality.Nuclear Infrastructure Development Shapes the P

281、ath to Fusion Commercialization.As fusion moves toward commercialization,existing nuclear infrastructure provides a strategic advantage.225 Chinas rapidly expanding nuclear industry leads the world in conventional reactor construction,with 22 of the 58 reactors under development globally and the fir

282、st Small Modular Reactor(SMR)now in commercial operation.226 In contrast,the United States faced hurdles in building new reactors227 and,as of August 2024,had none under construction.228 However,in November 2024,the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the first Generation IV power-producing r

283、eactor authorized for construction in the country.229 The presence or absence of supporting nuclear infrastructure could influence how quickly each nation transitions from demonstration to deployment of fusion power.International Partnerships Emerge as Key Differentiators in Fusion Competition.Globa

284、l alliances are becoming increasingly important in shaping fusions future.230 Recent 220 Pulsar Team&Swiss Plasma Center,Accelerating Fusion Science Through Learned Plasma Control,Google DeepMind(2022).221 Jaemin Seo,et al.,Avoiding Fusion Plasma Tearing Instability with Deep Reinforcement Learning,

285、Nature(2024).222 Jeremy Thomas,High-Performance Computing,AI and Cognitive Simulation Helped LLNL Conquer Fusion Ignition,Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(2023).223 Aman Tripathi,China Achieves Fusion Milestone with 10 x Improvement in Plasma Measurement Speed,Interesting Engineering(2024).224

286、 Pierre-Clment Simon&Casey Icenhour,Developing the Future of Fusion Energy,Federation of American Scientists(2024).225 Stephen Ezell,How Innovative Is China in Nuclear Power?,Information Technology&Innovation Foundation(2024).226 Sha Hua,Atomic Power Is In Againand China Has the Edge,Wall Street Jou

287、rnal(2023).227 William Mauldin&Jennifer Hiller,Washington Heats Up Nuclear Energy Competition With Russia,China,Wall Street Journal(2024).228 Safely and Responsibly Expanding U.S.Nuclear Energy:Deployment Targets and a Framework for Action,The White House(2024).229 Sonal Patel,NRC Approves Construct

288、ion of First Electricity-Producing Gen IV Reactor in the U.S.,Power(2024).230 International Partnerships in a New Era of Fusion Energy Development,The White House(2023).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 43 U.S.partnerships with the United Kingdom231 and Japan232

289、 focus on sharing facilities,harmonizing regulations,and bolstering supply chain resiliencemoves that could offset Chinas tightly integrated domestic ecosystem.These collaborations aim to accelerate progress,reduce costs,and maintain leadership as the window for securing a dominant position narrows.

290、Without timely,coordinated action,the United States risks ceding ground in the race to commercialize what may become the defining energy technology of the century.Internet Platforms(Social Media/Mobile Operating Systems),2025 Analysis Assessment:U.S.-Lead Confidence Interval:Moderate Direction:Trend

291、 Contested Confidence Interval:Moderate _ The United States Leads But New PRC Platforms Are Catching Up Overall,U.S.Internet platforms maintain a lead in terms of overall market capitalization,and the majority of the global population uses them to connect,communicate,233 and find information.234 U.S

292、.-based social media companies held the top four spots in monthly active users worldwide as of July 2024,235 and Google had roughly 90%of the global search engine market share in November 2024.236 But the steady emergence of new PRC mobile applications onto the global stage over the past two years,c

293、oupled with the Chinese Communist Partys(CCP)increasing calls for self-reliance in both hardware and software,have shifted our outlook.231 Joint Statement Between DOE and the UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Concerning a Strategic Partnership to Accelerate Fusion,U.S.Department of Ener

294、gy(2023).232 Joint Statement Between DOE and the Japan Ministry of Education,Sports,Science and Technology Concerning a Strategic Partnership to Accelerate Fusion Energy Demonstration and Commercialization,U.S.Department of Energy(2024).233 Global Social Media Statistics,Global Digital Insights(last

295、 accessed 2024).234 Search Engine Market Share Worldwide,GlobalStats(2024).235 Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of April 2024,By Number of Monthly Active Users,Statista(2024).236 Search Engine Market Share Worldwide,GlobalStats(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J

296、 E C T P A G E 44 The emergence and meteoric rise of new PRC Internet platforms237 particularly Bytedances TikTok,one of the top social media applications among the youth demographic in North America,second only to Youtube238 shows that Chinas success in this sector was not a fluke,but rather the be

297、ginning of a larger trend.Capcut,a video editing tool,also a product of Bytedance,became the fifth most popular app in 2023.239 PRC e-commerce apps,such as Temu and Shein,have skyrocketed in popularity among global Internet users.Notably,Temu,whose parent company is TDD Holdings,now sits among the t

298、op ten most popular apps in 2023.240 Even new PRC AI startups,like Moonshot.ai and Minimax,have gained a sizable following in the United States,with Minimaxs AI chat app“Talkie”boasting 11.4 million monthly active users.241 Source:David Curry,Most Popular Apps(2024),Business of Apps(2024).Wildcards

299、Will U.S.Policy Changes Finally Address the Market Access Imbalance with China?One of the biggest imbalances in this space is that virtually all U.S.Internet platforms are 237 Mapping the U.S.-PRC Tech Competition Landscape,Special Competitive Studies Project(2023).238 Monica Anderson,et al.,Teens,S

300、ocial Media and Technology 2023,Pew Research Center(2023).239 David Curry,Most Popular Apps(2024),Business of Apps(2024).240 David Curry,Most Popular Apps(2024),Business of Apps(2024).241 Paul Triolo&Kendra Schaefer,Chinas Generative AI Ecosystem in 2024:Rising Investment and Expectations,The Nation

301、al Bureau of Asian Research(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 45 barred from operating in the PRC market,while PRC platforms are able to operate freely in the United States at least for now.That is likely to change,as the U.S.government is beginning to imp

302、lement policies aimed at limiting the influence of PRC Internet platforms within its borders.The White House,for example,recently announced a new proposal that would eliminate a customs loophole that Shein and Temu have exploited to import millions of dollars of low-value items into the United State

303、s tariff-free.242 Could TikToks Fate Reshape the Future of PRC-Developed Apps in America?The saga of Tiktok,which is facing potential divestment or a ban in early 2025,underscores the escalating scrutiny and uncertainty surrounding PRC-owned Internet platforms in the United States.243 However,recent

304、 signals from the incoming administration suggest a softened stance toward TikTok,with incoming president Trump indicating that a complete ban may no longer be a foregone conclusion.244 This shift in policy highlights the evolving dynamics in the debate over PRC technology in the United States and t

305、he broader challenges of isolating a PRC-origin mobile application from the U.S.tech ecosystem,especially after it has established such a significant domestic user base.This case and the precedent that the ruling will set could have far-reaching implications for other PRC apps operating in the Unite

306、d States.What to Watch Huawei Advances Chinas Mobile Operating System Independence.Chinas Huawei is making a play to build an alternative mobile application ecosystem,a space long dominated by Apples App Store and Googles Play Store.Previous versions of Huaweis mobile operating system were based on

307、open-source Android and operated on a Linux kernel.In November 2024,however,Huawei launched its first smartphones245 with the capability to run its indigenously-developed“pure blood”mobile operating system.246 242 Annie Nova&Gabrielle Fonrouge,Biden Targets Shein,Temu with New Rules to Curb Alleged

308、Abuse of U.S.Trade Loophole,CNBC(2024).243 Dan Primack,TikTok Ban Bill Heads to Court,Axios(2024).244 Trump Signals Openness to Stopping TikTok Ban,Softening Stance,Bloomberg(2024).245 Arjun Kharpal,Huawei Launches First Phones Capable of Running its New Self-Developed Operating System,CNBC(2024).24

309、6 Marco Lancaster,HarmonyOS NEXT Launches This Month Without Android,GizChina(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 46 Source:Global Smartphone Sales Share by Operating System,Counterpoint Research(2024).The new operating system is reportedly built with comple

310、tely indigenous code,independent from open-source Android.Huaweis existing mobile operating system,HarmonyOS,recently overtook Apples iOS as being the second most used mobile operating system in China,after Android.247 Currently,about 700 million devices run on HarmonyOS and 2.2 million third-party

311、developers are creating apps for the platform,248 with Huawei aiming to build over 100,000 applications for the operating system within the next year.249 Notably,the Huawei app storefront on these devices has an emulator that allows them to run Android-based apps,a feature that may be particularly t

312、ailored for Chinese citizens working abroad.250 However,HarmonyOS NEXT has a long road ahead before it may pose as a serious competitor to Apple and Google,but its development will be a noteworthy milestone in addressing one of Chinas long-perceived gaps in mobile operating systems,a key vulnerabili

313、ty identified by a prominent PRC think tank report in 2022 that was subsequently censored.251 247 Iris Deng,Huaweis HarmonyOS Unseats Apples iOS to Become Chinas No 2 Mobile Operating Platform,South China Morning Post(2024).248 Lionel Lim,Huaweis Homegrown Operating System,Launched After the Company

314、 Was Put on a U.S.Blacklist,May Soon Overtake Apples iOS in China,Fortune(2024).249 Juliana Liu&Hassan Tayir,Huaweis New Homegrown Chinese Smartphone Takes on Apple and Android,CNN(2024).250 Alan Friedman,Surprise!Huaweis HarmonyOS NEXT Can Run Android Apps,Phone Arena(2024).251 Jeff Pao,Academic Re

315、port Unveils Chinas High-Tech Bottlenecks,Asia Times(2022).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 47 Next-Generation Networks(Low Earth Orbit Satellites),2025 Analysis Assessment:Contested Confidence Interval:Moderate Direction:Trend U.S.Confidence Interval:Moderate

316、_ The United States is Making Early Wins in the Path to Future Networks Non-terrestrial networks(NTNs)252 will be key to fostering next-generation networks and a critical piece is low-earth orbit(LEO)satellites.To date,the United States holds a commanding lead in the deployment of LEO satellite cons

317、tellations,with U.S.company,Starlink,having deployed approximately 6,764 LEO satellites.253 Other U.S.and allied companies such as London-based OneWeb and Amazons Project Kuiper,have plans to launch more in the next year.254 U.S.companies like Starlink255 and AST SpaceMobile are also taking a global

318、 lead in D2D-enabled(direct to device)satellites,which reduce implementation costs via decreased need for the base stations that traditionally serve as interlocutors between LEO satellites and terrestrial networks.256 As of 2024,Starlink has about 300+LEO satellites in operation and users can now ac

319、cess the beta version and experience D2D enabled networks themselves.257 Despite Beijings strategic prioritization of space technologies,via quantum communications,258 and earlier this year,a successful space mission to the other side of the moon,China is lagging behind in the deployment of LEO mega

320、-constellations.259 This past August,Beijing launched a series of 18 LEO 252 Low-earth orbit(LEO)satellites are part of a broader non-terrestrial satellite(NTN)ecosystem that includes medium-earth orbit(MEO)and geostationary orbit(GEO)satellites,MEOs and GEOs both complement LEOs with capabilities l

321、ike balanced coverage,latency for underserved areas,and high-capacity broadcasting for fixed locations.High-altitude platforms(HAPS),such as solar-powered drones and stratospheric balloons,provide localized connectivity and disaster recovery in remote areas.NTNs are also advancing into lunar and int

322、erplanetary communications through optical and quantum technologies,promising to revolutionize global connectivity,bridge digital divides,and enable next-generation services.253 Tereza Pultarova&Elizabeth Howell,Starlink Satellites:Facts,Tracking and Impact on Astronomy,Space News(2024).254 Everythi

323、ng you need to know about Project Kuiper,Amazons satellite broadband network,Amazon(Last Accessed 2024)255 Rachel Jewett,SpaceX Now Has More Than 100 Direct-to-Cell Satellites in Orbit,Via Satellite(2024).256 Mike Robuck,A Lot of People Want to be in AST SpaceMobiles Orbit,Mobile World Live(2024).25

324、7 T-Mobile Starlink Starts Beta Program for its Direct-to-Cell Satellite Service,GSMArena(2024).258 Andrew Jones,China Plans to Take Hack-Proof Quantum Satellite Technology to New Heights,Space(2023).259 Liz Lee,et al,China Lands on Moons Far Side in Historic Sample-Retrieval Mission,Reuters(2024).S

325、 P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 48 satellites first in August,260 and again,in October261 in an effort to form its own Starlink rival network.These are the first steps China took in an ambitious plan to launch as many as 40,000 LEO satellites in the next decade

326、.262 Source:Smallsats by the Numbers 2024,Bryce Tech at 18(2024).Wildcards Will Increasing Space Debris Trigger a Catastrophic Kessler Effect?As the LEO networks market continues to grow and space launches become more widespread,there is a growing issue with debris floating in low earth orbit.Approx

327、imately 85%of this debris resides within low-earth orbit and is traveling at high velocities.263 This debris can cause significant damage to existing satellites,and raises the possibility that the density of debris will render it impossible to safely deploy and operate satellites.This prospect,260 A

328、rjun Kharpal,China Launches Its Rival to Elon Musks Starlink Internet Satellites,CNBC(2024).261 Andrew Jones,China Launches Second Batch of 18 Satellites for Thousand Sails Megaconstellation,Space News(2024).262 Steven Feldstein,Why Catching Up to Starlink Is a Priority for Beijing,Carnegie Endowmen

329、t for International Peace(2024).263 Aneli Bongers&Jos L.Torres,Low-Earth Orbit Faces a Spiraling Debris Threat,Scientific American(2024).S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R O J E C T P A G E 49 known as the Kessler effect,can lead to a high number of collisions where the possibilit

330、y of each collision exponentially increases after each collision.264 Can Low Earth Orbit Support the Surge in Satellite Deployments?The issue of space debris rose again recently in August with the PRC launch of its Long March rocket,which created upwards of 700 debris fragments.265 As the global rac

331、e to deploy large-scale satellite constellations intensifies and other companies and nations are rapidly developing their own satellite networks they are pushing the boundaries of low Earth orbit(LEO)capacity.SpaceX has plans to launch a mega-constellation of LEO communications satellites with appro

332、ximately 42,000 satellites.266 However,experts say that low earth orbit can only hold 72,000 satellites under the current circumstances before reaching a critical threshold that could trigger the Kessler effect to take place.267 What to Watch China Accelerates Its Push for Global 6G Leadership Throu

333、gh Patents and Standards.Looking at the broader advanced networks sector,the 6G landscape is continuing to take shape,268 with many industry experts anticipating the emergence of 6G networks by 2028269 and fuller scaling and deployment of 6G networks within the 2030s;however,similar to Chinas deployment of 5G China is attempting to stake its claim as the leader of the 6G market.Currently,China has