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1、The Global RisksReport 202520th EditionI N S I G H T R E P O R TAcknowledgementThe Global Risks Report is produced exclusively by the World Economic Forum.We are grateful to our longstanding partners on previous editions,Marsh McLennan and Zurich Insurance Group.Their generous inputs and in-depth gu
2、idance have been invaluable over the last 20 years.Terms of use and disclaimerThis document is published by the World Economic Forum as a contribution to a project,insight area or interaction.The findings,interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are a result of a collaborative process facili
3、tated and endorsed by the World Economic Forum but whose results do not necessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum,nor the entirety of its Members,Partners or other stakeholders.World Economic Forum91-93 route de la CapiteCH-1223 Cologny/GenevaSwitzerlandTel.:+41(0)22 869 1212Fax:+4
4、1(0)22 786 2744E-mail:contactweforum.orgwww.weforum.orgCopyright 2025 by the World Economic ForumAll rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted,in any form or by any means,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,or otherwise without the prior
5、 permission of the World Economic Forum.ISBN:978-2-940631-30-8The report and an interactive data platform are available at https:/www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2025/.The Global Risks Report 2025January 2025Global Risks Report 20252ContentsPrefaceOverview of methodologyKey findings
6、Chapter 1:Global Risks 2025:A world of growing divisions1.1 The world in 20251.2 The path to 20271.3“Geopolitical recession”1.4 Supercharged economic tensions1.5 Technology and polarizationEndnotesChapter 2:Global Risks 2035:The point of no return2.1 The world in 20352.2 Structural forces2.3 Polluti
7、on at a crossroads2.4 Losing control of biotech?2.5 Super-ageing societies2.6 Looking back:20 years of the Global Risks ReportEndnotesAppendix A:Definitions and Global Risks ListAppendix B:Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025Appendix C:Executive Opinion Survey:National Risk PerceptionsAppendix D
8、:Risk governancePartner InstitutesAcknowledgements4561313152028344043434748536066707477809196102Global Risks Report 20253PrefaceThe multi-decade structural forces highlighted in last years Global Risks Report technological acceleration,geostrategic shifts,climate change and demographic bifurcation a
9、nd the interactions they have with each other have continued their march onwards.The ensuing risks are becoming more complex and urgent,and accentuating a paradigm shift in the world order characterized by greater instability,polarizing narratives,eroding trust and insecurity.Moreover,this is occurr
10、ing against a background where todays governance frameworks seem ill-equipped for addressing both known and emergent global risks or countering the fragility that those risks generate.This is the 20th edition of the Global Risks Report.Looking back over the last two decades,environmental risks have
11、steadily consolidated their position as the greatest source of long-term concern.This years Global Risks Perception Survey shows that a sense of alarm is also mounting in the shorter term:Environmental problems,from extreme weather to pollution,are here now and the need to implement solutions is urg
12、ent.Concerns about state-based armed conflict and geoeconomic confrontation have on average remained relatively high in the ranks over the last 20 years,with some variability.Today,geopolitical risk and specifically the perception that conflicts could worsen or spread tops the list of immediate-term
13、 concerns.Fear and uncertainty cloud the outlook in various parts of the world,including in Ukraine,the Middle East,and Sudan,with multilateral institutions struggling to provide effective mediation and work towards resolutions.Societal risks such as inequality rank high among todays leading concern
14、s as well as over the last years.Polarization within societies is further hardening views and affecting policy-making.It also continues to fan the flames of misinformation and disinformation,which,for the second year running,is the top-ranked short-to medium-term concern across all risk categories.E
15、fforts to combat this risk are coming up against a formidable opponent in Generative AI-created false or misleading content that can be produced and distributed at scale.More broadly,technological risks,while not seen as immediate,rise in the rankings for the 10-year time horizon,given the rapid pac
16、e of change in areas such as AI and biotech.Saadia Zahidi Managing DirectorEconomic risks have fallen in the rankings since last year,with inflation and the risk of an economic downturn no longer top of mind among decision-makers and experts.But there is no room for complacency:if the coming months
17、see a spiral of tariffs and other trade-restricting measures globally,the economic consequences could be significant.Elevated valuations in several asset classes make them more vulnerable to these and other risks.In this report we dive deep into key global risk themes conflict,trade wars,and technol
18、ogy and polarization as leading short-to medium-term concerns,as well as pollution,biotech and super-ageing as areas where serious risks could unfold over a longer-term time horizon.We also provide a retrospective view of the last two decades of assessing global risks.Twenty years ago,when we were p
19、reparing our first Global Risks Report,the world was in a different place.Risks that have been well managed and mitigated since then were those where the concerted and collective efforts of multistakeholder leaders helped to build common ground,compromises and mutually acceptable solutions.It will b
20、e up to visionary leaders to involve all key stakeholders to address the risks now foreseen for the next decade and to build durable peace and prosperity.The report highlights the latest findings from our annual Global Risks Perception Survey,which this year brought together the collective intellige
21、nce of over 900 global leaders across academia,business,government,international organizations and civil society.It also leverages insights from some 100 thematic experts,including the risk specialists who form the Global Risks Report Advisory Board,the Global Future Council on Complex Risks,and the
22、 Chief Risk Officers Community.We would also like to express our gratitude to the core team that developed this report Mark Elsner and Grace Atkinson and to Ricky Li,Ignacio Moreno and Gayle Markovitz for their support.The world has changed profoundly over the last 20 years and will continue to do s
23、o in unpredictable ways.But foresight based on informed,expert views remains critical for better planning and preparation,in both the short and long term.The 20th Global Risks Report continues to shine a light on globally relevant risks that are often complex and sometimes alarming.Yet,in examining
24、the trajectory of the risks foreseen over the last two decades,it is clear that there is no viable alternative to multilateral solutions going forward.Leaders across the public and private sectors,civil society,international organizations and academia must seize the baton to work openly and construc
25、tively with each other.By deepening honest dialogue and acting urgently to mitigate the risks that lie ahead,we can rebuild trust and together create stronger,more resilient economies and societies.Global Risks Report 20254Overview of methodologyThe Global Risks Perception Survey(GRPS)has underpinne
26、d the Global Risks Report for two decades and is the World Economic Forums premier source of original global risks data.This years GRPS has brought together leading insights on the evolving global risks landscape from over 900 experts across academia,business,government,international organizations a
27、nd civil society.Responses for the GRPS 2024-2025 were collected between 2 September and 18 October 2024.“Global risk”is defined as the possibility of the occurrence of an event or condition that,if it occurs,would negatively impact a significant proportion of global GDP,population or natural resour
28、ces.Relevant definitions for each of the 33 global risks are included in Appendix A:Definitions and Global Risks List.The GRPS 2024-2025 included the following components:Risk landscape invited respondents to assess the likely impact(severity)of global risks over one-,two-and 10-year horizons to ill
29、ustrate the potential development of individual global risks over time and identify areas of key concern.Consequences asked respondents to consider the range of potential impacts of a global risk arising,to highlight relationships between risks and the potential for compounding crises.Risk governanc
30、e invited respondents to reflect on which approaches have the most potential for driving action on global risk reduction and preparedness.Outlook asked respondents to predict the evolution of key aspects underpinning the global risks landscape.Appendix B:Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025 prov
31、ides more detail on the methodology.To complement GRPS data on global risks,the report also draws on the World Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey(EOS)to identify risks that pose the most severe threat to each country over the next two years,as identified by over 11,000 business leaders in 121
32、economies.When considered in context with the GRPS,this data provides insight into local concerns and priorities and points to potential“hot spots”and regional manifestations of global risks.Appendix C:Executive Opinion Survey:National Risk Perceptions provides more detail.Finally,the report integra
33、tes the views of leading experts to generate foresight and to support analysis of the survey data.Contributions were collected from 59 colleagues across the World Economic Forums platforms.The report also harnesses qualitative insights from 96 experts from across academia,business,government,interna
34、tional organizations and civil society through community meetings,private interviews and thematic workshops conducted from April to November 2024.Experts included members of the Global Risks Report Advisory Board,the Global Future Council on Complex Risks and the Chief Risk Officers Community.Refer
35、to Acknowledgements for more detail.Global Risks Report 20255Key findingsThe Global Risks Report 2025 presents the findings of the Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025(GRPS),which captures insights from over 900 experts worldwide.The report analyses global risks through three timeframes to suppo
36、rt decision-makers in balancing current crises and longer-term priorities.Chapter 1 explores current or immediate-term(in 2025)and short-to medium-term1(to 2027)risks,and Chapter 2 focuses on the risks emerging in the long term(to 2035).The report considers not only the survey findings and the range
37、 of implications,but also provides six in-depth analyses of selected risk themes.Below are the key findings of the report,in which we compare the risk outlooks across the three time horizons.Declining optimismAs we enter 2025,the global outlook is increasingly fractured across geopolitical,environme
38、ntal,societal,economic and technological domains.Over the last year we have witnessed the expansion and escalation of conflicts,a multitude of extreme weather events amplified by climate change,widespread societal and political polarization,and continued technological advancements accelerating the s
39、pread of false or misleading information.Optimism is limited as the danger of miscalculation or misjudgment by political and military actors is high.We seem to be living in one of the most divided times since the Cold War,and this is reflected in the results of the GRPS,which reveal a bleak outlook
40、across all three time horizons current,short-term and long-term.A majority of respondents(52%)anticipate an unsettled global outlook over the short term(next two years),a similar proportion to last year(Figure A).Another 31%expect turbulence and 5%a stormy outlook.Adding together these three categor
41、ies of responses shows a combined four percentage point increase from last year,indicating a heightened pessimistic outlook for the world to 2027.Compared to this two-year outlook,the landscape deteriorates over the 10-year timeframe,with 62%of respondents expecting stormy or turbulent times.This lo
42、ng-term outlook has remained similar to the survey results last year,in terms of its level of negativity,reflecting respondent skepticism that current societal mechanisms and governing institutions are capable of navigating and mending the fragility generated by the risks we face today.Deepening geo
43、political and geoeconomic tensionsComparing this years findings for the world in 2025 with the two-year risk outlook provided by the GRPS two years ago shows how far Short-and long-term global outlookFIGURE ASourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025Short term(2 years)1%Long
44、 term(10 years)Stormy:Global catastrophic risks loomingTurbulent:Upheavals and elevated risk of global catastrophesUnsettled:Some instability,moderate risk of global catastrophesStable:Isolated disruptions,low risk of global catastrophesCalm:Negligible risk of global catastrophesWhich of the followi
45、ng best characterizes your outlook for the world over the following time periods?NoteThe percentages in the graph may not add up to 100%because values have been rounded up/down.11%52%31%5%17%45%30%8%Global Risks Report 20256Share of respondents(%)State-based armed conflictExtreme weather eventsGeoec
46、onomic confrontationMisinformation and disinformationSocietal polarizationEconomic downturnCritical change to Earth systemsLack of economic opportunity or unemploymentErosion of human rights and/or civic freedomsInequalityInvoluntary migration or displacementNatural resources shortagesAdverse outcom
47、es of AI technologiesCyber espionage and warfareCrime and illicit economic activityDisruptions to a systemically importantsupply chainConcentration of strategic resourcesand technologiesBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseAsset bubble burstDecline in health and well-beingBiological,chemical or n
48、uclear weaponsor hazardsDisruptions to critical infrastructureDebtInfectious diseasesIntrastate violenceInsufficient public infrastructureand social protectionsInflationPollutionOnline harmsCensorship and surveillanceNon-weather-related natural disastersTalent and/or labour shortagesAdverse outcomes
49、 of frontier technologiesCurrent Global Risk LandscapeFIGURE BSourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.“Please select one risk that you believe is most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2025.”Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTe
50、chnologicalperceptions have darkened when it comes to conflict.State-based armed conflict,now ranked as the#1 current risk by 23%of respondents(Figure B),was overlooked as a leading two-year risk two years ago.In a world that has seen an increasing number of armed conflicts over the last decade,2 na
51、tional security considerations are starting to dominate government agendas.Section 1.3:Geopolitical recession dives deep into the dangers of Global Risks Report 20257unilateralism taking hold in national security considerations and highlights the worsening humanitarian impacts of the ongoing conflic
52、ts.The risk of further destabilizing consequences following Russias invasion of Ukraine,as well as in the Middle East and in Sudan are likely to be amplifying respondents concerns beyond 2025 as well.In the two-year outlook,State-based armed conflict has moved up from#5 to#3 since our GRPS 2023-24(F
53、igure C).Section 1.4:Supercharged economic tensions explores how global geoeconomic tensions could unfold.The rise in the two-year ranking of Geoeconomic confrontation,from#14 last year to#9 today reflects unease about the path ahead for global economic relations.The role of technology in geopolitic
54、al tensions also concerns respondents,with Cyber espionage and warfare ranked#5 in the two-year outlook.However,the top risk in 2027 is Misinformation and disinformation,for the second year in a row(Figure C).There are many ways in which a proliferation of false or misleading content is complicating
55、 the geopolitical environment.It is a leading mechanism for foreign entities to affect voter intentions;it can sow doubt among the general public worldwide about what is happening in conflict zones;or it can be used to tarnish the image of products or services from another country.A growing sense of
56、 societal fragmentationSocietal fractures are central to the overall risks landscape,as shown in the risk interconnections map(Figure D).Inequality(wealth,income)is perceived as the most central risk of all,playing a significant role in both triggering and being influenced by other risks.It is contr
57、ibuting to weakening trust and diminishing our collective sense of shared values.As well as Inequality,other societal risks also feature in the top 10 of the two-year ranking:Societal polarization,Involuntary migration or displacement and Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms.The importance
58、ascribed to this set of societal risks by respondents suggests that social stability will be fragile over the next two years.Respondent concern around certain key economic risks Economic downturn and Inflation has subsided since last year,with these two risks witnessing the largest falls in the two-
59、year ranking(Figure 1.5).Nonetheless,the impacts of the cost-of-living crisis since 2022 contributed to Inequality becoming the top interconnected risk this year:Economic downturn,Inflation,and Debt were selected among the top causes of Inequality by GRPS respondents.Although there are fewer societa
60、l risks in the top 10 of the 10-year risk ranking than in the top 10 of the two-year risk ranking(two compared to four,see Figure C),the profound societal fractures that feature prominently in this report should not be perceived as solely short-term risks.Looking ahead to the next decade,Inequality
61、and Societal polarization continue to feature among the top 10 risks.This is an important pair of risks to watch,given how related they can be to bouts of social instability,and in turn to domestic political and to geostrategic volatility.In super-ageing societies such as Japan,South Korea,Italy or
62、Germany unfavourable demographic trends could accentuate these risks over the next 10 years.Pensions crises and labour shortages in the long-term care Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseGlobal risks ranked by severity over the short and long termFIGURE CSourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPe
63、rception Survey 2024-2025.Please estimate the likely impact(severity)of the following risks over a 2-year and 10-year period.1st2nd3rd4th5th6th7th8th9th10th2 years10 yearsExtreme weather eventsCritical change to Earth systemsNatural resource shortagesMisinformation and disinformationAdverse outcomes
64、 of AI technologiesInequalityCyber espionage and warfareSocietal polarizationPollution1st2nd3rd4th5th6th7th8th9th10thMisinformation and disinformationExtreme weather eventsSocietal polarizationCyber espionage and warfareState-based armed conflictInequalityInvoluntary migration or displacementErosion
65、 of human rights and/or civic freedomsGeoeconomic confrontationPollutionRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 20258sector are likely to become acute and widespread problems in super-ageing societies,with no easy fix for governments.Section 2.5:Super
66、-ageing societies explores this risk theme.Environmental risks-from long-term concern to urgent realityThe impacts of environmental risks have worsened in intensity and frequency since the Global Risks Report was launched in 2006,as discussed in depth in Section 2.6:Looking back:20 years of the Glob
67、al Risks Report.Moreover,the outlook for environmental risks over the next decade is alarming while all 33 risks in the GRPS are expected to worsen in severity(Figure E)from the two-year to the 10-year time horizon,environmental risks present the most significant deterioration.Extreme weather events
68、 are anticipated to become even more of a concern than they already are,with this risk being top ranked in the 10-year risk list for the second year running.Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse ranks#2 over the 10-year horizon,with a significant deterioration compared to its two-year ranking.The
69、 GRPS shows generational divergence when it comes to risk perceptions related to environmental Adverse outcomes of AI technologiesAdverse outcomesof frontier technologiesAsset bubble burstBiodiversity lossand ecosystem collapseBiological,chemical or nuclearweapons or hazardsCensorship and surveillan
70、ceConcentration ofstrategic resources and technologiesCrime and illiciteconomic activityCritical changeto Earth systemsCyber espionageand warfareDebtDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemicallyimportant supply chainDisruptions tocritical infrastructureEconomic downturnErosion of huma
71、n rightsand/or civic freedomsExtreme weathereventsGeoeconomicconfrontationInequalityInfectious diseasesInflationInsufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsIntrastate violenceInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack of economic opportunity or unemploymentMisinformation and disinformatio
72、nNatural resourceshortagesNon-weather-relatednatural disastersOnline harmsPollutionSocietal polarizationState-based armed conflictTalent and/orlabour shortagesConcentration ofstrategic resources and technologiesAdverse outcomes of AI technologiesAdverse outcomesof frontier technologiesAsset bubble b
73、urstBiodiversity lossand ecosystem collapseBiological,chemical or nuclearweapons or hazardsCensorship and surveillanceCrime and illiciteconomic activityCritical changeto Earth systemsCyber espionageand warfareDebtDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemicallyimportant supply chainDisru
74、ptions tocritical infrastructureEconomic downturnErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsExtreme weathereventsGeoeconomicconfrontationInequalityInfectious diseasesInflationInsufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsIntrastate violenceInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack of econ
75、omic opportunity or unemploymentMisinformation and disinformationNatural resourceshortagesNon-weather-relatednatural disastersOnline harmsPollutionSocietal polarizationState-based armed conflictTalent and/orlabour shortagesGlobal risks landscape:An interconnections mapFIGURE DSourceWorld Economic Fo
76、rum Global RisksPerception Survey 2024-2025EdgesRelative influenceHighLowMediumRisk influenceNodesHighLowMediumRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 20259issues,with younger survey respondents being more concerned about this over the next 10 years t
77、han older age groups.Take Pollution,for example,which the under 30s rank as the#3 most severe risk in 2035,the highest of any age group surveyed.As noted in last years Global Risks Report,there is also divergence in how Pollution is ranked by stakeholder,with the public sector placing Pollution as a
78、 top 10 risk in the 10-year ranking,but not the private sector(Figure 2.4).Section 2.3:Pollution at a crossroads aims to fill awareness gaps by exploring under-appreciated pollutant risks that need to become more prominent in policy agendas by 2035 and ideally much sooner given their significant imp
79、acts on health and ecosystems.Technological risks-still“under the radar”In a year that has seen considerable experimentation by companies and individuals in making the best use of AI tools,concerns about Adverse outcomes of AI technologies are low in the risk ranking on a two-year outlook.However,co
80、mplacency around the risks of such technologies should be avoided given the fast-paced nature of change in the field of AI and its increasing ubiquity.Indeed,Adverse outcomes of AI technologies is one of the risks that climbs the most in the 10-year risk ranking compared to the two-year risk ranking
81、(Figure G).In this report we highlight the role of Generative AI(GenAI)in producing false or misleading content at scale,and how that relates to societal polarization.Section 1.5:Technology and polarization explores this and the broader risks from greater connectivity,rapid growth in computing power
82、 and more powerful AI tools.Among the areas experiencing the most rapid technological advances is the Biotech sector.Section 2.4:Losing control of biotech?takes an in-depth look at emerging risks in biotech,supercharged by AI.Over a 10-year time horizon,low-probability,high-impact risks exist,includ
83、ing Intrastate violence from biological terrorism and Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies involving accidental or malicious misuse of gene editing technologies,or even of brain-computer interfaces.At the same time,such risks do not Short-term severity(2 years)Long-term severity(10 years)3.544.
84、555.562.5117733.544.55.55Visible areaRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalDeteriorating risksRelative severity of global risks over a 2-and 10-year periodFIGURE ESourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.NoteSeverity was assessed on a 1-7 Lik
85、ert scale 1=Low severity,7=High severity.Adverse outcomes of AI technologiesAdverse outcomes of frontier technologiesAsset bubble burstsBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseBiological,chemical,or nuclear weapons or hazardsCensorship and surveillanceConcentration of strategic resourcesCrime and il
86、licit economic activityCritical change to Earth systemsCyber espionageand warfareDebtDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemically important supply chainDisruptions to criticalinfrastructureEconomic downturnErosion of human rights and/or of civic freedomsExtreme weather eventsGeoecono
87、mic confrontationInequalityInfectious diseasesInflationInsufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsIntrastate violenceInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack of economic opportunity or unemploymentMisinformation and disinformationNatural resource shortagesNon-weather related natural di
88、sastersOnline harmsPollutionSocietal polarizationState-based armed conflictTalent and/or labour shortagesAdverse outcomes of AI technologiesAdverse outcomes of frontier technologiesAsset bubble burstsBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseBiological,chemical,or nuclear weapons or hazardsCensorship
89、and surveillanceConcentration of strategic resourcesCrime and illicit economic activityCritical change to Earth systemsCyber espionageand warfareDebtDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemically important supply chainDisruptions to criticalinfrastructureEconomic downturnErosion of hum
90、an rights and/or of civic freedomsExtreme weather eventsGeoeconomic confrontationInequalityInfectious diseasesInflationInsufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsIntrastate violenceInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack of economic opportunity or unemploymentMisinformation and disinf
91、ormationNatural resource shortagesNon-weather related natural disastersOnline harmsPollutionSocietal polarizationState-based armed conflictTalent and/or labour shortagesGlobal Risks Report 202510diminish the tremendous actual and potential progress for humankind stemming from biotech.The time to act
92、 is now-is consensus possible in a fragmenting world?Deepening divisions and increasing fragmentation are reshaping international relations and calling into question whether existing structures are equipped to tackle the challenges collectively confronting us.Levels of global cooperation across many
93、 areas of geopolitics and humanitarian issues,economic relations,and environmental,societal and technological challenges may reach new lows in the coming years.Key countries appear to be turning inward,focusing on mounting domestic economic or societal concerns,just when they should be seeking to st
94、rengthen multilateral ties to confront shared challenges.When asked about the characteristics of the global political outlook over the next decade,64%of GRPS respondents believe that we will face a Multipolar or fragmented order,in which middle and great powers contest,set and enforce regional rules
95、 and norms(Figure F).Perceptions in response to this question have changed little compared to last year.The Western-led global order is expected to continue its decline over the next decade but will nonetheless remain an importance locus of power.Alternative power centres are likely to strengthen,no
96、t just led by China,but also by key emerging powers,including India and the Gulf states.The decade ahead will be pivotal as leaders will be confronted with increasingly complex global risks.But to prevent a downward spiral in which citizens worldwide will be worse off than before,ultimately there is
97、 no option other than to find avenues for dialogue and collaboration.4Global political outlook FIGURE FSourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-202519%Bipolar or bifurcated order shaped by strategic competition between two superpowers8%Continuation or reinvigoration of the US-l
98、ed,rules-based international order64%Multipolar or fragmented order in which middle and great powers contest,set,and enforce regional rules and norms9%Realignment towards a new international order led by an alternative superpower“Which of the following best characterizes the global political environ
99、ment for cooperation on global risks in 10 years?”Global Risks Report 202511Global risks ranked by severity over the short and long termFIGURE GSourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2024-2025Please estimate the likely impact(severity)of the following risks over a 2-year and 10-yea
100、r period.Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnological1stMisinformation and disinformationOnline harms2ndExtreme weather events3rdSocietal polarization4thCyber espionage and warfare5thState-based armed conflict6thLack of economic opportunity or unemployment7thInflation8thInvo
101、luntary migration or displacementInequality9thEconomic downturn10thPollution11thCritical change to Earth systems12th13thNatural resource shortages14thGeoeconomic confrontation15thErosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms16thDebt17thIntrastate violence18thInsufficient public infrastructure and
102、 social protections19thDisruptions to a systemically important supply chain20thBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse21stCensorship and surveillance22ndTalent and/or labour shortages23rdInfectious diseases24thConcentration of strategic resources25thDisruptions to critical infrastructure26thAsset b
103、ubble bursts27thDecline in health and well-being28thCrime and illicit economic activity29thAdverse outcomes of AI technologies30th31stBiological,chemical or nuclear hazards32nd33rdNon-weather related natural disastersAdverse outcomes of frontier technologiesShort term(2 years)State-based armed confl
104、ictInequalityDecline in health and well-beingCrime and illicit economic activity1stExtreme weather events2ndCritical change to Earth systems3rdBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse4thNatural resource shortages5thMisinformation and disinformation6thAdverse outcomes of AI technologies7thInvoluntary
105、 migration or displacement8thCyber espionage and warfare9thSocietal polarization10thPollution11thLack of economic opportunity or unemployment12thOnline harms13thConcentration of strategic resources14thCensorship and surveillance15th16thGeoeconomic confrontation17thDebt18thErosion of human rights and
106、/or of civic freedoms19thInfectious diseases20th21stInsufficient public infrastructure and social protections22ndIntrastate violence23rdDisruptions to critical infrastructure24thAdverse outcomes of frontier technologies25thDisruptions to a systemically important supply chain26thBiological,chemical o
107、r nuclear hazards27th28thEconomic downturn29thTalent and/or labour shortages30thAsset bubble bursts31st32ndInflation33rdNon-weather related natural disastersLong term(10 years)Global Risks Report 202512Global Risks 2025:A world of growing divisions1The current geopolitical climate,following Russias
108、invasion of Ukraine and with wars raging in the Middle East and in Sudan,makes it nearly impossible not to think about such events when assessing the one global risk expected to present a material crisis in 2025:close to one-quarter of survey respondents(23%)selected State-based armed conflict(proxy
109、 wars,civil wars,coups,terrorism,etc.)as the top risk for 2025(Figure 1.1).Compared with last year,this risk has climbed from#8 to#1 in the rankings.Geopolitical tensions are also associated with the rising risk of Geoeconomic confrontation(sanctions,tariffs,investment screening),ranking#3,which is
110、also driven by Inequality,Societal polarization and other factors.The risks associated with Extreme weather events also is a key concern for the year ahead,with 14%of respondents selecting it.The burden of climate change is becoming more evident every year,as pollution from continued use of fossil f
111、uels such as coal,oil and gas leads to more frequent and severe extreme weather events.Heatwaves across parts of Asia;flooding in Brazil,Indonesia and parts of Europe;wildfires in Canada;and hurricanes Helene and Milton in the United States are just some recent examples of such events.Similar to las
112、t year,Misinformation and disinformation and Societal polarization remain key current risks,in positions#4 and#5 respectively.The high rankings of these two risks is not surprising considering the accelerating spread of false or misleading information,which amplifies the other leading risks we face,
113、from State-based armed conflict to Extreme weather events.A sense of increasingly fragmented societies is reflected by four of the top 10 risks expected to present a material crisis in 2025 being societal in nature:Societal polarization(6%of respondents),The world in 20251.1Current Risk LandscapeFIG
114、URE 1.1Please select one risk that you believe is most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2025(top 10 risks selected risks by respondents).State-based armed conflictExtreme weather eventsGeoeconomic confrontationMisinformation and disinformationSocietal polarizationEconomic dow
115、nturnCritical change to Earth systemsLack of economic opportunity or unemploymentErosion of human rights and/or civic freedomsInequalityShare of respondents(%)SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlob
116、al Risks Report 202513Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment(3%),Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms(2%)and Inequality(2%).On the economic front,Inflation is perceived as less of a concern this year than in 2024.However,perceptions of the overall economic outlook for 2025 remain fair
117、ly pessimistic across all age groups surveyed.The risk of an Economic downturn(recession,stagnation)continues to be a common concern among respondents,coming in at#6(5%of respondents),the same position as last year.The perceived vulnerabilities associated with the Economic downturn risk are higher f
118、or younger age groups:it is ranked#3 for under 30s,#4 for the 30-39-year age group and#5 for the 40-49-yearage group(Figure 1.2),but does not even feature inthe top 10 for those aged 60 years or older.1st2nd3rd4th5th6th7th8th9th10th11th12thCurrent global risks,by age groupFIGURE 1.2SourceWorld Econo
119、mic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025Extreme weathereventsState-based armedconflictEconomic downturnMisinformation anddisinformationSocietal polarizationErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsAdverse outcomes ofAI technologiesGeoeconomicconfrontationLack of economicopportunityNatur
120、al resourcesshortagesAsset bubble burstDecline in health andwell-beingExtreme weathereventsState-based armedconflictExtreme weathereventsState-based armedconflictExtreme weathereventsState-based armedconflictExtreme weathereventsState-based armedconflictExtreme weathereventsState-based armedconflict
121、Economic downturnMisinformation anddisinformationCrime and illiciteconomic activityCritical change toEarth systemsDisruptions to asupply chainGeoeconomicconfrontationGeoeconomicconfrontationGeoeconomicconfrontationGeoeconomicconfrontationInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack of economicopportunit
122、yConcentration ofstrategic resourcesInflationMisinformation anddisinformationEconomic downturnEconomic downturnSocietal polarizationCyber espionageand warfareConcentration ofstrategic resourcesCritical change toEarth systemsCritical change toEarth systemsCritical change toEarth systemsCritical chang
123、e toEarth systemsLack of economicopportunityAdverse outcomes ofAI technologiesErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsMisinformation anddisinformationSocietal polarizationDebtInequalityBiodiversity loss andecosystem collapseDisruptions to criticalinfra
124、structureBiodiversity loss andecosystem collapseErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsDisruptions to criticalinfrastructureConcentration ofstrategic resourcesInequalityMisinformation anddisinformationSocietal polarizationInvoluntary migrationor displacementBiological,chemical or nuclear hazard
125、sCyber espionageand warfareBiological,chemical or nuclear hazardsEconomic downturnMisinformation anddisinformationSocietal polarizationAdverse outcomes ofAI technologiesGeoeconomicconfrontationAsset bubble burstRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnological3030-3940-4950-5960-
126、6970+NoteSample size by age group varied,and all respondents were weighted equally for the purposes of global rankings.The results are based on the following:30 years,n=122(14%of total);30-39,n=154(17%);40-49,n=250(28%);50-59,n=222(25%);60-69,n=104(12%);and 70+,n=42(5%).Global Risks Report 202514The
127、 global outlook for 2027 is one of increased cynicism among survey respondents,with a high proportion of respondents to the GRPS 2024-25 anticipating turbulence(31%),a four percentage-point increase since last years edition(Figure 1.3).There is also a two percentage-point year-on-year increase to 5%
128、in the number of respondents who are anticipating a stormy outlook the most alarming of the five categories respondents were asked to select from over the next two years.The top risk for 2027 according to survey respondents is Misinformation and disinformation for the second year in a row,since it w
129、as introducedinto the GRPS risk list in 2022-23.Respondentconcern has remained high following a year of“superelections”,with this risk also a top concern across amajority of age categories and stakeholder groups(Figures 1.6 and 1.7).Moreover,it is becoming moredifficult to differentiate between AI-a
130、nd human-generated Misinformation and disinformation.AItools are enabling a proliferation in such informationThe path to 20271.2Short-and long-term global outlookFIGURE 1.3SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025Short term(2 years)1%Long term(10 years)Stormy:Global catastr
131、ophic risks loomingTurbulent:Upheavals and elevated risk of global catastrophesUnsettled:Some instability,moderate risk of global catastrophesStable:Isolated disruptions,low risk of global catastrophesCalm:Negligible risk of global catastrophesWhich of the following best characterizes your outlook f
132、or the world over the following time periods?NoteThe percentages in the graph may not add up to 100%because values have been rounded up/down.11%52%31%5%17%45%30%8%Global risks ranked by severity over the short term(2 years)FIGURE 1.4SourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2024-2025P
133、lease estimate the likely impact(severity)of the following risks over a 2-year period.6th7th8th9th10thInequalityInvoluntary migration or displacementErosion of human rights and/or civic freedomsGeoeconomic confrontationPollution1st2nd3rd4th5thMisinformation and disinformationExtreme weather eventsSo
134、cietal polarizationCyber espionage and warfareState-based armed conflictRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 202515in the form of video,images,voice or text.Leading creators of false or misleading content include state actors in some countries.5 In
135、 a year that has seen the mass rollout of developments in AI and considerable experimentation with AI tools by companies and individuals,concerns about Adverse outcomes of InflationEconomic downturnCritical change to Earth systemsCrime and illicit economy activityLack of economic opportunity or unem
136、ploymentConcentration of strategicresourcesBiological,chemical,or nuclearweapons or hazardsMisinformation and disinformationExtreme weather eventsInvoluntary migration or displacementNon-weather related natural disastersAdverse outcomes of frontier technologies1717812Geoeconomic confrontation522106I
137、ntrastate violence7Talent and/or labour shortages629th19th24th17th28th11th13th12th23rd9th1st2nd8th32nd33rdStable level of concernBiggest increase in rankingBiggest fall in rankingOverall rankingChange in short-term(2 years)global risks perception,2023-2024 vs 2024-2025FIGURE 1.5SourceWorld Economic
138、Forum Global RisksPerception Surveys 2024-2025Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalInequalityPollutionGlobal risk perceptions over the short term(2 years),by age groupFIGURE 1.6SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.NoteEach column represe
139、nts the top 8 risks by age group,ordered by global ranking rather than within-age group rankings.A cell is coloured if the ranking of the risk for that age group is the same as the global ranking of that risk.Sample size by age group varied,and all respondents were weighted equally for the purposes
140、of global rankings.The results are based on the following:30,n=122(14%of total);30-39,n=154(17%);40-49,n=250(28%);50-59,n=222(25%);60-69,n=104(12%);and 70+,n=42(5%).Misinformation and disinformationExtreme weather eventsSocietal polarizationCyber espionageand warfareState-based armedconflictRisk cat
141、egoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalInvoluntary migrationor displacement3030-3940-4950-5960-6970+Global Risks Report 202516AI technologies is low in the risk ranking.In fact,it has slightly declined in the two-year outlook,with the risk now ranking#31 compared with#29 in las
142、t years report.However,complacency around the risks of such technologies should be avoided given the fast-paced change in the field of AI and its increasing ubiquity.In this report we highlight how AI models are a factor in the relationship between technology and polarization.Section 1.5:Technology
143、and polarization explores the risks for citizens resulting from the combination of greater connectivity,rapid growth in computing power,and more powerful AI models.In Section 2.4:Losing control of biotech?we highlight the role of AI in accelerating developments in this field,for both good and bad.Re
144、spondents also express unease over Cyber espionage and warfare,which is#5 in the two-year ranking,echoing concerns outlined in the World Economic Forums 2024 Chief Risk Officers Outlook,where 71%of Chief Risk Officers expressed concern about the impact of Cyber risk and criminal activity(money laund
145、ering,cybercrime etc.)severely impacting their organizations.The rising likelihood of threat actor activity and more sophisticated technological disruption were noted as particular concerns.6Elevated cyber risk perceptions are one aspect of a broader environment of heightened geopolitical and geoeco
146、nomic tensions,which is reflected in the two-year ranking of State-based armed conflict moving up from#5 in last years report to#3 now.The risk of further destabilizing consequences in Ukraine,the Middle East,and Sudan are likely to be amplifying respondents concerns.In a world that has been seeing
147、an increasing number of armed conflicts for a decade,as detailed in Section 1.3:Geopolitical recession,national security considerations are increasingly dominating government agendas.That section of the report dives deep into the dangers of unilateralism taking hold,including its implications for de
148、epening humanitarian crises.Overall,the GRPS risks with some of the sharpest rises in ranking compared to the previous year are geostrategic in nature.Biological,chemical,or nuclear weapons or hazards(#23)and Geoeconomic confrontation(#9)are up eight and five positions,respectively,since the GRPS 20
149、23-24.Section 1.4:Supercharged economic tensions explores how global geoeconomic tensions could unfold over the next two years.Private-sector concern with the two-year outlook for Geoeconomic confrontation has moved up from last years edition of the report,where it was not a top 10 risk;it now is#6.
150、There is also concern among both governments and academia,who rank this risk#9 and#10,respectively(Figure 1.7).Extreme weather eventsMisinformation and disinformationCyber espionageand warfareSocietal polarizationMisinformation and disinformationExtreme weather eventsState-based armedconflictSocieta
151、l polarizationMisinformation and disinformationExtreme weather eventsSocietal polarizationPollutionExtreme weather eventsState-based armedconflictMisinformation anddisinformationSocietal polarizationState-based armedconflictCyber espionageand warfareState-based armed conflictCyber espionageand warfa
152、rePollutionGeoeconomicconfrontationInequalityCrime and illicteconomic activityPollutionDebtCrime and illiciteconomic activityInvoluntary migrationor displacementInequalityCrime and illicit economic activityInvoluntary migrationor displacementCyber espionageand warfareInvoluntary migrationor displace
153、mentGeoeconomicconfrontationPollutionErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsPollutionInequalityInequalityGeoeconomicconfrontationErosion of human rights and/or civic freedomsExtreme weather eventsMisinformation and disinformationSocietal polarizationState-based armedconflictPollutionErosion of
154、human rightsand/or civic freedomsInequalityBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseCyber espionageand warfareNatural resourceshortagesCivil societyInternational organizationsAcademiaGovernmentPrivate sector1st2nd3rd4th5th6th7th8th9th10thGlobal risks over the short term(2 years),by stakeholder groupF
155、IGURE 1.7SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 202517Last year,two economic risks Inflation and Economic downturn(recession,stagnation)were new entrants in the top 10 ranking.Concer
156、ns around both have since subsided;in this years two-year risk ranking,there are no economic risks in the top 10.Inflation,which was#7 last year,has fallen to#29,with a similar decline for Economic downturn,which was#9 last year and is now#19.No stakeholder group selected either Inflation or Economi
157、c downturn as a top 10 risk,although there is ongoing concern about Debt among government stakeholders(at#7),and Crime and illicit economic activity among international organizations,private-sector and government respondents(#6,#7 and#8,respectively).Across stakeholders in the aggregate,however,ther
158、e are some sharp upticks in economic risk perceptions,with Crime and illicit economic activity increasing 17 positions to#11,and Concentration of strategic resources at#12,up 12 positions from last year.This overall mixed picture for economic risk perceptions is not mirrored in societal risk percept
159、ions,which have risen and feature prominently in the two-year risk landscape.Inequality(wealth,income)is#7 and Societal polarization is even higher,at#4.Involuntary Adverse outcomes of AI technologiesAdverse outcomesof frontier technologiesAsset bubble burstBiodiversity lossand ecosystem collapseBio
160、logical,chemical or nuclearweapons or hazardsCensorship and surveillanceConcentration ofstrategic resources and technologiesCrime and illiciteconomic activityCritical changeto Earth systemsCyber espionageand warfareDebtDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemicallyimportant supply chai
161、nDisruptions tocritical infrastructureEconomic downturnErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsExtreme weathereventsGeoeconomicconfrontationInequalityInfectious diseasesInflationInsufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsIntrastate violenceInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack o
162、f economic opportunity or unemploymentMisinformation and disinformationNatural resourceshortagesNon-weather-relatednatural disastersOnline harmsPollutionSocietal polarizationState-based armed conflictTalent and/orlabour shortagesConcentration ofstrategic resources and technologiesAdverse outcomes of
163、 AI technologiesAdverse outcomesof frontier technologiesAsset bubble burstBiodiversity lossand ecosystem collapseBiological,chemical or nuclearweapons or hazardsCensorship and surveillanceCrime and illiciteconomic activityCritical changeto Earth systemsCyber espionageand warfareDebtDecline in health
164、and well-beingDisruptions to a systemicallyimportant supply chainDisruptions tocritical infrastructureEconomic downturnErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsExtreme weathereventsGeoeconomicconfrontationInequalityInfectious diseasesInflationInsufficient public infrastructure and social protecti
165、onsIntrastate violenceInvoluntary migrationor displacementLack of economic opportunity or unemploymentMisinformation and disinformationNatural resourceshortagesNon-weather-relatednatural disastersOnline harmsPollutionSocietal polarizationState-based armed conflictTalent and/orlabour shortagesGlobal
166、risks landscape:An interconnections mapFIGURE 1.8SourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2024-2025EdgesRelative influenceHighLowMediumRisk influenceNodesHighLowMediumRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 202518migration or displacem
167、ent(#8),and Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms(#10)are also in the top 10.Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment has increased 17 positions from last years edition and is now#13.Inequality(wealth,income)is perceived as the most central,interconnected risk of all,with significant pot
168、ential to both trigger and be influenced by other risks(Figure 1.8).The importance ascribed to this set of societal risks suggests that social stability will be fragile over the next two years,weakening trust and diminishing our collective sense of shared values.This is being felt not only within so
169、cieties but also between societies and governments:the perceived risk of Censorship and surveillance(#16)is up five places compared to last year.Fractures across societal lines are also relevant to environmental risks,which have become a more divisive issue in domestic politics in many countries in
170、recent years.On aggregate across GRPS respondents,concerns about environmental risks are high over the two-year horizon.Respondents list Extreme weather events as the#2 most severe risk for 2027,with Pollution at#6,up four places from last years report.While Extreme weather events remain a persisten
171、t concern year-on-year the risk was also ranked#2 last year the uptickin Pollution demonstrates that environmentalrisks that are often perceived as long-term threatsare starting to be perceived with more certaintyby respondents as short-term realities,as theireffects become more apparent.Climate cha
172、nge isalso an underlying driver of several other risks thatrank high.For example,Involuntary migration ordisplacement is a leading concern,at#8.The following sections explore in-depth three risk themes and examine how these could play out over the next two years.State-based armed conflict(#3)and Geo
173、economic confrontation(#9)are,respectively,at the core of Section 1.3:Geopolitical recession and Section 1.4:Supercharged economic tensions,while Section 1.5:Technology and polarization explores the links between Societal polarization(#4),Misinformation and disinformation(#1),algorithmic bias and Ce
174、nsorship and surveillance(#16).Global Risks Report 202519Geopolitical recession1.32%14%16%23%19%19%7%Short-term(2 years)risk severity score:State-based armed conflictFIGURE 1.9SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-20252-year rank:3rdBilateral or multilateral use of force bet
175、ween states and/or between a state and non-state actor(s),often with ideological,political,or religious goals,manifesting as war and/or organized,sustained violence.Includes,but is not limited to:hot wars;proxy wars;civil wars;guerilla warfare;terrorism;genocide;and assassinations.2-year average ris
176、k severity score:4.67HighLow654321SeverityNoteSeverity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale1=Low severity,7=High severity.The percentages in the graphs may not add up to 100%because values havebeen rounded up/down.2 yearsOver the next two years,uncertainty around the course of current conflicts and th
177、eir aftermath is likely toremain high,and tensions elsewhere could escalate.A loss of support for and faith in the role of international organizations in conflict prevention andresolution has opened the door to more unilateralist moves.Humanitarian crises are multiplying and worsening,given funding
178、constraints and major powers lack ofsustained focus on them.State-based armed conflict(proxy wars,civil wars,coups,terrorism,etc.)was highlighted as by far the greatest risk for 2025 among the 33 risks ranked in the GRPS,with 23%of respondents anticipating a material global crisis.GRPS respondents c
179、ite Geoeconomic confrontation as well as the technology-related concerns Cyber espionage and warfare and Misinformation and disinformation among the risks most closely linked to State-based armed conflict(Figure 1.10).Concern about this risk among respondents remains alarming on a two-year horizon,w
180、ith State-based armed conflict ranked#3,increasing two positions from last years risk ranking.In the EOS,Armed conflict encompassing interstate,intrastate,proxy wars and coups is identified as one of the top 10 global risks over the next two years.According to the EOS,this geopolitical risk ranks as
181、 the primary concern for executives in 12 countries,including Armenia,Israel,Kazakhstan and Poland,and features among the top five risks in an additional 11 economies,such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia(Figure 1.11).Executives who prioritize this risk according to the EOS frequently cite a high perceptio
182、n of related risks,including Biological,chemical,or nuclear weapons or hazards and Geoeconomic confrontation.The top ranking of State-based armed conflict may also demonstrate concern among respondents that we are in what has been termed a“geopolitical recession”7 an era characterized by a high Anzh
183、ela Bets,UnsplashGlobal Risks Report 202520Erosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsErosion of human rightsand/or civic freedomsGlobal risk interconnections:State-based armed conflictFIGURE 1.10SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.EdgesRelative influenceHighLowMediu
184、mRisk influenceNodesHighLowMediumReferenceBiological,chemical or nuclearweapons or hazardsCyber espionageand warfareDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemicallyimportant supply chainDisruptions tocritical infrastructureGeoeconomicconfrontationInvoluntary migrationor displacementMisin
185、formation and disinformationState-based armed confictBiological,chemical or nuclearweapons or hazardsCyber espionageand warfareDecline in healthand well-beingDisruptions to a systemicallyimportant supply chainDisruptions tocritical infrastructureGeoeconomicconfrontationInvoluntary migrationor displa
186、cementMisinformation and disinformationState-based armed conflictRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalnumber of conflicts,in which multilateralism is facing strong headwinds.It can also be argued that such a geopolitical recession started almost a decade ago(see Figur
187、e 1.12).Since 2014,the number of armed conflicts has been elevated compared to the period from the 1990s to the early 2010s.Interstate conflicts,while they tend to present the greatest threats to global stability,only constitute a small proportion of the total number of armed conflicts,which also in
188、clude one-sided,non-state and intrastate armed conflicts.Escalation pathways The GRPS results are also likely to reflect the depth of respondents fears surrounding the two major current cross-border conflicts,Russias invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East,and perhaps also concern ar
189、ound the risks of conflict over Taiwan,China.Regarding Russias invasion of Ukraine,the position taken by the new US administration will be critical to its evolution.Will the United States take a firmer stance towards Russia,counting on such a move acting as a deterrent to further Russian escalation,
190、and/or will it increase pressure on Ukraine,including reducing financial support?In the latter case,European governments might increase their own support for Ukraine.The spectrum of possible outcomes over the next two years is wide,ranging from further escalation,perhaps also involving neighbouring
191、countries,to uneasy agreement to freeze the conflict.In the Middle East,any shift towards a full-scale Iran-Israel war over the next two years would draw in the United States further.Such a war would,in turn,generate more long-term instability in the entire region,including the Gulf economies,where
192、US military bases could become targets.Meanwhile,recent political developments in Syria raise both opportunities and risks.Hopes are high that there could be a revitalization of the economy and a more inclusive political environment.However,building stability across Syria will be challenging,given t
193、he many competing interests that are involved.These include both domestic groups and foreign states;if other countries decide to intervene more heavily while the transition unfolds,this could lead to renewed confrontations.In addition,conflict over Taiwan,China cannot be ruled out.Limited armed conf
194、rontation could be triggered more easily if global tensions are high around geoeconomic confrontation and if rhetoric Global Risks Report 202521National risk perceptions:Armed conflict(interstate,intrastate,proxy wars,coups,etc.)FIGURE 1.11SourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.Exe
195、cutive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question“Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?”1st10th20th30th33thRankis aggressive.Both the United States and China may go further in the coming years in undertaking military manoe
196、uvres close to Taiwan,China designed to show strength and act as deterrent.A major risk is that just one such manoeuvre could be misinterpreted by the other side and/or lead to accidental loss of life or destruction of hardware,leading to tit-for-tat military escalation.Waning appetite for multilate
197、ralism With the world facing this wide spectrum of ongoing armed conflicts,and escalation risks in the two major cross-border conflicts,the current weakness of the multilateral security framework with the UN Security Council(UNSC)at its core is alarming.The UNSC has not managed to stop conflicts fro
198、m escalating,including Russias invasion of Ukraine and the wars in the Middle East and in Sudan.Despite discussions over the last year about reinvigorating UN peacekeeping operations,these are in decline on aggregate,with their size having been reduced from over 100,000 peacekeepers in 20168 to arou
199、nd 68,000 in 2024.9 The UNSC faces ongoing structural challenges,10 and over the next two years risks having even less impact,given the new US administrations likely less favourable stance towards the UN generally and its preference for seeking solutions to conflicts unilaterally.There is a danger t
200、hat more governments lose faith not only in the UNSC,but in multilateralism as a forum for resolving conflicts,and that the world instead becomes more adversarial,with conflicts ending only via battlefield,winner-takes-all victories and not through negotiated,multistakeholder peace agreements.While
201、there continue to be discussions that aim towards reform of the UNSC,they are unlikely to make meaningful progress over the next two years given the complexity of aligning national interests and the current lack of political will to do so.Furthermore,there is no viable alternative global governance
202、set-up in sight.The growing vacuum in ensuring global stability at a multilateral level will lead governments around the world increasingly to take national security matters into their own hands,coordinating security and defense efforts only with select allied countries,or making unilateral military
203、 decisions.More countries will attempt to gain a greater degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency.Defense budgets could be prioritized over other long-term Global Risks Report 202522One-sided violenceInterstateNon-state conflictIntrastate200180160140120100806040200Number of armed conflicts since the
204、end of the Cold War(1989-2023)FIGURE 1.12SourceThe Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP).19891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023investments,placing at risk spending in areas such as healthcare,educatio
205、n and infrastructure.This accelerating military spending would represent a continuation of recent trends:World military expenditure increased for the ninth consecutive year in 2023,reaching a total of$2.4 trillion,11 with 2023 seeing a steep rise over 2022(see Figure 1.13).The top five countries acc
206、ounted for 61%of the total.As governments with strengthening militaries perceive that multilateral constraints on unilateral military action are weaker,there could be more instances of cross-border military interventions in the coming years.Unilateralism and the dominance of national security consid
207、erations in political agendas may also have increasingly far-reaching repercussions for state-society relations worldwide.Increased state surveillance of citizens and restrictions on individual freedoms may become more commonplace in the name of national security.Perceived or actual threats from oth
208、er countries also provide an opening for governments to seize control of narratives and suppress information,perhaps blurring the lines between genuine security considerations and political expedience.Governments may take measures that diminish the transparency of public expenditure,for example when
209、 it comes to funding parties to a conflict abroad.These are all conditions that will help authoritarian regimes consolidate their power and may lead to democratic regimes taking on more authoritarian characteristics.Salah Darwish,UnsplashGlobal Risks Report 2025232,5002,0001,5005001,0000World milita
210、ry expenditure(billion$),1992-2023FIGURE 1.13SourceStockholm International Peace Research Institute,Military Expenditure Database.NoteValues are in billion$at constant 2022 prices and exchange rates.19921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162
211、017201820192020202120222023Worsening humanitarian crisesEven beyond global security considerations,multilateralism appears set to endure its most difficult period since the founding of the UN in 1945.Over the next two years,more questions are likely to be asked by national governments about the role
212、s and priorities of key multilateral institutions,and there could be constraints placed on their funding.The outlook for this broader weakening of multilateralism is associated with declining global budgets for humanitarian aid(see Figure 1.14).Declining funding translates into an acute risk of huma
213、nitarian crises deepening.Global humanitarian efforts are highly dependent on the financial and human resources and institutional know-how provided by the UN.This know-how,in areas such as logistics or relationships with local governments and NGOs,has been built up over decades and is irreplaceable
214、over a short-or even medium-term time horizon.Over 90 million people in need receive humanitarian aid or development assistance from UN institutions on an annual basis.12 A rising number of these individuals,as well as others who also need support but are unable to access it,will be at increasing ri
215、sk of insecurity,disease,malnutrition and starvation over the next two years if UN institutions and the humanitarian sector overall are weakened further.Furthermore,higher levels of desperation will in some settings create more opportunities for armed groups to recruit.Countries in which serious hum
216、anitarian crises risk deepening further over the next two years and in turn fueling more violence include Sudan,Mali and Haiti.In Sudan,the domestic and regional impacts of reduced agricultural production and exports are already far-reaching.Like Ukraine,Sudan is a large exporter of agricultural pro
217、ducts.It plays a critical role for neighbouring countries Ethiopia,South Sudan,Chad and Egypt.13Forced displacement is also set to rise as international humanitarian aid efforts struggle to keep up.It is already at an all-time high,with over 122 million forcibly displaced people globally,14 and 56%a
218、re displaced within their own countries.Among the 44%who are cross-border refugees,three quarters are hosted in low-income countries that have limited resources to support them.Sometimes refugees are confronted with nationalist sentiment or identity-related violence because of their ethnicity or rel
219、igion,further fueling the potential for conflict in border areas.Increased competition Global Risks Report 2025244540Billion USD35252015105300Humanitarian funding(billion$),2022-2024FIGURE 1.14SourceFinancial Tracking Service by UN OCHA.202220232024for jobs between refugees and locals can also be a
220、source of tensions.Rising unilateralism will have softer implications,too.Societies are developing more disinterested mindsets when it comes to conflicts and humanitarian crises in which their own citizens are not involved.As local media deprioritize reporting on“far-away”conflicts,a self-fulfilling
221、 cycle emerges,with greater tolerance by governments and societies of civilian casualties in warfare.This is a risk that has already started unfolding with respect to current conflicts,for example when it comes to Sudan:This war has rarely been at the top of global policy agendas despite its huge hu
222、manitarian toll.Such disinterest makes internationally coordinated humanitarian responses more difficult,especially when combined with the prevailing geopolitical and funding conditions.Actions for todayA.Support multilateral institutionsThe GRPS finds that the approach that respondents believe has
223、the most long-term potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness regarding State-based armed conflict is Global treaties and agreements(Figure 1.15.See also Figure 1.16),followed by Multistakeholder engagement.These findings strongly suggest that it is critical for public,private a
224、nd civil society stakeholders across all countries to work together to reinforce existing multilateral institutions wherever feasible.This includes the UN Security Council;despite the challenges and complexity of reforming it,governments should continue dialogues with that ultimate objective in mind
225、.In highlighting the benefits of multilateralism in conflict resolution,leaders should draw on case studies of resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts.An example was the Colombian governments peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC)in November 2016.Broad internatio
226、nal cooperation has also helped to tackle armed threats,for example in combating piracy off the Somali coast over the course of many years from 2008.Global leaders can draw optimism from such examples and showcase lessons learned and actionable strategies for ending current conflicts.B.Expand the ro
227、le of regional organizations inmanaging tensionsAmid the current challenges facing global multilateralism,there is space for regional organizations to expand their roles in managing Global Risks Report 202525Share of respondents(%)Biological,chemical,or nuclear weaponsor hazardsGeoeconomic confronta
228、tion(sanctions,tariffs,investment screening)State-based armed conflict(proxy,civil wars,coups,terrorism,etc.)Critical change to Earth systems Cyber espionage and warfareInvoluntary migration or displacementBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapsePollution(air,soil,water,etc.)Concentration of strateg
229、ic resources(and technologies)Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies(quantum,biotech,geoengineering)Top risks that can be addressed by global treaties and arrangementsFIGURE 1.16SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.“Which approach(es)do you expect to have the most p
230、otential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10 years?Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalRisk Governance:State-based armed conflictFIGURE 1.15SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.“Which approach(es)do yo
231、u expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10 years?Select up to three for each risk.”Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalState-based armed conflict(proxy,civil wars,coups,terrorism,etc.)Share of respondent
232、sApproacha.Financial instrumentsb.National and local regulationsc.Minilateral treaties and agreementsd.Global treaties and agreementse.Development assistancef.Corporate strategiesg.Research&developmenth.Public awareness and educationi.Multistakeholder engagementGlobal Risks Report 202526geopolitical
233、 tensions in their regions.The African Union is a good example:It already has a track record in this regard,having carried out several peacekeeping operations across Africa and on other occasions has played a mediator role.15 Nonetheless,there is a need for it to play a greater role in future in bot
234、h peacekeeping and mediation.C.Diversify supply chains For organizations,one of the big lessons taken from the ongoing conflicts is the need for supply chain resilience and diversification.With geopolitical volatility likely to remain high over the next two years,organizational investment in geopoli
235、tical risk foresight and risk management is a must.When the level of uncertainty around conflicts or potential conflicts is high,scenario planning exercises can be a valuable tool to help organizations prepare for a range of different outcomes.Organizations need to consider not only whether their su
236、ppliers and supply routes are vulnerable to conflicts,but also what the reputational risks are of partnering or doing business with counterparts that are in any way party to a conflict.Matthew TenBruggencate,UnsplashGlobal Risks Report 202527Supercharged economic tensions1.4 A worldwide escalation o
237、f broad tariff-based protectionism could lead to global trade declining.Deeper decoupling of trade between West and East would have worldwide repercussions,even beyond trade relationships.With economic growth in China and Europe already weak,an escalating trade war will introduce additional uncertai
238、nties into the global economic outlook.Global trade relations are tense and there is a risk of unpredictable and potentially sharp changes in trade policies worldwide.Geoeconomic confrontation(sanctions,tariffs,investment screening)ranks#3 for current(2025)risks according to the GRPS and#9 over a tw
239、o-year horizon.This comes after trade tensions have already been rising steeply since 2017.According to Global Trade Alert,the number of harmful new policy interventions per year rose globally from 600 in 2017 to over 3,000 in each of 2022,2023 and 2024.16The incoming US administration has suggested
240、 that it will implement higher tariffs on imports from all trading partners,often singling out China,as well as Mexico and Canada.While these statements may have been the opening gambits ahead of future negotiations covering trade and other issues,they undoubtedly are a signal to the rest of the wor
241、ld that deepening protectionism is on the agenda.US trading partners are considering retaliatory measures,as well as the timing for potentially implementing them.Over the next two years,there is a significant risk of escalating tariffs and other trade-related protectionism globally,which could accel
242、erate broader decoupling between the United States and China,and their respective allies.While Cold War-style rhetoric between the United States and China could ramp up and fuel trade tensions between the two blocs,even the many countries that are not aligned with either West or East would find them
243、selves affected by these tensions.In such an unfolding trade war scenario,initiatives currently underway could easily stall or come apart.For example,the EUs Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is more likely to face retaliation from trading partners;and efforts to cooperate in the area of digital re
244、gulation will come up against hardening negotiating positions.These and other initiatives need ongoing collaboration to keep moving forward.Across-the-board tariffs In a worst-case scenario for tariff escalation over the next two years,governments would decide to impose tariffs not only on those cou
245、ntries/blocs imposing tariffs on them,but instead on all their trading partners.This widespread imposition of across-the-board tariffs globally would lead to a substantial contraction in global trade.17This scenario could originate from an escalation of the tariff conflict between the United States
246、and China.The latters dominance of global export markets is at the core of the new US administrations concerns.Not only in the United States,but manufacturing sectors worldwide have struggled to compete with Chinese products in a 2%2-year rank:9th2-year average risk severity score:4.17%12%19%26%22%1
247、2%Short-term(2 years)risk severity score:Geoeconomic confrontationFIGURE 1.17SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.Deployment of economic levers by global or regional powers to reshape economic interactions between nations,restricting goods,knowledge,services,or technol
248、ogy with the intent of building self-sufficiency,constraining geopolitical rivals and/or consolidating spheres of influence.Includes,but is not limited to:currency measures;investment controls;sanctions;state aid and subsidies;and trade controls.7HighLow654321SeverityNoteSeverity was assessed on a 1
249、-7 Likert scale1 Low severity,7 High severity.The percentages in the graphs may not add up to 100%because values havebeen rounded up/down.2 yearsGlobal Risks Report 202528range of sectors,such as solar panels or electric vehicles.While Chinese exports slowed from 2022-2023,18 their growth has remain
250、ed strong over a five-year timeframe.If Chinese access to the US market is constrained by new tariffs,Chinese exports will be likely to flow to EU and other markets.But the EU has already started pushing back in selected areas of trade with China,for example imposing tariffs on electric vehicles imp
251、orts from China for a period of five years in October 2024.19 If faced with a potential influx of Chinese imports redirected from the United States,the EU might impose new tariffs on Chinese imports.Other regions such as Latin America could take similar approaches in the face of diverted imports as
252、they aim to defend local industries.Over the next two years,this could lead to a pattern of rolling,progressive protectionism spreading worldwide,at different speeds in different sectors,going well-beyond bilateral tit-for-tat tariffs.Some governments would move more aggressively than others,and onc
253、e the first countries impose across-the-board tariffs on their trading partners,more countries could quickly follow.Escalation beyond tariffsResearch published in November 2024 assessed the vulnerability of 173 countries to restrictive US trade measures.The research considers key concerns of US poli
254、cy-makers,including those countries bilateral trade surpluses with the United States,restrictions on market access for US exports,and existing tariffs,among other criteria.20 Weighing the countries according to these criteria,South Korea is found to be the most at risk for being targeted with restri
255、ctive US trade measures,followed by China,Japan,Canada and India,at the next level of risk.However,other countries and blocs are found to be at risk,too:Brazil,the EU,Indonesia,Ireland,Italy,Kenya,Malaysia,Mexico and Thailand are the next group of economies.21This assessment chimes with the results
256、of the EOS,which show that geoeconomic confrontation(sanctions,tariffs,investment screening,etc.)is a prominent concern in Eastern Asia,in particular(Figure 1.18).In Taiwan,China and Hong Kong SAR,China,this risk is the third-most significant concern in their two-year outlooks.Moreover,12 other econ
257、omies,including Japan and South Korea,rank geoeconomic confrontation among their top 10 risks.While Eastern Asia may National risk perceptions:Geoeconomic confrontationFIGURE 1.18SourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the questio
258、n“Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?”Rank1st10th20th30th34thGlobal Risks Report 202529be one region most immediately impacted by new trade restrictions,broadening global geoeconomic fragmentation would affect all economies,with thos
259、e likely to suffer the most ultimately being emerging markets and low-income countries.22Beyond tariffs,industrial policy is at the core of other trade-related protectionist measures.The world is already in an era of industrial policy,with a high number of non-tariff barriers impacting trade relatio
260、ns.Two-thirds of all harmful trade restriction measures implemented in the last five years have been subsidies,23 excluding export subsidies.Legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act24 or initiatives such as Make in India25 are a rising characteristic of countries inward focus and this trend c
261、ould accelerate in a fragmenting trade environment.Although industrial policy can have benefits,for example addressing market failures,its risks include corruption and misallocation of resources.26 A related area likely to see escalation is more blocking of trade and investment on national security
262、grounds,with the number of sectors classified by governments as“strategically sensitive”expanding.As the space for a multilateral,rules-based and open global trade environment diminishes,government interventions in the private sector could be used more frequently as a form of retaliation against com
263、panies home governments.Employees of foreign companies could increasingly be prosecuted or have more restrictions placed on their in-country stays,and the number and size of fines imposed on companies for alleged regulatory non-compliance could be ratcheted up.Governments may make more use of sancti
264、ons targeting individuals,financial transactions and companies.Some governments may foment more aggressive Misinformation and disinformation campaigns about goods and services from targeted countries.Results from the EOS indicate widespread concerns about the Misinformation and disinformation risk i
265、n a diverse set of countries,including India(#2),Germany(#4),Brazil(#6),and the United States(#6).Hardening public perceptions could lead to more frequent consumer boycotts of products.Costs for companies doing business internationally will rise in this scenario.Global firms will need to navigate di
266、vergent sets of regulations in different,fragmenting parts of the world.Regulatory technology(RegTech)will be used more by governments to surveil foreign companies and ensure compliance,27 reducing the time between new regulations being imposed and the need for companies to become fully compliant.IT
267、 infrastructure as well as data security and storage protocols will continue to be adapted to national security interests at the expense of cross-border commercial considerations.Finally,international data flows and financial transactions will become more cumbersome and costly,setting back some of t
268、he rapid progress made in recent years through the implementation of new technologies.Government-led efforts at commercial cyber espionage could become more frequent as part of efforts to tilt the playing field towards their national champions.The EOS reveals that respondents in high-income countrie
269、s tend to highlight cybersecurity risk.In some of these for example Denmark,Luxembourg and the Netherlands Cyber insecurity is one of the top three risks.Governments may also put pressure on domestically headquartered cloud services companies to restrict access in other countries.Bernd Dittrich,Unsp
270、lashGlobal Risks Report 202530Such a global fragmentation scenario will weaken the kind of multilateral collaboration required in many fields.For example,coordinating regulatory efforts and mobilizing the vast financial resources needed for the green transition will become much more difficult.Techno
271、logical innovations that might make a difference towards greening economies will face more impediments to being shared across borders and scaled globally.Other areas where deeper global collaboration is badly needed,such as global health,energy or infrastructure,will also be likely to see slowdowns
272、or reversals in progress.This will leave the world less well prepared for the next global pandemic,for example,while urgent public health and broader humanitarian issues will slip even further down the global agenda.Contagion from trade disruptions could spill over into food insecurity,too.Some larg
273、e cities in Sub-Saharan Africa that are reliant on global commodity markets for their food supply are particularly at risk.Greater economic uncertainty The World Economic Forums September 2024 Chief Economists Outlook found that most of the chief economists surveyed(54%)expect the condition of the g
274、lobal economy to remain unchanged over the next year,but four times as many expect conditions to weaken(37%)rather than to strengthen(9%).28 This outlook aligns closely with the latest IMF forecast,which has economic growth stable at 3.2%annually in 2024 and 2025.29 Even without accounting for the p
275、otential impacts of downside risks,this growth rate is tepid compared to the long-term average growth rate of 3.8%from 2000-2019.30The IMF notes rising risks to the economy posed by conflict escalation,tariffs and trade policy uncertainty,lower migration,and the tightening of global financial condit
276、ions.31 The latter could pose a challenge to financial stability given that valuations are elevated in several asset classes and the amount of leverage used by financial institutions is significant.32 The rapid growth in the private credit market is one area to monitor.33 More generally,both governm
277、ent and private-sector debt levels continue to rise globally.34 There have been early signs that fiscal concerns could re-emerge over the next two years as markets will face a high volume of sovereign debt supply.35Globally,Economic downturn tops the EOS global risk ranking in the next two years.Thi
278、s risk ranks first in five regions:Latin America and the Caribbean,Northern America,Oceania,South-National risk perceptions:Economic downturn(e.g.recession,stagnation)FIGURE 1.19SourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question
279、“Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?”1st5th10th15th18thRankGlobal Risks Report 202531Eastern Asia and Southern Asia.It also ranks first in three out of the four country income groups,with the only exception being lower-middle income
280、countries.Respondents in 25 countries see Economic downturn as the leading risk,including developed economies such as the United States and United Kingdom,and emerging markets such as Brazil,Kenya and Malaysia(Figure 1.19).In the short term,higher import tariffs cause an increase in the price of imp
281、orted goods.The impact on global GDP depends on factors including the substitutability between imported and domestic goods;the response of exporting firms facing tariffs;and monetary policy reactions.36 When it comes to the latter,monetary policy-makers are in the fortunate position of having just b
282、rought inflation back under control.The International Monetary Fund(IMF)projects headline global inflation to fall to 3.5%by the end of 2025,which is lower than the average in the two decades prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.37 However,one risk is that an escalating trade war will lead to another uptu
283、rn in inflation,forcing central banks to halt or even reverse course from cutting interest rates.If this is associated with a strengthening US dollar,there could be knock-on risks for countries and companies with US dollar debt refinancing needs.Indirect impacts of tariffs include a fall in producti
284、vity,due to a change in the allocation of productive resources from more to less productive,more protected sectors and firms;a rise in the cost of capital caused by financial stress;and a drop in investment due to an increase in uncertainty about future business conditions,which causes firms to adop
285、t a“wait-and-see”approach.38 The latest World Investment Report,released in June 2024,cites fragmenting trade and regulatory environments as among the key drivers of a 10%slump in global foreign direct investment last year.39Analysis by the World Trade Organization(WTO)of the phase of the US-China t
286、rade conflict from 2018-2020 indicates that the direct impacts on the global economy of tariff increases during this period were far outweighed by the impacts of broader uncertainty around trade policy.With these broader impacts,the loss to global GDP was estimated at 0.34-0.50%during this period.40
287、 A true global trade war would have correspondingly more severe impacts,with estimates of global GDP losses highly uncertain but potentially much higher.41The US-China trade conflict since 2018 also had clear business impacts:exits of foreign companies from China increased by 34%compared to pre-2018
288、 levels.42 Importantly,the impacts were much broader than only in the specific sectors targeted by US tariffs on Chinese products and affected non-US companies as well as US companies.These findings suggest that even the“scalpel”approach levying tariffs on specific sectors does not have a well-targe
289、ted outcome in terms of either sector or geography.43 To reiterate,a broader global trade war would magnify these impacts on businesses.Actions for todayA.Foster multilateralism The GRPS finds that the approach that has the most long-term potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedne
290、ss regarding Geoeconomic confrontation is Global treaties and agreements(Figure 1.20).A specific area to prioritize would be Risk Governance:Geoeconomic confrontationFIGURE 1.20SourceSource:World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.“Which approach(es)do you expect to have the mos
291、t potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10 years?Select up to three for each risk.”Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGeoeconomic confrontation(sanctions,tariffs,investment screening)Share of respondentsApproacha.Financial ins
292、trumentsb.National and local regulationsc.Minilateral treaties and agreementsd.Global treaties and agreementse.Development assistancef.Corporate strategiesg.Research&developmenth.Public awareness and educationi.Multistakeholder engagementGlobal Risks Report 202532a revival of reforms at the WTO to a
293、ddress dispute resolution,tariff-setting rules and digital trade issues.With US-China Geoeconomic confrontation at the core of a fragmenting world,more opportunities will open up for rising powers,such as India or the Gulf countries,to fill the void and propose multilateral alternatives to the curre
294、nt global political economic order.These countries can also benefit by acting as a bridge between West and East,even though they too will suffer many of the negative impacts of the fragmenting environment.Smaller countries will face increasing pressure to align with the West or the East in their tra
295、de relationships.B.Develop strategic relationships Governments could consider further prioritizing efforts to develop strategic regional or bilateral ties with countries that offer complementarity in terms of sectoral strengths,natural resource endowments and skills.“Deep”regional trade agreements o
296、utside the WTO but consistent with WTO requirements and WTO-based plurilateral44 or“minilateral”agreements can be considered(Figure 1.21).45 Even at these levels,multistakeholder dialogue needs to be deepened to reinforce the message that well-designed deepening of trade can lead to mutually benefic
297、ial economic and social outcomes.C.Strengthen domestic economic resilience In an environment where trade becomes more costly and cumbersome,emphasis needs to be placed on policies that strengthen the domestic economy,such as financial sector development or investment in education,health and infrastr
298、ucture.On the supply side,developing greater self-sufficiency in key strategic sectors such as Energy,Agriculture,and Defense will increasingly become an important aspect of resilience at the national level.Share of respondents(%)Geoeconomic confrontation(sanctions,tariffs,investment screening)State
299、-based armed conflict(proxy,civil wars,coups,terrorism,etc.)Biological,chemical,or nuclear weapons or hazardsConcentration of strategic resources(and technologies)Disruptions to a systemically important supply chainInvoluntary migration or displacementCyber espionage and warfareIntrastate violence(r
300、iots,mass shootings,gang violence,etc.)Disruptions to critical infrastructureCrime and illicit economic activity(incl.cyber)Top risks that can be addressed by“minilateral”treaties and agreementsFIGURE 1.21SourceWorld Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025.Which approach(es)do you ex
301、pect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10 years?Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 202533Technology and polarization1.56%17%25%23%16%11%Short-term(2 years)risk severity score:Societal p
302、olarizationFIGURE 1.22SourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2024-2025.2-year rank:4th2%Present or perceived ideological and cultural divisions within and across communities leading to declining social stability,gridlocks in decision-making,economic disruption and increased politic
303、al polarization.2-year average risk severity score:4.6Proportion of respondentsNoteSeverity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale1=Low severity,7=High severity.The percentages in the graph may not add up to 100%because values havebeen rounded up/down.2 years7HighLow654321Severity Rising use of digital
304、platforms and a growing volume of AI-generated content are making divisive misinformation and disinformation more ubiquitous.Algorithmic bias could become more common due to political and societal polarization and associated misinformation and disinformation.Deeper digitalization can make surveillan
305、ce easier for governments,companies and threat actors,and this becomes more of a risk as societies polarize further.An estimated two-thirds of the worlds population 5.5 billion people46 is online and over five billion people use social media.47 The increasing ubiquity of sensors,CCTV cameras and bio
306、metric scanning,among other tools,is further adding to the digital footprint of the average citizen.In parallel,the worlds computing power is increasing rapidly.48 This is enabling fast-improving AI and GenAI models to analyse unstructured data more quickly and is reducing the cost to produce conten
307、t.With Societal polarization ranking#4 in the GRPS two-year ranking,the vulnerabilities associated with citizens online activities look set to continue deepening hand in hand with societal and political divisions.Taken as a whole,these developments threaten to fundamentally undermine individuals tru
308、st in information and institutions.Like last year,Misinformation and disinformation tops this years GRPS two-year ranking.The amount of false or misleading content to which societies are exposed continues to rise,as does the difficulty that citizens,companies and governments face in distinguishing i
309、t from true information.The interplay of rising Misinformation and disinformation with political and Societal polarization creates greater scope for algorithmic bias.If human,institutional and societal biases are not addressed,and/or best practices in modelling are neglected,the conditions will be r
310、ipe for algorithmic bias to become more prevalent.Such bias,whether inherent in data,models or their creators,can lead to unjust outcomes.Despite the dangers related to false or misleading content,and the associated risks of algorithmic bias,citizens need to strike a balance between privacy on one h
311、and and increased online personalization and convenience on the other hand.While data governance and regulation vary worldwide,it is becoming easier for citizens to be monitored,enabling governments,technology companies and threat actors to reach deeper into peoples lives.Those with access to rising
312、 computing power and the ability to leverage sophisticated AI/GenAI models could,if they choose to,exploit further the vulnerabilities provided by citizens online footprints.Rising political and Societal polarization could become more of a driving force for such increased surveillance.Misinformation
313、 and disinformation in a polarized worldThe advent of new technologies and the increase in user-generated content platforms is leading to a corresponding rise in the volume of content online.Flows of Misinformation and disinformation from those creating it are becoming more challenging to detect and
314、 remove in an increasingly fragmented media landscape.Differentiating between AI-and human-generated false or misleading content in the form of video,Global Risks Report 202534National risk perceptions:Misinformation and disinformationFIGURE 1.23SourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 20
315、24.Executive Survey Opinion rank of national risks from the question“Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?”Rank1st10th20th31stimages,voice or text can be difficult.GenAI lowers the barriers for content production and distribution,and s
316、ome of that content is inaccurate.Threat actors,state agencies in some countries,49 activist groups,and individuals who may or may not have criminal intentions can automate and expand disinformation campaigns,greatly increasing their reach and impact.50 Misinformation and disinformation can also be
317、the result of AI-hallucinated content or human error,and these too are likely to rise amid the growing volume of content.The upshot is that it is becoming increasingly hard to know where to turn for true information.Both political and Societal polarization skew narratives and distort facts,contribut
318、ing to low and declining trust in media.51 Across a sample of 47 countries,only 40%of respondents said that they trusted most news.52 According to the EOS,respondents in high-income countries are generally more likely to express concern about the risk of Misinformation and disinformation over the ne
319、xt two years than respondents in lower-income countries,with some exceptions.This risk ranks among the top five in 13 countries,including India,Germany and Canada,and features in the top 10 in 30 additional countries(Figure 1.23).Respondents identifying this risk often also highlight Societal polari
320、zation as one of the most severe risks in the same timeframe.Poor quality content and lack of trust in information sources continue to present a threat to societies.53Algorithms,especially complex machine learning models,can also be an entry point for cyberattacks that use disinformation.An example
321、of this would be a structured query language injection attack,in which inputs are manipulated to generate incorrect outcomes or to compromise training data sets.54 As many models lack transparency,either by intention,by accident,or because of intrinsic opacity,it is difficult to identify vulnerabili
322、ties and mitigate potential threats.In addition,given the reliance of algorithms on third-party data sources,software libraries and network infrastructures,threat actors can compromise the supply chain to manipulate algorithms and cause widespread damage.Further,as algorithms come to govern or influ
323、ence more aspects of society,the potential for coordinated cyberattacks using automated systems grows.Global Risks Report 202535Algorithmic biasAlgorithmic bias can both be influenced by Misinformation and disinformation and can be a cause of it.55 The risks of algorithmic bias are heightened when t
324、he data used for training an AI model is itself a biased sample.Sometimes,the bias can be obvious.For example,in a hiring process,a set of bios used as examples of good candidates might be drawn from a pool of previous candidates,all of whom might have the same gender,race or nationality.Other times
325、,a bias can be less obvious:for example,a model could be trained on citizens previous spending on education,without accounting for certain minority groups typically spending less on education.Synthetic data may be used,aiming to remove bias,but that can itself introduce new biases.56Examples of bias
326、es against citizens include waiting times for a government appointment being assigned on the basis of a questionable set of input data and criteria,or automated responses failing to respond adequately to citizens needs.When algorithms are applied to sensitive decisions,biases in training data or ass
327、umptions made during model design can perpetuate or exacerbate inequities,further disenfranchising marginalized groups.Predictive policing is one area where algorithmic bias based on race can be a concern.57 Such risks are heightened further when there is no human participation in decision-making.Un
328、less there are clear accountability frameworks in place,the use of automated algorithms makes it challenging to assign responsibility when harmful or erroneous decisions are made,especially when AI is involved.Automated algorithms often operate as“black boxes”,making it difficult for individuals to
329、understand how decisions are made.This lack of transparency and accountability can foster mistrust and skepticism about the fairness and accuracy of decisions taken.In many cases,algorithmic bias can be the result of lack of knowledge,testing or sufficient oversight.How a model is developed,applied
330、and governed is key to mitigating these risks.Independently of the input dataset used,the personal biases of individuals designing the assumptions of the model can also play a role in leading to unjust outcomes.These personal biases may be accidental(for example,the result of those inputting the dat
331、a having insufficient technical expertise)or intentional,for example,to pursue political aims.One risk that could come into focus more over the next two years is algorithmic bias against peoples political identity.58 Algorithmic political bias might be used intentionally to,for example,affect recrui
332、tment into public-sector jobs or access to certain public services or financial services.What makes this risk especially dangerous is that individuals political biases are widely known,and those biases can easily find their way into algorithms or data sets.Furthermore,individuals political views can
333、 increasingly be determined,even against their will,from their online activities.59Similarly to individual biases,societal biases can also play a role.60 These are likely to become more prevalent as societal divisions deepen.In the GRPS,Societal polarization is ranked#4 over a two-year time horizon.Regionally,Latin America and the Caribbean,Eastern Asia and Europe manifest the most pressing concer