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1、ELECTRICITY&GAS A national forecast to 2050ENERGY TRANSITION OUTLOOK UK 2025FOREWORDAs we enter 2025,the energy industry stands at a pivotal moment in its history.Despite global economic headwinds and geopolitical uncertainties,weve witnessed unprecedented momentum in clean energy deployment and DNV

2、 forecasts that the world will hit peak emissions this year.The UKs energy landscape is transforming rapidly,with record-breaking renewable energy generation and falling costs of clean technologies setting new benchmarks for what is possible.The past year has demonstrated the UKs potential on this t

3、ransition journey.Weve seen wind power generation reach historic highs,battery storage capacity expand significantly and Electric Vehicle(EV)adoption showing signs of recovery.However,these achievements,while significant,are merely the initial steps toward our 2050 net-zero goal.The ambitious new tr

4、ansition pathway mapped out by the UK government includes three critical mile-stones that will shape our journey towards net zero.This DNV report the UK Energy Transition Outlook 2025 reveals a mixed picture of progress and challenges against each of these targets:First,by 2030,we expect to see a dr

5、amatic expansion of clean power infrastructure,with installed renewable capacity forecast to double,reducing our reliance on gas to less than 12%,but falling just short of the Clean Power 2030 target.Second,we see progress towards the UKs new Nationally Determined Contributions(NDC)target by reducin

6、g todays emissions by more than a third by 2035.Finally,our forecast for 2050 sees the UK successfully decoupling economic growth from energy consumption,reducing UK energy demand by 25%and emissions by 82%compared with 1990 levels.But clearly the UK is not reaching net zero.Significant challenges r

7、emain to be tackled,particu-larly in electrifying our demand in heating and transport sectors.The transformation of domestic heating systems requires coherent implementation plans and associated incentives for heat pump adoption and building efficiency improvements.In transport,while the EV fleet an

8、d infrastructure is expanding rapidly,replacement of the current largely petrol/diesel-based vehicle fleet will be a gradual,slow process.The UK must also accelerate the devel-opment of solutions for heavy transport and aviation,including synthetic fuels and hydrogen technologies.As we navigate this

9、 transformation,we must keep in mind that change of this scale happens incremen-tally.Even though the UK continues to take large bites out of its reliance on fossil fuels,we need to recognize that oil and gas will remain dominant in our energy mix up to the early 2040s.Hence,we need to ensure robust

10、 plans are in place to manage our existing gas infrastructure,while working steadily on decarbonizing parts of the energy system through Carbon Capture and Storage(CCS)and hydrogen infrastructure.The build-out of CCS infrastructure is finally out of the starting blocks with the first Final Investmen

11、t Decision(FID)for the Hynet project and we forecast that CCS capacity will be close to government targets by 2035.The role of hydrogen in our energy future remains both promising and uncertain.While demand is growing,particularly in industrial clusters and transport,expanding to a national hydrogen

12、 infrastructure requires careful planning and substantial investment.Similarly,our energy storage capabilities must evolve to match the increasingly decentralized nature of our power generation.Looking ahead,we see enormous opportunities in this transition.The green economy promises new jobs,enhance

13、d energy security,and technological leadership.However,these opportunities can only be realized through continued policy support,strategic investment,and strong collaboration across all sectors.The path ahead is challenging but clear:we must maintain our momentum while being agile enough to adapt to

14、 new technologies and opportunities.Together,we can build an energy system that is not just cleaner and more efficient,but also more equitable and resilient.The time for action is now,and the UK must continue to lead by example in this global energy transition.Lets challenge the art of the possible

15、in 2025.A substantial green prize lies ahead for the UK as it decarbonizes its economy.Hari VamadevanRegional Director,UK&Ireland,Energy Systems,DNV2DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYCONTENTS!C

16、lick on the section you want to explore Foreword 2 Executive Summary 4 1 Introduction 12 1.1 About this Outlook 12 1.2 General assumptions 142 UK climate change policy 153 Energy demand 19 3.1 Transport 22 3.2 Buildings 27 3.3 Manufacturing 31 3.4 Non-energy use 334 Electricity and gas grid 34 4.1 E

17、lectricity 34 4.2 Power grids 37 4.3 Flexibility and storage 41 4.4 Gas grids 455 Industrial Clusters CCS and Hydrogen 48 5.1 Carbon capture and storage 48 5.2 Hydrogen 506 Energy supply 53 6.1 Non-renewable energy sources 56 6.2 Renewable energy sources and nuclear 607 Energy expenditure 70 7.1 Ene

18、rgy infrastructure investment 708 UK emissions and climate implications 74 References 79The project team 80Executive summaryTHE UK ENERGY TRANSITION A TALE OF THREE TARGETSCLEAN POWER 2030:THE SHORT-TERM TARGETThis target aims to decarbonize the UK electricity system by 2030 via a significant ramp-u

19、p in building and connecting new renewable capacity to the grid to replace todays 100 TWh/yr of gas-fired electricity generation.We forecast that over the next 6 years the UK will roughly double its installed capacity each of solar,onshore wind and offshore wind reaching nearly 90 GW of variable ren

20、ewable generation by 2030.Although a significant increase,this falls short of the government ambitions to double the capacity of onshore wind,triple solar and quadruple offshore wind generation.We see the latter as a particular challenge given the recent cost increases and supply chain issues.As a r

21、esult of this predicted level of renewables growth and only marginal build-out of CCS capacity,the UK will,in 2030,still rely for 12%of its electricity generation on unabated gas fired generation.Even though the ambitious Clean Power target is important on the road to net zero,it only addresses part

22、 of the challenge,because even by 2030 we forecast that only 20%of the total UK energy demand will be delivered in the form of electricity.The remaining 80%will still be largely consumed directly in the form of fossil fuels,mainly gas for heating our homes and oil for fuelling our transport system.2

23、035 NDC:THE MEDIUM-TERM TARGETTo meet the UKs new 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC)under the Paris agreement,the focus has to be on electrifying the demand side of the energy system.The NDC target commits the UK to reducing economy-wide GHG emissions by 81%by 2035,compared with 1990 level

24、s and means that we need to reduce todays emissions by 62%in the next 10 years.However,our medium-term forecast shows that by 2035 the UK will reduce todays emissions by only 35%.We will have completely decarbonised our electricity system,but the reductions associated with other energy demand sector

25、s lag behind significantly.In the buildings sector,we predict only a 12%emissions reduction,due to lack of the necessary penetration of heat pumps to reduce reliance on gas boilers.Based on current costs and subsidies,we forecast that 24 million homes(75%)will still be using gas heating and only 4 m

26、illion heat pumps will have been installed by 2035.In the transport sector,we see a more pronounced emission reduction of 25%,mainly driven by electri-fication of the passenger road sector.However,it is clear that even with the current incentives for car manufacturers for promoting EV sales and the

27、expected cost reductions for EVs over the next 5-10 years,it will take significant time to replace the current vehicle stock and in 2035 still close to 60%of the passenger cars on the road will be fossil-fuelled.On a positive note,by 2035 the ramp up of Carbon Capture and Storage(CCS)and hydrogen pr

28、oduction will have a significant impact on emissions from the industrial sectors,reducing their emissions by more than 50%.NET ZERO 2050:THE LONG-TERM TARGET Finally,for the long term legally-binding target for the UK to reach net zero by 2050,our forecast shows that the UKs annual emissions will st

29、ill amount to 145 MtCO2e in 2050,equivalent to a significant 82%reduction relative to 1990 levels,but not reaching net zero.Extrapolating the trends observed in 2035,the transport and buildings sectors are the major remaining contributors to the total energy system emissions in 2050,linked to contin

30、ued fossil fuel use in commercial transport and heating for homes.Despite not meeting the 2050 Net Zero target,our long-term forecast shows that there are three long-term structural positive trends the UK can build on:Firstly,UK final energy demand will no longer grow in lock-step with GDP and popul

31、ation growth;in fact,energy demand will fall by a quarter by 2050 due mainly to electrification.Our long-term forecast shows that by 2050 electricity will deliver close to half of UK final energy demand.An electrified energy system is more efficient than a fossil-fuelled energy system,so this predic

32、ted shift towards electricity as the key future energy carrier,will decouple UK energy demand growth from economic growth.Secondly UKs primary energy supply will progressively shift away from fossil fuels to low-carbon sources,with the former reducing from 75%of primary energy today to 34%by 2050.Ho

33、wever,the transformation is slow:even with the expected build-out rates of renewables,this heavy reliance on fossil fuels will remain for the next decade,only reducing to below 50%by the early 2040s.Thirdly the long-term picture shows that the de car-bonization of the UK economy is affordable and wi

34、ll,by 2050,reduce average household energy expenditure by nearly 40%relative to 2021 levels.We forecast annual energy infrastructure CAPEX spend to increase from an annual average of GBP 28 bn in previous decades to around GBP 50bn per year over the next 30 years.Whilst this is a significant increas

35、e in absolute terms,the future share of GDP devoted to energy CAPEX expenditure remains comparable to the previous 30 years at just above 1.3%of GDP.This years DNV UK Energy Transition Outlook report focuses on three key UK government energy transition targets each working towards net zero,but each

36、considering a different time horizon.4DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYREPORT KEY FINDINGS SUMMARY:In this years DNV UK Energy Transition Outlook report we have focused on comparison of our fo

37、recast results with three key UK government targets:Short term:Mission Control Clean Power 2030 with a target to decarbonise the UK electricity system by 2030.Medium term:New Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC)target of at least 81%emissions reduction by 2035 relative to 1990 levels.Long term:Th

38、e UKs legally binding target to achieve Net Zero by 2050.EXECUTIVESUMMARY5DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe short-term challenge:Clean Power 2030One of the key initiatives of the new UK gov

39、ernment to accelerate the UK energy transition is the creation of Mission Control with a target to decarbonise elec-tricity generation by 2030.Plans include doubling the capacity of onshore wind,tripling solar and quadrupling offshore wind generation,alongside use of carbon capture technologies to a

40、bate emis-sions from gas fired generation.It should be noted that the Clean Power 2030 target still allows use of 5%of unabated gas-fired generation in the electricity system as a strategic reserve.Our forecast shows that within this time horizon,the actual UK electricity generation demand will grow

41、 by about 15%compared to today(from 280 TWh/yr to 320 TWh/yr),reflecting a relatively slow start to the“electrification of demand”process in the UK.Over that same time period the UKs nuclear generation capacity is also forecast to reduce from around 6 GW today to less than 2 GW by 2030,after decommi

42、s-sioning of units at Torness,Heysham and Hartlepool in the latter years of this decade.Hence,the main challenge will be to build out and connect sufficient new renewable capacity to the grid by 2030 to cover 40 TWh/yr electricity demand growth and at the same time replace todays 100 TWh/yr of gas-f

43、ired generation and some of the 40 TWh/yr nuclear generation with low carbon sources.Our forecast shows that by 2030 significant progress will be made,but we will fall short of the Clean Power 2030 target:We forecast that the UK will roughly double its installed capacity each of solar,onshore wind a

44、nd offshore wind reaching a total of close to 90 GW of variable renewable generation.For onshore wind this growth is close to government ambitions.It reflects the impact removing the de facto ban under the previous government and the clear potential of adding and maintaining capacity through life-ti

45、me extension and repowering of existing wind farms.However,assessment of the current project pipeline for offshore wind,taking into account the clear increase in costs for offshore wind farm developments,shows that the most likely offshore wind growth is a doubling of todays capacity,rather than the

46、 quadruple target.Over this period the build-out of CCS facilities will have kick-started,linked to recent and imminent CCS project FIDs,but we forecast it will reach only 5 MtCO2/yr of installed capture capacity by 2030,60%of which is associated with electricity generation.This would only marginall

47、y reduce emissions asso-ciated with use of gas fired generation(5%of total gas generation emissions).As a result of this predicted level of renewables growth and only marginal build-out of CCS capacity,the UK will in 2030 still rely for 12%of its electricity generation on unabated gas fired generati

48、on,to cover for periods of high demand/low renewable generation.Plans include doubling the capacity of onshore wind,tripling solar and quadrupling offshore wind generation.TABLE 1Comparison of ETO forecasts with Clean Power 2030 targets2030Key 2030 TargetsToday(2023)Government TargetOur forecastDelt

49、aOffshore wind installed capacity(GW)1560(x4)28-32Onshore wind installed capacity(GW)1428(x2)25-3Solar installed capacity(GW)1545(x3)34-11Total variable renewables installed capacity(GW)4413387-46Installed CCS capacity(MtCO2eq/yr)010 to 155-5Installed low carbon hydrogen production capacity(GW)0104-

50、6Use of unabated gas fired generation(%)37%15 GW of capacity installed at the end of 2024(RenewableUK,2024),there are many multi-megawatt projects now reaching 30 years of operation with consistent high availability and financial performance.In the UK,onshore wind is on average the cheapest form of

51、electricity generation.In recent years,hiatuses in deployment,particularly in England,have not so much been due to economic or technical viability but to restrictions in permitting.For example,England has seen a de facto planning ban on new onshore wind development since 2015,and prior to this,a bla

52、nket restriction on the overall height of the turbines stifled potential generation.In July 2024,the new Government lifted the de facto ban on onshore wind in England committing to revising planning policy to place onshore wind alongside other sources of generation in the National Planning Policy Fr

53、amework.Even with the onshore wind ban lifted,grid bottle-necks and waiting times for connection are limiting the speed of deployment of new onshore wind projects.However,in DNVs view this should not prevent extraordinary onshore wind capacity growth.For many existing wind farms there is the option

54、to either repower their existing turbines or extend their design lifetime as a way of avoiding bottlenecks asso-ciated with the grid and greenfield development ramp up.Existing windfarms benefit from established grid connections and community support from decades of investment in the local area.In t

55、he next five to ten years,we see that much of the projected increase in capacity may be through this route.Repowering The average age of UK onshore wind turbines is around 10 years,and the average turbine rated capacity is 1.8 MW(RenewableUK,2024).If the existing fleet were to be repowered with cont

56、em-porary 4 or 5 MW turbines with extended permits,then over 35GW of generating capacity could be achieved through a rolling replacement programme without extensive new greenfield developments.Advances in turbine control,design,and materials mean that loading can be managed more sophisti-catedly whi

57、lst maximizing energy output and staying within existing wind farm boundaries.Such power boosts are technically feasible but require relaxation in aspects of planning to allow higher turbine heights and continued removal of grid bottlenecks.A recent demonstration of repowering potential is the Hagsh

58、aw Hill Wind Farm in Scotland,owned and operated by Scottish Power Renewables:14 turbines are replacing the original 26 turbines installed in 1995.The fewer but larger and more efficient turbines mean that the repowered wind farm will produce approximately six times more power(Scottish Power Renewab

59、les,2023).Positive social impacts of repowering are also now apparent.Wind farms that have been established for 20 years or more in rural communities can be a significant contributor to the local economy providing employment and accessing local services;this is sustained through repowering.Lifetime

60、extension A factor contributing to lower cost of energy for onshore wind in recent years has been longer lifetime assumptions.Typically,a UK wind farm financial model will assume an economic life of more than 30 years.This assumption is up from 2025 years generally assumed at financial close of most

61、 of the current installed fleet.Longer lifetime gives favourable reduction in cost of energy and also lowers the overall carbon intensity(RenewableUK,2024)with arguably more than 50%more production for only a marginal increase in raw materials.A recent example is Nadara(formally Ventient Energy)who

62、in December 2023 announced that they have secured approval for modifications to original planning consents to operate six 20-year-old wind farms with a total capacity of 200MW,for a further 10 years,extending their overall lifetime from 25 to 35 years(Nadara,2023).Onshore wind:repowering and life-ex

63、tension will be needed alongside new developments to accelerate the UK pathway to Net ZeroThe government target to double installed wind capacity to 30GW by 2030 is achievable with a combination of life-extension and repowering alongside new onshore wind farm development.61DNV Energy Transition Outl

64、ook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYOffshore wind roll-out stalled but recoverableDespite being one of the flagbearers of the UK energy transition,offshore wind has been facing significant headwinds as of late.Although ab

65、ated,cost pressures due to a constrained supply-chain and interest rate hikes still remain.To compound this,subsidy strike prices have been inconsistent causing uncertainty and slowdowns in deployment.This turbulence has led many developers to reconsider their approach to their investment portfolios

66、 and slow the development of their projects.Allocation round 4(AR4)in June 2022 was a landmark moment in the UK offshore wind industry with 5 offshore wind projects securing 7 GW of offtake agreements under the UK governments Contracts for Difference(CfD)support scheme,representing the most capacity

67、 ever supported in a single round at the lowest price for any technology on record.However,the UK government ignored calls from industry to raise the administrative strike prices for 2023s AR5 in response to the challenging economic environment.The unaffordable price offered by the government result

68、ed in no offshore wind bidders in AR5 despite there being 5 GW of eligible offshore wind looking for a route to market.As further evidence of the challenging market condi-tions,we have seen AR4 projects change hands and reduce the awarded capacity to defer to later rounds when strike prices would be

69、 more advantageous.Following a change of government and in no short measure as a response to the disastrous performance of AR5 for offshore wind,the government then pushed the administrative strike price for AR6 up by 66%for fixed offshore wind and 52%for floating offshore wind compared to the unfea

70、sible AR5 strike prices.This was welcomed by developers and resulted in 5.3 GW(of which 4.9 GW were fixed offshore projects)of a potential 12 GW of expected offshore project capacity being awarded CfDs.This comprised of the totality of rebid projects(1.6 GW)and 3.8 GW of possible 10.5 GW of new capa

71、city.Unfortunately,these results still fell well short of what was needed to make progress towards the UKs offshore wind target.There are a number of other recent developments that will also directly impact the development of the UK offshore market,namely the introduction of Sustainable Industry Rew

72、ards(SIRs)and the creation of a partnership between GB Energy and The Crown Estate.From AR7 onwards,SIRs will require offshore wind developers to demonstrate investments in the UK supply chain to be allowed to enter Allocation Rounds.The developers that can demonstrate their investments will receive

73、 support from the government while other developers will still be required to make a minimum investment to be eligible for a CfD.The combined entity from GB Energy and The Crown Estate will have the goal of leasing another 20-30 GW of offshore wind sites by 2030,and would also look to invest in the

74、offshore wind supply chain.The Crown Estate itself has also been given further powers that will allow it to borrow money and invest it in ways to increase the UKs offshore wind pipeline capacity.However the point still remains that to reach the Labour governments election pledge to quadruple offshor

75、e wind by 2030,the UK now needs to be installing 6-8 GW per annum over the next 6 years.This is more than double the maximum installation rate observed to date.2025 installations are not expected to be anywhere near that number although our latest forecast shows an increase in installation rate to a

76、n average of about 2.5 GW/yr over the remaining period to 2030.This would bring the UK to 28-30 GW of offshore wind installed capacity by 2030 about half of the proposed targets for offshore wind but hopefully with the correct foundations in place for the sectors growth out to 2050.Current forecasts

77、 show that the UK will achieve about half of the proposed targets for offshore wind but with the correct foundations in place for the sectors growth out to 2050.62DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUM

78、MARYThe floating wind industry is in a transitional phase between demonstration and commercialisation,with some of the most advanced developments happening in the UK.On the one hand there are two operational“mini-arrays”of floating wind turbines and on the other,there is a significant pipeline of co

79、mmercial-scale projects in the early stages of development.Progress in the sector therefore is being made,although perhaps in a less visible way than in previous years.Added to an international picture in which progress sometimes appears faltering(with notable developments being scaled back in Norwa

80、y,South Korea and the US),the perception of uncertainty in floating wind in the UK has risen somewhat.Real world impediments to capacity building have largely refused to soften for offshore wind in general over the last year,including the speed and difficulty of obtaining consent and grid connection

81、,supply chain bottlenecks,eye-watering industry-specific inflation rates(e.g.for steel),and higher interest rates than in recent history.Some of these are even more acute for floating wind in particular,due to the unsuitability of current port infrastructure for mass production of floating platforms

82、 and the large quantities of steel that are typically required to make them.Furthermore,DNV has over the last year exten-sively reviewed offshore wind(fixed and floating)costs in consultation with a wide range of market participants and has revised upwards estimates in line with current industry vie

83、ws.Market sentiment for floating wind specifically has evolved from dizzy over-enthusiasm of a year or two ago to a more sober assessment of the risk/reward picture now.This could be expected in light of the additional risks over and above those of fixed offshore wind,which itself is now viewed more

84、 sceptically for the reasons outlined above.These viewpoints have been reinforced by the scaling back of offshore wind ambitions by major oil and gas players,since their deep pockets and expertise in floating technology was once seen in some quarters as the winning formula to rapidly commercialise t

85、he sector.Perceptions of technology risk have also been heightened by further instances of costly main component replacements being needed on pilot floating wind farms;however,these risks were well-known and a range of mitigations have long been considered.Amongst the gloom,there has also been a ray

86、 of sunshine in the stunning award of power purchase support(Contracts For Difference)to the Green Volt wind farm,leapfrogging projects that started development much earlier.These uncertainties(both perceived and actual)lead DNV to predict that rate at which projects come on stream in the early days

87、 of commercialisation will be restrained compared to previous predictions.Therefore,a slower build-up of subsequent capacity and an increase in cost of energy can be expected in the medium term.The UK Government target for floating wind in 2030 was previously set at 5GW,although the recent Clean Pow

88、er 2030 Action Plan envisages a“limited role in the 2030 energy mix”,in line with DNVs prediction that 5GW will only be achieved around the middle of the next decade.However,we expect that progress will accelerate once the first batch of commercial projects are operational,with technology advancemen

89、ts and economies of scale supporting rapid roll out and falling costs.This is anticipated to mean average costs reach a similar order of magnitude to fixed offshore wind(the premium reduced to around 30%on average)by mid-century.In the near term,the biggest test of sentiment will be in the Crown Est

90、ates Leasing Round 5,where all eyes will be on the Celtic Seas to see if there is still the voracious appetite for floating wind capacity seen in previous leasing rounds that has given the UK a significant development pipeline.Uncertainties(both perceived and actual)lead DNV to predict that commerci

91、alisation rates will be more restrained than previously thought.Floating Wind63DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis is not the case,however,in high northern latitudes with low solar irradiati

92、on,such as in the UK.Low solar irradiation leads to low capacity factors and therefore higher levelized costs.For example,the typical solar capacity factor in the UK is half of that in Middle East and North Africa,and levelized cost is over two times higher.However,we expect levelized cost of solar

93、electricity in the UK to decline by 30%by mid-century,and installed capacity(including solar with storage)to grow from 16 GW today,to 48 GW in 2035,and 96 GW in 2050.We model utility-scale solar with storage as a separate category,where storage is co-located with solar plant.Despite its higher capit

94、al costs,solar plus battery storage has an advantage over standalone solar PV on capture price due to its ability to store and shift intra-day generated electricity to higher-tariff periods.Plants with storage can charge their batteries when sunlight is plentiful during the day and sell the stored e

95、lectricity when the price is high.This will make this power station type more attractive in the future.By 2050,we expect that about 10%of all solar installed capacity in the UK(approximately 9 GW)will be with dedicated battery storage.We expect levelized cost of solar electricity in the UK to declin

96、e by 30%by mid-century,and installed capacity to grow from 16 GW today,to 48 GW in 2035,and 96 GW in 2050.6.2.2 SolarSolar PV costs have declined spectacularly in recent decades,while the technologys efficiency has increased and the scale and forms in which it is implemented have diversified.The gro

97、wth of solar PV has been remarkable:globally,1 GW/yr(1 Gigawatt-peak)was installed for the first time in 2004,10 GW added in 2010,and 100 GW in 2019.Based on our model,global weighted average levelized cost of energy(LCOE)for solar PV is currently around GBP 28 per MWh.We expect this to reduce furth

98、er to GBP 17 by mid-century.Globally,solar PV together with onshore wind will be in an unassailable position as the cheapest sources of new electricity.64DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe U

99、K deployment of new utility-scale solar continues to grow apace.The attractiveness of the UK solar market is both stimulating new development activity as well as enabling project developers to attract inward investment to build out their current pipelines.Many developers,who would previously have ha

100、d to sell projects at the ready to build(RTB)stage,are now aiming to transform themselves into independent power providers(IPPs):with the objective of constructing,owning and operating solar generation assets over the long term.Domestic rooftop solar has seen an increase in new installations since 2

101、021,comprising around one third of all new solar capacity installed in 2022 and 2023.While high electricity prices may have contributed to an increased interest in households seeking to generate their own solar electricity over the past two to three years,it is not clear that this rate of growth is

102、set to continue as many households who can afford a rooftop installation are likely already to have one.The attractiveness of the UK solar market is both stimulating new development activity as well as enabling developers to attract inward investment to build out their current pipelines.The interest

103、 of long-term asset investors in commercial(behind-the-meter installations at corporate sites)and utility-scale projects is more positive.Utility-scale devel-opers are increasingly focused on technical quality assurance over the project life cycle,as developers take their development assets through

104、to construction and into long-term ownership.Furthermore,developers continue to accelerate their commitment to large-scale solar PV develop-ments.The UKs first solar Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project(NSIP)Cleve Hill in Kent(350 MW)is nearing completion and since July 2024 the incoming La

105、bour Government has approved six more solar NSIPs(totalling 2.5 GW).The Government has signalled reforms to the UK planning system to make it easier to obtain consent for solar and onshore wind projects,as well as the new network infrastructure needed to connect this additional generation to the gri

106、d.The sixth allocation round(AR6)of the UKs Contracts for Difference(CfD),announced September 2024,included 93 NSIP and non-NSIP(50 MWAC)solar projects with total capacity of 3.3 GW and further annual CfD allocation rounds are expected.The UK policy framework over the next five years at least is the

107、refore likely to be favourable to new solar devel-opments even though some projects,particularly at NSIP-scale,may not be connected until the necessary network reinforcements have been completed.Challenges for the industry include:obtaining access to the increasingly congested distribution and trans

108、-mission networks;overcoming the technical diffi-culties presented by increasingly large and complex sites;maintaining quality in a hot market for skilled and experienced solar project designers,managers and construction personnel;and ensuring that site selection,project development and construction

109、 is done sensitively and in partnership with local commu-nities,in order to keep public opinion on-side.Solar65DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYUse of biomass for energy purposes in the UK has

110、 grown rapidly over recent decades,from 30 TWh/yr at the beginning of the century to about 200 TWh/yr in 2023;a more than 6-fold growth(Figure 6.10).The largest share of the total demand for biomass in the UK comes from power generation,which currently accounts for more than half of biomass use.Biom

111、ass powered electricity generation is readily dispatchable;an important advantage over wind and solar.Biomass-powered electricity will increasingly be used as flexible capacity supplier to complement renewable generation.Furthermore,bioenergy presents a crucial opportunity to achieve net negative em

112、issions via biomass with carbon capture and storage(BECCS)technologies which will be sorely needed given the formidable challenge of reaching the net-zero emissions by the target year of 2050.Other notable usages of bioenergy in order of importance are in the buildings,manufacturing,and transport se

113、ctors.Going forward,we expect biomass demand to continue growing up to around 230 TWh/yr by the early-2030s,at which point it is likely to slowly decline and stabilise at around 200 TWh/yr,replaced by renewables,nuclear and electrification.As a share of total primary energy,however,bioenergy is set

114、to continue to supply approximately 13%,playing an important role in a less carbon-intensive future.By 2050,almost half of bioenergy will be used in power generation,often combined with heat production,about 21%in transport and 18%in biomethane production.6.2.3 BioenergyBioenergy is currently the la

115、rgest source of renewable energy and a key option to supply renewable energy needs towards 2050,especially in hard-to-electrify sectors.Bioenergy is derived from many forms of biomass,such as organic waste and residues from agriculture and livestock production,wood from forests,and energy crops.In o

116、ur model,we also include within the bioenergy category any form of energy obtained from non-renewable industrial and municipal waste,such as the combustion of plastic waste.66DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYE

117、XECUTIVE SUMMARYBioenergyThrough the process of photosynthesis,carbon dioxide from the atmosphere together with water and minerals from the soil are fixed into biomass,a solid form of cellulose,hemicellulose,lignin,sugars and/or oils.Over a suitably long period of time and when operated sustainably,

118、the cultivation and burning of biomass and oils provides energy with a low carbon intensity.The challenges for the use of bioenergy are linked to its production costs,feedstock availability and the potential of carbon emissions in the value chain for production from forest to furnace and from the ef

119、fects on land use.In contrast to other forms of renewable power generation such as wind and solar where capital investment is high but operating costs are low,biomass has a high ongoing cost from harvesting,production,transport and storage.The advantage of biomass for power generation is that medium

120、 duration storage of fuel is practical,and therefore biomass can offset some of the variability in other forms of renewable power.In the longer term it is anticipated that there will be continued global demand for biomass,not least as the source of renewable carbon in the manufacture of a second gen

121、eration of biofuels for transport use through torrefaction and gasification pathways.Also,Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage(BECCS),for large scale biomass plants,potentially provides a mechanism to offset the carbon emissions from the hardest to abate sectors.Where biomass is not replanted

122、or is extracted at a greater rate than it is replenished by nature,a direct land use change and net increase in carbon emissions occurs.There is also an indirect land use effect where agricultural land is repurposed to grow energy crops and therefore the demands to maintain food production result in

123、 intensification of production on existing land or destruction of forest or other sources of natural carbon store to maintain agricultural output.If the production is not well managed the biomass might have a significant carbon footprint resulting from the manufacture of fertilisers employed,the ene

124、rgy input in drying and processing,and the fuels used in transporting it to its final point of use.The UK has long been a leader in setting policy and targets for the cultivation and use of biomass for energy supply and as a result biomass accounted for some 8.6%of UK primary energy supply in 20221.

125、The key limitations to the wider adoption of bioenergy are the availability of sustainable feed-stock at an economic price and the requirements to treat other emissions from the combustion of biomass such as particulates,sulphur&nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide.In 2022,66%of biomass used in bioen

126、ergy supply was from domestic sources derived from a range of sources including plant biomass(straw,wood pellets and agricultural residues),biogenic waste(waste wood,sewage&landfill gas)and food waste.In the UK Biomass Strategy,DESNZ outlined several scenarios for future biomass availability.The mod

127、els recognise a theoretical potential biomass supply based upon biophysical models and a much smaller sustainable implementation potential that accounts for the technical,economic and sustainability criteria.The models proposed a restricted supply and an ambitious supply scenario,differentiated by a

128、 rate of domestic development(land area dedicated to energy crop planting each year)and proportion of biomass made available from overseas markets meeting the required sustainability criteria.In the restricted scenario only 20%of overseas production is exported globally whilst in the ambitious scena

129、rio it is assumed that the UK imports a share of global sustainable biomass in correlation to national GDP.In the DESNZ future biomass availability models the availability of biomass from domestic sources is not expected to increase significantly in either scenario and is expected to be relatively s

130、table at 350 400 PJ/year through to 2050.Thus,any increase in UK bioenergy use must come from imported sources and here the DESNZ ambition and restricted supply models diverge significantly with the restricted scenario indicating a declining portion of imports falling from around 150 PJ to 100 PJ ov

131、er the period 2025 2050,whilst the ambitious scenario indicates a large and rising potential biomass import of 400 PJ by 2025 rising to 600 PJ over the same period.1 Data from DESNZ Biomass Strategy document 2023.Due to the limited availability of land for domestic biomass production and the competi

132、ng global demands for international supply of biomass for advanced biofuels and BECCS,it is considered unlikely that biomass will be more economically attractive in the future.This is clearly reflected in DNVs most likely forecast,which shows that little growth is expected in the contribution to UK

133、primary energy supply from bioenergy.67DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYrenewables in the short term from an exclusively economic perspective.Policy is therefore the key driving force behind c

134、apacity additions in nuclear,especially given recently heightened energy security concerns following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis.Many countries are once again considering nuclear as a viable option due to its stability of supply and relative lack of dependency on no

135、n-friendly countries.This has also led the UK government to consider extending nuclear plant lifetimes through upgrades and life-extension measures.The government has announced 385 million in funding for the Advanced Nuclear Fund.This includes up to 215 million for small modular reactors(SMRs)and up

136、 to 170 million for the devel-opment of advanced modular reactors(AMRs)which are expected to belong to fourth generation of nuclear reactors with novel cooling systems and offering new functionalities.(DESNZ,2024b).Historically most of the nuclear fuel for both gas and light-water reactors,has been

137、sourced from the Springfields facility currently operated by Westing-house.In early 2024 the government announced awarding 196 million to Urenco to build new uranium enrichment facility delivering high-assay low-enriched uranium(HALEU).HALEU fuel has higher concentrations(5-20%)of uranium 235,compar

138、ed to traditional low-enriched uranium.Currently all commercial HALEU comes from Russia,with growing capabilities in China,and a pilot production scale in the US,the UK site aims to create an independent supplier for upcoming SMRs and AMRs that may require more enriched fuel than the current world f

139、leet.Taking existing government ambitions into consider-ation,we expect to see nuclear capacity rise from a low of 1.5 GW in 2030 to 7 GW by 2040,and thereafter to reach 11 GW by 2050.Of the 12 GW new capacity foreseen(some of which is replacing existing capacity being retired),6.5 GW will come from

140、 Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C plants.We expect little additional capacity in the form of small modular reactors in the mid-2030s,with approximately 5 GW of advanced modular reactors coming online in the last decade of our forecast.since 1995,and the upcoming end-of-life decom-missioning of existin

141、g plants,we expect installed capacity to decline from close to 9 GW in 2020 to a low of around 1.5 GW around year 2030.Due to the high capital costs,nuclear power is expensive from a levelized cost perspective,as Figure 6.11 shows.As an illustration,it is almost always more than twice as expensive a

142、s offshore bottom-fixed wind through to 2050.High capital costs and lengthy lead times will continue to be important barriers for nuclear power.The absence of long-term,viable solutions for managing nuclear waste and the rising costs and construction times will limit new nuclear powers ability to co

143、mpete with 6.2.4 NuclearHaving established the worlds first civil nuclear programme with the Calder Hall power plant in 1956,the UK has a long history in nuclear power.The country currently has nine operational nuclear reactors at five locations,all operated by EDF.Reactors in three locations,Hunter

144、ston B,Hinkley Point B,and Dungeness B,have stopped generating and are currently defuelling(ONR,2024).Following the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011,nuclear power has had a rough decade competing against incumbent,fossil-based electricity generation and emerging cheap renewables.With no new nucle

145、ar capacity build-outs 68DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe insurance industry is a critical enabler for the Energy Transition As the Energy Transition accelerates,the insurance industry wil

146、l be a critical catalyst,underwriting risk and enabling change.New insurance products will be needed to facilitate the transition and these will be driven by global commitments to reduce carbon emissions,the adoption of unknown/untested tech-nology and by the changing investor and societal expectati

147、ons.We are seeing insurers aligning their strategies with global sustainability goals,prioritizing renewable energy and other green infrastructure projects.Many insurers have adopted ESG(Environ-mental,Social,Governance)policies and are reducing or ceasing coverage for oil and gas projects.Governmen

148、ts are providing incentives for renewable energy projects and encouraging insurers to support these initiatives.Aligning with sustainability goals,addressing reporting requirements,and managing liabilities related to fossil fuel projects,while actively promoting green energy underwriting,are all bec

149、oming increasingly common.In contrast to oil and gas where the IOC(International Oil Companies)were often big enough to“self-insure”,Renewable Energy projects have far tighter margins and developers are often new companies,in the shape of SPV(Special Purpose Vehicles)which are in place solely to bui

150、ld and manage a single asset.They are increasingly looking to the insurance market for their protection from risk.Insurers are transitioning their portfolios to focus more on renewable energy projects like wind,solar,hydrogen,and carbon capture and storage(CCS).Increasingly,the tradi-tional oil and

151、gas assets are gradually becoming less attractive to underwrite,conversely the availability of cover for renewables has grown substantially.Change inevitably means a pivot away from known risk.Sensitivity to weather events increases with renewables projects,particularly during installation.Turbine d

152、amage during operation can quickly degrade the capacity of a farm,likewise solar farms are prone to hail damage,theft,and efficiency degradation.Due to the number of turbines and potential for systemic failure,risk aggregation is an increasing concern,equally so the magnitude of Delay in Start-Up(DS

153、U)claims.New energy projects are often“First of a Kind”(FOAK)projects that may involve cutting-edge technologies which lack data regarding historical loss.Such projects make underwriting more challenging and require higher transparency and greater confidence in the technology qualification process.H

154、ydrogen projects involve new safety risks and both CCS and Hydrogen raise questions regarding the storage and transportation of the associated gases.Certain risks,such as extreme weather events intensified by climate change,are becoming harder to insure due to frequency or magnitude,creating challen

155、ges for both traditional and renewable energy sectors.Coverage for downtime due to lack of wind or sunlight may become increasingly difficult to obtain.There is a clear disconnect between the length of investments and the cycles of insurance coverage particularly when planning for long-term projects

156、 that span decades,especially considering that insurance policies typically renew every two years.In the world of CAPEX projects,this phenomenon is significantly exaggerated due to the extended build times and will be further exacerbated with the advent of large scale Floating Offshore Wind.As oil a

157、nd gas declines,the rapid growth of renewable energy is exposing gaps in insurance coverage,such as for cyber,new fuel utili-sation and supply chain disruptions.The insurance industry is pivoting to meet the demands of a rapidly changing energy landscape,with a growing focus on renewables,technologi

158、cal innovation,and climate resilience.All stakeholders need confidence that their particular needs will be met;the insurance industry is no different.As the demand for change speeds up so does the impor-tance of technical surety;the role of independent assurance will become more important and must b

159、e able to deliver trust when it matters,providing trans-parency that risks can be underwritten with technical confidence.Certain risks,such as extreme weather events intensified by climate change,are becoming harder to insure due to frequency or magnitude,creating challenges for both traditional and

160、 renewable energy sectors.Coverage for downtime due to lack of wind or sunlight may become increasingly difficult to obtain.69DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025We forecast that CAPEX investment in UK energy infrastructure will increase significantly in the next three decades to enable the transit

161、ion to a more electrified system powered by renewables.The average annual spend for all the considered cate-gories for the decades between 1980 and 2050 are summarized in Table 7.1 overleaf.The average annual CAPEX spend on energy infra-structure in the 19812023 period was GBP 28bn/yr.We forecast th

162、at this will increase by an average of 80%for the next three decades to GBP 50bn/yr,peaking in the mid-2030s and mid-2040s at around GBP 60bn/yr.Nearly 40%of the energy system investment for the next 26 years will be CAPEX for the addition of new power generation capacity to meet the increased 700 T

163、Wh annual electricity demand in 2050.Annual investment in this sector will nearly double to GBP 20bn over the next three decades up to 2050.The addition of nearly 105 GW of wind capacity will be the largest contributor to this investment(GBP 293bn in total).In parallel,expansion and strengthening of

164、 the current power grid will be required.Annual expenditure will increase more than three-fold from historical levels,rising from GBP 2.5bn today to GBP 9bn in the 2040s.This will account for close to 20%of energy infrastructure spend in the next 30 years.Going forward,we see annual upstream oil and

165、 gas investment reducing significantly compared with the GBP 10bn historical level,reflecting the maturity of the UK Continental Shelf production basin.For the next decade,annual investment will still be close to GBP 3bn to bring online various remaining large projects and tie-backs to existing hubs

166、,but then reduces further to very low levels after 2030.7 ENERGY EXPENDITUREThere are various definitions of energy expenditure,so it is important to clearly define what is covered in our capital expenditure(CAPEX)figures.We have included all investment costs for fossil-fuel extraction,transport,and

167、 conversion to hydrogen and electricity.Similarly,all costs in the power sector are incorporated,including power grids,storage capacity,and the installation and operation of renewable energy plants.However,we have excluded investments in energy efficiency measures and costs related to end-use spendi

168、ng in manufacturing and transport.We also included the costs associated with replacing space heating equipment in buildings and the estimated costs associated with upgrading insulation of UK housing stock.7.1 Energy infrastructure investment70DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYD

169、ROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYRamp-up of hydrogen production for use in industry,transport,gas-fired generation,and to some extent in domestic heating,will result in increasing investment for electrolysers and reformers;GBP 32bn and GBP 7bn,respe

170、ctively,over the next 30 years.Based on our current forecast,there will be limited uptake of hydrogen for domestic heating.Hence,we do not foresee major new investments for repur-posing the current pipeline network to hydrogen operation.As a result,pipeline CAPEX remains at the current GBP 500mn per

171、 year.Our forecast shows an expected 50 MtCO2/yr carbon capture and storage(CCS)capacity for capturing emissions from the power and process sectors by 2050,requiring a GBP 21bn investment over that period.Linked to the increased amount of variable renewable sources on the grid,a total of 300 GWh of

172、utility-scale electricity energy storage capacity(batteries and pumped hydro)needs to be added to the network by 2050,requiring GBP 76bn investment over that time frame.To accommodate the expanding fleet of EVs in the UK,we predict the installation of more than 360,000 fast-charging stations by 2050

173、,requiring total investment of GBP 41bn across the country.We have also included an estimate for the investment required to upgrade/retrofit insulation TABLE 7.1Past and forecast trends in annual capital expenditure on the UK energy systemAverage annual Energy System CAPEX spend trend 1981-2050(GBP

174、Bn)Total CAPEXspend 2024-2050 (GBP bn)CAPEX CategoryHistoricalForecast1981-20002001-20232024-20302031-20402041-2050Power generation total4.97.617.622.820.9559Wind0.03.39.811.211.2293Solar0.00.61.92.02.760Nuclear3.30.00.47.63.5114Gas/bio fired1.03.63.50.83.567Other power generation0.60.11.91.20.025El

175、ectrical grid2.62.67.210.010.8258Upstream oil and gas10.89.42.60.50.023Pipelines0.30.40.20.21.118Electrolysers0.00.00.60.81.932Reformers0.00.00.20.40.27CCS0.00.00.01.01.121Direct Air Capture0.00.00.00.10.23Storage0.20.12.92.92.776EV charging infrastructure0.00.10.92.60.941Buildings insulation retrof

176、its1.33.44.75.05.4136Space heating equipment5.15.06.06.46.4170Total25.428.742.852.651.51,34471DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYin UK buildings to reduce heating energy demand(3540%improvement

177、in efficiency)and to allow efficient use of heat pumps across the UK housing stock.We have based our estimates on current retrofit rates of approximately 1%of housing stock per annum(250,000 homes per annum)and an average retrofit cost of approximately GBP 18,000.This would translate to a cost of ap

178、proximately GBP 45bn per year.To accommodate the switch from mainly gas-fired central heating to heat pumps for domestic heating,we forecast an increase in annual spend for space-heating equipment across UK residential and commercial properties.Historically,these costs were mainly related to replaci

179、ng gas boilers at the end of their life(typically 15 years)at an average cost of GBP 5bn per year across the UK buildings stock.Going forward,these costs will be a combination of boiler replacements and a gradual introduction of heat pumps.As a result,we expect these average annual replacement costs

180、 to increase to GBP 6-7bn/yr by the 2040s.As discussed in the previous section,the average annual UK energy CAPEX spend will increase signifi-cantly in absolute terms from GBP 28bn in the 19802023 period to GBP 50bn over the next 3 decades.However,as the economy grows,the share of GDP devoted to ene

181、rgy CAPEX expenditure remains rela-tively stable at around 1.3%of GDP across the whole 19902050 period.This is illustrated in Figure 7.2.Energy system spending was actually significantly higher,at close to 2.0%of GDP,during development of the fossil-fuel industry in the UK in the 1980s.As the econom

182、y grows,the share of GDP devoted to energy system CAPEX expenditure remains relatively stable at around 1.4%of GDP across the whole 19902050 period.72DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYPublic ac

183、ceptability of the need for energy tech-nology changes in households is vitally important for achieving net zero,and this is influenced by the direct financial impacts on households.Household energy expenditure includes utility bills for gas and electricity(for heating,lighting,appliances,and other

184、energy uses);fuel costs for household vehicles;and the cost of installing(CAPEX)and maintaining(OPEX)equipment.The impact of the spike in energy prices in 2021 and 2022 are still being seen by households,although prices did decrease somewhat in 2023.The vulnerability of households to fuel poverty re

185、mains a high concern for governments and NGOs at the local,regional,and national levels.Figure 7.3 shows the UK ETO forecast for a typical households total energy expenditure,compared to 2021.The spike in energy prices in 202122(from a combination of the effects of the war in Ukraine on energy marke

186、ts and strong inflation in the UK economy)caused household energy costs to increase significantly.They are expected to drop to below 2021 levels by 2026 and then gradually reduce further to be almost half that in 2021 by 2050.Please note that our estimate of household energy expenditure does not inc

187、lude the following:cost of improving building efficiency,cost of public transport,the marginal cost for an electric car compared to an internal combustion engine car,and cost of fuels other than gas or electricity such as biofuels and heating oil.The expected decline in household energy expen-diture

188、 will be driven by increased electrification of both road transport and household heating.Road:The retail price of petrol saw big increases in 2021 and 2022.It increased by 15%in 2021 and 25%in 2022 compared to the year before,meaning the price of petrol was 44%higher in 2022 compared to 2020.The pr

189、ice has come down from the peak,decreasing by 10%in 2023.(DESNZ,2024c)From now to 2050 we expect to see a continual decrease in road fuel costs,driven predominantly by the ever increasing rate of conversion of household vehicles to electric vehicles reaching 95%of the vehicle stock by 2050.Electric

190、vehicles convert energy to vehicle motion far more efficiently than cars with internal combustion engines.Energy savings from electrification will be aided by continual improvements in the efficiency of vehicles due to technology learning.While vehicle-km per household is expected to increase by 17%

191、between 2023 and 2050,there will be a simultaneous 70%decrease in energy used per km travelled,with a net decrease in household road fuel expenses of 65%.Home energy:Average residential energy demand is expected to decrease by 35%between 2023 and 2050,and home energy costs will decline by around hal

192、f in the same period.This is despite the share of residential energy demand as electricity increasing from 24%in 2023 to 34%in 2050 and the cost of electricity being much higher than natural gas.In general,the cost of heating equipment is quite small compared to the cost of fuel.Equipment and main-t

193、enance costs per household are expected to remain fairly steady up to 2050.Fuel poverty:The energy price spikes in 2021/2022 forced many households into fuel poverty that had previously not been.Around 13%of households in England were in fuel poverty in 2023,rising from 27%in 2022.Improvements in en

194、ergy efficiency have meant that 54%of low income households are now living in properties with a Fuel Poverty Energy Efficiency Rating(FPEER)of band C or better.By 2024,government expect that fuel poverty will decrease to 12.7%(DESNZ,2024e).Household energy expenditureDriven by increasing rates of el

195、ectrification of both household road transport and heating,we see household energy expenditure continuing to decline in future,reaching 2021 levels by 2026 and almost half of 2021 levels by 2050.73DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDE

196、LECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis chapter discusses the emissions trajectory for the UK based on our forecast primary energy mix up to 2050.Our ETO model provides a forecast of those energy-related CO2 emissions based on assumed emission factors for the primary energy mix.To derive the tota

197、l UK GHG emissions,we add the contribution of other energy and non-energy-related(mainly the agricultural sector)anthropogenic emissions based on decarbonization assumptions.UK total GHG emissions trajectory By 2050,we forecast the UKs total emissions to be around 144 MtCO2e approximating to an 82%r

198、eduction from 1990 levels.This falls short of the 2019 amendment to the Climate Change Act,which legislated for net zero by 2050.Our forecast also shows that the UK will not meet its recently updated Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC),where the UK committed to an 81%reduction in GHG emissions b

199、etween 1990 and 2035.We expect the actual reduction to be around 68%by 2035,with the transport and buildings sectors contributing around 34%and 27%respectively.To date,the UK has met its first three carbon budgets CB1(20082012)and CB2(20132017)and CB3(20182022).Much of the progress so far has been a

200、chieved through the phasing out of coal generated electricity.For the next three carbon budgets,we note that the emissions reduction level is correlated to the timing of implementation of government policies and business models which dictate the pace of change in the various sectors of the economy.C

201、arbon budget 4(CB4):Our model indicates that the UK will narrowly meet its budget of 1,950 MtCO2e over the period 20232027 as total emissions are projected to be around 1,837 MtCO2e(average of 367 MtCO2e/yr compared to a budget average of 390 MtCO2e/yr).Most of this is anticipated to come from emiss

202、ion reductions mainly in the manufacturing and power sectors,with expected decreases of 25%and 29%respectively between 2023 and 2027.Carbon budget 5(CB5):We expect the UK to marginally meet its fifth carbon budget of 1,725 MtCO2e over the period 20282032 with total emissions from our forecast being

203、around 1,657 MtCO2e(average of 331 8 UK EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE IMPLICATIONSWe forecast that the UK will fall short of its latest Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC)commitment,which aims for an 81%emissions reduction by 2035 from 1990 levels.It will also miss its legally binding 2050 target of net

204、 zero.Lack of consistent policies and of clear implementation plans to decarbonise the buildings and transport sectors are the primary drivers for the UK missing its targets.74DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICY

205、EXECUTIVE SUMMARYMtCO2e/yr compared to a budget average of 345 MtCO2e/yr).The main factor in achieving CB5 is a 39%reduction in emissions from the power sector,a 31%reduction in the manufacturing sector,and a 21%increase in decarbonisation in the transport sector through the adoption of electric veh

206、icles(EVs).Carbon budget 6(CB6):The UK is projected to miss its sixth carbon budget of 965 MtCO2e over the period 20332037,with total emissions over that period expected to be around 1,453 MtCO2e.The sixth carbon budget is a significant step-up in emissions reduction compared to the previous budgets

207、 the average of 190 MtCO2e per year for CB6 compared to 345 MtCO2e per year for CB5 corresponds to a reduction of around 45%.For the first time,the sixth carbon budget will include the UKs share of inter-national aviation and shipping emissions.The primary reason for not meeting the emission reducti

208、on targets is the insufficient pace of decarbonization across most sectors of the economy.The current approach to the energy transition remains incremental with no clear imple-mentation plan.To deliver on the 2035 NDC target and the legally binding 2050 net-zero target,a transformative approach back

209、ed by detailed and clear implementation plans that consider all the stakeholders is required to successfully deliver each target or initiative.Energy-related emissions by source UK energy-related CO2 emissions have decreased by approximately 43%over the period 19902023.Our forecast,as illustrated in

210、 Figure 8.2,shows that the energy-related CO2 emissions will continue to fall over the entire forecast period in lockstep with the decline in use of fossil fuels in our energy system.In September 2024,the last coal-fired power plant in the UK was shut down,confining coal use to the manufacturing sec

211、tor.Coal use in manufacturing will primarily be for energy intensive processes such as iron and steel production.However,this usage is also expected to decrease due to The UK is projected to miss its sixth carbon budget of 965 MtCO2e for the period of 2033-2037.increased recycling,improved energy ef

212、ficiency of industrial processes,direct electrification and use of hydrogen and bioenergy.Natural gas use has grown by around 35%over the period 19902022,mainly to replace coal in electricity generation.However,we expect that gas use will decrease as the power sector decarbonizes and that by 2050,em

213、issions from natural gas use in the energy system will be around 55%less than in 1990.Oil use is on a continuous downward trajectory with emissions from combustion of oil and oil products forecast to be 85%lower in 2050 than in 1990.This decline is mainly driven by the electrification of road transp

214、ort and adoption of low-carbon fuels in aviation and shipping.75DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYEnergy-related emissions by sector The sectoral breakdown of energy-related CO2 emissions is sh

215、own in Figure 8.3.In 2023,transport was the largest sectorial contributor to energy-related CO2 emissions accounting for around 46%of all energy-related emissions that year at 162 MtCO2.The buildings sector emitted 20%(71 MtCO2)of the total,while power and manufacturing accounted for around 16%(55 M

216、tCO2)and 13%(45 MtCO2),respectively.In 2050,emissions from transport will be around 33 MtCO2,79%less than in 1990.The UK government ZEV mandate introduced in 2023,whereby 100%of new vehicles by 2035 are to be zero emission,should result in sharp decline in transport-related emissions although there

217、has been recent pushback from the industry regarding the implementation of that mandate.Use of petroleum products will persist within the sector.In road transport,there will be an existing stock of ICEVs,particularly commercial ICEVs,that will continue to use oil products.Within aviation,we see pene

218、tration of low-carbon fuels such as synthetic e-fuels and hydrogen emerge for medium to long-haul flights,but this will not fully displace jet fuel by 2050.A similar picture is seen in shipping where ammonia,bio-based fuels and synthetic fuels play an increasing part in long-distance shipping,but ma

219、rine bunker fuel and LNG will comprise around 42%of the total energy demand in 2050.The buildings sector also sees a large fall in emis-sions to around 45 MtCO2 in 2050,around 54%less than in 1990.This fall is driven by a combination of improved energy efficiency of buildings and appli-ances,as well

220、 as the switch to low-carbon sources for heating,primarily in the form of heat pumps,which reach a penetration of around 35%of households by 2050,well below the UK government targets.The low penetration of heat pumps can be directly attributed to the lack of a holistic approach as reflected in the l

221、ack of consistent and clear policies around home insulation,the high price of electricity due to an outdated marginal pricing model,the lack of a robust supply chain with competent installers and the lack of low-cost financing schemes for the high upfront heat pump CAPEX.The remaining emissions in 2

222、050 arise from use of natural gas which comprises over 54%of final energy demand for buildings in 2050,around 15%less than in 2023.The continued use of natural gas is due to the higher levelized cost of hydrogen and the low penetration of heat pumps in households.The power sector is net zero by 2050

223、.The govern-ments ambition is to have a fully decarbonized power sector by 2030,but we forecast emissions from that sector to be around 31 MtCO2 by then.The manufacturing sector emitted approximately 45 MtCO2 in 2023,55%less than in 1990.The reduction can be attributed to the offshoring of heavy ind

224、ustries from the UK.We expect manufacturing emissions to be around 5 MtCO2 by 2050,which is 95%less than 1990 levels.This decline is driven by factors which include increased circularity within the sector leading to reuse of materials,better design of products,increased efficiency of manufacturing p

225、rocesses,and the use of CCS to capture process emissions.76DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe production of almost all types of energy(except wind and solar PV)relies upon water either for c

226、ooling or,in the case of hydrogen,as a raw material.We forecast that as we move towards 2040 and beyond,electricity will deliver around 50%of the final energy demand of which renewable wind and solar generation will account for nearly a third.Demand for water will remain a key challenge for future l

227、ow-carbon energy systems and supplies of water may increase or decrease due to the effects of climate change.Hydrogen is likely to be an important part of the future energy mix.Although it is the most abundant element on earth,it is not usually found in the form of hydrogen gas and it needs to be pr

228、oduced from either water(using low-carbon electricity)or by reforming fossil-fuel hydrocarbons in the presence of steam.For hydrogen to be a low-carbon fuel,the electricity for electrolysis needs to be low-carbon,and carbon capture and storage(CCS)needs to be part of reforming fossil fuels.We make a

229、 distinction between primary and secondary water.Primary water is largely required for hydrogen production and,as shown in figure 8.4,its use will rise 5-fold by 2050.Secondary water is required in all forms of thermal power generation;growing and using biomass;and carbon capture processes.Although

230、secondary water is returned to the envi-ronment(for example,cooling water taken from rivers or the sea and returned),the quantities required are five to ten times greater than primary water and,most importantly,the power generators and CCS plant cannot run without it.There have been numerous inciden

231、ts globally in which the temperature of cooling water has been too high due to climate change and power plant has had to be shut down.One of the most water-intensive processes is BECCS(bioenergy with CCS),though on the positive side this creates net negative carbon emissions.Five key points about wa

232、ter supply and demand for the UK energy system:Water is crucial to almost every aspect of energy supply,from fossil fuel extraction and processing,biofuels cultivation and electricity generation.Reliable access to usable water sources is a worldwide concern and will affect the feasibility of both hy

233、drogen projects and projects in the wider energy sector.Availability of suitable water resources is already having an impact on energy production and reliability,affecting a wide variety of locations and technologies.The availability of water resources to supply new hydrogen production will ultimate

234、ly be contingent on the selected location and scale of production.The identification and evaluation of suitable water supply sources should be a key consideration when deciding the location and design parameters of a hydrogen production plant.Climate change is already having an impact on water suppl

235、y,security and demand this is likely to get worse in the future.As the share of renewable power in the energy supply increases,replacing gas-fired power,the demand for cooling water at gas-fired power stations will correspondingly decrease.Despite this,water demand will remain above current day figu

236、res,as primary water demand for hydrogen production and secondary water demand for nuclear power cooling increase over time.The fuels or technologies used to achieve the energy transition,if not properly managed,may increase water stress or be limited by it.Water usage for energy production in the U

237、K is projected to reduce until 2025,after which it will increase out to 2050.This is attributed to an increase of primary water demand for hydrogen production and secondary water demand for nuclear power cooling and carbon capture technology.Water use for UK energy systems12345FIGURE 8.477DNV Energy

238、 Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYClimate change has been the subject of over 30 years of global advocacy and diplomacy.Biodiversity loss,however,has received much less attention but is rapidly rising in

239、 importance as our whole economic system is underpinned by nature.However,the failure to account for the full economic value of natural capital is a significant factor in the continuing loss of biodiversity.December 2022 saw the ratification of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework(GBF)

240、by 188 countries as part of COP15 on biodiversity.The GBF aims to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and put nature on a path to recovery by 2050.The GBF enforced the need for National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans(NBSAPs)as a mechanism to align national efforts with global biodiversity t

241、argets.Whilst the UK is yet to publish an NBSAP,great progress has been made toward protecting national biodiversity.The Environment Act(2021)mandates the requirement for Biodiversity Net Gain(BNG),ensuring developers leave nature in an improved state.Further,Target 15 of the GBF is particularly rel

242、evant for large companies and financial institutions as it requires such organisations to regularly assess,monitor,and dis-close their impacts and dependencies on biodiversity.The recently published recommendations from the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures(TNFD)provide a framework f

243、or businesses to assess their biodiversity footprint.The TNFD joins a suite of disclosure frameworks and standards which are now available,including the European Sustainability Reporting Standards,the Global Reporting Initiative and Science Based Targets for Nature,among others.The key challenge wit

244、h assessing biodiversity risks,however,is that nature is complex.Biodiversity impact is generally local and requires site specific data on species,habitats,and ecosystems to assess impacts.Such data is often unavailable and requires surveys.In addition,translating the findings from site data into cl

245、ear action plans can be challenging given that assessment methodologies to quantify net gain and/or offset strategies are still evolving.This is particularly relevant in the marine sector,where Marine Net Gain(MNG)is undergoing consultation in the UK,but development of metrics and methodologies is s

246、till in progress.The ETO predicts a sixfold increase of installed onshore and offshore wind capacity by 2050,creating an oppor-tunity for BNG and MNG to ensure biodiversity is able to thrive alongside renewable energy production.Though companies need to be aware of the implications associated with t

247、his such as cost and time scales.Biodiversity assessment in practice DNV provides BNG assessments for our customers in the UK,and develops bespoke tools where projects are in locations where net gain metrics are not yet established.Further to this,an MNG tool has been developed by our teams,and is u

248、ndergoing successful piloting,offering the first step to customers who are engaged with MNG for offshore wind.A phased biodiversity materiality assessment has also been developed,tailored to meet the specific require-ments of projects and/or organisations so they can address the above challenges aro

249、und disclosures.The biodiversity materiality assessment combines existing standards and frameworks aiming to answer key questions in a series of steps:What do we have to worry about?Screen for material impacts and dependencies by identifying the interface with nature along a companys operations and

250、across its value chains and evaluating the material impacts of those interfaces.The screening identifies high impact and/or high dependency sites based on biodiversity heat maps and local knowledge as far as is available.To what extent should we be concerned?Deep dive at the high impact/high depende

251、ncies locations to assess the actual state of nature.This can be conducted as a combination of site surveys and satellite data.The outcome would be a detailed view of the species and ecosystem status at those specific sites.How do we turn the biodiversity data into insights and actions to deliver a

252、positive solution?Build a risk and opportunity picture by integrating the findings on the state of nature at the high impact/high dependencies locations and the potential impact on relevant stakeholders(through open dialogue)such as local communities,regulators,NGOs,and so on.How do we ensure we are

253、 doing the right things?Develop companys biodiversity strategy,targets,and metrics.Implement appropriate mitigation and moni-toring programmes and ensure transparent reporting and disclosure of performance.This assessment will enable organisations to understand their potential level of biodiversity

254、risk exposure and their readiness(in terms of resources,data availability,internal capabilities,etc.)to address those risks and deliver positive solutions.The approach will necessarily vary between organisation types and will support them in meeting regulatory requirements.Biodiversity mattersDespit

255、e ambitious targets to address nature loss through the Global Biodiversity Framework,the size of the response and investment remains far from what is needed.(State of Nature,2023).78DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS

256、POLICYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYREFERENCESACEA European Automobile Manufacturers Association(2024)New car registrations.https:/www.acea.auto/pc-registrations/new-car-registra-tions-1-1-in-october-2024-year-to-date-battery-electric-sales-4-9/BEIS Department for Business,Energy and Industrial Strategy(2022)Ene

257、rgy Trends UK:April to June 2022.https:/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1107456/Energy_Trends_September_2022.pdfDESNZ Department for Energy Security and Net Zero(2023)UK energy in brief 2023.https:/www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-energy-in-

258、brief-2023DESNZ(2024a)Energy consumption in the UK 2024.https:/www.gov.uk/government/statistics/energy-consumption-in-the-uk-2024DESNZ(2024b)Advanced Nuclear Technologies.https:/www.gov.uk/government/publications/advanced-nuclear-technologies/advanced-nu-clear-technologiesDESNZ(2024c)Weekly road fue

259、l prices.https:/www.gov.uk/govern-ment/statistics/weekly-road-fuel-pricesDESNZ(2024d)UK territorial greenhouse gas emissions national statistics.https:/www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-territorial-green-house-gas-emissions-national-statistics DESNZ(2024e)Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics in England

260、,2024(2023 data).https:/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ccecba-1d939500129466a9/annual-fuel-poverty-statistics-report-2024.pdfDNV(2024a)Energy Transition Outlook A global and regional forecast to 2050.https:/ forecast to 2050.https:/ of UK Energy Statistics(2024)Digest of UK Energy Statisti

261、cs(DUKES)2024.https:/www.gov.uk/government/statistics/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes-2024 EHPA European Heat Pump Association(2024)In which countries does the electricity price work for heat pumps?https:/www.ehpa.org/news-and-resources/news/in-which-countries-does-the-electricity-price-work-fo

262、r-heat-pumps/European Commission(2023a)Alternative fuels infrastructure:Council adopts new law for more recharging and refuelling stations across Europe.https:/alternative-fuels-observatory.ec.europa.eu/general-infor-mation/news/alternative-fuels-infrastructure-coun-cil-adopts-new-law-more-rechargin

263、gEuropean Commission(2023b)FuelEU Maritime Regulation.https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1805/ojEV Volumes(2024)Global EV sales 2023.https:/www.ev-FES Future Energy Scenarios(2024)Future Energy Scenarios by Nation-al Energy System Operator.https:/www.neso.energy/publications/future-energy-scenari

264、os-fesGov.UK(2022)British energy security strategy.https:/www.gov.uk/government/publications/british-energy-security-strategy/british-ener-gy-security-strategyGov.UK(2023)Welsh steels future secured as UK Government and Tata Steel announce Port Talbot green transition proposal.https:/www.gov.uk/gove

265、rnment/news/welsh-steels-future-secured-as-uk-government-and-tata-steel-announce-port-talbot-green-transition-proposal Gov.UK(2024)Heat pumps in demand as grant applications soar by 75%.https:/www.gov.uk/government/news/heat-pumps-in-demand-as-grant-applications-soar-by-75GWR Great Western Railways(

266、2024)Great Western Railways battery train sets new distance record.https:/ of Commons(2021)UK Steel Industry:Statistics and policy.https:/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7317/CBP-7317.pdf IEA International Energy Agency(2024)Global EV Outlook 2024.https:/www.iea.org/reports/globa

267、l-ev-outlook-2024 IEA WEB(2023)IEA World Energy Balances.https:/www.iea.org/da-ta-and-statistics/data-product/world-energy-balances IMF International Monetary Fund(2023)World Economic Outlook.Washington DC.Marklines-Marklines Automotive Industry Portal(2024)Automotive Sales Data.https:/ Energy celeb

268、rates the approval of 10-year life extensions across six of its operating wind farms.https:/ National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory(2019)NAEI Data Portal.https:/naei.energysecurity.gov.uk/data/mapsNAO National Audit Office(2024a)Low heat pump uptake slowing progress on decarbonising home heating.h

269、ttps:/www.nao.org.uk/press-releases/low-heat-pump-uptake-slowing-progress-on-decarbonis-ing-home-heating/NAO(2024b)Decarbonising home heating.https:/www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Decarbonising-home-heating-HC-581.pdfNikolakopoulos et al.(2024)Reducing carbon emissions in cement productio

270、n through solarization of the calcination process and thermo-chemical energy storage,Computers&Chemical Engineering.https:/ OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(2023)Real GDP long-term forecast.https:/www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/real-gdp-long-term-forecast.htmlONS UK Offic

271、e for National Statistics(2024)National population projec-tions:2021-based interim.https:/www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulation-andcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/bulle-tins/nationalpopulationprojections/2021basedinterim ONR-Office for Nuclear Regulation(2024)Operational power stati

272、ons.https:/www.onr.org.uk/our-work/what-we-regulate/operational-pow-er-stations/OZEV-Office for Zero Emission Vehicles(2023)Alternative fuels infra-structure regulations(AFIR)report 2023.https:/www.gov.uk/govern-ment/publications/alternative-fuels-infrastructure-regulations-afir-re-port-2023/alterna

273、tive-fuels-infrastructure-regulations-afir-report-2023RenewableUK(2024)Onshore Wind:Could repowering,extended lifetimes and hybrid projects help deliver the ambitious UK capacity growth targets to 2030 and beyond?https:/ al.(2018)The remaining potential for energy savings in UK households,Energy Pol

274、icy,121(June),pp.542552.Scottish Power Renewables(2024)ScottishPower to repower Scotlands first commercial windfarm.https:/ Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders(2024a)SMMT vehicle data:car registrations.https:/www.smmt.co.uk/vehicle-data/car-registrations/SMMT(2024b)SMMT vehicle data:LCR regis

275、trations.https:/www.smmt.co.uk/vehicle-data/lcv-registrations/State of Nature(2023)State of Nature 2023 Report.https:/stateofnature.org.uk/Statista(2022)United Kingdom Distribution of GDP across economic sectors 2022.https:/ Supreme Court of the United Kingdom(2024)Case details:UKSC 2022/0064.https:

276、/www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2022-0064#judg-ment-detailsUCL University College London(2022)Electricity prices dictated by gas producers who provide less than half of UK electricity.https:/www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2022/sep/electricity-prices-dictated-gas-producers-who-provi-de-less-half-uk-electricityUK

277、 Department for Transport(2023)Zero Emission Vessels and Infrastruc-ture(ZEVI)competition.https:/www.gov.uk/government/publications/zero-emission-vessels-and-infrastructure-zevi-competitionUS DOE Department of Energy(2024)DOE Global Energy Storage Database.https:/gesdb.sandia.gov/Virgin Atlantic(202

278、3)Virgin Atlantic flies worlds first 100%sustainable aviation fuel flight from London to New York.https:/corporate.virginatlan- charging statistics 2024.https:/www.zap- Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE S

279、UMMARYTHE PROJECT TEAMCore team Frank Ketelaars Project managerViken Chinien Policies and emissionsOnur zgn Global ETO model responsibleChi Zhang UK ETO modelling teamKris Strug UK ETO modelling teamRachel Freeman UK ETO modelling teamHari Vamadevan Project sponsorSverre Alvik Global DNV ETO leadCon

280、tributors Ali Daoud,Angus Milne,Ben Brewin,Ben Child,Benedict Harrison,Caroline Tsvigu,Darshak Parikh,Elizabeth Tinsley,Gareth Jones,Graham Faiz,Graham Nott,Ioannis Papadopoulos,James Jenkins,Keir Harman,Michael Dodd,Peyi Pey Gerard,Rafiek Versmissen,Robert Maxwell,Sarah Kimpton,Stefanie Bourne,Stev

281、en He,Thibault Delouvrie,Tim IllsonResearch and modelling Adrien Zambon,Anne Louise Koefoed,Eduard Romanenko,Erica McConnell,Mats Rinaldo,Sondre Vik Furuseth,Sujeetha Selvakkumaran,Tak OnoEditor Mark IrvineAl-Karim GovindjiCommunications Stacey SummersJohn NeugebauerReshma Nair Published by DNV AS D

282、esign:Minnesota Agency.Images:Cover image:Unsplash.P.6,7,8,11,18,20,25,27,29,31,32,34,36,37,42,44,45,51,53,56,57,58,64,65,66,68,69,70,72:Shutterstock.P.3,15,49,50,55,62,63,74,77:Unsplash.P.40:Richard J Adams.P.16,17,19,21,30,33,60,61,71,73,76:AdobestockSubscribe to the latest Energy Transition insig

283、hts from DNV DNV PublicationsDNV has prepared this report as a cross-disciplinary exercise between the Group Technology and Research unit and our business areas.80DNV Energy Transition Outlook UK 2025ENERGY SUPPLYCCS&HYDROGENENERGY EXPENDITUREEMISSIONSENERGY DEMANDELECTRICITY&GAS POLICYEXECUTIVE SUM

284、MARYHeadquarters:DNV AS NO-1322 Hvik,Norway Tel:+47 67 57 99 00 The trademarks DNV and Det Norske Veritas are the properties of companies in the Det Norske Veritas group.All rights reserved.About DNVDNV is a global quality assurance and risk management company.Driven by our purpose of safeguarding l

285、ife,property,and the environment,we enable organizations to advance the safety and sustainability of their business.We provide classification,technical assurance,software and independent expert advisory services to the maritime,oil&gas,power,and renewables industries.We also provide certification,su

286、pply chain,and data management services to customers across a wide range of industries.Combining technical,digital and operational expertise,risk methodology,and in-depth industry knowledge,we empower our customers decisions and actions with trust and confidence.We continuously invest in research and collaborative innovation to provide customers and society with operational and technological foresight.With origins stretching back to 1864 and operations in more than 100 countries,our experts are dedicated to helping customers make the world safer,smarter,and