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1、February 2023ReportRekindling US productivity for a new eraRegaining historical rates of productivity growth would add$10 trillion to US GDP a boost needed to confront workforce shortages,debt,inflation,and the energy transition.AuthorsCharles Atkins,San FranciscoOlivia White,San FranciscoAsutosh Pa
2、dhi,ChicagoKweilin Ellingrud,MinneapolisAnu Madgavkar,New JerseyMichael Neary,San FranciscoEditorMark Staples,New YorkMcKinsey Global InstituteThe McKinsey Global Institute was established in 1990.Our mission is to provide a fact base to aid decision making on the economic and business issues most c
3、ritical to the worlds companies and policy leaders.We benefit from the full range of McKinseys regional,sectoral,and functional knowledge,skills,and expertise,but editorial direction and decisions are solely the responsibility of MGI directors and partners.Our research is currently grouped into five
4、 major themes:Productivity and prosperity:Creating and harnessing the worlds assets most productively Resources of the world:Building,powering,and feeding the world sustainably Human potential:Maximizing and achieving the potential of human talent Global connections:Exploring how flows of goods,peop
5、le,and ideas shape economies Technologies and markets of the future:Discussing the next big arenas of value and competitionWe aim for independent and fact-based research.None of our work is commissioned or funded by any business,government,or other institution;we share our results publicly free of c
6、harge;and we are entirely funded by the partners of McKinsey.While we engage multiple distinguished external advisers to contribute to our work,the analyses presented in our publications are MGIs alone,and any errors are our own.You can find out more about MGI and our research at Directors MGI Partn
7、ersSven Smit(chair)Michael ChuiChris Bradley Mekala KrishnanKweilin Ellingrud Anu MadgavkarMarco Piccitto Jan MischkeOlivia White Jeongmin SeongJonathan Woetzel Tilman TackeContentsAt a glance vIntroduction 1US productivity is a story of haves and have-nots 4Looming challenges make productivity grow
8、th an imperative 14Achieving and equalizing productivity gains will require concerted action 18Acknowledgments 22iiiMcKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new era Boosting US productivity represents a$10 trillion opportunity.Thats the potential cumulative increase in US GDP betwe
9、en now and 2030equivalent to$15,000 per householdthat could result from regaining the long-term productivity growth rate of 2.2 percent annually(exhibit).Looming challenges make productivity growth an imperative.Workforce shortages,debt,inflation,and the cost of the energy transition are powerful he
10、adwinds.All will be easier to confront with higher productivity.Since 2005,US labor productivity has grown at a lackluster 1.4 percent.At the same time,real wages have slowed and workforce participation has declined.Averages obscure important variation across states,cities,sectors,and firms.Some hav
11、e become much more productive,while others are increasingly falling behindand in many sectors the most productive firms are fivefold more productive(or more)than the least productive.Achieving and equalizing productivity gains will require concerted action.Priorities include unlocking the power of e
12、xisting technology,investing in intangibles,improving workforce reskilling and labor mobility,and implementing place-based approaches tuned to specific geographies.At a glanceSee exhibit next pagevMcKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraFocusing on long-term productivity gr
13、owth could add$10 trillion in output,as shown by some states,cities,and sectors maintaining growth near 2.2 percent.McKinsey&CompanyUS GDP,real dollars,2021,$trillion152025301.4%productivity growth(200519 average)2.2%productivity growth(19482019 average)200520212030Two projectionsGap between the 2 p
14、rojections is equivalent to:$10 trillionCumulative GDP added over 202130$15,000Additional output per household in 2030North DakotaWashingtonCaliforniaSan FranciscoSan JoseSeattleInformationMiningWholesale tradeFastest-growing sectors,200519Fastest-growing states and cities,200719ExhibitviMcKinsey Gl
15、obal Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraLabor productivity growth1 has been the engine of US economic power and prosperity since WorldWar II,adding 2.2 percent annually to economic growth and contributing mightily to a 1.7 percent annual gain in real incomes.Looking to the future,simi
16、lar levels of productivity growth would help the country confront looming challenges,including workforce shortages,debt,inflation,and the cost of the energy transition.(For background on productivity,see sidebar“More with less:Aproductivity primer.”)But if the US economy were a car,the engine has be
17、en sputtering for a while.In the past 15 years,productivity growth has averaged just 1.4 percent,even as incredible advances in digital technology put a supercomputer in every pocket.This state of affairs is well known.It is also not confined to the United States.Most OECD countries have seen a drop
18、 in labor productivity growth since 2005.2In the US economy,theres also a problem with the transmission.The link between productivity growth and real incomes has weakened.In the postwar boom from 194870,incomes grew at 3.0 percent annually,3 while productivity growth averaged 2.8 percent.More recent
19、ly,real incomes have grown at 0.7 percent,well below the 1.4 percent gains in productivity(Exhibit 1).Worse,not everyone has shared equally in the relatively low gains in income,and labor participation rates have fallen from 67 percent in the 1990s to 63 percent in 2019,4 as millions have become dis
20、couraged about work.5Returning US productivity to its long-term trend of 2.2 percent annual growth would add$10 trillion in cumulative GDP over the next ten years.This is equivalent to every US household seeing a cumulative income gain of$15,000 over that period.Other things being equal,it would als
21、o boost stagnating median incomes and encourage labor participation.6Its an aspirational prospect and one with historical precedent.In 1995,five-year productivity growth averaged 1.6 percent,only for productivity to jump to 3 percent the following decade.Recent technology advances,including in AI an
22、d biotechnology as well as productivity spikes since the global COVID-19 pandemic,raised hopes(albeit briefly)that perhaps another boost may lie ahead.1 In this study,we define labor productivity as the following:LP=the output of goods and services/working hours.Output is defined as the real value-a
23、dded output for the relevant sectors and states.For growth comparisons,output measures are deflated using the appropriate sector-or state-level deflators.An extensive literature exists that documents the shortcomings of such deflators in accounting for quality improvements in goods and services(see,
24、for example,David M.Byrne,John G.Fernald,and Marshall B.Reinsdorf,Does the United States have a productivity slowdown or a measurement problem?,Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,working paper 2016-03,April 2016).Efforts to account for such errors find that they do not explain the aggregate slowd
25、own in productivity since 2005 in the United States.Throughout this research,we calculate labor productivity on a five-year rolling average.For longer time period comparisons,we compare the level of labor productivity indexes versus the prior period.Due to data limitations,we have occasionally used
26、proxies or assumptions for the numerator or denominator in labor productivity based on data availability.For national,sector-level,or state-level estimates,we use output,hours worked,and productivity data directly from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS).For sector data at a state level,we estima
27、te state-level productivity using state-level GDP by sector data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis(BEA)and employment by sector from the US Census Bureau.For city-level estimates,we utilize GDP by metropolitan statistical area estimates from the BEA and employment-level estimates from the Cens
28、us Bureau.2 Robert J.Gordon,Why has economic growth slowed when innovation appears to be accelerating?,National Bureau of Economic Research,working paper 24554,April 2018;David Adler and Laurence B.Siegel,The Productivity Puzzle:Restoring Economic Dynamism,New York,NY:CFA Institute Research Foundati
29、on Publications,2019.3 Real compensation includes employer costs for wages,salaries,and employee benefits;deflated against the consumer price index,which is heavily influenced by rising housing and healthcare costs,to estimate worker purchasing power.4 Labor participation rates fell to 63 percent fr
30、om 2005 to 2019.5 Working Economics Blog,“Wages for the top 1%skyrocketed 160%since 1979 while the share of wages for the bottom 90%shrunk,”blog entry by Jori Kandra and Lawrence Mishel,December 1,2020.6 Economic Report of the President,White House and Council of Economic Advisors,February 2015.Intr
31、oduction1McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraSidebar1 One productivity measure,total factor productivity(TFP),accounts for both capital and labor.Many of the trends and challenges that weve observed with labor productivity hold true when measured with TFP.2 Anna M.Stans
32、bury and Lawrence H.Summers,Productivity and pay:Is the link broken?,National Bureau of Economic Research,working paper 24165,December 2017;Grant E.Hayes,James M.Jedras,Edward Lazear,and Kathryn L.Shaw,Productivity and wages:What was the productivity-wage link in the digital revolution of the past,a
33、nd what might occur in the AI revolution of the future?,National Bureau of Economic Research,working paper 30734,December 2022.3 Open Vault Blog,“Nonfarm payrolls:Why farmers arent included in jobs data,”blog entry by Maria Hasenstab,July 3,2019.4 See,for example,David M.Byrne,John G.Fernald,and Mar
34、shall B.Reinsdorf,Does the United States have a productivity slowdown or a measurement problem?,Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,working paper 2016-03,April 2016.More with less:A productivity primerProductivity is the measure of output relative to input.In macroeconomic terms,its a measure of t
35、he value of the goods and services produced,divided by the amount of labor,capital,and other resources required for its production.For this paper,we focus on labor productivity,which is defined as the economic output per hour worked.1 This is a commonly used productivity measure,and is of interest s
36、ince it is the most consequential determinant of long-run economic growth.Rising prosperitya higher standard of livingcan come only from productivity growth.And in the long run,labor productivity and real wages are closely,if not perfectly,linked.2 Productivity growth will also be essential to addre
37、ss several looming challenges.As the US population ages and the ratio of nonworkers to workers grows,productivity growth in the remaining workforce will be essential to sustain output and meet the needs of the population.Productivity will also ameliorate inflation,by reducing the need for supply-con
38、strained labor,capital,and raw materials to deliver a given output.And by delivering a larger economic base,productivity will increase the affordability of the coming energy transition as well as growing debt and entitlements.Measures of productivity typically focus on the nonfarm business sector to
39、 exclude government and farming activities3 for which reliable productivity data is unavailable.The nonfarm business sector represented 87 percent of US GDP in 2021.It encompasses 18 sectors,spread across services(78 percent)such as retail trade and goods production(22 percent).To compare across per
40、iods,economists adjust the value of output to account for changes in prices and quality.Any analysis of productivity is susceptible to errors or blind spots.In the numerator,rapid technological progress can complicate measurement of output across time periods by making it more challenging to account
41、 for changes in the quality of goods and services.In addition,reliable measures of quality can be challenging to construct in areas such as healthcare where services,prices,and health outcomes are often disconnected.In the denominator,too,there are complications.For instance,informal working hours a
42、re often not captured,which can impede measurement in sectors with high share of informal labor such as construction.This esoteric topic has taken on new urgency,given the paradoxical productivity slowdown that has occurred during a boom era in technology innovation over the past 15 years.Some have
43、argued that this paradox reflects measurement error,and with more accurate quality adjustments the productivity slowdown would disappear.For this to be true,there not only needs to be mismeasurement but the scale of mismeasurement also needs to have increased over the past 15 years.A number of resea
44、rchers studying the issue have found no evidence of an increase in mismeasurement that would explain the aggregate slowdown in productivity since 2005 in the United States.4A note on our sources and methods:our measures of output are primarily real value added,or sectoral output(in 2012 dollars)from
45、 data sets published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS)and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis(BEA).Our calculation of working hours comes primarily from the BLS.We have also used proxies for inputs(such as total employment)where needed,incorporating additional data from Moodys Investors Servi
46、ce,the US Census Bureau,the World Bank,the Conference Board,and the Federal Reserve Board.The period we studied in most cases stops in 2019 or earlier,to stay focused on long-term patterns and avoid the gyrations of the COVID-19 pandemic.2McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a ne
47、w eraIt will not be easy,but some states,cities,sectors,and firms are growing productivity quickly and set an example.For example,from 200719,Washington and North Dakota raised productivity at a growth rate over 2.2 percent;California was close,at 2.1 percent.Seattle has powered growth in Washington
48、,and San Jose and San Francisco have led the way for California.Among sectors,mining and information grew productivity faster than 2.2 percent,though together these represent only 10 percent of US output and 3 percent of working hours.Even in slower-growing sectors,such as manufacturing,the most pro
49、ductive firms outpace laggards by a factor of five or more.The$10 trillion goal poses difficult but not insurmountable challenges.In this research,we review the patterns of productivity growth over the past 15 years,parse the challenges that lie ahead,and identify implications for business leaders a
50、nd policy makers.US labor productivity is running well below its long-term average.Change in US nonfarm,private business labor productivity growth and real hourly compensation growth,%Data series for real compensation growth begins in 1948 and for labor productivity growth in 1949.Rolling averages i
51、n initial years are for fewer than 5 years,refecting that availability.Source:US Bureau of Labor Statistics;US Federal Reserve economic data McKinsey&Company012345194819711989199520052019Era of marketsLaborproductivity5-year rolling average19492021 annual averageReal compensation5-year rolling avera
52、ge19482021 annual averageUS recessionsPostwar boom(194871)2.83.0Era ofcontention1.81.11.50.31.40.71.93.0Productivity and compensation averages for each era,%Exhibit 13McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraUS productivity is a story of haves and have-nots Averages obscure
53、details that matter.Some states,sectors,firms,and cities have become significantly more productivebut those gains have been far from universal.These patterns of divergence highlight the unevenness with which the benefits of innovation,globalization,and other shapers of productivity have spread acros
54、s the United States.(A similar story has unfolded in other nations;see sidebar“A global problem”for more.)Inequality among states is on the riseState-level productivity is diverging,with some states pulling away and others falling behind(Exhibit 2).This pattern is at odds with much of US history,whe
55、n states converged in productivity and income levels.7 Seven states currently lead the wayCalifornia,Colorado,Massachusetts,New York,North Dakota,Texas,and Washington.These leading states are both more productive and increasing productivity faster than the US average.Together,they provide nearly one
56、-third of the nations jobs and 40 percent of GDP.7 Robert J.Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,“Convergence,”Journal of Political Economy,April 1992,Volume 100,Number 2.SpVVK/Getty images4McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraSidebarA global problemThe United States is not un
57、ique in its productivity challenges with declining productivity growth observed across G7 nations since 2005(exhibit).The United States starts from a position of strength,being the most productive nation among the G7 in 2019.This has not always been the case:the United States overtook France and Ger
58、many shortly after the 200708 financial crisis,a position it has held since.Slowdowns in productivity growth can be seen across the G7 since 2005,with most countries experiencing declines of 0.6 to 1.6 percentage pointsequivalent to a halving of productivity growth.Other countries confront more cons
59、iderable challenges:Italy has barely sustained any productivity growth at all,averaging only 0.1 percent per year since 2005.The United Kingdom has experienced the most significant drop-off,falling from robust rates of 2.1 percent over 19952005 to 0.5 percent from 200519.These declines represent sig
60、nificant challenges to economic growth and individual prosperity in these economies.There is one area in which the United States is uniquely challengeddeclining labor participation.While each of the other G7 countries has experienced rising labor participation rates since the 1990s,bolstering their
61、total economic growth,labor participation in the United States has declined by 4 percent since its peak in 1998.This adds a further headwind to economic growth,and one to be confronted in concert with reviving productivity.See exhibit next page5McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity fo
62、r a new eraWeb Exhibit of The US experience mirrors other developed markets with a 1-percentage-point average decline since 2005.McKinsey&CompanyLabor productivity by G-7 country,output per hour worked,2021 international dollars,converted using purchasing power parity,%FranceUKItaly25507520192005199
63、519891.31.60.8Canada25507520192005199519891.50.825507520192005199519891.80.825507520192005199519890.525507520192005199519891.91.70.725507520192005199519891.90.60.1Germany25507520192005199519891.32.51.1CAGR over the same time periods,%JapanSource:The Conference Board2.72.62.32.1USUSUSUSUSUSUSSidebar
64、exhibit6McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraWeb Exhibit of Four groups of states are heading in diferent directions on productivity growth.McKinsey&CompanyUS labor productivity in 2019 and productivity growth,200719Source:US Bureau of Labor StatisticsGrowingStates movin
65、g up from a smaller base4000.50.51.011.5233.52.55060708010090Nonfarmaverage$67Circle size=change in total hours worked 200719Nonfarmaverage 1.3%NDCONJDENYMAILMDPANCOHINMINVAZFLSDNMVAHIIAMENEIDMTKYVTARMSALKSTNMOMNWAMALAWYCTAKCAGR 200719,%Real output 2019,$per hour worked(2012 dollars)TXCAORUTSCLeadin
66、gTop states pulling awaySlowingStates falling back from a high levelLaggingStates falling behindWAORIDMTUTHINMNDNEKSOKGANYNHPAOHMIINILWIMNIASDWYCOTXMOARLAMSALTNKYWVVANCSCFLCAAKNVAZMEMARICTNJDEMDVTStates by categoryNHWIGAWVRIOKMDExhibit 27McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new
67、 eraIn contrast,25 states lag behind,with below-average productivity and slower-than-average growth;many are inland states east of the Mississippi.This lagging group is also large;it includes 44 percent of total employment and 37 percent of real GDP.In 2007,average productivity across these states w
68、as 83 percent of todays leading states;by 2019 it had shrunk to 72 percent and by 2030 it will have fallen to 64 percent if productivity growth rates persist.The remaining 18 states present mixed stories.Six states,representing 8 percent of employment and 9 percent of GDP,are slowing.They have above
69、-average productivityfor nowbut their average productivity growth was near zero for the past decade.The story is reversed for 12 growing states with below-average productivity but above-average productivity growth rate.Should these states maintain their growth,they will continue to converge with the
70、 US average level of productivity.Surprisingly,sector mix within states explains little of the variation in productivity levels and none of the relative growth.High-productivity sectors have benefited some states,such as North Dakota,which benefited from the boom in natural gas,and California,which
71、reaped the benefits of the technology boom.However,in aggregate,sector employment mix only explains a small share of the productivity gap across states.8 As an example,the eight most-productive sectors amount only to 28 percent of California employmentroughly the same share as in the United States o
72、verall.Instead,both the absolute level of a states productivity and its growth rate seem to be driven by differences within sectors.For example,in 2007,information firms in California were 18 percent more productive than the US average,but this gap grew to 47 percent by 2017.In sectors such as retai
73、l,accommodation,and transportation,leading states have double or more the productivity of states that are lagging behind.This means having a desirable sector mix is not enoughto secure productivity growth,states need to provide an environment that enables firms to thrive across all sectors.That grow
74、th is necessary for states(and cities)to fulfill their goal of delivering economic gains that are broadly shared.Some sectors pulled aheadLike states,sectors present a picture of productivity divergence(Exhibit 3).Sectors with the highest and fastest-growing productivity have often been powered by a
75、 combination of advances in digital technology and an advantageous place in global industries.In a 2015 study,we observed a 70 percent correlation between sectors productivity growth and their level of digitization over the previous 30 years(Exhibit 4).Unfortunately,despiteand perhaps because ofthei
76、r relative productivity success,the sectors with the highest and fastest-growing productivity supply a disproportionately small number of jobs.They account for only 2 percent of new labor hours and on average generate 40 percent working hours per unit of output than other sectors.Four sectors are le
77、ading,largely powered by adoption of digital technologies.Mining,information,finance and insurance,and wholesale trade all enjoy above-average productivity and have grown most rapidly since 2005.With the exception of mining,which has benefited from natural gas innovation,all are among the most digit
78、ized sectors in the US economy.Information,which includes businesses such as software,telecommunications,and internet publishing,has been a productivity superstar,averaging 5.5 percent growth since 2005,propelled by internet services and software.While these sectors represent 25 percent of the US ec
79、onomy,they only account for 15 percent of US working hours.8 State sector value-added statistics are available from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.The US Census Bureau publishes estimates of state employment level by sector.8McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraLeadi
80、ng sectors in the United States are pulling away from the rest.McKinsey&CompanyUS labor productivity by sector,sectoral output in 2012 dollars per hour workedShare of outputShare of working hours20.524.530.517.214.523.736.630.90100200300400500Accommodationand food servicesOther services,except gover
81、nmentConstructionTransportationand warehousingHealthcare andsocial assistanceAdministrative and wastemanagement servicesRetail tradeArts,entertainment,and recreationProfessional,scientifc,and technical servicesManagement of companiesand enterprisesManufacturingReal estate andrental and leasingUtilit
82、iesWholesale tradeFinance and insuranceInformationMiningLeading sectorsSlowing sectorsGrowing sectorsLagging sectorsProductivityCAGR200519,%20052019Sizes of 2019 circles=working hours in 2019National average:$96 in 2005$110 in 2019Sectors share of US economy,by productivity bracket,2019,%GrowingLead
83、ingSlowingLaggingPrivate-education sector is excluded due to its small size.Figures do not sum to 100%,because they omit the private-education sectors 0.8%share.2.95.51.52.10.11.00.50.90.50.50.10.21.31.81.82.20.9Source:US Bureau of Labor StatisticsExhibit 39McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US pr
84、oductivity for a new eraAn additional four sectors representing 31 percent of the US economy are slowing:manufacturing,real estate,utilities,and management of companies have experienced slower growth but continue to outpace the US average.Employment in these sectors has shrunk,most notably in manufa
85、cturing,which dropped from 15 to 12 percent of national employment between 200519.Globalization has played an important role,shifting work in less productive subsectors such as textiles overseas,while highly productive,R&D-intensive subsectors grew rapidly.It also meant US firms shifted their place
86、in global value chains,reducing their share in labor-intensive activities such as factory production while retaining high-value activities such as design.The result was that subsectors such as semiconductor manufacturing could shrink employment by 19 percent while expanding productivity by almost 50
87、 percent.In contrast,a group of services-led sectors(for example,accommodation and food services,healthcare)are badly lagging on productivity growth while also being among the least-productive industries.These sectors also provide a disproportionate number of jobs:while they contribute only 24 perce
88、nt of economic output,they are responsible for 37 percent of hours worked.Worse,these sectors have accounted for more than two-thirds of employment growth since 2005,creating headwinds for overall productivity as more workers shift into less-productive work.These sectors tend to adopt technology mor
89、e slowly than highly productive sectors do,attract lower-skilled workers,and operate more prominently in local value chains,with limited exposure to global markets.Web Exhibit of Productivity growth in US sectors is linked to digital adoption.Sectors labor productivity growth compared with digitizat
90、ion levelPrivate-education sector is excluded due to its small size.The McKinsey Global Institute digitization index assesses digital assets,digital usage,and digital workers using 27 indicators to capture the many possible ways in which companies are digitizing.Source:US Bureau of Labor Statistics;
91、“Digital America:A tale of the haves and have-mores,”McKinsey Global Institute,Dec 1,2015McKinsey&Company010123465123465LaborproductivityCAGR19892019,%MGI digitization index(2015)LowHighArts andentertainmentMiningTransportation andwarehousingHealthcare andsocial assistanceAccommodation and food serv
92、icesConstructionInformationWholesale tradeUtilitiesFinanceandinsuranceProfessional,scientifc,technologyservicesRetail tradeManufacturingManagement of companiesOther servicesAdministrative and waste managementReal estate and rental correlation between productivity growth and digital adoption during t
93、he 19892019era of markets70%Exhibit 410McKinsey Global Institute|Rekindling US productivity for a new eraA few growing sectors(retail trade,professional services,administration and waste management)have provided a relative bright spot;they are converging with the US average.Together they represent 3
94、1 percent of working hours and 21 percent of GDP.Technology accounts for part of their story:subsectors such as non-store retail(e-commerce)and computer and electronic products manufacturing have experienced robust growth.In sum,technology adoption and competition have proved central to sector-level
95、 productivity improvement.Yet,the benefits of each have not been broadly shared to date.Leading firms outpace the restThe most productive firms in every sector have widened their lead on the rest.In fact,the gap between the most and least productive is wider within sectors than in any other dimensio
96、n we studied.Manufacturing provides a particularly striking example;leading firms operate at 5.4 times the productivity of laggards.9 In some manufacturing subsectors,the differences are extraordinary.The leading semiconductor manufacturers are 38 times more productive than the least-productive comp
97、anies.This mirrors other research showing similar patterns of divergence across other sectors such as wholesale trade and information.10The“frontier firms”in the productivity vanguard are accelerating away from their peers.These firms tend to be larger,more connected to global value chains,and focus
98、 on technology-intensive aspects of their sector.Research suggests these leading firms invest 2.6 times more in technology and other intangibles such as research and intellectual property,and attract and invest in more skilled talent.11 As a result,the gap between frontier firms and laggards has gro
99、wn over the past 30 years.In manufacturing,the gap was 25 percent wider in 2019 than it was in 1989,with most of that change happening before 2000.At the same time,industry dynamism has fallen,as seen in metrics such as new firm entry rate(which has declined 29 percent from 1989 to 2019 in the Unite
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